Un post = un arabe remigré

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Guardiola's Barcelona 2010/11 Tactics | Pep Guardiola's Greatest Team? |


How Slot is Already Implementing His Philosophy at Liverpool

During Liverpool's match vs Arsenal in 2024, Arsenal pressed quite high on the pitch. But despite the fact that Liverpool were 3 v 2 with both cb and gk, Liverpool wasn't able to take advantage of that. Fullbacks are not necessarly hugging the touchline as you would expect and used to see from Klopp's Liverpool like with TAA starting out wide then later on the attacking, moving more centrally. They are not as central as how Arteta used Zinchenko on the other side of the pitch. They are not inverting, freeing a midfielder to push forward. They are more in half spaces positionning. If center backs move more wide, they can play the ball directly into the wingers either side into Carvalho or Salah. Secondly the close proximity of players in the center allow Liverpool to circulate possession more easily and then Tsimikas or Bradley received the ball into these positions, they had a number of different options where they could come the ball either centrally either into Jones or ethen down the line into Carvalho or Jota lmoving to the flank. These triangles either side of the box made it difficult for the opposition to choose which kind of press they want to do. Because in Arsenal's case, Odegaard and Jesus would often be caught between these triangles as if Arsenal tried to close them down and go man to man, Liverpool had their own goalkepper to exploit. A lot of times Liverpool would play long balls especially because Elliot was often free in the center. And if a defender stepped on him, Arsenal just had 3 defenders left with the 3 of Liverpool's back line ready to attack. It make it easier for players to rotate between these positions. Tsimikas could for example move out wide and if the oppositio'ns winger follows his movement, It opens up passing line for Carvalho to receive the ball or even Jones into the half spaces.
But it's also possible to rotate in a more central position with Jones pushing forward and Carvalho giving the width on the flanks. Having a lot of players in the center mean that if the ball is lost, the coutner press can quickly be adopted. In the third half, we can see that Jota, Elliot and Jones are often free to rotate into the center.

How Newcastle Completely Dismantled Liverpool in the EFL Final

It was a Newcastle masterclass that allow to expose Liverpool's flaws in defense. Newcastle controlled the game despite having only 34% of possession with their high direct attack consistently overwhelming Liverpool's high line. Newcastle's high press resulted in Liverpool finding space with difficulty. Newcastle won their first trophy since 1955. Eddie's tactics were spot on. Liverpool started in a 4 2 3 1 formation while Newcastle were in their 4 3 3 When Liverpool tried to build from the back, Newcastle switched to a man oriented pressing system. Tino Livramento had an agressive rotation on Quansah pushing all the way forward to close down Liverpool's. But it was also Newcastle's midfield that made life so difficult for Liverpool. While defending in a mid block, Tonali was used as the holy midfielder and during press his agression made him the perfect choice for being used further up the pitch. So he would swtich his position with the midfielder Joe Ellington in the first phase before switching back later on. This gave Grevenbersh, Szoboslai and McAllistair no time to receive the ball as Newcastle's midfielders followed them all over the pitch. Once play shifted to Liverpool's right flank, Newcastle winger Murphy would move inside to cover the midfielder. And Guimaraes had more freedom to add support between the lines. If Liverpool went long into the front 3 any second ball could be reclaimed by Newcastle then they could start their attack. This shape started their way to the second goal at the beginning of the second half. When Liverpool was forced long, Newcastle's defense was more physical and won the majority of the aerial duels. Even when Liverpool passed the press, Newcastle players were determined to quickly get back behind the line of the ball. Newcastle was only starting to get caught on at the end of the match when their press started to be a bit more disjointed and there was more space between defense and midfield.
Once Newcastle shifted to their 4 5 1 defensive shape in their mid block. This shape worked for 2 reasons. Firstly the match up in the midfield and secondly Liverpool's fullbacks were picked up by Murphy and Barnes. In the center there were no space for Liverpool's 2 holding midfielders to push between the lines, resulting in them playing the majority of the time in front of Newcastle's midfielders and circulating possession in this area. Back then during the season, the circulation around the back was mostly done by the center backs and the fullbacks while Liverpool used to be good at getting many players upfront. The front 4 didn't outnumber the defense and if any player rushed forward, they could comfortably be followed by any Newcastle's midfielders The other reason why this 4 5 1 shape worked was the overload out wide. The majority of danger from Liverpool came from their wingers. By Newcastle having their wingers ready to track the fullbacks, It meant Liverpool would not be in 1 v 1 position with the space that led to so many goals in the season. This resulted in a underwhelming game from both Salah and Diaz who weren't able to create any meaningful opportunities. On possession unlike Liverpool, Newcastle didn't look to build in this game and goal kicks were often long balls and even if they played from the back, the defenders generally didn't waste time to try to get the ball into the forwards. This took the plan into something more chaotic and physical, fighting for balls and packing the space between the lines with their agressive midfielders. When a defender goes 50 / 50 in the air it's comon for the other defenders to drop more to reduce the risk of any opponent winning the ball and then flicking in for someone running in behind.
But that left more gap in the midfield and Newcastle was well aware of that.Instead of having their wingers to rush forward and attack instantly they would pick these space between the lines so even if Newcastle didn't win aeriel duel, the ball would bounce aroud and they would have space to receive in this area. The way Newcastle reacted fast to these second balls meant they created a lot of danger from these positions. Even if they didn't for most of time resulted into goal opportunities, it led to a lot of free kicks and corners. And Newcastle scored their first goal from a corner. Jones, Gakpo, Elliot and Nunez entered in the game in an attempt to overturn the situation for Liverpool. Jones gave Liverpool more chances to be dangerous down the middle. But it was Federico Chiesa coming in that allowed Liverpool to score a late goal. But it wasn't enough.

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Barcelona's NEW Gameplan is Evil

Hansi Flick's approach led Barca to win 3 titles this season; beating Real Madrid in 4 straight Clasicos, humiliating them on several occasions. Flick revitalized the squad. Barcelona is now dominating la liga in a way never seen since Pep Guardiola and Luis Enrique's eras. Even though Xavi gave Barcelona 1 Liga and 1 Supercup, the style didn't really click. Barca suffered 3 defeats in a row against Real Madrid during 2023 / 2024 season. The Supercup final 4 - 1 defeat was particularly painful for them. In 2022 / 2023 season, defeats against Bayern Munich and a draw against Inter Milan eliminated Barcelona in the group stage, forcing them to play the Europa League, which Barcelona couldn't even win, somehow losing to Manchester United. Against Donetsk and Antwerp, there were inexplicable defeats. Childish mistakes, lack of talents and a team that looked made of paper. Then came the defeat in UCL quarter final against PSG in 2024 at Camp Nou. By the end of the season, Barcelona looked broken tactically and mentally, with lack of clear identity, stalled prospects and no real vision for the future. It's when they bring on Hansi Flick who brings a mental, tactical and football revolution. Hansi Flick rebuilt Barcelona in record time. He brought back its competitivity, winning mentality and its pride. They won la Liga, the Supercup and Copa Del Rey, beating all their domestic rivals. Even if they didn't reach the UCL final, barely losing to Inter Milan, they were the top scoring team in the tournament, made epic comebacks delivered unforgettable performances and played attacking football. Even Pep Guardiola praised Hansi Flick's system. It was a change of mentalities, tactics, automations, rythm, intensity and above all, purpose. 4 2 3 1 formation is Flick's basis system. But he gave a level of flexibility and precision only a few could have imagine. In that structure, every player found their ideal role.
And Hansi Flick did all of that while not betraying the club's philosophy. He just reinterpreted it bringing back the essence of Cruyff's positional play. Possession had now a purpose, meaning and edge. It wasn't passing for the ake of passing or keeping the ballin harmless zones. The ball moved with rythm, switchd sides with surgical speed and looked to break lines. It was return to identity but a renewed one. What changed everything was the use of gegenpressing : pressing after losing the ball became a non negotiable principle. And the team turned into a synchronized machine Once they lost the ball, they launched into a fierce recovery mode. it wasn't running around. It was smart, tactically and precise pressure. Thsi high press not only stopped counter attacks but turned recoveries to lethal transitions. The most brillant aspect of this system is the freedom Flick gave to his players. These talents needed room to express themselves so he encouraged constant role interchanges on the pitch. Raphina was no longer for example stuck to the wing because he now operate more as a false attacking midfielder, drifting inside and arriving in the box like a second striker, and unleashing his powerful shots. At the same time, Alejandro Balde, who started as a fullback, morphed into a winger, stretching the left side, pushing higher up the pitch, providing width and depth. These movements were carefully designed mechanisms meant to create numerical superiority and confuse opposing defenses. Barce began attacking through constant rotations, surprise and fluidity. It was positional play with a modern engine. It's now an aggressive animal, dynamic and intelligent. Position was no longer a goal, it was a tool. The team structure was rebuilt to be functional, aggressive and deadly. In early games, the double pivot was formed by Caasdo and Pedri. It was a mix of muscle, control and flair.
Once De Jong returned to full form, double pivot was De Jong and Pedri and the system gained another layer of intelligence. This double pivot didn't just provide defensive balance. It also freed up Pedri to drive transitions and exploit the inner spaces. Another great innovation from Flick was to bring back the number 10 role. And Dani Olmo was crucial in that role, just like Fermin Lopez. Both taking space between the lines with their movements constantly disrupting defensive marks and opening passing lanes. They pierced defenses, forced jewels and pulled center backs out of position. Meanwhile chaos unfolded on the wings with Raphina not being glued to the touchline anymore. He became an inside forward starting from the wing and cutting into central zones. That movement combined with the striker's runs in behind, the second pivot stepping out and Yamal holding width on the right flank. If opponents laid wide, attacking midfielders and inside attacking players exploited the gaps, but close inwards and Yamal would be 1 v 1. Outside Baldé, even Koundé sometimes attacked. More chances, more control and less exposure. By daring to push the defensive line higher, Barcelona was able to attack opponents with overwhelming intensity began defending further up the pitch. That forced rivals to play quicker decisions, to play on the dedge of the offside to run more than usual. Without the ball, Barcelona would press until you suffocated and Real Madrid just like Bayern were completly neutralized by that offside trap.
The backline pushed further up while the opponent's last line dropped deeper. Flick abandonnd Xavi's passive possession game. The touch for the sake of touching died and instead it was a hybrid, everchanging, mutating style. If opponents opened space, Barcelona accelerated and if they needed to slow the match down, they could. And if they needed to kill the game with total control, they could do that too. Barcelona knew how to attack with fury and to manage the tempo with intelligence. But in order to achieve these aggressive and constant stylistic shifts within games, Hansi Flick has to squeeze every tool at his disposal. From 2024 to 2025, the club's finances were still battered from years of mismanagement and Flick knew on day 1 that his success wouldn't depend on who he could sign but rather how he would shape the players he already had. It was about regenerating from within. Cubarsi became essential because of his ability to play from the back with an uncommon composure especially for his age. He had the vision, ability to break lines with his passes and his tactical awareness was on point. Of course when rebuilding on the fly, mistakes were inevitable.

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Kompany's Insane Tactics Are Making Bayern Exciting Again | Bayern Munich Tactical Analysis

Bundesliga is generally a high pressure league when it comes down to pressing systems from the teams. Bayern Munich ahs their center backs spread extremly wide to spread as well and open more potential passing lines. But the gap not only increased the isolation between the center backs but also the isolation of each one of the cb. It means a potential turnover from the opposite press and a counter attack. Kompany wanted to take the risk and also wanted to be very agressive with Neuer who would push up between the center backs so they had a numerical overload in the first line. This way the build up could be more unpredictable. But it's not always that easy to have Neuer this high especially with some teams looking to stop Bayern before they can even get into this situation. With the double pivots covered as well, options become incredibly limited if not non existent. That's why Kompany tried to make the most of Muasiala's intelligence. Musiala can drop deeper than the usual attacking midfielder to create a 3 v 2 and help to play out. If opposit's pivots follow him, they can stop him but they also leave gaps between the lines. That means that Bayern's wingers had the potential to move infield to receive. Kane also drops a lot then play it quickly to the wingers. But Musiala's dribbling qualities meant he could pass the pressure by himself and create himself a lot of space to attack. There is still a plan B if this fails because the centerbacks can spread wider in the build up and there is an opportunity for 1 or 2 fullbacks to support the midfield. It allows Bayern to have their wingers to stay wide with Musiala and Kane staying higher to focus mainly on attacking the opposition's back line. Wingers are also supported by the fullback overlapping on the side or in the half space.
Kane and Musiala would then come across to free space for a long ball diagonically to the other winger on the other side of the pitch or sometimes to the opposite fullback. But the center is where Kompany really wants to show dominance.



How Flick Destroyed The Bayern Machine | Tactical Analysis : Barcelona 4-1 Bayern Munich |


Barcelona's motto was to pressure Bayern. It was supported by Barcelona using an extremely high line. A line so high that the back line often used the halfway line as their reference. But being so agressive with that defensive line meant that the forward player had to be extremely aware and also agressive in their press to prevent Bayern beginning their build up. They used an interesting modified pressing shape with Lewandowski dropping deeper on one of the pivots, either Palhinha or Kimmich. This was supported by the wingers Raphina and Yamal both looking to press from out to in so that the center backs were under pressure as well. One of the advantages of this pressing shape was that. Second was with Lewandowski picking a pivot, the actual Barcelona midfielders had more rooms to pick up their men in a man to man to back up their press. It was meant to have one midfielder spared to pick any player that would drift centrallly. It meant that Barcelone applied high amount of pressure to force Bayern Munich backwards. Barcelone was pressing narrow which in turn made it difficult for Bayern to play in the center of the pitch. So the ball often filtered into the wide regions. It was what Barcelona expected but later on it would also play into Bayern's hands. Having a line that high meant they need to apply pressure consistently on the ball carrier so he wouldn't have an easy long ball to make for a forward to run behind the back line. What happened is that Bayern were rushed to make the pass straight from the back line instead of building up through the midfield. But it often were inaccurates passes.
Kompany seeing Bayern was struggling looked to adjust 2 players, Guerreiro and Kimmich. Kimmich abandonned the defensive midfielder position in the build up because the narrow pressing shape from Barcelona made it almost impossible to find him. So Kimmich either dropped into the back line centrally either into the left to form a back 3 with the center backs. Now Barcelona had a decision to make. If they maintained their pressing shape, Bayern Munich had a 3 v 2 in the build up phase, making Barcelona's press much less effective. Not only that but the spare man would now be Kimmich who is a lot better on the ball than the center backs.
So he would have the ability to find the wingers running in behind the opposite back line. Since Barcelona wanted to maintain an agressive pressing shape, we saw Lopez often being man oriented into Kim with Yamal remaining high. With that Bayern opened in little more room in that compact Barcelona's midfield. The second issue for Barcelona is that if the wingers are narrow and defending high, who would help the fullbacks to defend in those wider regions? Bayern tried to take advantage of that with Guerrero who was flexible and not always sticking to the wide regions. He would often move into the half spaces. We saw instances where letting too much spaces like this almost costed Barcelona to concede. One of the incidents led to a goal from Bayern Munich. To switch fast into the wings from the center, Thomas Muller was crucial. From his attacking midfield position he would often drift and draw the fullback down the right handside.
The hope for Barcelona is that with playing in a high line, the winger would have still a lot of distances to cover after he receives the ball and that Barcelona's back line would have time to recover. And this was true on many occasions. So Guerreiro was pushing high up often into these half spaces so it wasn't the winger who needed to take on his man and look to go to goal by himself and instead he would pass the ball into the half space where Guerreiro was looking to make the agressive run. However, a disadvantage a left footed right back is that he wasn't instantly able to whip in crosses into Harry Kane, meaning that these high positions were slightly less dangerous that it would have been with a right footed right back. Another interesting aspect of the shape is that it made Barcelone very dagenrous in attack with Raphina and Yamal were still high up so when Barcelona won the ball back, they already knew they had dangerous man to hit quick the ball in behind. Yamal assisting Raphina was a great example of that. On possession, Barcelona has been adapting their pressing shape as earlier in the season. Kane was often in deep alongside the attacking midfielder, Muller. Both were covering the double pivots whilst both of the wingers would then push onto the center backs, not unlike Barcelona. But Inaki Pena is great on the ball so he would have the potential to find a fullback with a simple pass over the top. And this was a risk that Kompany wasn't willing to take. So we saw that Gnabry often stayed deeper as a more traditionnal left winger with Kane pressing alongside Olise. And because they couldn't have let a midfielder having that much room, It meant Kimmcih was often dragged high up the pitch.
This shape also created an issue as Balde could receive the ball on the left so when Balde was on the ball, Guerreiro was willing to be much more agressive and back up their press. With Raphina's fine form this season, that would present a huge issue on the flank. But Upamecano would be moving out wide and here is where Bayern Mucnih was often presented with a tricky scenario as with Lewandowski often looking to show for the ball, It would be Kimmich's role to drop into the back line. This meant that Bayern Munich were somewhat using a back 4. The issue with this was that Kimmich had to know when to push up into the miedifeld and when to drop into the back line. This zone was crucial and meant that one wrong move could be quickly taken advantage of by Barcelona. We saw at the beginning Guerriro pressing high and Upamecano being dragged out wide. With Kim pressing Lewandowski, it created a gap in the back line and Kimmcih has dropped to make a 2 v 2. However Kimmich is still tight on his man Lopez even through him and Upamecano switched mens. So Kimmich off unbalanced as Raphina was allowed to have a 1 v 1. Bayern Munich was also less compact between the lines than Barcelona. We often saw Lopez finding rooms, drifting around between the lines. It was made worse by Balde often providing the width on the left hand side, meaning that Raphina could also move infield. And Lopez showed extreme flexibility. When they stayed on the opposite side, there was a potential for the center back to simply pick up the winger. However we often saw Raphina drift around the pitch so that now they foten overloaded one of the half spaces, meaning that the center back now had 2 men to potentially cover. And this caused issues as we saw in the 2 1 goal with Ferman running in behind after Raphina had moved deep on the same side.

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Why Man City's Problems Are Bigger Than you Think


Some people say that's not really a crisis since we already saw Man City starting strong then have a dip of form in october or november then starting to be good again in december and january before going from february to may with an unbeaten streak and ultimatly clutch the Premiere League titles. Some think It might happen again considering they are still top 2/3 with most of key players returning for the second part of the season. In fact this time the problems are probably more serious. Man City sturggle at the end of the pitch with their lower goals scored and higher goals conceded per mathc since the arrival of Pep Guardiola. Another important factor is that ballon d'or Rodri is out for almost the whole season. Everyone knwo that this guy is so crucial for the team. Their slight dip of form last season was because Rodri was injured.When he plays, Man City has a win percentage of 74% and when he doesn't, it drops to 58%. With not out and out numbers 6, Pep's system loses both balance and control which are the fundamentals of his tactics. Whether it was Busquets, Thiago or Fernandinho, the number 6 was always vital to Pep's philosophy. For XG conceded from counter attack, Man City right now is ranking at the 17th position. The lack of protection in front of the defensive line is a main reason for that. Man City is a tema that wants to suffocate the opposition into their own halffor the vast majority of the game, averaging close to 65% of possession. And a field tilt of 77%. Guardiola may have consistently changed his tactics throughout the years from a 3 2 5, 2 3 5 and more recently a 3 1 6, the fundamentals have remained the same : it's all about controlling the possession and circulating the ball quickly before finding a player in the center.
Their ability to box into the opponent was down firstly to their overarching offensive structure, which includes players in strategic positions. But also because of players like Rodri that could comfortably clsoe down any danger of counter attack, if Man City lost the ball. His ability to quickly push forward and lead an agressive counter press meant that City could nearly always maintain possession high in the pitch, forcing the opposition into giving up the ball quickly. It reusltes in small margin gians for City. They would regain possession more often, meaning more chances and meaning more goals. Rodri's presence not only had an impact on the offensive out put but it also helped the defenders being more comfortable in possession and push forther up the pitch. With Rodri on the pitch, the back line was more comfortable gaining ground and stopping any danger of counter attack. His absence meant that his defense need to be slightly more cautious. And Guardiola's adaptations are more difficult than some might initially thought. Kovacic started as a holding midfielder to give the team more consistency. Defensively speaking Kovacic doesn't have the same ground covering ability than Rodri. Alongside players like Gundogan and Silvahe can be very dangerous sure, the instant they loose the ball, they are also more vulnerable to counter attacks. And opposite teams are finding spaces more easily through the center of the pitch. Look at Bournemouth vs Man City for example. Even against Sporting who defended as a low block, fast transitions caused a lot of issues for the defense. Without Rodri Man City also doesn't have the presence and physicality to win the 50/50 duels. But the issues in defense don't end here. In City's 4 1 4 1 shape in defense, opposition find it easier to find spaces through the center with Kovacic being not as effective as Rodri when it comes to shielding the defense from central passes. The second goal Brighton scored is a perfect example of that.

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How Mourinho Conquered La Liga | Jose 2011/12 Real Madrid Tactics | Peak Mourinho |

This season is one of the biggest in history of liga with Real Madrid winning la Liga with 100 points. They scored 121 goals, a record still standing. Their goal difference is 89. They also have 50 points away from home still unbeaten. They often would choose a 4 3 3 with Alonso as deep lying playmaker, and the other defensive midfielder Lassana Diarra, who made Real Madrid hard to penetrate throught the center. He was mainly used in the games against tough oppositions in knock out games. Ozil came in place of Diarra, making them more offensive. Their formation was often a 4 2 3 1. Real Madrid had an average of 57% of possession. They mainly played short to one of the 2 centerbacks. But against a team who pressed high, they were comfortable of going long as they had 2 aerial targets, being Ronaldo and either Higuain or Benzema. As one man made the header, the other would run behind often joined by Di Maria with Ozil just behind them. They searched to provoke an attack. Both centerbacks were comfortable on the ball. However, Ramos was the best here. If all passes on the midfield were cut off, he could take the responsability to conduct the ball on the pitch with Pepe covering. Even when these 2 remained deep, Pepe would generally be the deepest to allow Ramos to be slightly higher. Alvaro Arbeloa was the right back, who was more an outlet to relieve pressure when necessary. For the most part he stayed deep, slightly in advanced compared to the centerbacks when it was possible. Marcelo on the left was vital for the attacks. He dribbled alongside the line when needed. He also made more risky passes to break the lines as well as trying diagonal passes to Di Maria who would maintain the width on the right. Even without the ball, he moved higher on the pitch than the right back.
When it comes to facing tohugher teams, Khedira who usually was often acting as an extra player in the box, often making overlaps when the right back stayed deep, was more disciplined. In this case Alonso would be a bit higher to thread long balls to the front 3. A double pivot allowed the front 4 to have more freedom with Ozil often staying centrally and spreading balls to the 3 others of the front line. But he also liked to move more wide to help the winger, often creating overloads. In this case he would often either gain time on the ball, either make a precise pass forward. Di Maria was often hugging the touchline. The rare times the right back was overlapping however, he would have the freedom to tuck inside and look for a key pass. In fact he was second in his team in term of key passes this season, only behind Ozil. He also had good long shoot qualities. However the key man was still Ronaldo. He would rarely attack the wide. Instead he would let Marcelo doing the overlap and position himself into the half spaces. Ronaldo had the most long shoots among all players from la Liga by a large margin, scoring 7 goals from outside the box. This meant that others teams had to tigh their shapes to stop him, often even double teaming against him. This freed more spaces for Ozil in the center and if the entire opposition shifted to the left side, Di Maria was often the free man to receive for a quick switch to the otehr side of the pitch. When Ronaldo left his position, Ozil often came here to look to cross into the dangerous regions into the box. But Ozil would also link up to Marcelo, passing the ball to him, so he could look to provide to Ronaldo or have a regular cross. Real Madrid attempted 22 crosses per game on average during this season. Benzema and Higuain were both hard working. Both were selfless and worked for the team, dropping to link up when necessary or even when Ronaldo needed more spaces in central areas. Both were good at scoring from crosses.
Also or creating spaces for themselves at the edge of the box. Against a weaker opposition, after loosing the ball, Madrid pressed high to win it high on the pitch when it was possible. But when they were easy bypassed, they tended to drop deeper. Madrid's priority was to protect the center of the pitch. Di Maria was a defensive winger, contrasting to Ronaldo who would stay higher up on the pitch pratically as a forward while Ozil being slightly deeper meant that their formation looked like sometimes as a lop sided 4 3 1 2 with an emphasis of closing down the center as they had 2 dominant centerbacks who could deal with crosses. Both Khedira and Alonso tried to have the most of tackles and interceptions in the second defensive line in the center. During counter attacks, both Ramos and Alonso were capable of doing long and precise balls. Often Ozil would drift behind the defensive midfielders into the space, with Ronaldo and the other forward running in behind, freeing space for Ozil while Di Maria would also join the attack. Often in this situation the opposition's fullback is high to take advantage of Ronaldo staying high and Di Maria tucking in. When Ozil was conducting the ball, the forwards were trying to make intelligent runs and Di Maria would often passing the ball for them to finish off the move.

Mourinho at Porto.

Mourinho’s Porto Explained

Mourinho's Porto was solid and organized in defense while less structured and more expressive in attack. It can be characterized as counter attacking but it's largely because the system was so agressive and disrupting that, by winning the ball back with pressing from a compact shape, it almost inevitably allowed space for the forward and attack minded midfielders to break at speed. The team's shape looked like a 43 1 2, or a midfield diamond, depending on how deep were the central midfielder, usually Costinha, sat and screened. Width, always an issue with 4 3 1 2 or with a diamond shape, came from the fullbacks. Nunoe Valente and Paulo Ferreira were used in that role with Valente on the left generally more offensive, mostly because Mourinho wanted his side covered defensively and thus encouraged only one fullback to push really high at a time. The midfield 2, anchored by Costinha usually with Maniche and Pedro Mendes flanking played strictly in concert with each other and with the back 4. They were horizontally and vertically compact, seeking to create a difficult to play through mid block that would won possession back and transition quickly and directly into the attacking trio. The flanking midfielders were also tasked with carrying the ball forwards in transition and when fit, Dmitri Alenichev was a more dynamic midfielder who could be used in a flanking position for this purpose. Porto would play with a high line to facilitate this mid block and would also press astutely althought this lessened during the UCL campaign as Mourinho sought to make FC Porto evne more compact and hard to play through.
Once the ball was won back the 2 main options for transition were the carrying runs of the midfield or long passes from the center back Ricardo Carvalho. The aim was to get the opposition quickly on the back foot, especially if they over committed players to the attack. Once the ball was to the trio up front, it was supported by one of the flanking midfielders and a fullback providing the width and a crossing option. Deco sat behind the 2 strikers as a 10, capable of dribbling, passing through the lines and slide rule through passes especially. He was the creative hub of the team. Helder Postiga and Derlei in the 2002 / 2003 season then Derlei, Carlos Alberto and Benni McCarthy in the 2003 / 2004 season combined direct running of the ball, good positionnal awareness to make most of Deco's creativty or the width created by the fullbacks. Deco assisted 6 times during the victorious UCL. Only Rothen from AS Monaco did as good. There were 2 parts in this team. On one side the organized and systematized back line with the back 4 + Costinha and the flexible, creative and responsive front 5 able to answer to any defensive setup. The influence of Mourinho's periodisation training could be seen again. Aim was to create space for the front 3 by sucking in the opposition, winning the ball and then transitionning directly. It can be seen as functional and coutner attacking but Mourinho was capable of showing sublime passages of attacking football with players like Deco, McCarthy, Alenichev and Maniche Mourinho was one of the first managers going really deep into opposition analysis and making frequently subtle adjustments. to twart expected opposition's game plans. It's seen as a reactive approach.

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Guardiola's Tactical Evolution At Barcelona | How Pep's Tactics Changed At Barcelona |

In his first 2 seasons at Barcelona, some changes happened when Pep Guardiola came. In the 2008 / 2009 season, Barcelona won la Liga, la Copa del Rey and the Champions League. The formation was predominantly a 4 3 3 and it generally had Puyol and Piqué as center backs, Abidal and Alves as fullbacks, Xavi and Iniesta as attacking midfielders while Yaya Touré was the cdm. Henry and Messi then were wingers with Eto'o as centre forward. In the 2009 / 2010 season, Barcelona won la Liga, the Supercopa de Espana, the UEFA Cup and the club world cup being added to their trophy cabinet. With also a 4 3 3 formation. With Keita playing more often in the midfield, Maxwell being added as a left back and finally Pedro and Ibrahimo coming respectively as left winger and center forward. And finally Busquets making his entry as the main cdm of the team. During the build up, both seasons were similar with Valdes looking to find one of the center backs to initiate the play. If the center backs were pressed high by the opposition in wither case they were comfortable splitting on the widtrh of the 18 yards area to make it harder for the opposition to close them down as they would be split across the pitch. The cdm was also a key to this. Busquets during the 2009 / 2010 season became the undeniable first choice. Either way they would drop between the center backs to form a back 3 when it was required when building up to outnumber the opposition's front 2. Due to injuries, Iniesta started only 20 games, and sometimes he made late appearances in second half times. But most of the time Keita was here to replace him. Keita was a bit more defensive than Iniesta so as a result, the more attacking Maxwell started as a left back instead of Abidal to maintain Barcelona's attacking thrust on the left side in which Iniesta often helped when he moved wide.
Then we see some differences. In the 2008 / 2009 season, Messi was happy wide on the right and was more than anything else an inverted winger, often hugging the touchline during the build up play and looking to go for the goal or feed his teammates. Or to provide that incisive movement in the last phase of play with off the ball movement. This meant that Dani Alves was still high attacking but often had Messi ahead of him and could look to combine vertically and overlapping Messi to try to create more space for him wide on the right. Very late on the season, Messi was now occasionally used as a center forward. And Eto'o was selfless and had the traits to play on the right and could move into this region to maintain the balance of the team. It's contrasting with the tactical problem Pep encountered with Ibrahimovic in the following season. Messi who had a taste of playing as a false 9 at the end of prior season now wanted to occupy the central regions. So instead of making his way down the wing then looking to cut in from higher up the pitch he now headed infield much earlier meaning that Barcelona now had more numbers central. This also meant that Dani Alves was no longer performing in support to the right winger. Instead he was the primary provider of the width. With Messi getting more numbers centrally, Xavi could offset the lack of balance on the right side at times. Unlike Eto'o, Ibrahimovic didn't constantly push the opposition back by staying on the defender's shoulder as he liked to be more involved with the ball deeper, something Messi did as well which is why they often didn't thrive that much together. So at the end of the season, Messi started more often as a false 9 while Zlatan Ibrahimovic was out of favor. Pedro moved to the right and Henry was reintroduced to the left hand side.
This meant that in the 2008 / 2009 season, the left winger and the center forward attacked the box consistently but in the next season, that threat was slightly different with the wingers making runs ahead of Messi. Now what about the 2011 / 2012 season, Pep's final season at Barcelona? In this season, Barcelona won the Copa del Rey, the UEFA Super cup, super Copa de Espana and the club world cup. He shifted from the 4 3 3 to a more Cruyffian 3 4 3 diamond which he had played in during his career. This 2011 / 2012 season saw Messi playing as false 9, with Sanchez and Pedro in the wings. Fabregas was at the top of the midfield diamond with Xavi and Inista being the wide midfielders and Keita being the cdm. Abidal and Mascherano were the wide center backs. Finally, Busquets was used as the central center back. Busquets could often move forward with the ball creating a numerical superiority in front of the defense and helping to build the play from back. This formation was primary used against teams that operated with a 2 man frontline and tried to sit deeper against Barcelona. Busquets often slotted to the central position, due to his passing ability and that meant that the central center backs could confidently create passing lines higher up knowing that he could find them with unerring accuracy, allowing them to then bypass the front 2.
With Seydou Keita more limited than Busquets on the ball, either Xavi or Iniesta often dropped alongside him to form a double pivot and help to progress the ball. Using this tactic, Barcelona has several man central and this forced the opposition to contract and narrow their shape. Instead of the fullbacks, Pep Guardiola had the wingers who would then be able to freely receive the ball out wide. In addition, the 4 midfielders meant that the wide central midfielders were keen to move into the half spaces in support when the ball did go wide to generate more attacking options. But the main reason this system was used was the presence of Cesc Fabregas. Pep liked Fabregas ' instinctive attacking ability while still being able to retain possession. Him and Messi formed a strong partnership. When Messi stayed high, Fabregas could drop into the midfield to provide them with an extra passing option. And when Messi dropped deep, they could perform the opposite role. In many ways, Fabregas unlocked Messi, giving him even more freedom to move and create angles where ever he wanted, knowing Fabregas was always here to balance his movements as the perfect soil. This led to Messi's highest goalscoring rate in la liga with 50 goals although with the wingers hugging the touch line, their goal out put suffered as well. Guardiola's peel at Barcelona combined with good transfers peak of Barcelona's academy, no wonder why this team thrived so much.


How Brazil Won The 2002 World Cup | Brazil's Joga Bonito Tactics |

Some think that it's obvious that the team should have win the tournament with the team they have. However Emerson Lia during preparation and qualifying matches, only won 4 on 11 matches. Scaloni then came one year before the WC and Brazil managed to qualify only with 3 points advance. Brazil set a formation for the tournament that generally looked like a 3 4 3 with Marcos gk, Lucio, Edmilson and Roque as the 3 cb, Cafu and Roberto Carlos as the wingbacks. Kleberson and Silva as the central miedfielders and the R trio in front with Ronaldinho, Rivaldo and Ronaldo Nazario. Only variation of this was a 5 3 2 or 3 5 2 where Ronaldinho would be set as an attacking miedfielder while Juninho would play instead of Kleberson as a more defensive minded miedfielder. Marcos often made long balls high up the pitch looking for Ronaldo. Ronaldinho and Rivaldo would come narrower to pick up the second ball. Roque and Lucio, the wide center backs, were more conservatives with the ball, playing risk free passes into Gilberto Silva or Edmilson who was the central center back. Playing with only 2 central miedfielders meant that they could be at times overloaded in the miedfield. So Edmilson played the role of the libero, pushing up in the miedfield to the point that the formation sometimes looked like a 4 3 3. But Edmilson could also stay deeper and look for a ball into Gilberto Silva; This was the case especially when Juninho came alongside him in the miedfield as he tended to be more offensive and drifted high up the pitch. And crucially when Edmilson played deeper, then Roque and Lucio would shift into wider regions. This gave Cafu and Roberto Carlos 2 position defining wingbacks. Their passing and positionnal rotations quickly dragged mens out of position.
And Brazil was comfortable exploiting both the wide areas and the central regions. 3 of their matches were against teams that played with 3 center backs, Costa Rica, Turkey and Germany. So Roberto Carlos and Cafu were found in wide regions to be in 1 v 1 against their men. They had the physical as well as the technical ability to breeze past their men and make the cross When wide regions were targeted, the role of the forwards could vary. They could push up into the half spaces ALternativly Ronaldinho in particular could move to the left channel as a more traditionnal winger while Rivaldo and Ronaldo would shift across. Juninho if he was starting would push higher to take the place vacated by Ronaldinho. Edmilson would then push up in the miedfield to ensure they would not be overpowered in that area on the transition.

The Tactics Behind Spain's Dominance | How Spain Created The Most Dominant Team 2008-2012 |


Spain back then was known for their possession based football with slight and technical midfielders. The term used before tiki taka was " la furia ". It was a style of football that involved trying to get in good wide areas and swinging in as many crosses as possible into the twin forwards. The team changed during the 3 tournaments won but there were some pilars. Araones opeted for a 4 4 2 with creative players like Iniesta and David Silva out wide rather than crosses. In 2010 WC, Del Bosque opted for 4 2 3 1, giving them high control in the miedfield. This was morphing into a formation that was strikerless and wingerless 4 6 0. In 2008 euros, althought they played sometimes 4 4 2, there were instances when they played better in a 4 5 1 with a solitary forward with Torres being the lone forward and Fabregas being with Xavi in the midfield to form a 4 1 4 1. Despite attacking brillance of playes like Xavi, Iniesta, Torres and Silva, It could be argue that Marco Senna was the key to the team back then. In either formation he was the only midfielder primarly focused on the defensive tasks. That, combined with his incredible work rage, meant that he was the plateform to allow technical playmakers upfront to showcase their talents. Spain was much more lethargic in their possession. It was before Guardiola's revolution. It was more a passive position, often rotating the ball in the back until the perfect gap opened to play into the miedfield. In many ways, possession was used as a defensive tool, as their counter press had not been developed yet. So a loss of possession would have been much more costly especially when playing with a single pivot.
But when going into the meidfield, Senna often looked to pass to Xavi, who was the conductor of the game and the kye to stitching the midfield and the attack together. This was also the trigger for the inverted wide playmakers, David Silva and Iniesta, to drift into the half spaces, stark contrast to the old Spain where the wingers used to hug the touchline. At this time, both fullbacks, Ramos in particular, looked to move higher on the pitch to provide width in order to stretch the opposition's back line. In the final third, Spain had many options as they could choose to slip it into the wide fullbacks who looked for the cut back into the box or the cross as they had 2 aeriel capable forwards. But Villa could also drop into the midfield potentially drawing a center back out and creating another passing lane. Or if the center back stayed deep, he could create or shoot for himself. He could also push high alongside Torres, giving the miedfield more options to pass. When it came to defending, there was no rampant pressing. International sides rarely have the time to work on coordinated pressing mecanisms. So they would instead drop into a 4 5 1 mid block with Villa dropping into the midfield.

Busquets and Alonso came to replace Senna as Del Bosque opted for a double pivot. Spain used pacier wingers this time with Pedro and sometimes Villa moving on the wide left. Players like Fabregas and Silva also made massive contributions in certain matches. After their 1 0 loss against Switzerland, they had to play more cautious and less expensively. They switched to an even higher possession style, with players having much closer proximity. Their possession rose to 50% to 60%. It led Spain to score 8 goals in 7 matches. With the 3 maestro in the center of the pitch, being Busquets, Alonso and Xavi, Spain retained possession pretty easily. But the double pivots were not that physically gifted so 2 mens were needed to cover the width of the pitch. The double pivot was also a defensive precaution which allowed them to concede only 2 goals during the entire tournament. We often saw Iniesta start on the right. Naturally he drifted more inside to have the ball and create. It allowed Ramos to make his marauding runs when he overlapped. In the left as Villa attacked the box alongside Torres, Spain had good numbers in central zones, but it left a vacuum on the left as the Spanish left back Capdevila, was aging and less impressive than Ramos going forward. So as the tournament went, Spain shifted to a 1 men frontline It allowed the emerging Pedro out wide,a s he was much happier hugging the touchline. It stretched the opposition's back line a lot more. Defensivly Spain pressed more during this tournament with shades of Barcelona's system coming throught. However it was much less much less manic and more concerned about closing off passing lanes rather than creating turnovers high up.
In euro 2012 it was a strikerless system. Alba easily provided the width as a left back but Arebeola on the right was less impressive and more defensive minded. Instead of making quick switches like most teams would do, they used a thir man runner and pinpoint passing to get though on goal which they managed on several occasions.

Manchester United's Failed Post Ferguson Tactics | United's Tactical Evolution Post Ferguson |


The amount of trophies United won dropped significantly since Ferguson left the club in 2013. Initially David Moyes was selected to replace Ferguson. He was a respected manager well known for the defensive elements of his teams. They then moved on with Luis Van Gaal, who had a good international reputation. He was known for his positionnal brand of position football. Then came Mourinho, the superstar manager known for his adaptability. Fellaini came in the winter transfer cindow under David Moyes. Moyes first chooice squad had Rooney behind Van Persie and they would combine as they did successfully during Ferguson's final moments at United. Then Mata would come into the 10 position and Rooney was pushed further forward as Van Persie had a lot of injuries. The formation was a 4 2 3 1. One of the criticism Moyes had received was the inefficiency of the miedfield. At times when he was at Everton, Fellaini functionned as a second striker, looking to receive the ball as a target man but now Moyes dropped him deeper to form a double pivot alongside Carricx more often. Fellanini was playing this role well For Belgium national time. However at United he came under a lot of criticism. His passing range was limited and he tended to slow down the game. Also both Fellaini and Carricx were physically limited and were not the best runners. Rooney back then was playing more as an attacking miedfield ans so more willing to drop deep alongside the pivots. He would use his passing ranges to release runners in behind. So Moyes tried to adapt by bypassing the meidfield and use the wide regions more often The conservatice nature of the double pivots often allowed the fullbacks to flood forward Both Evra and Rafael would look to join the attack. On the right, Rafael would often look to overlap. They did this often to have good cross positions.
However both Rafael and Valencia were extremly righr footed, meaning there was never any threat of anyone coming infield, making the attacks more predictables. Down the left Young could cut in for the shoots or crosses but he could also go down the line. Evra could go forward with Young covering his aging legs on the defensive end of the things. Man United had the most crosses per game in the league. But with Ronney's injuries, he was used more as a target in the box with Fellaini only joining when they were chasing a goal. Moyes was shown the door after his tactics were simply too predictables for the others teams. Van Gaal was given more funds in his transfert window. The major incoming in hsi side included Di Maria, Schneiderlin, Martial, Blind, Falcao, Rohr and Schwensteiger. He used a variety of tactics across his 2 seasons. But his 2 most comon formations were the 4 2 3 1 and 4 1 4 1. With some variations being the 3 5 2. The general principles remained the same. There was much greater emphasis on possession, rising from 54% under Moyes to 59% during Van Gaal's first season. He often looked to build up from the back. Van Gaal would often started Blind, a natural miedfield, to start as a center back to facilitate this. The builder play was very methodical with players taking constant positions to automate many phases of the play. with the man on the ball knowing where his options would be before even received it. But Man united still had a problem in the miedfield. When Di Maria joined on the right, he could slot into the left central miedfielder role. His proactivity on the ball meant that he could drive the team up the pitch and look for opportunities to create. But he soon fall out of favor meaning Man United's miedfield often had Schneiderlin, Schweinsteiger and Herrera as cam. All were capable miedfielders but they were more focused on retaining the ball rather than create. Rooney would sometimes drop deep to create for Van Persie.

How Xabi Alonso’s Tactic BROKE Football!

Xabi Alonso went from pulling Bayer Leverkusen out of relegation to win the Bundesliga title in only 18 months, breaking German football. This club never won a league title since 100 years. From being a tiki taka team in first half to a counter attacking side in second half, based on diferent teams, Alonso keep changing his tactics. It only only confuses others teams but also make it almost impossible to break throught. They became the first team to win the league without loosing a single match. Since taking charge, Xabi has consistently used a 3 2 4 1 formation on paper. But instead of being ridig it keeps on changing during the match. It makes them unpredictable to play against. During build up they often play in a 4 2 4 asymetric shape with the right back staying upfront as a right winger while the back 4 spread wide to form the back 4. The reason is that German clubs are often press oriented, meaning it was difficult for others teams to build up short. So Xabi applied circular rotations, meaning that when opposition are pressing to the center backs, it passes it to the left back who deliberatly carries the ball and drifts toward the pivot. The right pivot simultaneously shifts on the right and takes on the right flank position. Due to this inward movement, it narrows down the front markers which frees up the right space for the right pivot who has a path to break throught the first line of pressure. But if opposition sits in low block this tactic can become ineffective. So to counter this, Alonso used a tactic that is a miw between Guardiola's in City and Zerbi's Brighton. For example when one of the center back passes the ball to one of the pivot, the pivot quickly passes the ball back to him.
It creates a pressing trigger to the markers to close the 2 players down which indirectly frees up spaces for the second pivot to receive an actual pass. It attract markers who are behind him. Due to this it creates an open space between the lines where one of the forwards drop deeper to receive the ball as a third man, which then draws one of the center backs and frees up space for the striker as fourth man. They use oppositio'ns press as a weapon against themselves. But if opposition, rather pressing 1 v 1 than pressing ni numbers with low press strategy, it also can be frawned. So to adress this, Xabi intentionally overload one presser with 2. WHe the center back is looking for a pass from one of the pivots, Palacios, who is close to Xhaka, intentionally jumps right in with Xhaka It confuses XHaka's marker who is being ready for a 1 v 1. Once the ball goes th Xhaka, Palacios is unmarked and becomes the third man to avance up the pitch. When entering in the second phase of build up, Alonso uses a combination between Guardiola's positionnal play and Diniz's relationnism. After the first phase, both pivots moves vertically to each other. Also their asymetrical approach makes Leverkusen play more on the right side of the pitch. It triggers the narrow right forward to shit to that side as well, creating a 6 box structure on one side of the pitch. At the same time Grimaldo the left back drifts wide to imitate his partner's winger role. If opposition commit a lot of mens to cover the 6 men box, then Bayer can easily switch play toward the left towards Grimaldo who only has one player to defend them. If they spread to cover the opposite player then it can create a 6 v 5 superiority on the other side where they can easily progress the ball with one touch. He uses Diniz's relationnism to overloard one side of the pitch and Pep's positionnal play by using the box tactic.
When they drift into the attacking phase, they switch from a 4 2 4 to a 3 2 5 structure where Grimaldo finally advances to act like his opposite partner, Frimpong. But rather playing this way it's generally used to trick the opposition's markers. If Leverkusen use a 3 2 5 shape, opposition often mark them using a 5 4 2 defensive structure. It makes difficult for Bayer to pass throught the block and often force them to rely on long balls. So to solve this one of the inverted forwards from the front 5 drops deeper and act as a roaming number 10. At the same time it gives both the wide center backs options to carry the ball forward while partnering Palacios with the roaming player. This makes the opposition shift to focus on the incoming center backs. It creates open spaces between the second and third line of defense. When receiving the ball, these players quickly join the front 4 and try to exploit the back line. Once they actually get near the box using this, the front 5 do the remaining work where they shift the entire opposition into one side. To achieve this they often pass the ball wide to the side player while the player inside the half spaces makes a deliberate wide run toward the flanks and draws his marker. This movement then frees up a striker without a man, leading the back line to spread towards him. When the ball is passed to the half space player it effectivly draws most of the opposition to the first half of the pitch which leaves the far right and right space player with just one marker. So a quick cross to them exposes the opposition's defense while creating a prime socring opportunity for Bayer Leverkusen. However Xabi's tactics trully emerges when out of possession. Witohut the ball they press in a 5 2 3 setup. The main objective was always to protect the center channels. So he created an interesting star line pattern to adress this.
For example, when opposition build up from the back, Alonso asks his front 3 to be narrow with both of the pivots just behind them, creating a compact star shape. It creates a numerical superiority in the center with a box 4 behind the striker. Even if the opposition still paly throught the center, Alonso encourages his wide center backs to step up as well makig it almost impossible to advance centrally. This forces the opposition to go wide. But as soon opposition plays wide the wingbacks quickly jumps onto them, creating a one side overload. The far sided center back track the wide options. It makes the opposition to go back and switches the play or trust their aerial ability. Even if the opposition breaks Bayer's perssing pattern, the team quickly transition into a 5 4 1 shape with the inverted forwards becoming the wide miedfielders. Due to the 3 center backs and the double pivots shileding the central areas, it helps to keep the opposition attack wide with the wingbacks and wide miedfielders to protect the flank. WHen they win the ball back using this, rather than quickly launching counter attack, Alonso let the opposition press them more in which he invites the opposition to couter press and let them commit more numbers forward. As the opposition is fully into their counterpress, Bayer quickly execute a long ball toward the forwards who are being left isolated. It makes them the most dangerous counter attacking sides as they use opposition's psychologie to their advantage. It can be only achieved with the player's roles. Rather than a traditionnal back 3, they form a back 4 with the right center back covering space behind the right wingback who is pushing up. The left back stays deep and takes the role of a wingback. Rather than being a traditionnal wingback, Grimaldo is one of the most versatile player in the squad who can operates as a winger during attacks, invert as a pivot during build up and even act as a third number 10.
However, he still fills his duties as a fullback when neede unlike Frimpong who had been assigned to a right winger role. Frimpong's positionning is even proactive than Trent as you might see him as a right winger, as a numer 10, even as a striker in various occasions. he also serves as press releasers due to his positionning for the central players. Palacios is a box to box miedfielder as he drops deep alongside Xhaka in the 4 plus 2 build up, then advances into spaces between the lines during the attack. Xhaka is the deep lying playmaker, being the main man launching counter attacks. Hoffman plays as a narrow attacking miedfielder giving Frimpong more spaces to take on the right wing while the right winger mostly controls the right half space. Wirtz in the other hand plays in a more wider role. When Grimaldo stays back to form a back 4, Wirtz takes the left wing to maintain the width. He also serves as a key playmaker with Grimaldo who drops between the lines to connect the miedfield with the attack. In order to create spaces for Wirtz between the lines, Xabi assigns both his center backs as ball players. He encourages them cto carry the ball and draw markers higher to open gaps between the lines. Boniface in front is used as a pressing forward. Due to his speed and strenght he plays a massive role for pressing the opposition from during the build up and in the counterpressing if they loose the ball. Their style os to blend the control with attacking mindset. In defense in order to apply a pattern at pressing they play with a high line and apply pressure across the opposition's half. In the ifnal third they are excellent at working the ball into the box, using close connexions and driving the ball at defense to create spaces between the lines or flanks.
Due to the close proximity of players, Alonso always favored short passes It's a possession based team who also excelles in counter attacks. A team that plays with a structure but also without. This is a team using opposition's counter press against them while also using counter press against their opponents.

Le rêve absolu

Très grave oui

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