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Tactical Analysis : Brazil 4-1 South Korea| A Different Level From Brazil |
South Korea were looking to press in a 4 4 2 whatever Brazil was building from the goalick or even in more open plays situations. Because the 2 forwards pressed the centerbacks, the center midfielders had to back up the press in order to make it more difficult for Brazil to find their midfielders. But obvious problem was that they were 3 v 2 down and their extra men was Neymar. Because of the threat of pacy wingers like Vinicius and Raphina, it was difficult for the backline to back up the press. So they tended to sit slightly deeper. This would open spaces for Neymar between the lines. So Neymar is free because South Korea's doubles pivots are more concerned with Brazil's pivots than him. But Danilo during build up liked to operate more centrally alongside Casemiro, like an inverted fullback. This would give the freedom for Paqueto to push forward with Neymar often in the lft handside. With Danilo moving central, the wingers were dragged centrally with him also. The fullback had a problem since if he stayed high on Vinicius, Neymar would be free but if he stayed too narrow, Vinicius could receive the ball and then have a run on the fullback even when he came out. So the defense drifted aisde on the left. So Richarlison also drifted aside. Because of this overload it would be dificult for the backline to shift across. There were massive gaps between the defense and the miedfield and Neymar was dropping into these. Once he is drawing a fullback, Brazil had plenty of players in advanced positions.
Some teams used to deal with this kind of situations with the team not pressing high and instead having their forwards to cover the double pivots, allowing their own pivots to operate in deeper regions, which would allow them to cover more Neymar's movements while Lee could stay deeper to help the fullback in 1 v 2 situations. Higher up, Korea defended in a narrower 4 4 2 with their wingers often tucking in. But it had problems with the ability of Vinicius and Raphina in 1 v 1 situations. When Brazil was playing out wide, the winger could either take his men directly, either look to combine with the men in the half spaces, often being Neymar or Paqueta. For the first goal for example, Vinicius had the time and space to finish it because of Brazil's front 5. Brazil defended in a 4 4 2 mid block at times especially after scoring so early. Korea's fullbacks were quite agressive with Lee tucking in to be the third men, allowing his fullback to overlap. While Swang would hug the touchline, J. Kim could either tuck into the miedfield either also look to overlap wirings at times. So it left large gaps between the defense. When the ball was high, both Neymar and RIcharlisson tended to stay quite up so in the transitions, Brazil could either find their wingers running in behind, either find their forwards for a 1 v 1. Either way it wsa not ideal for South Korea so Brazil was enjoying playing in counter attacking football style. Even when Koreas's fullbacks were ditting deeper, Brazil kept staying agressive with their wingers pushing high on them. And they had the quality advantage in almost every positions to thrive in 1 v 1 situations.
The real problem with Brazil.
In the first 2 games vs Bolivia and Peru, players from European teams struggled to adapt to Diniz's views. It was the case later but in diferent ways against Venezuela and Uruguay where Brazil struggled to break their mid/low defensive blocks. Now Uruguay was more agressive than Venezuela in term of pressing. But Brazil passed their press pretty consistently. It was when Uruguay dropped into their compact mid block that problems appeared. Uruguay had their 4 2 3 1. Against Venezuela Brazil faced a 4 4 1 1 block. Brazil seemed to do some uncertain possessive football, as they were confused with what to do with the ball. On top of that Gabriel insisted on carrying the ball on his feet of his teamates rather than letting the ball do the work. He just close down the angles himself. If Brazil cannot put the ball quickly into the right areas, then it looks like the attack is basically dead before beginning. Neymar was very useful for Brazil's build up as he dropped quite deep to give the centerbacks passing options. He was good at finding the spaces between the lines and acted as a conductor of the game. When Neymar takes wide responsabilitues or comes close to the forward, the miedfield becomes dysfunctionnal. The fact that Casemiro either has to tell him to take the positions either takes the positions himself is showing Guimaraes is sometimes clueless about his role in the team. Just like he has a tendancy to apss and stand still instead of passing and move forwards. Also there are not enough forwards movements across the games; Of course Neymar and Casemiro missing the copa américa 2024 isn't going to help them.
.
Tactical Analysis : Brazil 4-1 South Korea| A Different Level From Brazil |
South Korea were looking to press in a 4 4 2 whatever Brazil was building from the goalick or even in more open plays situations. Because the 2 forwards pressed the centerbacks, the center midfielders had to back up the press in order to make it more difficult for Brazil to find their midfielders. But obvious problem was that they were 3 v 2 down and their extra men was Neymar. Because of the threat of pacy wingers like Vinicius and Raphina, it was difficult for the backline to back up the press. So they tended to sit slightly deeper. This would open spaces for Neymar between the lines. So Neymar is free because South Korea's doubles pivots are more concerned with Brazil's pivots than him. But Danilo during build up liked to operate more centrally alongside Casemiro, like an inverted fullback. This would give the freedom for Paqueto to push forward with Neymar often in the lft handside. With Danilo moving central, the wingers were dragged centrally with him also. The fullback had a problem since if he stayed high on Vinicius, Neymar would be free but if he stayed too narrow, Vinicius could receive the ball and then have a run on the fullback even when he came out. So the defense drifted aisde on the left. So Richarlison also drifted aside. Because of this overload it would be dificult for the backline to shift across. There were massive gaps between the defense and the miedfield and Neymar was dropping into these. Once he is drawing a fullback, Brazil had plenty of players in advanced positions.
Some teams used to deal with this kind of situations with the team not pressing high and instead having their forwards to cover the double pivots, allowing their own pivots to operate in deeper regions, which would allow them to cover more Neymar's movements while Lee could stay deeper to help the fullback in 1 v 2 situations. Higher up, Korea defended in a narrower 4 4 2 with their wingers often tucking in. But it had problems with the ability of Vinicius and Raphina in 1 v 1 situations. When Brazil was playing out wide, the winger could either take his men directly, either look to combine with the men in the half spaces, often being Neymar or Paqueta. For the first goal for example, Vinicius had the time and space to finish it because of Brazil's front 5. Brazil defended in a 4 4 2 mid block at times especially after scoring so early. Korea's fullbacks were quite agressive with Lee tucking in to be the third men, allowing his fullback to overlap. While Swang would hug the touchline, J. Kim could either tuck into the miedfield either also look to overlap wirings at times. So it left large gaps between the defense. When the ball was high, both Neymar and RIcharlisson tended to stay quite up so in the transitions, Brazil could either find their wingers running in behind, either find their forwards for a 1 v 1. Either way it wsa not ideal for South Korea so Brazil was enjoying playing in counter attacking football style. Even when Koreas's fullbacks were ditting deeper, Brazil kept staying agressive with their wingers pushing high on them. And they had the quality advantage in almost every positions to thrive in 1 v 1 situations.
The real problem with Brazil.
In the first 2 games vs Bolivia and Peru, players from European teams struggled to adapt to Diniz's views. It was the case later but in diferent ways against Venezuela and Uruguay where Brazil struggled to break their mid/low defensive blocks. Now Uruguay was more agressive than Venezuela in term of pressing. But Brazil passed their press pretty consistently. It was when Uruguay dropped into their compact mid block that problems appeared. Uruguay had their 4 2 3 1. Against Venezuela Brazil faced a 4 4 1 1 block. Brazil seemed to do some uncertain possessive football, as they were confused with what to do with the ball. On top of that Gabriel insisted on carrying the ball on his feet of his teamates rather than letting the ball do the work. He just close down the angles himself. If Brazil cannot put the ball quickly into the right areas, then it looks like the attack is basically dead before beginning. Neymar was very useful for Brazil's build up as he dropped quite deep to give the centerbacks passing options. He was good at finding the spaces between the lines and acted as a conductor of the game. When Neymar takes wide responsabilitues or comes close to the forward, the miedfield becomes dysfunctionnal. The fact that Casemiro either has to tell him to take the positions either takes the positions himself is showing Guimaraes is sometimes clueless about his role in the team. Just like he has a tendancy to apss and stand still instead of passing and move forwards. Also there are not enough forwards movements across the games; Of course Neymar and Casemiro missing the copa américa 2024 isn't going to help them.
.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
How Gasperini Dominated Europe's Biggest Teams
When defending, there are generally 2 diferent shools of thought, either zonal marking, either man marking. Zonal marking is for the managers thinking that the most dangerous threat is the ball while man marking managers believe that the player is the most dangerous threat. Depending of the situation, the majority of the teams will use a mixture of both. Some teams press man to man during the build up but transition into a zonal marking system from more active build positions. For example Man City under Guardiola used to press men to men from opposition goalkick. But will transition into zonal marking system from more active positions, covering passing lanes and trying to force the opposition the ball into designated areas. But it's uncomon to see man marking the way Atalanta do. Gaspereni's mens will follow their direct opponent relentlessly throughout the 90 minutes. And even as the opposition pushes up, they are not afraid to step up their line to close a player down, often resulting in completly diferents patterns and structures depending on the opposition, with no clear miedfield or defensive lines. In Gasperini's words, they are not waiting for opposition to make a msitake, but they are rather chasing the ball to win it back in a proactive way. Some rules are still followed. For example the wingbacks will usually wait to close their player down, first shutting down the risk of a direct ball in behind, before closing quickly the player down if the opposition moves down their flank. Against Liverpool, in Europa league we saw that Liverpool was given little space in the center. But there were slighty more spaces into the flanks and once Liverpool the decision to move down the left flank, Zappacosta would instantly close down the fullback and put pressure on the ball.
The beauty is that it doesn't matter where they are on the pitch. Atalanta are always looking to push up to win the ball. They don't play the offside trap and there is no clear defensive line. But if a player receives the ball with their back to the goal there is absolutly no way he will be able to turn around. This agressive defensive principles become even more interesting when entering the box and defending crosses. Generally speaking a team will look to get as many players as possible between the ball and the goal. Even man making teams will oftne shift to certain lvels of zonal marking in the box, either ressembling a diagonical line or triangle across the 6 yards bow and covering the most dangerou areas of the goal. But Gasperini still insists that the most dangerous elemnt is the player and not the ball. Rarely Atalanta has a fullback shape to rely on. For example in theri win against Monza we could see no player was left unmarked into the box. Atalanta would end up with extra players in the defense sometimes but they would usually pick up a position they believe will give their team the best chance of stopping a goal. But these playesr rarely adopt a specific structure. But this still has weakness that the opposition can exploit. Since there is no specific structure for Atalanta to fall back on, the opposition can and will drag the players aroud to exploit certain spaces. Whlie each player will need to be disciplined in 1 v 1 situations, all it takes is one player loosing track of his men and suddently, Atalanta can find themselves scrambling to pick up the extra player. And the space in behind the defense is usually the target to aim for. Before their match vs Liverpool, Atalanta foud themselves exposed on the back on multiple occasions usually with direct balls toward the striker to chase.
Coordinated moves forward and backward can leave the defender isolated at the back. A simple mistake can lead Atalanta's defense being exposed but this system can be an excellent starting point of any attack. Gasperini rarely shifted away from back 3 system during his carreer as a manager with the biggest difference being often either a 3 4 1 2 or a 3 4 2 1 with the 3 4 1 2 being the most comon formation the 2023 - 2024 season. Atalanta had become throught the seasons a more direct team, looking to get the ball forward into the attackers as quickly as possible. This season their offensive set of players means they can often rely of combinations to create chances. And will often adopt diferent shapes depending on who is playing, also resulting in a lot of diferent attacks. With Lookman they will usually end up with more players between the lines, allowing them to progress the ball centrally and exploit the space out wide witht he wingbacks before attacking forward himself. While playing with Scamacca, his hold up play is much more effective. And Atalanta will often loook out to play more centrally and directly into the forward, who can knock it down between the lines for Koopmeiners who can then play the other forward in behind. In their semi final clash against Marseille, the chooice of switching to a 3 4 2 1 with Lookman and Deketelare between the lines proved to be extremly beneficial and Atalanta were comfortably able to dominate the space between the lines. Scamacca could be relied on as a target men. who can knock it down between the lines For more structured attacks, their formation mean they are creating triangles either side of the pitch, that allows them to find easy passing combinations ad move the ball forward. either out wide or in the hald spaces. Combine this with the rotation of Koopmeiners with one of the 2 strikers and it creates big overloads on either side of the pitch.
His ability to pass into the box and to make coordinated his runs and attack the box himself proved to be dangerous and the focal point for the majority of Atalanta's attacks. The positionning of the wingback and striker mean that Koopmeiners position is difficult to cover and so he can receive the ball eitehr directly or indirectly in space. Once the ball is in this position, Atalanta's willingness to get forward is evident in all the players. It's very comon to see the wide centerbacks laying the ball off before attacking forward to give an extra option in attack. Scalvini, the right centerback highlights this with his heat map, consisting of pushing forward in the right and overlapping into more advanced positions while providing on average 3 progressive passes per match. The 2 holding miedfielders are also not shy of pushing forward. Ederson consistenyl provided dangerous balls for the striker while Pasalic, previously an attacking miedfielder, has been excellent from deeper positions, disrupting opposition's defenses when they least expect it. In the final third, thanks to runs from diferent players and from diferent positions, Atalanta are not reliant on only one way to create chances. And their goals can come from diferent scenarios, such as crosses from wingbacks, throught balls for the striker to chase, or cutbacks from timed runs into the half spaces, meaning that's impossible to predict how Atalanta are going to score their next goal. It's important to note about the psychological benefits that Gasperini gives to his players, by empowering every individuel there is a reason why he is giving new life to struggling players, whetever it's Ketelare after a disappointing season at Milan or Lookman struggling to make a significant impact for Fulham and for Leicester. Lookman is the guy who scored a hat trick in the Europa League final against unbean Bayer Leverkusen by the way in case someone forgot.
How Gasperini Dominated Europe's Biggest Teams
When defending, there are generally 2 diferent shools of thought, either zonal marking, either man marking. Zonal marking is for the managers thinking that the most dangerous threat is the ball while man marking managers believe that the player is the most dangerous threat. Depending of the situation, the majority of the teams will use a mixture of both. Some teams press man to man during the build up but transition into a zonal marking system from more active build positions. For example Man City under Guardiola used to press men to men from opposition goalkick. But will transition into zonal marking system from more active positions, covering passing lanes and trying to force the opposition the ball into designated areas. But it's uncomon to see man marking the way Atalanta do. Gaspereni's mens will follow their direct opponent relentlessly throughout the 90 minutes. And even as the opposition pushes up, they are not afraid to step up their line to close a player down, often resulting in completly diferents patterns and structures depending on the opposition, with no clear miedfield or defensive lines. In Gasperini's words, they are not waiting for opposition to make a msitake, but they are rather chasing the ball to win it back in a proactive way. Some rules are still followed. For example the wingbacks will usually wait to close their player down, first shutting down the risk of a direct ball in behind, before closing quickly the player down if the opposition moves down their flank. Against Liverpool, in Europa league we saw that Liverpool was given little space in the center. But there were slighty more spaces into the flanks and once Liverpool the decision to move down the left flank, Zappacosta would instantly close down the fullback and put pressure on the ball.
The beauty is that it doesn't matter where they are on the pitch. Atalanta are always looking to push up to win the ball. They don't play the offside trap and there is no clear defensive line. But if a player receives the ball with their back to the goal there is absolutly no way he will be able to turn around. This agressive defensive principles become even more interesting when entering the box and defending crosses. Generally speaking a team will look to get as many players as possible between the ball and the goal. Even man making teams will oftne shift to certain lvels of zonal marking in the box, either ressembling a diagonical line or triangle across the 6 yards bow and covering the most dangerou areas of the goal. But Gasperini still insists that the most dangerous elemnt is the player and not the ball. Rarely Atalanta has a fullback shape to rely on. For example in theri win against Monza we could see no player was left unmarked into the box. Atalanta would end up with extra players in the defense sometimes but they would usually pick up a position they believe will give their team the best chance of stopping a goal. But these playesr rarely adopt a specific structure. But this still has weakness that the opposition can exploit. Since there is no specific structure for Atalanta to fall back on, the opposition can and will drag the players aroud to exploit certain spaces. Whlie each player will need to be disciplined in 1 v 1 situations, all it takes is one player loosing track of his men and suddently, Atalanta can find themselves scrambling to pick up the extra player. And the space in behind the defense is usually the target to aim for. Before their match vs Liverpool, Atalanta foud themselves exposed on the back on multiple occasions usually with direct balls toward the striker to chase.
Coordinated moves forward and backward can leave the defender isolated at the back. A simple mistake can lead Atalanta's defense being exposed but this system can be an excellent starting point of any attack. Gasperini rarely shifted away from back 3 system during his carreer as a manager with the biggest difference being often either a 3 4 1 2 or a 3 4 2 1 with the 3 4 1 2 being the most comon formation the 2023 - 2024 season. Atalanta had become throught the seasons a more direct team, looking to get the ball forward into the attackers as quickly as possible. This season their offensive set of players means they can often rely of combinations to create chances. And will often adopt diferent shapes depending on who is playing, also resulting in a lot of diferent attacks. With Lookman they will usually end up with more players between the lines, allowing them to progress the ball centrally and exploit the space out wide witht he wingbacks before attacking forward himself. While playing with Scamacca, his hold up play is much more effective. And Atalanta will often loook out to play more centrally and directly into the forward, who can knock it down between the lines for Koopmeiners who can then play the other forward in behind. In their semi final clash against Marseille, the chooice of switching to a 3 4 2 1 with Lookman and Deketelare between the lines proved to be extremly beneficial and Atalanta were comfortably able to dominate the space between the lines. Scamacca could be relied on as a target men. who can knock it down between the lines For more structured attacks, their formation mean they are creating triangles either side of the pitch, that allows them to find easy passing combinations ad move the ball forward. either out wide or in the hald spaces. Combine this with the rotation of Koopmeiners with one of the 2 strikers and it creates big overloads on either side of the pitch.
His ability to pass into the box and to make coordinated his runs and attack the box himself proved to be dangerous and the focal point for the majority of Atalanta's attacks. The positionning of the wingback and striker mean that Koopmeiners position is difficult to cover and so he can receive the ball eitehr directly or indirectly in space. Once the ball is in this position, Atalanta's willingness to get forward is evident in all the players. It's very comon to see the wide centerbacks laying the ball off before attacking forward to give an extra option in attack. Scalvini, the right centerback highlights this with his heat map, consisting of pushing forward in the right and overlapping into more advanced positions while providing on average 3 progressive passes per match. The 2 holding miedfielders are also not shy of pushing forward. Ederson consistenyl provided dangerous balls for the striker while Pasalic, previously an attacking miedfielder, has been excellent from deeper positions, disrupting opposition's defenses when they least expect it. In the final third, thanks to runs from diferent players and from diferent positions, Atalanta are not reliant on only one way to create chances. And their goals can come from diferent scenarios, such as crosses from wingbacks, throught balls for the striker to chase, or cutbacks from timed runs into the half spaces, meaning that's impossible to predict how Atalanta are going to score their next goal. It's important to note about the psychological benefits that Gasperini gives to his players, by empowering every individuel there is a reason why he is giving new life to struggling players, whetever it's Ketelare after a disappointing season at Milan or Lookman struggling to make a significant impact for Fulham and for Leicester. Lookman is the guy who scored a hat trick in the Europa League final against unbean Bayer Leverkusen by the way in case someone forgot.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
How One Manager Finally BROKE Alonso's Tactics
In the first 15 minutes, Atalanta barely had the ball. Yet they were in control of the game. The 3 center backs had a men advantage meaning that they had a free man, normally a wide center back who could move up the pitch But this match was different. Rather than being passive with his defenders forming a back 5, Gasperini was agressive with his front 3 going man to man. Grimaldo on the left usually looked to push high to attack but the pressure on the center backs was so hard he had to move deeper to be an option. But Atalanta kept suffocating Leverkusen with their wingbacks, Tappacosta and Ruggeri pressing Leverkusen's wingbacks, But one crafty turn by Xhaka or Palacios and they would ahve an immediate numerical advantage. But that moment never came. Atalanta's pressing was perfect. Even if the central miedfielders were receiving the ball, there was no chance of receiving it while facing Atalanta's goal. It would often force them backward. So Leverkusen's pivots had to take more risks, either take a risky turn, or aim to win the ball quickly. But Atalanta's pivots were ready to intercept any passes, allowing to win the ball back and attacking Leverkusen's center backs. With the miedfield cut off and the pressure mouting, Alonso searched for a solution. After the match, Alonso stated that they should have play more long balls. The thing is Leverkusen played long more often, at least wwhen it comes down to the 3 centerbacks. The difference is that it was Atalanta forciing them to do so rather than Leverkusen choosing it. Hincape, Tah and Tapsoba had more long balls playing than average during this season. When Ederson and Koopmeiners went against Leverkusen's pivots, the front 3 threated to make runs in behind Now Frimpong could hold the width and Wirtz drop deeper. Stanisic looked to invert agressivly.
But Atalanta's secret was the trust Gasperini had in his players. This meant that the centerbacks had the freedome to go high in their man to man orientation. Hien, the right wide centerback of Atalanta, was hoding own against Adli Djimsiti would follow Wirtz to shut hum down and the man to man orientation meant that the back 3 would be as loopsided as they were running away from the front 3. It resulted in some gaps being open in central regions. Adli wsa supposed to be the man going in but Stanisic also stepped up on rare occasions here. Frimpong on the other side was perfectly positionned because not only he was isolating the wide centerback Kolasinac but the others forwards created room in the defense. Paired with the vertical spaces created by Atalanta backline meant that he was perfectly positionned to make the run in behind. In possession, Atalanta's wingbacks were more agressive, Zappacosta particularly pushing high. De Ketelare and Lookman could then tigh their shape around Xhaka. When Lookman dropped deep, dragging a centerback, it opened up spaces When being high on the pitch, Atalanta's main focus was trying as many shoots as possible. It was helped by the ball moving wide quickly supported by the attacking wingbacks, which allowed the front 3 to focus on attacking the box high up, rather than making connexions deep. Boniface came on for Leverkusen with Frimpong moving to the wingback position but only on paper, since he still stayed very high. It had the advantage of keeping the front 3 at close proximity, opening up the potential for combinations. The reason why Alonso didn't start with that is Tapsoba would be isolated on the transitions as the right centerback. Bonifca allowed Leverkusen offensive players to push forward as he was not only a target man but also able to link between the miedfield and the attack while holding off Hien, Atalanta's central centerback.
Nagelsmann’s tactics are even crazier than I thought
One of Nageslman's pilar is to always adapt to the opposition. He himself said in an interview that most coaches like to stretch the opposition's miedfield line but that he prefered to pull the defenders apart and create spaces in the final third. When Nageslmann sometimes choose to build up in a 3 1 3 3 against a compact 4 4 2, it's because it allows the attacking line to be much wider with the wingers hugging each touchline. Against a 5 3 2 defensive shape, the opposition's miedfield can stay compact while pressuring the left center back. But the wingback is centered out wide by the winger, isolated in the right back 1 v 1. It created spaces. Nagelsmann said he viewed the game mostly in term of spaces.and manipulate opposition's shape via rigid structures. When he was managing Leipzig,, rather than ball circulation, he wanted to put the ball forward very quickly. This often meant finding central routes in the lines. From that you could see 3 mens combinations. But it has some risks as with the players spread out, a dispossession in the center can be very difficult to counterpress. As a result, center backs could be quickly exposed. So rather having his players being in strict places like it was often the case with him, his players would be a lot closer together, often congregating between the lines.
So when you loose the ball, players are closer to it to counterpress. Nagelsmann came with the concept of relative width. Or variable witdh. The idea is that having both wingers are not hugging the touchline all time, Nagelsmann's wingers will only stay out wide as they need to be. When one winger hug the touchline to stretch the defensive opposition, the opposite winger will often be more narrow. You will often see narrow wingers in transitions situations. Before the ball goes centrally, the winger is often hugging the touchline. However, as soon as the miedfielder receives between the lines, the winger start drifting inside so he can receive the ball closer to the box. Stay wide is only to stretch the defense. The narrower the frontline is, the more players you have to counterpress. At Leipzig and even more at Bayern, you often see both swings as arrow and this block players in the box. So when cross is done, everyone is ready to jump on the rebound, ricochets and of course press if it falls to an opponent. You would end up with waves and waves of crosses and counterpress. So Nagelsmann has gegenpress among his principles with the players proximity and relative width. At Hoffenheim, he was known for his compact 5 3 2 which we of course never saw at Bayern. However one of his principles is also the pressing trap. It happens when he is not trying activly to have the ball back but would rather force the opponent into a position of disadvantage, moving the ball down the line where 5 Hoffenheim players have clustered. When he was in Bayern, although the press was more agressive and happening higher on the pitch, the same principles do remain : angled runs forcing ball down the touchline. So it's about setting pressing traps regardless of defensive shape. But recently, Nageslamnn has been trying to no longer trying to adap to the opponent and trying to manipulate spaces by implementing rigid structures. Width wasn't just relative, but optinonal.
It was often provided by the wide fullbacks who didn't arrive until later in the build up.
Tactical Analysis : Brazil 1-1 Croatia | How Brazil Got Knocked Out |
Biggest mistakes of Brazil vs Croatia.
-Letting Richarlison play with a hamstring injury and only subbing him at the 83 minutes mark
-Replacing Vini with Rodrygo instead of Martinelli (or just let Vini play ffs)
-Replacing Militão instead of Danilo
-And the most unforgiving, unexplicable and mindblowing mistake: Fred.
Imagine having Fabinho on the bench but sticking with Fred instead.
How One Manager Finally BROKE Alonso's Tactics
In the first 15 minutes, Atalanta barely had the ball. Yet they were in control of the game. The 3 center backs had a men advantage meaning that they had a free man, normally a wide center back who could move up the pitch But this match was different. Rather than being passive with his defenders forming a back 5, Gasperini was agressive with his front 3 going man to man. Grimaldo on the left usually looked to push high to attack but the pressure on the center backs was so hard he had to move deeper to be an option. But Atalanta kept suffocating Leverkusen with their wingbacks, Tappacosta and Ruggeri pressing Leverkusen's wingbacks, But one crafty turn by Xhaka or Palacios and they would ahve an immediate numerical advantage. But that moment never came. Atalanta's pressing was perfect. Even if the central miedfielders were receiving the ball, there was no chance of receiving it while facing Atalanta's goal. It would often force them backward. So Leverkusen's pivots had to take more risks, either take a risky turn, or aim to win the ball quickly. But Atalanta's pivots were ready to intercept any passes, allowing to win the ball back and attacking Leverkusen's center backs. With the miedfield cut off and the pressure mouting, Alonso searched for a solution. After the match, Alonso stated that they should have play more long balls. The thing is Leverkusen played long more often, at least wwhen it comes down to the 3 centerbacks. The difference is that it was Atalanta forciing them to do so rather than Leverkusen choosing it. Hincape, Tah and Tapsoba had more long balls playing than average during this season. When Ederson and Koopmeiners went against Leverkusen's pivots, the front 3 threated to make runs in behind Now Frimpong could hold the width and Wirtz drop deeper. Stanisic looked to invert agressivly.
But Atalanta's secret was the trust Gasperini had in his players. This meant that the centerbacks had the freedome to go high in their man to man orientation. Hien, the right wide centerback of Atalanta, was hoding own against Adli Djimsiti would follow Wirtz to shut hum down and the man to man orientation meant that the back 3 would be as loopsided as they were running away from the front 3. It resulted in some gaps being open in central regions. Adli wsa supposed to be the man going in but Stanisic also stepped up on rare occasions here. Frimpong on the other side was perfectly positionned because not only he was isolating the wide centerback Kolasinac but the others forwards created room in the defense. Paired with the vertical spaces created by Atalanta backline meant that he was perfectly positionned to make the run in behind. In possession, Atalanta's wingbacks were more agressive, Zappacosta particularly pushing high. De Ketelare and Lookman could then tigh their shape around Xhaka. When Lookman dropped deep, dragging a centerback, it opened up spaces When being high on the pitch, Atalanta's main focus was trying as many shoots as possible. It was helped by the ball moving wide quickly supported by the attacking wingbacks, which allowed the front 3 to focus on attacking the box high up, rather than making connexions deep. Boniface came on for Leverkusen with Frimpong moving to the wingback position but only on paper, since he still stayed very high. It had the advantage of keeping the front 3 at close proximity, opening up the potential for combinations. The reason why Alonso didn't start with that is Tapsoba would be isolated on the transitions as the right centerback. Bonifca allowed Leverkusen offensive players to push forward as he was not only a target man but also able to link between the miedfield and the attack while holding off Hien, Atalanta's central centerback.
Nagelsmann’s tactics are even crazier than I thought
One of Nageslman's pilar is to always adapt to the opposition. He himself said in an interview that most coaches like to stretch the opposition's miedfield line but that he prefered to pull the defenders apart and create spaces in the final third. When Nageslmann sometimes choose to build up in a 3 1 3 3 against a compact 4 4 2, it's because it allows the attacking line to be much wider with the wingers hugging each touchline. Against a 5 3 2 defensive shape, the opposition's miedfield can stay compact while pressuring the left center back. But the wingback is centered out wide by the winger, isolated in the right back 1 v 1. It created spaces. Nagelsmann said he viewed the game mostly in term of spaces.and manipulate opposition's shape via rigid structures. When he was managing Leipzig,, rather than ball circulation, he wanted to put the ball forward very quickly. This often meant finding central routes in the lines. From that you could see 3 mens combinations. But it has some risks as with the players spread out, a dispossession in the center can be very difficult to counterpress. As a result, center backs could be quickly exposed. So rather having his players being in strict places like it was often the case with him, his players would be a lot closer together, often congregating between the lines.
So when you loose the ball, players are closer to it to counterpress. Nagelsmann came with the concept of relative width. Or variable witdh. The idea is that having both wingers are not hugging the touchline all time, Nagelsmann's wingers will only stay out wide as they need to be. When one winger hug the touchline to stretch the defensive opposition, the opposite winger will often be more narrow. You will often see narrow wingers in transitions situations. Before the ball goes centrally, the winger is often hugging the touchline. However, as soon as the miedfielder receives between the lines, the winger start drifting inside so he can receive the ball closer to the box. Stay wide is only to stretch the defense. The narrower the frontline is, the more players you have to counterpress. At Leipzig and even more at Bayern, you often see both swings as arrow and this block players in the box. So when cross is done, everyone is ready to jump on the rebound, ricochets and of course press if it falls to an opponent. You would end up with waves and waves of crosses and counterpress. So Nagelsmann has gegenpress among his principles with the players proximity and relative width. At Hoffenheim, he was known for his compact 5 3 2 which we of course never saw at Bayern. However one of his principles is also the pressing trap. It happens when he is not trying activly to have the ball back but would rather force the opponent into a position of disadvantage, moving the ball down the line where 5 Hoffenheim players have clustered. When he was in Bayern, although the press was more agressive and happening higher on the pitch, the same principles do remain : angled runs forcing ball down the touchline. So it's about setting pressing traps regardless of defensive shape. But recently, Nageslamnn has been trying to no longer trying to adap to the opponent and trying to manipulate spaces by implementing rigid structures. Width wasn't just relative, but optinonal.
It was often provided by the wide fullbacks who didn't arrive until later in the build up.
Biggest mistakes of Brazil vs Croatia.
-Letting Richarlison play with a hamstring injury and only subbing him at the 83 minutes mark
-Replacing Vini with Rodrygo instead of Martinelli (or just let Vini play ffs)
-Replacing Militão instead of Danilo
-And the most unforgiving, unexplicable and mindblowing mistake: Fred.
Imagine having Fabinho on the bench but sticking with Fred instead.
Aya 200 pages.
Thomas Tuchel's Chelsea Tactics Explained | How Tuchel's Changed Chelsea |
Tuchel's tactics at Chelsea.
Tuchel brought consistency and slight twiks as well. His line up were either a 3 4 2, either a 3 4 1 2. He had players he would consistently start while only the wide attackers would rotate often with Havertz, Zieg and Hudson coming to replace Mount and Werner when needed. Also the right wingback position with Reece James and H Odoi rotating. Across the 2 formations, the build up are quite similar. Tuchel liked to keep possession of the ball. It started from the goalkepper who had a lot of options with the wide centerbacks spreasing wide, allowing the wingbacks to push up. It made it harder for opponents to press as Chelsea had 5 players deep, 3 centerbacks and 2 central miedfielder. And of course the gk, being either Mendy either Kepa. CHelsea passed the first phase relativly unchallenged since a man to man press made them vulnerable deeper. Higher up in the build up, Chelsea often maintained a 3 2 shape which gave them many options. Azpilicueta and Rudiger both as wide centerbacks had the responsability to carry the ball into the miedfield third to pass the first line of pressure and open up more passing options. If the opponent pressed with a front 3, in 4 3 3 in particular, Chelsea would often use the wide regions to their advantage with a wingback dropping deeper while the inside forward would occupy the wide regions left by the wingbacks. Alternativly, the forwards could drop into the wide regions instead. A double pivot made of Jorginho and Kovacic or Kanté had been crucial for their system. They were comfortable with the ball, creating options to receive the ball between the lines and often able to combine into tigh spaces to bypass their markers. Jorginho tended to be the deepest of the 2, acting like a metronome, looking to rotate the ball around the pitch.
So Kovacic was given more responsability and freedom at progressing the ball. Some teams would often go man to man against Chelsea's double pivots. Kovacic took advantage of this, using his dribbling ability to get pass his man. So Chelsea had a man advantage higher up. Mout is also capable of dropping deep to give numerical advantages in the miedfield when needed. He has been effective at doing this, picking the ball and play it to the runners and forwards ahead of him. So we coudl see Chelsea creating sides overloads to create spaces. Due to the pivots being trapped so closely, it often involved both of them moving wide, sometimes on the left, dragging the opposite miedfielder across with Mount dropping into these spaces created in the miedfield to receive helped by the winger ahead of him or occasionally by the wingback. We also saw sometimes 2 inside forwards dropping deep almost in the miedfield so the shape often looked like a box. which often made the opposition's miedfield to decide between pressing high and pressure the pivot which allow mens to be between the lines. Or dropping deeper and giving Jorginho and Kovacic more spaces Higher on the pitch, Chelsea used wide combinations between the forwards and the wingbacks. Down the left, Alonso was one of the best in the world in his position while Werner would try to get behind the defender or to be slightly deeper to get the ball, dragging the fullback infield, allowing the wingback to make his run out wide. Werner did that more often than being in the box to finish off, which could translate a lack of confidence.
Chelsea's attacking structure meant that they sometimes had a 5 v 4 advantage. And Chelsea had been brillant on the right side too. If the fullback choosed to pick Chelsea's right wingback, then Mount could often receive the ball in the half space. And once the fulllback close him down, he find the wingback in a great position to get a cross. In 4 3 1 2, Azpilicueta push even higher to find the width. Mount and an inside forward combined with one often dropping deep, creating space in the backline for the other to attack. In 3 4 1 2, when defending, Abraham and Werner could press the centerbacks while Mout stay deeper to cut off a center option, forcing the opposition to play outwide. Then, Chelsea's wingback could push higher to apply the pressure quickly. It was facilitated by the back 3, as they could shift to a back 4 rapidly to ensure that the opposition in not free to use these spaces. Similarly, when opponent build with 3, Mount could push up into the first line of pressure alongside the 2 others to maintain the man to man press with Jorginho and Kovacic pushing higher up in these phases to cover the central options. As they only had a double pivot, this press could be broken if the opposition had 3 mens here. It was often the trigger for Chelsea to drop into a more stable shape, a 5 4 1 with the inside forwards moving wider to prevent overloads. They then slow down the opponent and make it harder for them to create opportunities. And with 3 centerbacks, they can defend the box well. It's worth noticing that by the end of 2020/2021 season, It was Kanté who came to replace Kovacic in that midfield. And he did a very great job here. And at the end of the day, Tuchel managed to win the UCL with Chelsea in 2021 just one year after reaching the final with PSG and loosing it barely, prooving he was definitly an elite manager.
What Was Pep Thinking? Champions League Final Tactics Explained | Man City Vs Chelsea UCL
UCL final 2021 tactics.
In this final, Chelsea stick to their 3 4 2 1 with Kanté and Jorginho being the center miedfielders. But Guardiola made a lot of changes that surprised everyone. Walker, Diaz, Stones and Zinchenko were the defenders as expected. But the miedfield was more surprising with Guardiola starting Gundogan as the holding miedfielder with Bernardo Silva and Phil Foden respectivly on the right and left. No cdm. No Rodri or Fernandinho. The front 3 having Sterling in the left, De Bruyne in front and Mahrez also caught a lot of people off guard. The essential idea was to have 6 offensive minded players who could pass and be fluid in their positionning with the wingers cutting inside, De Bruyne as a false 9 and allowing both Silva and Foden to attack the backline to pressure Chelsea's back 3. But City lost valuable protection in front of the back 4 by having Gundogan as a holding miedfielder. During the first hald, Chelsea was able to exploit it a lot of times. The main idea of having Sterling in the left despite him being out of form was for him to find pockets of spaces between Chelsea"'s right wingback and Chelsea's right center back. And Gundogan was forced into a more defensive role even throught he had been excellent in a more offensive minded position. With Kanté dominating the miedfield for Chelsea, Foden became lost in here. Tuchel wanted to work with the 11 players that worked so well with him in the past in the same compo and formation. In the other hand, Guardiola choose a more reactive approach, looking to counter how Chelsea would play rather than fielding his strongest starting 11.
City wanted to dominate possession and attempted to move the ball throught the lines. And to find Mahrez or Sterling between the lines between the centerbacks and the wingbacks. Chelsea looked to hit Man City with very quick transitions and counter attacks. They would try to feed the front 3 in the pockets of space either side of the centerbacks. Also Chelsea didn't look to press to high. And their compact shape made extremly difficult for City to play between the lines. In the other hand,, City took a more agressive approach when they didn't have the ball, playing with a high line and pressing the centerbacks as soon as possible.
With the wingbacks and Werner in front, it formed a square for Chelsea covering the whole pitch and making it difficult for City to defend against. And City had a lot of outlets as soon as they won the ball. Kanté moved into an area to create overloads. In the semi final of the FA Cup the same 2021 year, Fernandinho as a cdm would not allow him to turn and pick out any vertical pass. But with Gundogan in he was caught out as he likes to press higher on the pitch. Stones tried to close him down in this UCL final when Chelsea's goal was scored. Werner did a good run to drag Diaz out to open the center of the pitch for Kai Havertz to run into. This was poor from ZInchenko but the ball from Mount was worldclass. The tactical changes saw Guardiola in the second half replacing De Bruyne who went injured because of a collision with Rudiger, by Gabriel Jesus, a surprising change since most people expected Sergio Aguero. A cdm was introduced in the 65th minute but for Man City it was too late. The compact 5 of the back shape with Havertz and Mout dropping deep either side of Jorginho and Kanté, making impossible for City to create any chance. The formation for City moved more into a 4 1 3 2 in the final half hour of the match. James and Chilwell were pocketing Sterling and Mahrez. It would result in hopeless crosses in the box with Jesus and Aguero being outnumbered in 3 v 2.
Thomas Tuchel's Chelsea Tactics Explained | How Tuchel's Changed Chelsea |
Tuchel's tactics at Chelsea.
Tuchel brought consistency and slight twiks as well. His line up were either a 3 4 2, either a 3 4 1 2. He had players he would consistently start while only the wide attackers would rotate often with Havertz, Zieg and Hudson coming to replace Mount and Werner when needed. Also the right wingback position with Reece James and H Odoi rotating. Across the 2 formations, the build up are quite similar. Tuchel liked to keep possession of the ball. It started from the goalkepper who had a lot of options with the wide centerbacks spreasing wide, allowing the wingbacks to push up. It made it harder for opponents to press as Chelsea had 5 players deep, 3 centerbacks and 2 central miedfielder. And of course the gk, being either Mendy either Kepa. CHelsea passed the first phase relativly unchallenged since a man to man press made them vulnerable deeper. Higher up in the build up, Chelsea often maintained a 3 2 shape which gave them many options. Azpilicueta and Rudiger both as wide centerbacks had the responsability to carry the ball into the miedfield third to pass the first line of pressure and open up more passing options. If the opponent pressed with a front 3, in 4 3 3 in particular, Chelsea would often use the wide regions to their advantage with a wingback dropping deeper while the inside forward would occupy the wide regions left by the wingbacks. Alternativly, the forwards could drop into the wide regions instead. A double pivot made of Jorginho and Kovacic or Kanté had been crucial for their system. They were comfortable with the ball, creating options to receive the ball between the lines and often able to combine into tigh spaces to bypass their markers. Jorginho tended to be the deepest of the 2, acting like a metronome, looking to rotate the ball around the pitch.
So Kovacic was given more responsability and freedom at progressing the ball. Some teams would often go man to man against Chelsea's double pivots. Kovacic took advantage of this, using his dribbling ability to get pass his man. So Chelsea had a man advantage higher up. Mout is also capable of dropping deep to give numerical advantages in the miedfield when needed. He has been effective at doing this, picking the ball and play it to the runners and forwards ahead of him. So we coudl see Chelsea creating sides overloads to create spaces. Due to the pivots being trapped so closely, it often involved both of them moving wide, sometimes on the left, dragging the opposite miedfielder across with Mount dropping into these spaces created in the miedfield to receive helped by the winger ahead of him or occasionally by the wingback. We also saw sometimes 2 inside forwards dropping deep almost in the miedfield so the shape often looked like a box. which often made the opposition's miedfield to decide between pressing high and pressure the pivot which allow mens to be between the lines. Or dropping deeper and giving Jorginho and Kovacic more spaces Higher on the pitch, Chelsea used wide combinations between the forwards and the wingbacks. Down the left, Alonso was one of the best in the world in his position while Werner would try to get behind the defender or to be slightly deeper to get the ball, dragging the fullback infield, allowing the wingback to make his run out wide. Werner did that more often than being in the box to finish off, which could translate a lack of confidence.
Chelsea's attacking structure meant that they sometimes had a 5 v 4 advantage. And Chelsea had been brillant on the right side too. If the fullback choosed to pick Chelsea's right wingback, then Mount could often receive the ball in the half space. And once the fulllback close him down, he find the wingback in a great position to get a cross. In 4 3 1 2, Azpilicueta push even higher to find the width. Mount and an inside forward combined with one often dropping deep, creating space in the backline for the other to attack. In 3 4 1 2, when defending, Abraham and Werner could press the centerbacks while Mout stay deeper to cut off a center option, forcing the opposition to play outwide. Then, Chelsea's wingback could push higher to apply the pressure quickly. It was facilitated by the back 3, as they could shift to a back 4 rapidly to ensure that the opposition in not free to use these spaces. Similarly, when opponent build with 3, Mount could push up into the first line of pressure alongside the 2 others to maintain the man to man press with Jorginho and Kovacic pushing higher up in these phases to cover the central options. As they only had a double pivot, this press could be broken if the opposition had 3 mens here. It was often the trigger for Chelsea to drop into a more stable shape, a 5 4 1 with the inside forwards moving wider to prevent overloads. They then slow down the opponent and make it harder for them to create opportunities. And with 3 centerbacks, they can defend the box well. It's worth noticing that by the end of 2020/2021 season, It was Kanté who came to replace Kovacic in that midfield. And he did a very great job here. And at the end of the day, Tuchel managed to win the UCL with Chelsea in 2021 just one year after reaching the final with PSG and loosing it barely, prooving he was definitly an elite manager.
What Was Pep Thinking? Champions League Final Tactics Explained | Man City Vs Chelsea UCL
UCL final 2021 tactics.
In this final, Chelsea stick to their 3 4 2 1 with Kanté and Jorginho being the center miedfielders. But Guardiola made a lot of changes that surprised everyone. Walker, Diaz, Stones and Zinchenko were the defenders as expected. But the miedfield was more surprising with Guardiola starting Gundogan as the holding miedfielder with Bernardo Silva and Phil Foden respectivly on the right and left. No cdm. No Rodri or Fernandinho. The front 3 having Sterling in the left, De Bruyne in front and Mahrez also caught a lot of people off guard. The essential idea was to have 6 offensive minded players who could pass and be fluid in their positionning with the wingers cutting inside, De Bruyne as a false 9 and allowing both Silva and Foden to attack the backline to pressure Chelsea's back 3. But City lost valuable protection in front of the back 4 by having Gundogan as a holding miedfielder. During the first hald, Chelsea was able to exploit it a lot of times. The main idea of having Sterling in the left despite him being out of form was for him to find pockets of spaces between Chelsea"'s right wingback and Chelsea's right center back. And Gundogan was forced into a more defensive role even throught he had been excellent in a more offensive minded position. With Kanté dominating the miedfield for Chelsea, Foden became lost in here. Tuchel wanted to work with the 11 players that worked so well with him in the past in the same compo and formation. In the other hand, Guardiola choose a more reactive approach, looking to counter how Chelsea would play rather than fielding his strongest starting 11.
City wanted to dominate possession and attempted to move the ball throught the lines. And to find Mahrez or Sterling between the lines between the centerbacks and the wingbacks. Chelsea looked to hit Man City with very quick transitions and counter attacks. They would try to feed the front 3 in the pockets of space either side of the centerbacks. Also Chelsea didn't look to press to high. And their compact shape made extremly difficult for City to play between the lines. In the other hand,, City took a more agressive approach when they didn't have the ball, playing with a high line and pressing the centerbacks as soon as possible.
With the wingbacks and Werner in front, it formed a square for Chelsea covering the whole pitch and making it difficult for City to defend against. And City had a lot of outlets as soon as they won the ball. Kanté moved into an area to create overloads. In the semi final of the FA Cup the same 2021 year, Fernandinho as a cdm would not allow him to turn and pick out any vertical pass. But with Gundogan in he was caught out as he likes to press higher on the pitch. Stones tried to close him down in this UCL final when Chelsea's goal was scored. Werner did a good run to drag Diaz out to open the center of the pitch for Kai Havertz to run into. This was poor from ZInchenko but the ball from Mount was worldclass. The tactical changes saw Guardiola in the second half replacing De Bruyne who went injured because of a collision with Rudiger, by Gabriel Jesus, a surprising change since most people expected Sergio Aguero. A cdm was introduced in the 65th minute but for Man City it was too late. The compact 5 of the back shape with Havertz and Mout dropping deep either side of Jorginho and Kanté, making impossible for City to create any chance. The formation for City moved more into a 4 1 3 2 in the final half hour of the match. James and Chilwell were pocketing Sterling and Mahrez. It would result in hopeless crosses in the box with Jesus and Aguero being outnumbered in 3 v 2.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
La Meilleure Tactique de Man United dont Personne ne Parle…
Back then in 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right midfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central midfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the midfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit.
Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide midfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player.
They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whenever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack.
When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming midfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide midfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide midfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was balanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.
La Meilleure Tactique de Man United dont Personne ne Parle…
Back then in 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right midfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central midfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the midfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit.
Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide midfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player.
They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whenever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack.
When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming midfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide midfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide midfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was balanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.
Remigrez!!!
Louis auguste je t'ai à l'œil
200 pages
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La Meilleure Tactique de Man United dont Personne ne Parle…
Back then in 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right midfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central midfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the midfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit.
Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide midfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player.
They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whenever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack.
When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming midfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide midfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide midfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was balanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.
La Meilleure Tactique de Man United dont Personne ne Parle…
Back then in 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right midfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central midfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the midfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit.
Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide midfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player.
They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whenever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack.
When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming midfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide midfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide midfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was balanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.
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