Un post = un arabe remigré

Ultimate Giga supra ultra mega big cho

Parce qu’ils on pas pu voler un deuxième

Gloire à toi et à ton abnégation

Non ils l’on fait exploser

Ça glisse fortement . J'approuve a 100%

Putain jean ma qui n'arrive pas à passer le triso au classement , big cho

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Arsenal's tactics.

Why Arsenal's NEW Tactic is Breaking Rules?

During the 2 first seasons of Arteta at Arsenal, they played generally in 4 2 3 1 with mid or low block as they mostly relied on staying deep and hti on the break with wide players. However after signing players like ZInchenko, Rice and Havertz, Arteta shifted into a more proactive 4 3 3 with players being close of each other for efficient short passes. Also he set several positionnal rotations during diferent phases of the game. For example during their build up phase they used to play with a box shape in the midfield with Zinchenko inverting as the second pivot to establish a central dominance. However a lot of teams are now well aware about how to defend against this as they use their wide winger to invert with Zinchenko, creating their own box with additionnal winger providing an extra cover. This sometimes blocked the central routes for Arsenal. As a result they were forced to play wide where the backline is already man marking their wingers. So to overcome this, instead of making the box predictable, Arteta introduced a rotationnal box in which instead of Zinchenko, you might seee Havzrtz or Odegaard dropping back to form the box. You could also see Zincheko still inverting while Partey would move wide as a right back. Even the goalkepper could advance to play the role of a centre back. A particularity of these rotations is that it's maintaining a back 4 shape. So even if the center is heavily marked by the opposition, you could easily have wider movements with 2 v 1 advantages against the opposite fullbacks and create numerical overloads against the backline. This shape often helps Arsenal to play effectivly against the best pressing sides. By shifting from 3 + 2 to 4 + 2, Arteta invites more markers to press higher and split the opposition in 2. It creates spaces for the central miedfielder between the liens to exploit. Also the deeper positions of the forwards also drags the opposition's center backs higher than the fullbacks.
It creates open field allowing the wingers to go in via long balls. However when they enter into the second phase, Arsenal use 2 fundamental technics on both flanks to progress forward into the final third. On the left wing, the players being more direct, they use a combinations of third man play and throught balls to break the lines. While in the right because of having more technical players here, they use triangular patterns and positionnal rotations to trick the opposition. But among these 2 the majority of their balls come from the right side using wide triangles. However recently, most teams used triangular schemes this implies that opposition will commit more numbers on this flank and blocking routes to the opposite side. So to overcome this, with the arrival of Rice and his excellent movements, Arteta has gave him the freedom to move into higher spaces. So they switched from a wide triangle to a wide box, including Rice as an extra player. This provided a weapon to overcame the opposition's overloads and open multiple opportunities here. With a triangle when the right back, Ben White passed it to Saka and then made an overlap for example he was often marked by a defender, leaving Saka with 2 options, either trying a pass to Odegaard so he can cross, either trying to dribble the opposition. But now Rice could make runs into the half spaces. So having 2 players making runs in the same time, Saka has 2 options. Also the extra man allow them to switch play easier to the other side of the pitch. Also other tactic being used is the same side tactic. When Saka receive the ball in the right wing, the opposition shifts toward him. So he can make a side pass to Rice, making the opposition believe that they will go for the opposite side. But it indirectly open more roads into the same side. So instead of passing to the left, Rice pass it back to White, opening up spaces and catching the defense off guard.
When Arsenal get into the final third, last season, Zinchenko acted as a box to box while Ben White had a more advancec role with triangle rotations. This shape made them dangerous offensivly. But at the back they were left vulnerables as they could be targeted into the flanks with long balls. To adress this problem, rather than playing with 2 agressive fullbacks, Arteta played with only 1. When Zinchenko was not available, he played Tomiyasu who stayed deep as a wide center back, while Ben White could advance into the center to form large triangles if needed. It allowed them to have a wide presence to defend against the counters. It also created a 5 v 3 numerical superiority in the center and a 5 v 4 against the backline, offering both horizontal and vertical advantages. So even if the opposition narrows down, Arsenal has the wide presence to exploit the wider areas. However apart from the wide areas the majority of Arsenal's goals come from set pieces. This is possible because of the new crossing technics set up by Arteta. When they make a cross, Arsenal position 5 or 6 aerial strong players inside of the box. Instead of spreading these players uniformally, they overload the back post with one player covering the goalkepper. The reason for this is that if these players were positionned in front of the defenders, they could easily attract the direction of the ball, and the attackers simultaneously. When the attackers are behind them, they have to look the ball and the attackers in opposite direction. It puts them to dilemma, either delay their runs and they get vulnerable to concede from this. However out all the tactics what made Arsenal the best defensive team of the Premiere League during 2023 - 2024 season is Arteta's locking mechanism. To achieve this they use a hybrid pressing system which is a combination of zonal marking and man marking.
For example when the opposition start their build up by the center, Arsenal structure themselve into a zonal 3 4 3 shape with the fullback as the single pivot. Under that shape, each player has 2 focal point on either side, covering efficiently all the opposition players. So when the opposition try to play to one side, then these players swtich rapidly from zonal to man marking following the focal point in this zone. This locks the opposition from all the corners and force them to play long or go directly to the opposition. And as soon as they go long, instead of using the offside trap, Arsenal put one player against the ball while the rest switch back to their zonal maring and stay deep, attracting any potential passers to prevent counter attacks. This hybrid style disrupts the opposition's rythm and often forcing turnovers before they could advance to Arsenal's half. When this press is beaten by the opposition, Arsenal transition into a compact 4 4 2 in which the frontline tries to push the opposition further way whenever they make side or back pass. When opposition goes wide, Arsenal's wingers becomes the false fullbacks allowing the real fullbacks to cover the half spaces for any pass. Meanwhile, the rest of the backline overload centrally and reinforce themselves against any cross. This locks all attacking possibilities for the opposition. When they try to revert back, then these players switch to a high man to man pressing and push the opposition even further. This alternation between zonal marking and man marking to a compact defense has proven difficult to break, even for top teams like Liverpool or City. When it comes to the players roles, Arteta focuses on having one agressor out of the 2 fullbacks. When Zinchenko plays, he becomes the inverted wingback while when Tomiyasu plays, then Ben White takes on the inverted wingback.
In the midfield, instead of the double pivot, a single one is used with Rice acting as a box to box midfielder who drops back during the build up to form 4 + 2 shape and then advancing with Odegaard to form the box shape in the right. Odegaard is a roaming playmaker who can plays a key role in Arteta's positional rotations as he frequently interchanges positions with the pivot, with the wingers and even with the striker. His main job is to draw the markers with his movements and create spaces for his teamates to advance. While Saka can play as an inverted winger, he often stays wide to stretch the opposition then quickly moves inside to receive passes from the fullback. On the left Arsenal adopt a more direct approach using an inside forward to fit this strategy. Finally upfront after the arrival of Havertz Arsenal often deploys him as a false 9 to act lilke a roaming playmaker like Odegaard. He can drop into the midfielder to pull centrabcks out of position, make opposite runs with the winger and even act as a pivot to create spaces for the inverted wingback. Due to his technical ability, Havertz has created numerous chances for Arsenal in the center by being an extra playmaker which was not the case earlier. Arteta said in an interview that he prefered to dominate the game by constantly pressuring the opposition rather than controlling it with 100 touches but still remaining goal less. Out of possession they play in high block and try to lock the opposition's build up with their high pressing style. Instead of using offside trap they track the second man whatever the opposition plays a long ball. Like Guardiola, Arteta likes to to keep the possession by using short passes often. To create a strong dominant team, you must see in long term and trust the process with the same patience than Arsenal. His tactic not only transformed Arsenal but also gave them a strong identity. Due to this they may be capable of realizing something big in the upcoming future.

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This Is How Arsenal Tactically Dominated Madrid | Tactical Analysis : Arsenal 3-0 Real Madrid


Before the match started we could wonder how Real Madrid would cope with this Arsenal's potential midfield 5 given they tended to defend in a loose 4 4 2. In early minutes Real Madrid shifted in a 4 2 2 2 in the defensive phase. Vini and Mbappé had to sit effectively on the double pivot to make it work, the double pivot being Partey and Lewis Skelly. This way they might form a sort of midfield 6 that would have make centrla progression almost impossible. It in fact happened early on this match. One of the few things Arsenal didn't do well was about taking advantage of these wide space with Rma's front 2 being narrow and passive and the wingers also narrow and tucked in. There was plenty of rooms for the wide defenders to advance but they didn't do it, so Odegaard had to take matters in his own hands, dropping into the right center back space and showing how easy it could be to progress outwide that narrow 2 Real Madrid's problem was that for central progression being disallowed the whole match, the front 2 had to stay disciplined in their position, constantly tracking the pivots for 90 minutes. As the match went on, the positions of Mbappé and Vinicius began to waver, meaning that at least one of the pivots could be easily found. They had a clear route around or through the front 2. If Bellingham and Rodrygo went higher, Merion, Odegaard and Rice now had a 3 v 2 advantage against Camavinga and Modric, allowing Arsenal to have men between the lines. But despite the pressure applied on the center, the game was ultimatly won on the flanks. Each of the flanks were taken advantage of differently by Arteta, making most of his players strenght while fully taking advantage of the opposition's weaknesses. In the 3 - 2 shape, Timber tucked in which he usually do but in this match it added the benefit of shielding the left which is Real Madrid's main transitional strenght.

In the Premiere League we tended to see Timber joining the attack late from time to time. But in this match, he almost always sat deep. With Bellingham and Rodrygo narrow, Odegaard could drift wide when he was in the half space, drawing Bellingham even further infield, allowing Saka being in 1 v 1 versus Alaba. Saka often beat Alaba and went into good crossing positions. Saka also by times cut infield, one instance of them leading to the free kick that allowed Arsenal's first goal. In second half, Ancelotti made Bellingham shifting deep to double team Saka. But meanwhile with Merino and Rice occupying Camavinga and Modric, Odegaard could lurk on the blind side by times, in the half space. Neither Bellingham or Alaba were great at covering his runs, even through they weren't punished for this. While Arsenal's right flank was about isolation between Saka and Alaba, the left flank was about overload. Arsenal executed both in a masterful way. Both Lewis Skelly and Rodrygo, who played on paper wide, foud themselvesinfield whenever Arsenl was in possession. This signed the beginning of the end for Real Madrid. If Mbappé and Vinicius had been disciplined on the double pivot, Rodrygo could have remained tight on Rice. Instead, Skelly was often able to get away from Mbappé, leading to huge issues. Rodrygo was now 2 v 1 down against Lewis Skelly and Rice. If a pivot was trying to back him up, that pivot could be 2 v 1 against Rice and Merino dropping in. No matter what move Real Madrid made, it felt like the wrong move.
If Rodrygo pushed toward Skelly, this was the trigger for Rice to move into Arsenal's left space out wide, often receiving completly unchallenged, while Martinelli tied up Valverde and Merino tying up the central man, being often Modric. This would allow Rice and Martinelli to combine perfectly when Rice created a separation from Rodrygo to get into crossing positions into the box. Assuming the front 2 hadn't track, if Rodrygo was more disciplined in tracking Rice, Lewis Skelly was more than happy to get into these dangerous central zones, threatening to create some dangerous actions. Rice was the hub, with effective combinations with Martinelli and Lewis Skelly, but as importantly, Merino dropped constantly, meaning that Asencio was un unsure to whether to press and the sheer physicality of Rice could take over in these situations As whether it was a pivot or more often Rodrygo trying to keep up with him, they simply couldn't. The magnum opus of this tactical setup comes in the 75th minute when sloppy positionning of the front 2 means that Arsenal pivots are accessible. This draws Valverde but Merino has dropped in from 9 and was an extra receiver. Rice was ready to take advantage of the space left on the left as always, whenever Rodrygo is central. He progressed effortlessly as a result. Lewis Skelly is in a dangerous space and he uses it to find Merino who finishes the move.

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