Mbappé brisé.
Saison blanche pour la maison blanche
3 buts fronçais ce soir
Saison blanche pour la maison blanche
Il reste encore le championnat.
AYAAAAAAAAAA l'ascenseur émotionnel
Cette chatte
Sales catalans de merde
Sales catalans de merde
Encore un hors jeu pour Mobutu.
Ayaaa le HJ qui sauve la baraque.
60 secondes.
Les étranges similitudes entre le Bayern et Barcelone de Flick
A high left back allowing a tucked in winger, a pivot joining the attack and plenty of men between the lines. That's the similarities between Bayern and Barca under Flick. However in the press, Barca has narrow wingers with a withdrawn center forward while Bayern pressed in a 4 4 2 with Lewandowski and Muller on top. At Bayern, Flick inherited a dressing room in disarray. Kovac alienated the club's elder statesmen leading to a dressing room filled with discontentment. Flick reinstated Neuer, Boateng and Muller tp prominent roles. In Barcelona, it was the opposite situation because rather than a squad full of disgruntled veterans, he had a team brimming with young talents. In Bayern, he turned Davies, a sporadic left back, into one of the best left back in the world. At Barcelona, nurturing young talents from La Masia became his main focus. Flick showed he had no problem adapting. Barcelona moved away from theit trademark 4 3 3 towards his preferred 4 2 3 1. It was a shape that allowed Barcelona to easily reshape into a 4 3 3 when needed. Both Bayern and Barcelona under Hansi Flick are possession based teams Flick's principles in possession are centered about creating overloads in dangerous areas, and ruthless verticality. So he minimizes the players in deep positions to maximize the bodies higher up the pitch, also offering multiple vertical passing lanes. In both teams, the fullbacks had the licence to move higher up the pitch, especially the left back. Of course the heart of his system if the double pivot. For Bayern, he had Thiago and Kimmich, 2 technically gifted midfielders who could effortlessly switch positions. Either could drop deeper whilst the other push forward, creating a fluid progression pattern that opponents struggled to deal with. At Barcelona, it manifested through Pedri and Casado ( or De Jong ) for most of the season. While Casado or De Jong typically stayed deeper, their ability to rotate positions became a powerful weapon.
Especially against a team that would aim to man mark the deepest pivot. In his second season at Bayern, it was a Kimmich - Goretzka double pivot Unlike some managers, Flick doesn't want to be dependent on a single metronome for all of the progression. Whenever possible, he wants to start from the back. He places a lot of this responsability on his center backs. He frees his midfielders to operate in more advanced positions to allow those overloads higher up the pitch and allow verticality. At Bayern, it was mostly on Boateng, who was a good long passer. He was joined by Alaba, who could either carry the ball up the field, switching the play, or piercing through the midfield to find men in higher lines. That's one of the reason he leaned so much on Cubarsi at Barcelona. His ability to pierce the lines give Pedri the freedom to not have to always drop deep to begin the build up. The other center back is often
Íñigo Martínez, who is no slouch with the ball either. Barcelona embraced a more direct progression, including long balls towards Lewandowski. One of the main differences between Bayern and Barcelona under Flick is when both teams faced high pressing oppositions with an aggressive front 2, forcing him to have a third man deep to create a minimal overload. At Barcelona, Flick wants to avoid as much as possible to have one of his pivots to drop deep. So Koundé often tucks in from his right back position. Only when it wasn't possible, a pivot would drop deep. In Bayern, both Kimmich and Thiago were more than happy to drop deep into the backline. One of them often dropped deep to create a 3 v 2 advantage, while tucking in Pavard from his right back position was only a secondary option. When it was Goretzka and Kimmich, Kimmich was the one used as the metronomic controller while Goretzka was the dynamic box to box crasher, causing overloads higher up the pitch with his vertical movements.
But it woudln't have make sense to turn Pedri into Goretzka like player. While Pedri pushes up as Goretzka, he rarely breaks into the box as a late finisher. Instead, he operates off the left or still more centrally, looking to create but just from higher up the pitch. When it cannot work, he can function as a more genuine pivot who is more aggressive than ever. True adaptability is not necessarly changing your principles but changing how you express them. The biggest change for Barcelona was the introduction of a true number 10, either Gavi, Olmo or Fermin, depending. The 10 was almost always seeking space between the lines, looking to be an option to receive. While a 10 can drift deeper to assist the other midfielders, they are expected to push high into the right hand half space for example or to stay higher up but central. As for Bayern, Muller as the cam could drift deep as well as cause overloads into the right hand side, like the Barcelona 10s are expected to do. Having them running into goalscoring positions by time meant that the 9 had to be good at link up play, which was the case with Lewandowski. Both teams also use loopsided fullbacks, with the left fullback being hyper aggressive while the right backs could both operate as a third center back, being a bit more conservative, with Gnabry and Raphina both tucking in from their left winger positions. With them both + the number 10, that meant that they had potentially 3 men who could receive between the lines. The tucked in wingers just like the number 10 had the responsability to break beyond the forward. On the right hand side, the winger wasn't always expecting to attack the center, with Sané and Yamal often trying to get into isolations on their flanks and providing the width. Flick also expected sometimes his right backs to arrive late and offer their wingers support when it was possible.
At Bayern with more physical players like Gnabry, Lewandowski and Goretzka, having a cross from wide regions became a main weapon while at Barcelona, the support shifted to cutbacks form the by line, with the same destination with a different route. At Bayern, they pressed in a 4 4 2 with Muller and Lewandowski often on the center backs and if they wanted to focus even more on protecting the center, one always picked up the deepest pivot while the other pressed the center backs. In Barcelona, Lewandowski picks up often the deepest pivot with the wingers moving infield to press the center backs, ensuring that the center is protected. This forces the opponent to play out wide, where the fullbacks have to press unusually high to back up the press. Finally, the obvious similarity between both teams are the very high defensive line used. Even if both defenses were more than decent, it still looked shaky by times against an opposition often looking to run in behind.
Les étranges similitudes entre le Bayern et Barcelone de Flick
A high left back allowing a tucked in winger, a pivot joining the attack and plenty of men between the lines. That's the similarities between Bayern and Barca under Flick. However in the press, Barca has narrow wingers with a withdrawn center forward while Bayern pressed in a 4 4 2 with Lewandowski and Muller on top. At Bayern, Flick inherited a dressing room in disarray. Kovac alienated the club's elder statesmen leading to a dressing room filled with discontentment. Flick reinstated Neuer, Boateng and Muller tp prominent roles. In Barcelona, it was the opposite situation because rather than a squad full of disgruntled veterans, he had a team brimming with young talents. In Bayern, he turned Davies, a sporadic left back, into one of the best left back in the world. At Barcelona, nurturing young talents from La Masia became his main focus. Flick showed he had no problem adapting. Barcelona moved away from theit trademark 4 3 3 towards his preferred 4 2 3 1. It was a shape that allowed Barcelona to easily reshape into a 4 3 3 when needed. Both Bayern and Barcelona under Hansi Flick are possession based teams Flick's principles in possession are centered about creating overloads in dangerous areas, and ruthless verticality. So he minimizes the players in deep positions to maximize the bodies higher up the pitch, also offering multiple vertical passing lanes. In both teams, the fullbacks had the licence to move higher up the pitch, especially the left back. Of course the heart of his system if the double pivot. For Bayern, he had Thiago and Kimmich, 2 technically gifted midfielders who could effortlessly switch positions. Either could drop deeper whilst the other push forward, creating a fluid progression pattern that opponents struggled to deal with. At Barcelona, it manifested through Pedri and Casado ( or De Jong ) for most of the season. While Casado or De Jong typically stayed deeper, their ability to rotate positions became a powerful weapon.
Especially against a team that would aim to man mark the deepest pivot. In his second season at Bayern, it was a Kimmich - Goretzka double pivot Unlike some managers, Flick doesn't want to be dependent on a single metronome for all of the progression. Whenever possible, he wants to start from the back. He places a lot of this responsability on his center backs. He frees his midfielders to operate in more advanced positions to allow those overloads higher up the pitch and allow verticality. At Bayern, it was mostly on Boateng, who was a good long passer. He was joined by Alaba, who could either carry the ball up the field, switching the play, or piercing through the midfield to find men in higher lines. That's one of the reason he leaned so much on Cubarsi at Barcelona. His ability to pierce the lines give Pedri the freedom to not have to always drop deep to begin the build up. The other center back is often
Íñigo Martínez, who is no slouch with the ball either. Barcelona embraced a more direct progression, including long balls towards Lewandowski. One of the main differences between Bayern and Barcelona under Flick is when both teams faced high pressing oppositions with an aggressive front 2, forcing him to have a third man deep to create a minimal overload. At Barcelona, Flick wants to avoid as much as possible to have one of his pivots to drop deep. So Koundé often tucks in from his right back position. Only when it wasn't possible, a pivot would drop deep. In Bayern, both Kimmich and Thiago were more than happy to drop deep into the backline. One of them often dropped deep to create a 3 v 2 advantage, while tucking in Pavard from his right back position was only a secondary option. When it was Goretzka and Kimmich, Kimmich was the one used as the metronomic controller while Goretzka was the dynamic box to box crasher, causing overloads higher up the pitch with his vertical movements.
But it woudln't have make sense to turn Pedri into Goretzka like player. While Pedri pushes up as Goretzka, he rarely breaks into the box as a late finisher. Instead, he operates off the left or still more centrally, looking to create but just from higher up the pitch. When it cannot work, he can function as a more genuine pivot who is more aggressive than ever. True adaptability is not necessarly changing your principles but changing how you express them. The biggest change for Barcelona was the introduction of a true number 10, either Gavi, Olmo or Fermin, depending. The 10 was almost always seeking space between the lines, looking to be an option to receive. While a 10 can drift deeper to assist the other midfielders, they are expected to push high into the right hand half space for example or to stay higher up but central. As for Bayern, Muller as the cam could drift deep as well as cause overloads into the right hand side, like the Barcelona 10s are expected to do. Having them running into goalscoring positions by time meant that the 9 had to be good at link up play, which was the case with Lewandowski. Both teams also use loopsided fullbacks, with the left fullback being hyper aggressive while the right backs could both operate as a third center back, being a bit more conservative, with Gnabry and Raphina both tucking in from their left winger positions. With them both + the number 10, that meant that they had potentially 3 men who could receive between the lines. The tucked in wingers just like the number 10 had the responsability to break beyond the forward. On the right hand side, the winger wasn't always expecting to attack the center, with Sané and Yamal often trying to get into isolations on their flanks and providing the width. Flick also expected sometimes his right backs to arrive late and offer their wingers support when it was possible.
At Bayern with more physical players like Gnabry, Lewandowski and Goretzka, having a cross from wide regions became a main weapon while at Barcelona, the support shifted to cutbacks form the by line, with the same destination with a different route. At Bayern, they pressed in a 4 4 2 with Muller and Lewandowski often on the center backs and if they wanted to focus even more on protecting the center, one always picked up the deepest pivot while the other pressed the center backs. In Barcelona, Lewandowski picks up often the deepest pivot with the wingers moving infield to press the center backs, ensuring that the center is protected. This forces the opponent to play out wide, where the fullbacks have to press unusually high to back up the press. Finally, the obvious similarity between both teams are the very high defensive line used. Even if both defenses were more than decent, it still looked shaky by times against an opposition often looking to run in behind.
Endrick, hors jeu de 2m, contrôle de boulanger. Sacrée pépite.
il aurait du laisser Rudiger
Endrick pue sa mr
Mbappé qui craque.
Mobutu qui fait faute.
AYAAAAA RUNIGGER
Rudiger quelle merde ce type
Pas de coupe Lana del Rey pour le Real cette année
On a pas tous la même couleur de peau mais on a tous la même couleur de popo.
Sans le foot il aurait bossé dans un abattoir ce malade.
