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Spain's tactics between 2008 and 2012.
Spain back then was known for their possession based football with slight and technical midfielders. The term used before tiki taka was " la furia ". It was a style of football that involved trying to get in good wide areas and swinging in as many crosses as possible into the twin forwards. The team changed during the 3 tournaments won but there were some pilars. Araones opeted for a 4 4 2 with creative players like Iniesta and David Silva out wide rather than crosses. In 2010 WC, Del Bosque opted for 4 2 3 1, giving them high control in the miedfield. This was morphing into a formation that was strikerless and wingerless 4 6 0. In 2008 euros, althought they played sometimes 4 4 2, there were instances when they played better in a 4 5 1 with a solitary forward with Torres being the lone forward and Fabregas being with Xavi in the midfield to form a 4 1 4 1. Despite attacking brillance of playes like Xavi, Iniesta, Torres and Silva, It could be argue that Marco Senna was the key to the team back then. In either formation he was the only midfielder primarly focused on the defensive tasks. That, combined with his incredible work rage, meant that he was the plateform to allow technical playmakers upfront to showcase their talents. Spain was much more lethargic in their possession. It was before Guardiola's revolution. It was more a passive position, often rotating the ball in the back until the perfect gap opened to play into the miedfield. In many ways, possession was used as a defensive tool, as their counter press had not been developed yet. So a loss of possession would have been much more costly especially when playing with a single pivot.
But when going into the meidfield, Senna often looked to pass to Xavi, who was the conductor of the game and the kye to stitching the midfield and the attack together. This was also the trigger for the inverted wide playmakers, David Silva and Iniesta, to drift into the half spaces, stark contrast to the old Spain where the wingers used to hug the touchline. At this time, both fullbacks, Ramos in particular, looked to move higher on the pitch to provide width in order to stretch the opposition's back line. In the final third, Spain had many options as they could choose to slip it into the wide fullbacks who looked for the cut back into the box or the cross as they had 2 aeriel capable forwards. But Villa could also drop into the midfield potentially drawing a center back out and creating another passing lane. Or if the center back stayed deep, he could create or shoot for himself. He could also push high alongside Torres, giving the miedfield more options to pass. When it came to defending, there was no rampant pressing. International sides rarely have the time to work on coordinated pressing mecanisms. So they would instead drop into a 4 5 1 mid block with Villa dropping into the midfield.
Busquets and Alonso came to replace Senna as Del Bosque opted for a double pivot. Spain used pacier wingers this time with Pedro and sometimes Villa moving on the wide left. Players like Fabregas and Silva also made massive contributions in certain matches. After their 1 0 loss against Switzerland, they had to play more cautious and less expensively. They switched to an even higher possession style, with players having much closer proximity. Their possession rose to 50% to 60%. It led Spain to score 8 goals in 7 matches. With the 3 maestro in the center of the pitch, being Busquets, Alonso and Xavi, Spain retained possession pretty easily. But the double pivots were not that physically gifted so 2 mens were needed to cover the width of the pitch. The double pivot was also a defensive precaution which allowed them to concede only 2 goals during the entire tournament. We often saw Iniesta start on the right. Naturally he drifted more inside to have the ball and create. It allowed Ramos to make his marauding runs when he overlapped. In the left as Villa attacked the box alongside Torres, Spain had good numbers in central zones, but it left a vacuum on the left as the Spanish left back Capdevila, was aging and less impressive than Ramos going forward. So as the tournament went, Spain shifted to a 1 men frontline It allowed the emerging Pedro out wide,a s he was much happier hugging the touchline. It stretched the opposition's back line a lot more. Defensivly Spain pressed more during this tournament with shades of Barcelona's system coming throught. However it was much less much less manic and more concerned about closing off passing lanes rather than creating turnovers high up.
In euro 2012 it was a strikerless system. Alba easily provided the width as a left back but Arebeola on the right was less impressive and more defensive minded. Instead of making quick switches like most teams would do, they used a thir man runner and pinpoint passing to get though on goal which they managed on several occasions.
Man United's post fergie tactics.
The amount of trophies United won dropped significantly since Ferguson left the club in 2013. Initially David Moyes was selected to replace Ferguson. He was a respected manager well known for the defensive elements of his teams. They then moved on with Luis Van Gaal, who had a good international reputation. He was known for his positionnal brand of position football. Then came Mourinho, the superstar manager known for his adaptability. Fellaini came in the winter transfer cindow under David Moyes. Moyes first chooice squad had Rooney behind Van Persie and they would combine as they did successfully during Ferguson's final moments at United. Then Mata would come into the 10 position and Rooney was pushed further forward as Van Persie had a lot of injuries. The formation was a 4 2 3 1. One of the criticism Moyes had received was the inefficiency of the miedfield. At times when he was at Everton, Fellaini functionned as a second striker, looking to receive the ball as a target man but now Moyes dropped him deeper to form a double pivot alongside Carricx more often. Fellanini was playing this role well For Belgium national time. However at United he came under a lot of criticism. His passing range was limited and he tended to slow down the game. Also both Fellaini and Carricx were physically limited and were not the best runners. Rooney back then was playing more as an attacking miedfield ans so more willing to drop deep alongside the pivots. He would use his passing ranges to release runners in behind. So Moyes tried to adapt by bypassing the meidfield and use the wide regions more often The conservatice nature of the double pivots often allowed the fullbacks to flood forward Both Evra and Rafael would look to join the attack. On the right, Rafael would often look to overlap. They did this often to have good cross positions.
However both Rafael and Valencia were extremly righr footed, meaning there was never any threat of anyone coming infield, making the attacks more predictables. Down the left Young could cut in for the shoots or crosses but he could also go down the line. Evra could go forward with Young covering his aging legs on the defensive end of the things. Man United had the most crosses per game in the league. But with Ronney's injuries, he was used more as a target in the box with Fellaini only joining when they were chasing a goal. Moyes was shown the door after his tactics were simply too predictables for the others teams. Van Gaal was given more funds in his transfert window. The major incoming in hsi side included Di Maria, Schneiderlin, Martial, Blind, Falcao, Rohr and Schwensteiger. He used a variety of tactics across his 2 seasons. But his 2 most comon formations were the 4 2 3 1 and 4 1 4 1. With some variations being the 3 5 2. The general principles remained the same. There was much greater emphasis on possession, rising from 54% under Moyes to 59% during Van Gaal's first season. He often looked to build up from the back. Van Gaal would often started Blind, a natural miedfield, to start as a center back to facilitate this. The builder play was very methodical with players taking constant positions to automate many phases of the play. with the man on the ball knowing where his options would be before even received it. But Man united still had a problem in the miedfield. When Di Maria joined on the right, he could slot into the left central miedfielder role. His proactivity on the ball meant that he could drive the team up the pitch and look for opportunities to create. But he soon fall out of favor meaning Man United's miedfield often had Schneiderlin, Schweinsteiger and Herrera as cam. All were capable miedfielders but they were more focused on retaining the ball rather than create. Rooney would sometimes drop deep to create for Van Persie.
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Xabi Alonso's tactics at Bayer Leverkusen.
Xabi Alonso went from pulling Bayer Leverkusen out of relegation to win the Bundesliga title in only 18 months, breaking German football. This club never won a league title since 100 years. From being a tiki taka team in first half to a counter attacking side in second half, based on diferent teams, Alonso keep changing his tactics. It only only confuses others teams but also make it almost impossible to break throught. They became the first team to win the league without loosing a single match. Since taking charge, Xabi has consistently used a 3 2 4 1 formation on paper. But instead of being ridig it keeps on changing during the match. It makes them unpredictable to play against. During build up they often play in a 4 2 4 asymetric shape with the right back staying upfront as a right winger while the back 4 spread wide to form the back 4. The reason is that German clubs are often press oriented, meaning it was difficult for others teams to build up short. So Xabi applied circular rotations, meaning that when opposition are pressing to the center backs, it passes it to the left back who deliberatly carries the ball and drifts toward the pivot. The right pivot simultaneously shifts on the right and takes on the right flank position. Due to this inward movement, it narrows down the front markers which frees up the right space for the right pivot who has a path to break throught the first line of pressure. But if opposition sits in low block this tactic can become ineffective. So to counter this, Alonso used a tactic that is a miw between Guardiola's in City and Zerbi's Brighton. For example when one of the center back passes the ball to one of the pivot, the pivot quickly passes the ball back to him.
It creates a pressing trigger to the markers to close the 2 players down which indirectly frees up spaces for the second pivot to receive an actual pass. It attract markers who are behind him. Due to this it creates an open space between the lines where one of the forwards drop deeper to receive the ball as a third man, which then draws one of the center backs and frees up space for the striker as fourth man. They use oppositio'ns press as a weapon against themselves. But if opposition, rather pressing 1 v 1 than pressing ni numbers with low press strategy, it also can be frawned. So to adress this, Xabi intentionally overload one presser with 2. WHe the center back is looking for a pass from one of the pivots, Palacios, who is close to Xhaka, intentionally jumps right in with Xhaka It confuses XHaka's marker who is being ready for a 1 v 1. Once the ball goes th Xhaka, Palacios is unmarked and becomes the third man to avance up the pitch. When entering in the second phase of build up, Alonso uses a combination between Guardiola's positionnal play and Diniz's relationnism. After the first phase, both pivots moves vertically to each other. Also their asymetrical approach makes Leverkusen play more on the right side of the pitch. It triggers the narrow right forward to shit to that side as well, creating a 6 box structure on one side of the pitch. At the same time Grimaldo the left back drifts wide to imitate his partner's winger role. If opposition commit a lot of mens to cover the 6 men box, then Bayer can easily switch play toward the left towards Grimaldo who only has one player to defend them. If they spread to cover the opposite player then it can create a 6 v 5 superiority on the other side where they can easily progress the ball with one touch. He uses Diniz's relationnism to overloard one side of the pitch and Pep's positionnal play by using the box tactic.
When they drift into the attacking phase, they switch from a 4 2 4 to a 3 2 5 structure where Grimaldo finally advances to act like his opposite partner, Frimpong. But rather playing this way it's generally used to trick the opposition's markers. If Leverkusen use a 3 2 5 shape, opposition often mark them using a 5 4 2 defensive structure. It makes difficult for Bayer to pass throught the block and often force them to rely on long balls. So to solve this one of the inverted forwards from the front 5 drops deeper and act as a roaming number 10. At the same time it gives both the wide center backs options to carry the ball forward while partnering Palacios with the roaming player. This makes the opposition shift to focus on the incoming center backs. It creates open spaces between the second and third line of defense. When receiving the ball, these players quickly join the front 4 and try to exploit the back line. Once they actually get near the box using this, the front 5 do the remaining work where they shift the entire opposition into one side. To achieve this they often pass the ball wide to the side player while the player inside the half spaces makes a deliberate wide run toward the flanks and draws his marker. This movement then frees up a striker without a man, leading the back line to spread towards him. When the ball is passed to the half space player it effectivly draws most of the opposition to the first half of the pitch which leaves the far right and right space player with just one marker. So a quick cross to them exposes the opposition's defense while creating a prime socring opportunity for Bayer Leverkusen. However Xabi's tactics trully emerges when out of possession. Witohut the ball they press in a 5 2 3 setup. The main objective was always to protect the center channels. So he created an interesting star line pattern to adress this.
For example, when opposition build up from the back, Alonso asks his front 3 to be narrow with both of the pivots just behind them, creating a compact star shape. It creates a numerical superiority in the center with a box 4 behind the striker. Even if the opposition still paly throught the center, Alonso encourages his wide center backs to step up as well makig it almost impossible to advance centrally. This forces the opposition to go wide. But as soon opposition plays wide the wingbacks quickly jumps onto them, creating a one side overload. The far sided center back track the wide options. It makes the opposition to go back and switches the play or trust their aerial ability. Even if the opposition breaks Bayer's perssing pattern, the team quickly transition into a 5 4 1 shape with the inverted forwards becoming the wide miedfielders. Due to the 3 center backs and the double pivots shileding the central areas, it helps to keep the opposition attack wide with the wingbacks and wide miedfielders to protect the flank. WHen they win the ball back using this, rather than quickly launching counter attack, Alonso let the opposition press them more in which he invites the opposition to couter press and let them commit more numbers forward. As the opposition is fully into their counterpress, Bayer quickly execute a long ball toward the forwards who are being left isolated. It makes them the most dangerous counter attacking sides as they use opposition's psychologie to their advantage. It can be only achieved with the player's roles. Rather than a traditionnal back 3, they form a back 4 with the right center back covering space behind the right wingback who is pushing up. The left back stays deep and takes the role of a wingback. Rather than being a traditionnal wingback, Grimaldo is one of the most versatile player in the squad who can operates as a winger during attacks, invert as a pivot during build up and even act as a third number 10.
However, he still fills his duties as a fullback when neede unlike Frimpong who had been assigned to a right winger role. Frimpong's positionning is even proactive than Trent as you might see him as a right winger, as a numer 10, even as a striker in various occasions. he also serves as press releasers due to his positionning for the central players. Palacios is a box to box miedfielder as he drops deep alongside Xhaka in the 4 plus 2 build up, then advances into spaces between the lines during the attack. Xhaka is the deep lying playmaker, being the main man launching counter attacks. Hoffman plays as a narrow attacking miedfielder giving Frimpong more spaces to take on the right wing while the right winger mostly controls the right half space. Wirtz in the other hand plays in a more wider role. When Grimaldo stays back to form a back 4, Wirtz takes the left wing to maintain the width. He also serves as a key playmaker with Grimaldo who drops between the lines to connect the miedfield with the attack. In order to create spaces for Wirtz between the lines, Xabi assigns both his center backs as ball players. He encourages them cto carry the ball and draw markers higher to open gaps between the lines. Boniface in front is used as a pressing forward. Due to his speed and strenght he plays a massive role for pressing the opposition from during the build up and in the counterpressing if they loose the ball. Their style os to blend the control with attacking mindset. In defense in order to apply a pattern at pressing they play with a high line and apply pressure across the opposition's half. In the ifnal third they are excellent at working the ball into the box, using close connexions and driving the ball at defense to create spaces between the lines or flanks.
Due to the close proximity of players, Alonso always favored short passes It's a possession based team who also excelles in counter attacks. A team that plays with a structure but also without. This is a team using opposition's counter press against them while also using counter press against their opponents.
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Excusez moi les amis j'étais bloqué temporairement par le site
membre de la confrérie des "Frères Validux"
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