Un post = un arabe remigré

Non ils l’on fait exploser

Ça glisse fortement . J'approuve a 100%

Putain jean ma qui n'arrive pas à passer le triso au classement , big cho

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Arsenal's tactics.

During the 2 first seasons of Arteta at Arsenal, they played generally in 4 2 3 1 with mid or low block as they mostly relied on staying deep and hti on the break with wide players. However after signing players like ZInchenko, Rice and Havertz, Arteta shifted into a more proactive 4 3 3 with players being close of each other for efficient short passes. Also he set several positionnal rotations during diferent phases of the game. For example during their build up phase they used to play with a box shape in the midfield with Zinchenko inverting as the second pivot to establish a central dominance. However a lot of teams are now well aware about how to defend against this as they use their wide winger to invert with Zinchenko, creating their own box with additionnal winger providing an extra cover. This sometimes blocked the central routes for Arsenal. As a result they were forced to play wide where the backline is already man marking their wingers. So to overcome this, instead of making the box predictable, Arteta introduced a rotationnal box in which instead of Zinchenko, you might seee Havzrtz or Odegaard dropping back to form the box. You could also see Zincheko still inverting while Partey would move wide as a right back. Even the goalkepper could advance to play the role of a centre back. A particularity of these rotations is that it's maintaining a back 4 shape. So even if the center is heavily marked by the opposition, you could easily have wider movements with 2 v 1 advantages against the opposite fullbacks and create numerical overloads against the backline. This shape often helps Arsenal to play effectivly against the best pressing sides. By shifting from 3 + 2 to 4 + 2, Arteta invites more markers to press higher and split the opposition in 2. It creates spaces for the central miedfielder between the liens to exploit. Also the deeper positions of the forwards also drags the opposition's center backs higher than the fullbacks.
It creates open field allowing the wingers to go in via long balls. However when they enter into the second phase, Arsenal use 2 fundamental technics on both flanks to progress forward into the final third. On the left wing, the players being more direct, they use a combinations of third man play and throught balls to break the lines. While in the right because of having more technical players here, they use triangular patterns and positionnal rotations to trick the opposition. But among these 2 the majority of their balls come from the right side using wide triangles. However recently, most teams used triangular schemes this implies that opposition will commit more numbers on this flank and blocking routes to the opposite side. So to overcome this, with the arrival of Rice and his excellent movements, Arteta has gave him the freedom to move into higher spaces. So they switched from a wide triangle to a wide box, including Rice as an extra player. This provided a weapon to overcame the opposition's overloads and open multiple opportunities here. With a triangle when the right back, Ben White passed it to Saka and then made an overlap for example he was often marked by a defender, leaving Saka with 2 options, either trying a pass to Odegaard so he can cross, either trying to dribble the opposition. But now Rice could make runs into the half spaces. So having 2 players making runs in the same time, Saka has 2 options. Also the extra man allow them to switch play easier to the other side of the pitch. Also other tactic being used is the same side tactic. When Saka receive the ball in the right wing, the opposition shifts toward him. So he can make a side pass to Rice, making the opposition believe that they will go for the opposite side. But it indirectly open more roads into the same side. So instead of passing to the left, Rice pass it back to White, opening up spaces and catching the defense off guard.
When Arsenal get into the final third, last season, Zinchenko acted as a box to box while Ben White had a more advancec role with triangle rotations. This shape made them dangerous offensivly. But at the back they were left vulnerables as they could be targeted into the flanks with long balls. To adress this problem, rather than playing with 2 agressive fullbacks, Arteta played with only 1. When Zinchenko was not available, he played Tomiyasu who stayed deep as a wide center back, while Ben White could advance into the center to form large triangles if needed. It allowed them to have a wide presence to defend against the counters. It also created a 5 v 3 numerical superiority in the center and a 5 v 4 against the backline, offering both horizontal and vertical advantages. So even if the opposition narrows down, Arsenal has the wide presence to exploit the wider areas. However apart from the wide areas the majority of Arsenal's goals come from set pieces. This is possible because of the new crossing technics set up by Arteta. When they make a cross, Arsenal position 5 or 6 aerial strong players inside of the box. Instead of spreading these players uniformally, they overload the back post with one player covering the goalkepper. The reason for this is that if these players were positionned in front of the defenders, they could easily attract the direction of the ball, and the attackers simultaneously. When the attackers are behind them, they have to look the ball and the attackers in opposite direction. It puts them to dilemma, either delay their runs and they get vulnerable to concede from this. However out all the tactics what made Arsenal the best defensive team of the Premiere League during 2023 - 2024 season is Arteta's locking mechanism. To achieve this they use a hybrid pressing system which is a combination of zonal marking and man marking.
For example when the opposition start their build up by the center, Arsenal structure themselve into a zonal 3 4 3 shape with the fullback as the single pivot. Under that shape, each player has 2 focal point on either side, covering efficiently all the opposition players. So when the opposition try to play to one side, then these players swtich rapidly from zonal to man marking following the focal point in this zone. This locks the opposition from all the corners and force them to play long or go directly to the opposition. And as soon as they go long, instead of using the offside trap, Arsenal put one player against the ball while the rest switch back to their zonal maring and stay deep, attracting any potential passers to prevent counter attacks. This hybrid style disrupts the opposition's rythm and often forcing turnovers before they could advance to Arsenal's half. When this press is beaten by the opposition, Arsenal transition into a compact 4 4 2 in which the frontline tries to push the opposition further way whenever they make side or back pass. When opposition goes wide, Arsenal's wingers becomes the false fullbacks allowing the real fullbacks to cover the half spaces for any pass. Meanwhile, the rest of the backline overload centrally and reinforce themselves against any cross. This locks all attacking possibilities for the opposition. When they try to revert back, then these players switch to a high man to man pressing and push the opposition even further. This alternation between zonal marking and man marking to a compact defense has proven difficult to break, even for top teams like Liverpool or City. When it comes to the players roles, Arteta focuses on having one agressor out of the 2 fullbacks. When Zinchenko plays, he becomes the inverted wingback while when Tomiyasu plays, then Ben White takes on the inverted wingback.
In the midfield, instead of the double pivot, a single one is used with Rice acting as a box to box midfielder who drops back during the build up to form 4 + 2 shape and then advancing with Odegaard to form the box shape in the right. Odegaard is a roaming playmaker who can plays a key role in Arteta's positional rotations as he frequently interchanges positions with the pivot, with the wingers and even with the striker. His main job is to draw the markers with his movements and create spaces for his teamates to advance. While Saka can play as an inverted winger, he often stays wide to stretch the opposition then quickly moves inside to receive passes from the fullback. On the left Arsenal adopt a more direct approach using an inside forward to fit this strategy. Finally upfront after the arrival of Havertz Arsenal often deploys him as a false 9 to act lilke a roaming playmaker like Odegaard. He can drop into the midfielder to pull centrabcks out of position, make opposite runs with the winger and even act as a pivot to create spaces for the inverted wingback. Due to his technical ability, Havertz has created numerous chances for Arsenal in the center by being an extra playmaker which was not the case earlier. Arteta said in an interview that he prefered to dominate the game by constantly pressuring the opposition rather than controlling it with 100 touches but still remaining goal less. Out of possession they play in high block and try to lock the opposition's build up with their high pressing style. Instead of using offside trap they track the second man whatever the opposition plays a long ball. Like Guardiola, Arteta likes to to keep the possession by using short passes often. To create a strong dominant team, you must see in long term and trust the process with the same patience than Arsenal. His tactic not only transformed Arsenal but also gave them a strong identity. Due to this they may be capable of realizing something big in the upcoming future.

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How Arteta beats Ancelotti.

Before the match started we could wonder how Real Madrid would cope with this Arsenal's potential midfield 5 given they tended to defend in a loose 4 4 2. In early minutes Real Madrid shifted in a 4 2 2 2 in the defensive phase. Vini and Mbappé had to sit effectively on the double pivot to make it work, the double pivot being Partey and Lewis Skelly. This way they might form a sort of midfield 6 that would have make centrla progression almost impossible. It in fact happened early on this match. One of the few things Arsenal didn't do well was about taking advantage of these wide space with Rma's front 2 being narrow and passive and the wingers also narrow and tucked in. There was plenty of rooms for the wide defenders to advance but they didn't do it, so Odegaard had to take matters in his own hands, dropping into the right center back space and showing how easy it could be to progress outwide that narrow 2 Real Madrid's problem was that for central progression being disallowed the whole match, the front 2 had to stay disciplined in their position, constantly tracking the pivots for 90 minutes. As the match went on, the positions of Mbappé and Vinicius began to waver, meaning that at least one of the pivots could be easily found. They had a clear route around or through the front 2. If Bellingham and Rodrygo went higher, Merion, Odegaard and Rice now had a 3 v 2 advantage against Camavinga and Modric, allowing Arsenal to have men between the lines. But despite the pressure applied on the center, the game was ultimatly won on the flanks. Each of the flanks were taken advantage of differently by Arteta, making most of his players strenght while fully taking advantage of the opposition's weaknesses. In the 3 - 2 shape, Timber tucked in which he usually do but in this match it added the benefit of shielding the left which is Real Madrid's main transitional strenght.

In the Premiere League we tended to see Timber joining the attack late from time to time. But in this match, he almost always sat deep. With Bellingham and Rodrygo narrow, Odegaard could drift wide when he was in the half space, drawing Bellingham even further infield, allowing Saka being in 1 v 1 versus Alaba. Saka often beat Alaba and went into good crossing positions. Saka also by times cut infield, one instance of them leading to the free kick that allowed Arsenal's first goal. In second half, Ancelotti made Bellingham shifting deep to double team Saka. But meanwhile with Merino and Rice occupying Camavinga and Modric, Odegaard could lurk on the blind side by times, in the half space. Neither Bellingham or Alaba were great at covering his runs, even through they weren't punished for this. While Arsenal's right flank was about isolation between Saka and Alaba, the left flank was about overload. Arsenal executed both in a masterful way. Both Lewis Skelly and Rodrygo, who played on paper wide, foud themselvesinfield whenever Arsenl was in possession. This signed the beginning of the end for Real Madrid. If Mbappé and Vinicius had been disciplined on the double pivot, Rodrygo could have remained tight on Rice. Instead, Skelly was often able to get away from Mbappé, leading to huge issues. Rodrygo was now 2 v 1 down against Lewis Skelly and Rice. If a pivot was trying to back him up, that pivot could be 2 v 1 against Rice and Merino dropping in. No matter what move Real Madrid made, it felt like the wrong move.
If Rodrygo pushed toward Skelly, this was the trigger for Rice to move into Arsenal's left space out wide, often receiving completly unchallenged, while Martinelli tied up Valverde and Merino tying up the central man, being often Modric. This would allow Rice and Martinelli to combine perfectly when Rice created a separation from Rodrygo to get into crossing positions into the box. Assuming the front 2 hadn't track, if Rodrygo was more disciplined in tracking Rice, Lewis Skelly was more than happy to get into these dangerous central zones, threatening to create some dangerous actions. Rice was the hub, with effective combinations with Martinelli and Lewis Skelly, but as importantly, Merino dropped constantly, meaning that Asencio was un unsure to whether to press and the sheer physicality of Rice could take over in these situations As whether it was a pivot or more often Rodrygo trying to keep up with him, they simply couldn't. The magnum opus of this tactical setup comes in the 75th minute when sloppy positionning of the front 2 means that Arsenal pivots are accessible. This draws Valverde but Merino has dropped in from 9 and was an extra receiver. Rice was ready to take advantage of the space left on the left as always, whenever Rodrygo is central. He progressed effortlessly as a result. Lewis Skelly is in a dangerous space and he uses it to find Merino who finishes the move.

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How PSG beat Liverpool in 2025.

The opening case of this match showcased Liverpool's agressive 4 2 4 press as they threatened to fully suffocate the Parisians. The same pressing structure that caused nightmares to some of the biggest teams of England. PSG at first didn't make exception. Szoboszlai joined the front 3, creating a first layer that looked almost impossible to penetrate.Time and time they were forced to go back to Donnaruma. But even here a man could continue his press, keeping the center back in his cover shadow. As a result PSG were often forced long. Initially the solution was Vitinha dropping alongside the center backs and Donnaruma during the goalkick with the hope to have both quantity and quality advantage since Vitinha is comfortable on pressure. Liverpool still was able at times to press the narrow men in the box still forcing PSG long and Donnaruma has a hard time to sometimes find the fullbacks directly. Turning point was when Luis Enrique made a subtle adjustment. Vitinha returned to his midfield position from the deeper zones and entrusting his back 4 to begin the build up. At first it was not a problem for Liverpool who could oeprate with a dedicated man to man shape in the midfield or with their 4 2 4. But the difference now was Dembelé starting to drop deeper and deeper meaning there was now a 4 v 3 in the midfield. It cause some indecisions in Liverpool's back 4, as we already saw in the first leg. Liverpool's center backs were often not backing up the press, meaning a Liverpool player higher up would have to choose between pressing a midfielder deep or dropping to Dembelé. It was a chooice between letting PSG having a relatively easy progression and allow a threat like Dembelé to roam between the lines. The best example was in the 12th minute, with the action leadinfg to PSG's goal with Dembelé dropping as a false 9 and the center backs not backing up the press due to the runners behind. So Dembelé can turns, finds Barcola on his right, leading to Dembelé's goal.
Szoboszlai had to reconsider his position and start deeper to not be completly overrun centrally. As a result, their press became more selective, opening the floodgates for PSG. But the key was that theyr were no longer building up in the center. Despite Szoboszlai staying more deep than before, Liverpool still wanted to keep high pressure with a winger often joining Jota's press more narrow, often Salah pressing Pacho while keeping Mendes in his cover shadow. However, Pacho's build up play was masterfull, taking his first touch higher up the pitch which had the double effect on the press. It drew Salahin further toward him It also changed the passing angle to Mendes meaning he was no longer in Salah's cover shadow. When Nuno Mendes was found, he had room to push up. And due to the presence of Dembelé, Liverpool was reluctant to cover. PSG's right flank told a similar story of tactical exploitation. Diaz was tasked with pressing from the left into Marquinhos. But PSG was now more composed under pressure. By finding the center backs first there was less dependency on Donnaruma's distribution. It also ensured that the winger was fully drawned onto Marquinhos, meaning that Hakimi was more easily found. It created a pressure dilemma for Robertson: either pressing Hakimi high up and leave space in behind for Barcola to exploit, either hold position and allow Hakimi time to progress the ball. The difficulty of this decision was coumpounded by Dembelé's false 9 positionning When he dropped deep, it became almost impossible for a center back to cover for Robertson. Because if for example Van Dijk drifted to cover, Dembelé could potentially exploit that space.
PSG's formation morphed throughout the match, sometimes forming a back 3 with 2 cb and 1 midfielder dropping. Other time Mendes was working as a third center back, specifically positionned to neutralize Salah on transition with the arrest defense while allowing the left winger to create an isolation against the right back, often Kvara against Trent. This structural flexibility made PSG difficult to counter. Then up the pitch, the fluid interchanging of positions between the attackers added another dimension to PSG's tactical approach. At times Dembelé would operate as a false 9 with Barcola wider but then they would rotate. Kvaratskhelia also rotated between the flanks, creating constant identification problems for Liverpool 's defenders and Dembelé's role was particularly effective in the final third. His ability to drop deep to receive was key but it was also possible through the movement of his teammates, the wingers and the midfielders particularly since their movements assured that both Van Dijk and Konaté were always hesitant to follow Dembelé when he dropped deep meaning that at times even when the runners did not go beyond, Dembelé could receive, turn and play out to the wingers in dangerous zones. Despite these sophisticated mechanisms, PSG struggled to convert their tactical advantage into goals, consistently reaching dangerous positions but lacking the clinical edge to make their dominance count on the scoreboard. Alisson kept Liverpool alive for a long time.

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Getafe's tactics.


Jose Bordanas is the ultimate antagonist of spanish football, a manager thriving on disruption and ignoring all tactical trends. So much that his style had been called anti football. A total rejection of possession and passing based style. Bordalas has a reputation of overachieving with modest squads. Getafe beat Athlético Madrid during 2024 / 2025 season, drew Barcelona, On only 3 occasions they conded 3 goals during this season. The game plan is just to sit back in an incredibly compact block and wait for the right chance to strike. When they get the ball they go forward as quickly as possible. But Getafe is not just about defense, brute force and long balls. Their defensive structure is meticulously designed to frustrate opponents. They rank first in amount of duels per game but last for pretty much any passing metric. However some stats are misleading like their high gegenpressing intensity or their high buildup disruption percentage. In reality, it's because they allow the opponent to start the attack from much further up the pitch. Against some other teams they can be more comfortable pressing higher up the pitch like against Seville. But when living in their mid or low block structure, they become really difficult to play against. Most of the season they lined up into a 4 4 2 and sometimes shifting into a 4 1 4 1. But the principles remain the same : not letting midfielders any time on the ball. This isn't just low block park the bus. In fact Getafe's defensive line starts surprisingly high, second only to Barcelona in la liga. Their first line of pressure isn't designed to win the ball back. But rather shadow mark any central player.s, ensuring that if a player in this position receives the ball, they are instantly swamped, forcing the opposiiton to either shift the ball out wide, or go long over the defensive line. None s ideal. The defensive line doesn't rely on offside traps like Barcelona. Instead they are ready to drop and follow the runners in behind.
This was evident with their win against Athlético Madrid. Alvarez and Griezmann found no space in the center, forcing Athlético to go long that never found proper supporting structure. When going out wide it's almost impossible for the opponent to outnumber Getafe because the whole team will defend in a compact bloc, shifting as an unit to whether flank the ball is on. With no holding midfielder rotating to add support, Getafe can get 4 or 5 players otu wide before opponents can get more players to support. Against Athlético it was nearly as 3 v 2 on the right flank. And on the left flank, it was 4 v 3. Same story against Osasuna. They encourage passes out wide into the space between the lines. Rather to rush to close down the players in possession, Bordalas wants his team to completly shut off certain routes. As soon as the pass is made, the whole team surround the player in possession, giving him no option to move the ball forward. The defensive line is agressive and can push agressively forward when needed. Midfielders and strikers can then start the counter attack. They are not that good at counter attacks but they try. Agression in midfield is why Getafe gets a lot of fouls and yellow cards. They would rather defend from a free kick than from open play. Teams like Real Madrid and Barcelona are glued to their spot when matching Getafe as none of their rotations work, being forced to play into the space Getafe want them to play. Vast majority of chances Getafe concedes are crosses into the box. Only one player is above the line of the ball ready to counter attack when the whole rest of the team helps in defense. They concede either when opponent counter attack with Getafe's back line exposed, either from crosses.
Getafe's defensive record in la liga speaks for itself. The same can't be said about their offensive numbers as their attack is one of the worst of la Liga. Even when the team looks to start attacking from a deeper position, goal kicks are always taken long. The center backs passing map also shows they rarely repeat the same pattern during cnosecutive games. Sometimes they passes around the back line other time it's more direct to the striker. But it's never the exact same in every match. They have physical players in the midfield that can win the loose ball. THey get fouled constantly in the era. THey can knock it out of a throwing. It does an excellent job at keeping their opponent far away from their goal. The few times they are able to move into the opposition's half, it's mostly coming from wingers dribbling into a more central position and feeding the strikers running in behind. At most their attacks will be with 5 players. But when in possession their main focus is to keep a solid defensive shape. Their goal chances mostly come when the opposition is not correctly positioned. Defending against Getafe can be tricky as their wingers are very good at dribbling inside and there is usually big gaps for them to move into. But that's where their positive points in attack end as there is still a lot to be desired when it comes to finishing, ranking last in the league for XG per shot. With calculated chaos, Bordalas ensure no game against Getafe will be easy.

Postecoglou's tactics at Tottenham.

With no traditionnal fullbacks in the structure, by using diamonds and triangular patterns, he has turned spurs into a vertical tiki taka team which is capable of breaking any opposition's defense. He uses a 4 3 3 formation but during possession, it transforms into a 2 3 5 structure. Where Pep and Arteta uses an inverted fullback, Postecoglou uses 2 inverted fullbacks which is quite unique. During the build up phase, they have 2 1 2 structure where the fullbacks moves into the center and the cdm drops deeper to form a link between the centerbacks and the central fullbacks. It facilitates circulation against high pressing teams with quick short passes. As the game progress into the second phase, one of the central midfielder drop deeper into the flanks while the striker, the winger and the other number 8 drift wide, creating a double diamond inside of the pitch. It creates numerical diagonal and vertical passing options into the final third allowing fluid transitions from defense to attack and encouraging vertical playing style. In addition to olverload the wide areas, it also gives a significant overload in the center with the fullbacks moving into the center. This way the team can create a miedfield powerhose with 5 v 3 which can let multiple players unmarked proovking more passing options and helping to move the ball more with more efficiency. When the opposition add more players centrally, Spurs can quickly switch to a double diamond to exploit the wide areas. This traps the oppositions from all sides. In the final third, they maintain the 2 3 5 structure but add more flexibility and positional rotations. For example if the opposition is too rigid, 2 wingers could move a bit more inside, leaving the way for the fullbacks to push forward.
Alternativly, the wingers can also stretch the opposition by staying as wide as possible which can leave gaps into the half spaces to run in which is often executed by the inverted fullbacks or the number 8, meaning that 7 players are involved into the attack. These players have the freedom to move into the spaces and change their positions, confusing the defensive line, resulting in goalscoring ipportunities. Without the ball, the team gives priority to recuperate the ball in high positions on the pitch. One of the problems of the tactic is that when the 2 fullbacks are inverting, it let wide spaces for the opposition to launch a quick counter attack. To solve the problem, the center defensive midfielder drop deep to form a back 3 with the centerbacks. This strategy is efficient but no without risk. The structure need rapid adaptations to maintian solidity in defense. Firstly the striker act like a deep lying forward and interchanging positions with wingers and the 8, looking to create or run into the spaces into the opposite's defense while the winger stay wide but can also invert. Because of the absence of fullbacks, the wingers are positionned as wide as possible. But there are moments whe the wingers can adopt a narrower position allowing the 2 fullbacks to overlap. It makes difficult for opponent to predict their movements. In the middle, Maddison and Sarr use perfectly their roaming playmaker roles, moving constantly out of their positions to find spaces, whatever by making runs into the half spaces, or drifting wide into the pitch to create this double diamond structure. They also have the freedom to drop deeper if needed, acting like outlet options to build the game from deep. Bissouma, the cdm, act like a miw between a deep lying playmaker and a defensive destroyer. His excellent ball control and his passing abilities allow him to dictate the tempo of the game. Acting as a pivot connecting defensive and offensive units.
Udogie and Porro are the inverted fullbacks. They must give the 2 number 8 more freedom to occupy the positions into the half spaces and contribute more to the attack. Alsotheir positionning create a double pivot in central zones. These compacts presences make difficult for the opposition to execute central penetrative passes while the 2 centerbacks must be excellent ball playing defenders. It's necessary against high press from the opposition. Their ability to read the game with precision and make passes allow the team to bypass the opposition's first line of press effectivly. Finally the goalkepper assume the role of sweeper. He is tasked of attracting opposition's closing presser by holding the ball and opening up spaces so the others can be free. The tempo is fast while the defensive line is set up high. The team is encouraged to recover the ball quickly and start a counter attack.

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How Ten Hag beat Pep Guardiola in the 2024 FA Cup final.

City dominated the possession but United still outplayed them. Man United was happy to not have the ball, not having to press very high on the pitch. It meant that City's center backs got on the ball pretty easily. United allowed City to have possession as long as it was not in the center of their own half. Having Bruno in center forward, it was difficult to get the ball on the double pivots. He would drop on one of the pivots. Mc Tominay, an attacking miedfielder would push onto the remaining pivot. Ten Hag was willing to leave spaces out wide if it meant that half spaces were closed for City. Garnacho and Rashford tucked infield. United were playing narrow 4 2 4 with 2 mobiles engines leading the defensive efforts. Ten Hag did this because he noticed the shape City had used during recent matches with Pep using his fullbacks ore as traditionnal fullbacks. It would allowed the wingers like Foden or Silva to play more centrally into their natural positions. But now City hardly found anyone between the lines and with the double pivots covered, Bernardo Silva would drop deep to try to make a 3 v 2 situation against Fernandez and Mc Tominay. Foden drifted infield on the left hand side. So City's miedfield was often split into 3 attempted progressors and 2 attempted creators. But this hypothetical 3 v 2 was more a 4 v 2 in United's favor because the front 4 was so norrow and compact in his space. Ten Hag was willing to let City's fullbacks to get on the ball as they were barely a threat compared to the central players. It made it difficult to find the progressors and easier to stop the fullbacks who were not grade 1 v 1. Kovacic and Silva often dropped into the half spaces vacated left by the fullbacks.
But knowing there was one less men at the center, United could look to tigh up that City's men fairly easily in that zone. But this shape caused even more problems to Cyt due to the Rashford Walker dynamic. Walker being high gave Rashford too much of a head start on transitions. It forced City to restrategize with Walker and Bernardo Silva having to rotate. It was more dangerous than having Walker in that zone. But from the deeper zone Walker was less secure with his passing. He was often forcing passes into dangerous zones which could result into turnovers. The narrow 4 afforded Maino and Amrabat and the freedom to be more man oriented on the 2 creators, following them aroud the pitch and looking the make their lives miserables. They were willing to track them even when they looked for rooms in the fullbacks. But United's defensive shape was not impenetrable and Haaland would look to drop at times to play in one of the rushing miedfielders. This worked well when Haaland's touch was on point. But it was often not the case. On the left De Bruyne and Gvardiol would often switch roles. It meant De Bruyne would have more room to pick up a pass. But City looked the most dangerous when De Bruyne and Foden not spilt the pitch in hald but looked to overload one side. Since united pivots had 2 mens to pick up, it created opportunities of combinations. But with the 2 attacking mied committing to one side, it would often mean that during transitions, the far side fullback would potentially have room to attack if they received the ball. ALternativly a quick switch would also mean a guaranteed 1 v 1 against the fullback.
United were pretty comfortable men to men against the creators. But when the ball got wide one of the biggest game changers was having one of the progressors make a late run to create a 3 v 2 advantage and try to break United's defensive line shape. But when Kovacic or Rodri made the run they left the other pivot vulnerable on the transition as Walker would be instantly moving out wide to cover Rashford. So it leads United to play pretty easily throught the center, allowing United to settle with long and quick switches to the other side, like the one that led to Man United's second goal. Pep needed to change something and that change came from the magic Doku provided. Balls were passed much more on the left side to Doku. By comparision, Bernardo Silva had much less balls on the right side of the pitch during second half time compared to the first half time. This lead to an intense battle between Doku and Bissaka with both having their moments. But it's throught the secondary impact on Foden that Doku's impact was best shown. With Gvardiol coming in, Man United had to double team against Doku. That meant that with Stones also being a pivot, Foden had more spaces in this zone. Foden had during the second half more key passes and shot compared to the first half.
Jude Bellingham combined that traditionnal physicality of english players with the technical flair that let him fits in modern day football.
His progressive passes, passes into the final third and long balls completed increased. Dortmund generally are a ball dominant side that try to pin their opposition inside their own box. Therefore Bellingham was heavily involved in the final third play, using his ability of drifting between the lines unoticed to engage quick combinations. He was involving himself more in the opposite box, making more and more last minute runs to get a goalscoring opportunity or a goal scoring creating chance. For somebody playing as a traditionnal miedfield Bellingham already in the past as a lot of involvment in that final third.His touches in the box and his line breaking runs, he became a game changer for Dortmund.His shoot creating actions as well as his decision making were in progression. Ancelotti was the perfect man to get the best from Bellingham's new form. That's why Bellingham's move to real madrid was perfect. ot only Benzema going in Saudi meant that there was a hole in the 9 position, bu Ancelotti was also cursed with having too many high quality miedfielders. So the miedfield diamond was the solution for Ancelotti.Modric and Kross were aging but both were still far superior orchestrators from deep. Bellingham was a monster at carrying the ball from deep with his feet while Valverde had the ability to provide similar athleticism from deep. So instead found himself at the cutting edge of the diamond. When the game called for it, Bellingham could still momentally drop deeper to be the extra option.
His increased possession and security were still important in these deeper phases. But now with the forwards being both natural wingers who will take the drift wide, it was vital for Bellingham to provide a strong central presence. He didn't play as a centre forward or even as a false 9. He was very much an attacking miedfielder. He revealed his ability to find spaces to receive between the lines. He thrived in this role with world class miedfielders being able to find him being on the receiving end of progressive passes. As he developed a strong relationship with the forwards, his ability in tigher regions also improved. Bellingham often happened to be into the box at the right place at the right time. His shoots were now taken more at optimal positions compared to before where he had to make more long shoots. His goals and expected goals vastly increased as a result.

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Ten Hag didn't find any consistency level with Man United. Their pressing shape looked different every week. The opposition had too much space. On top of that, their offensive tactics were becoming too predictable and easy to counter. Man United were conceding too many chances. In their defeat against Spurs in 2024, Man United defended with 4 4 2 structure which made sens considering how Postecoglou wanted to move up the pitch their fullbacks forward and creating a wide line of 4 across midfield with players like Kulusevksi and Maddison rotating or attacking in behind. The main issue was the initial 3 v 2 formed with the 2 center backs + Betancur outnumbering Fernandez and ZrikzeeMan United front 2 tried to force Tottenham out wide where the wingers were ready to double up on any player in this position Spurs took advantage of this by slowly circulating the ball around the back adn stretching the space between the first 2 lines, making it impossible for Man United to press the 2 center backs, meaning that Man United's front 2, caught in ths triangle, couldn't win the ball back. A lot of time Spurs would play back to their gk creating a 4 v 2 situation and forcing Man United to even more pushing players forward, creating bigger gaps in behind as the players in the midfield would have to cover more ground between them. They would move the ball out wide, creating overlaps against Mazraoui and Dalot. It comes down to Man United letting too much space between the lines. In thier 3 - 0 loss against Liverpool, Man United wanted in 2024 to man mark both McAllistair and Gravenberch, which exposed a bigger gap between midfield and defense with Casemiro constantly caught in 2 v 1 situation. The threat of pacy wingers and fear of being caught in behind meant the defense struggled to clsoe of the space between the lines, making it easier for midfielders to receive on the turn. The defensive unit acted as a separate bloc from the offensive unit.
It was down probably to fear and pace. With De Ligt and Martinez they are more comfortable pushing forward rather than running back towards their own goal. So they compensated too much by starting deep on the pitch. Man United leaving gaps + slow midfielders needing to cover, it's no ownder Man United sturggled especially when Maino was used further up the pitch to press the defensive line. Offensively, Man United sometimes could be dangerous but even their offensive shape was not that good. Their in possession game seemed to change depending on the opponent but their main route they moved down were the 2 flanks mostly through Rashford or Garnacho. Vs Spurs Fernandez and Zirkzee constantly dropped to receive with the wingers staying as high as possible. As Spurs defenders followed these movement sin the center, it created space in behind that they could exploit directly. But such moves. But not only they lakced a goalscorer on top, Man United couldn't get the ball up the pitch at first place with opponents finding relatively easy to clown down any forward option.



What about a blueprint that guaranteed instant success, demanded the highest standars and had no tolerance for failure. That's how Roman Abramovich did at Chelsea. For Man United, since Fergie left it has been a roller coster of different managers with different tactics, visions and players. David Moyes struggled with an aging squad. Then Van Gaal with his rigid possession heavy system, bringing players like Schweinsteiger and Depay, both gone not too long after he was sacked. then came Mourinho who took a win now approach, demanding big money signings like Lukaku, Pogba, Matic. He won trophies but clashed with the board and players, leading to another rebuild wih Solskjaer who wanted to restore Man United's DNA, signing young promising players like Sancho and Bissaka. But results dipped. Ralf Rangnick came as an interim, criticizing the clubs's structure and calling for drastical changes. Ten Hag arrived with his disciplined, possession based style investing in former Ajax players like Antony, Lisandro Martinez. He initially brought some stability, even winning the Carabao Cup and most importantly the FA Cup. But inconsistency saw him dismissed. Now Ruben Amorim is in charge after knowing success at Sporting. Every time a new manager comes in, the squad gets reshuffled, new tactics get drilled in. Man United are stuck in a circle making it almost impossible to get success. Abramovich at Chelsea also didn't care about long term project. You won or you are gone. Chelsea also went throught managers like a deck of cards but got 2 UCL and 5 Premiere League titles, plus other domestic trophies. Meanwhile Man United spent the last decade waiting for their managers to build something only to tear it down a few years later. Chelsea took a similar approach.
Mourinho, Ancelotti and Conte were all elite managers but when the results dipped, they ended up being shown the door. Even mid season, sackings worked like when Di Matteo stepped in and won the UCL in 2012. Tuchel replaced Lampard and delivered another UCL in 2021. Solskjaer had way too much time, Van Gaal had a second season despite the fact that things weren't going anywhere. With Ten Hag they should have end it after tha FA Cup win who was the tree hiding the desert. They suffered humiliating defeats and off the pitch dramas. What if Man United focused purely on winning?, cutting ties with underperforming managers and bringing in the right coach who gets results immediatly. Chelsea didn't waste time building dynasties. They won first and figured out the rest later. Maybe Man United should have done this instead of chasing after the next Ferguson.

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How Pep Guardiola's Man City won the treble in 2023?

During 2022/2023, City won the treble finally winnning the UCL. And Guardiola managed to find solutions to every single tactical problems. Not having a false 9 anymore with Haaland coming already meant that City had to adapt their tactics. At times before City even played with 2 false 9 with De Bruyne and Bernardo Silva. But most of the times it was either Jesus either Sterling. Walker often tucked in with the left back inverting. With the 9 dropping deep, they outnumbered always the opposition's miedfield. Haaland stayed now high up on the pitch, looking to hold defenders. This meant that miedfield had not a miedfield 5 anymore but a miedfield 4. Early we saw Walker and Cancelo or Zinchenko move into the miedfield region, making it a 2 3 shape rather than 3 2 shape. With Haaland's presence, it put the opposite team with 2 chooice, either following him closely when he threat to make runs in behind. But this would open up more spaces in half spaces for Bernardo Silva and De Bruyne. But when the team tried to compact their shape in the miedfield, Haaland could thrive. With the 2 free 8 coming into half spaces, it forced the opposition's miedfielder wider, it opened passing line and even if Haaland was not a false 9, he dropped to link up the play when he could. Even off ball, defenders tended to converge around Haaland trying to stop him. This could allow the free 8, either De Buryne either Bernardo Silva, making quick dashes ahead of Haaland, either the wingers sneaking in close to their posts. Despite a lot of wins, City sometimes looked defensivly a bit shaky by times. At least the world cup break allowed them to rebuild themselves tactically. Cancelo would often push up to help creating spaces in half spaces and with the fullbacks bringing the width on the sides, it could become a nightmare to defend against this.
But to bring balances, someone like Bernardo Silva would drop alongside Rodri. Despite Walker making progression technically, he was still not at ZInchenko or Cancelo's level when it comes to inverted fullbacks. So Pep previously used him as defensive inverted fullback. At least Walker could use his pace to prevent any counter attack opportunities. But now higher on the pitch, he often would confront the ball carrier on the transition. And on the other side, Cancelo didn't have that much space to recover meaning that the 2 cb were often overwhelmed. Also oppositions started to compact their shape to stop progression thought the center and defend as narrow as humanly possible. That means the wingers would be the only width providers here. As soon as Walker got the ball a miedfielder would often look to press. The center backs as a result had more owners to carry the ball into the miedfield regions, trying to pull a miedfielder higher for pressing. But teams sometimes defended so anrrow that if the wingers wanted to have the ball, they had to drop deep, outside of the miedfield block to create the angle to receive;
The fullbacks then played more wide, outside of their defensive shape. so they could receive outside of the blcok, allowing the wingers to stay higher. With teams often using a back 3, Walker was used in a more offensive way to overlap. But Rodri could be quickly left exposed in the transitions. With Haaland, if City could not pass the miedfield block, they would often choose long balls into him. But with Walker picking an injury, it would lead Guardiola to try and experiment a solution. Stones would start as a right back against Wolves, inverting effortlessly and trying to help the build up anc control the play, a clear upgrade on Walker. However with Cancelo inverting, the problem was now the defensive holes as Sontes recovery pace was not as fast as Walker's. But with Stones being injured, Pep Guardiola had to find a diferent solution again. That lead to experimenting a back 3 against Liverpool, allowing more solidity. In others matches they kept their back 4 with Akanji being right back often inverting with Cancelo which for a while seemed like the solution. But Cancelo had the prospensity to push higher or wider in inopportune moments, isolating Rodri, or to make dangerous passes would would be prone to turnovers.
He then experimented with Bernardo Silva as left back being the controller and invert and keeping Akanji deep. Despite winning With City facing numerous charges from others clubs, Guardiola seeked his troops, mobilizing them in a siege mentality. Nathan Aké played impressivly all the season. When City played a back 3 or had Akanji as a inverted right back, Aké's ability as left footed left center back has been a key to thrive outside narrow blocks as he naturally had the passing angle. So Pep trust him to start as his defensive inverted fullback Now he needed a controller sitting deep alongside Rodri who would retain the ball rather than venture too far forward as Cancelo. Lewis was tested for this role at first. Lewis's eagernss and intelligence when inverting was impressive seamlessly taking over the Cancelo role, never complicating things and instead being safe in possession of the ball. But also when needed driving a bit high on the pitch into the miedfield and seeking out teamates higher on the pitch. Grealish on the left wing was flouishing as Ak" outside their narrow block meant he could easy find Grealish down the line and Grealish could stay high. But despite this, there were still concerns for Pep. Off the ball there was uncertainty about facing off against elite wingers Stones then returned from injury and took his role. It's when his ability in this role chocked everyone Stones was excellent on the ball like Lexis and good defensivly like Walker. But the calibers of opposite's wingers would then become even higher with the likes of Sané, Vinicius, Martinelli, Coman, etc... Of course Stones have good defensive ability but Guardiola had an ace to assume.
And Walker came back as a game changer. But since Guardiola still coudln't trust him as a controlling inverting fullback, To make things work, heprobably remembered City's match against Arsenal in 3rd Fabruary 2019. Fernandinho started as center back. But on possession, Fernandinho would push from cb into the miedfield to overload it. So during the win against Chelsea in 2023 when City won 1 0, Rodri started as cb. But the problem is that despite being the best cdm in the world, him being cb meant that he was not early available in that miedfield when City regain the ball. Instead he would have to take times to shuffle into the miedfield only when the ball was under control possession. So Walker was put at right back and Stones at right center back, moving into the miedfield when needed while Walker would tuck in. Then with the return of Dias, he could be put as the central cb, and this, alongside the shut down ability of Aké and Walker, saw City elevating himself to a diferent level. City would go on to win a treble this season.

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Rma vs Man City 2023.
Real Madrid knew that if they played in their default defensive shape, there was the risk of City having the numerical advantage in the midfield as City likes to use the midfield box. So Real Madrid had to be more agressive than usual in the press to prevent this situation from occuring in first place. Madrid pressed high to prevent City from building up easily. Stones started deep then would be pushing up to be the second pivot alongside Rodri. But with the high press we often saw Gundogan having to drop deep instead to be the other pivot. Valverde and Modric were looking to press City's double pivot. This meant that Kross could be free to follow De Bruyne. Benzema was ready to apply pressure on Stones while Rodrygo was closer to Dias. At times this meant City would have to go longer. But City still tried to find advantages into the midfield with De Bruyne pushing on the same half space than Gundogan meaning that with Kross following him, there was a potential for Haaland to drop a bit deeper to be found between the lines. But De Bruyne could tuck in to receive the ball in deeper regions. Sometimes City was still able to make their box midfield box after passing the first wave of pressure. With Benzema being on Dias, it meant that the wide centerback, Walker and Akanji were often the outlet options. If Akanji had the ball, Rodrygo would look to press while while Vinicius would look to do the same in Walker's case. Even if the wingers dropped deeper to receive, Real Madrid's fullbacks were very agressive on them. Into the midfield, Man City looked for isolation situations, with Bernardo Silva against Camavinga.
Althought Camavinga often forced Silva to make a back pass, it sometimes created opportunities for guys like De Brune to make runs between the fullbacks and the centerbacks. De Bruyne got a good shooting opportunity this way. But Real Madrid's players adapted to this by having Valverde often dropping into the right half space It would temporarly form a back 5. So the midfield was still 2 v 2 as the wide centerbacks could focus on their man. And these half spaces runs would be more easy to track by Real Madrid. If Valverde was in the midfield, Real Madrid was sitting deep and narrow. When the ball was played to their wingers, Carvajal and Camavinga closed their man down while the rest of the back shift across here. Camavinga was often targetting, with balls being played to Bernardo Silva and De Bruyne making underlapping runs to potentially receive and cross. However, Vinicius often was slow to track back after Real Madrid was attacking So Guardiola was willing to take the risk to have Walker overlap down the right handside at times to make it 2 v 1 against Camavinga. However with Stones pushing in the midfield, it would leave City vulnerable during the defensive phases. If Vinicius got the ball, he had Benzema to support him with only Akanji and Dias to stop them for a few seconds.
When defending, Man City was playing in 4 4 2 with De Bruyne joining Haaland in front and the rest of the midfield shifting across. From goalkick, Rudiger and Alaba would provide the passing outlets to Courtois with Haaland and De Bruyen looking to cose them down. So they could play it to their fullbacks which would draw City's wingers. But then, Real Madrid would be the one having numerical advantage in the midfield with Kross often being the option as the pivot. Later in the game, in defensive phases, Man City would look for piston press with one man pressing at time and the other looking to cover Toni Kross. Sometimes we saw Toni Kross joining the backline meaning that they had a 3 v 2 advantage while the midfield had their 2 v 2 situation. Madrid also looked to overload often the left handside with Modric and Camavinga switching positions, Vinicius and Benzema often dropping into these regions. That meant that Carvajal and Rodrygo both could occupy the wide regions in the right and be options for quick long switches with both of them often interchanging positions. Eventually, both sides were tactically matched and it took individual brillance from players to make the difference.

We saw similarities with the first leg with Stones pushing up in the midfield. The back 3 consisted then of Akanji, Walker and Dias. Gundogan and De Bruyne pushed higher on the pitch into the half spaces. The press for real madrid would be start with Benzema and then Modric who would look to cover on of the double pivots. But to not have 1 v 2, Vinicius and Rodrygo would operate extremly narrow, allowing Valverde and Kross deeper and pick up the men in the half spaces, making the progression more difficult centrally. Since the double pivots were often pressed a lot, the wide centerbacks had the ball very often. If the ball went to the wide center back, it would be easy for real madrid's wingers to come out and apply pressure. Camavinga and Carvajal would be very agressive against Man City's wingers City's wingers pushed high, forcing real madrid's fullbacks to stay deep. Because of the wingers and Modric pressing the double pivots, Real Madrid was able to deal with the players in the half spaces with Valverde dropping deep allowing Real Madrid to shift from a back 4 to a back 5 to match City's front 5. If City's pivots were able to turn that would change the game completly. Man City's movements often allowed Stones and Rodri to drag Madrid's mens into pressing them, meaning that Walker was free to receive in wider regions. When Walker is drawing Vinicius from his narrow position, that left Modric more isolated and combinatinos between Rodri and Stones often allowed Stones to receive, makes the turn and drives into the heart of the midfield. In these situations, Valverde couldnt afford to drop that deep as they would leave Man City overloard the midfield too easily, meaning that Man City often managed to outnumber Real Madrid's backline. We also saw how both Grealish and Bernardo Silva were good against their fullbacks in 1 v 1 situations.
When the fullback got tight, players in the half spaces were making consistent runs someitmes only trakced by midfilder.

Man City vs Inter Mialn UCL final 2023.

During the UCL 2023 final, Man City lined up in their comon 3 2 4 1 formation with John Stones being the second pivot alongside Rodri, forming this box miedfield in the center of the pitch. Inter Milan stuck to their 3 5 2 line up. The majority of the first half, Man City held the ball in their first half. They struggled to build any substancial attack. Inter Milan's intentions were clear and they dictated Man City's tempo effectivly. First they looked to press City high up <hich is the initial idea from being to block off the central places into the 2 pivots being shadow marked by the strikers. However one rotation forced Inter to adapt their positionning while City lined up as 3 2 4 1 it instnatly transformed into a 3 4 3 diamond. The iconic system used Cruyff's total football This rotation meant Rodri could pick up a position between 2 centerbacks with De Bruyne and Stones shifting outwide. Calhanoglou was positionned into Rodri's one to counter this. Bastoni shifted to man mark Stones. While it was a 3 v 2 initially at the back, Barella started closing down Ake to form a 3 v 3. WHile it seemed to leave a mansure in the center, Dumfries or Dammian would push up to even out the center. This made life very difficult for Man City as Inter defended very well from this position. WHat made Man City so dangerous during the season was their ability to play throught the center. But Inter assured that this was not going to happen. With Man City's miedfielders going wider and wider, it left the center of the pitch more vacated, resulting in City circulating the ball around the back with Inter having a clear pressing triggers and continuously forcing them back, resulting in Man City to look over the center block directly to Haaland. But Acerbi completly man marked him, resulting in Haaland having only one shoot in the box for the entire first half.
Damian or Bastoni would shift to cover City's miedfielde while the other would join Acerbi to form a 2 v 1 vs Haaland. While Inter kept this shape and defended very well,t heir main issue was that they couldn't build any substancial attack, looking for the forwards to hit City directly on the counters. City kept an interesting 4 2 4 defensive shape with the central box ensuring City could outnumber into the central 3. The interesting aspect of this shape is having Stones playing as a right back to ensure City would not be outnumbered in the defense with Inter's wingbacks. A change from Guardiola included a more tight miedfield. Gundogan and Stones operated more in the half spaces with the outlets options in the flanks being Silva or Grealish. Silva would drop his positionning more frequent and would be more involved into City's play. It resulted in Di Marco being draw out of his line, giving more space for Stones or Foden to run in. Subsequently, it freed more spaces in the center to rotate from flank to flank.

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Chelsea vs Man City UCL final 2021.

In this final, Chelsea stick to their 3 4 2 1 with Kanté and Jorginho being the center miedfielders. But Guardiola made a lot of changes that surprised everyone. Walker, Diaz, Stones and Zinchenko were the defenders as expected. But the miedfield was more surprising with Guardiola starting Gundogan as the holding miedfielder with Bernardo Silva and Phil Foden respectivly on the right and left. No cdm. No Rodri or Fernandinho. The front 3 having Sterling in the left, De Bruyne in front and Mahrez also caught a lot of people off guard. The essential idea was to have 6 offensive minded players who could pass and be fluid in their positionning with the wingers cutting inside, De Bruyne as a false 9 and allowing both Silva and Foden to attack the backline to pressure Chelsea's back 3. But City lost valuable protection in front of the back 4 by having Gundogan as a holding miedfielder. During the first hald, Chelsea was able to exploit it a lot of times. The main idea of having Sterling in the left despite him being out of form was for him to find pockets of spaces between Chelsea"'s right wingback and Chelsea's right center back. And Gundogan was forced into a more defensive role even throught he had been excellent in a more offensive minded position. With Kanté dominating the miedfield for Chelsea, Foden became lost in here. Tuchel wanted to work with the 11 players that worked so well with him in the past in the same compo and formation. In the other hand, Guardiola choose a more reactive approach, looking to counter how Chelsea would play rather than fielding his strongest starting 11.
City wanted to dominate possession and attempted to move the ball throught the lines. And to find Mahrez or Sterling between the lines between the centerbacks and the wingbacks. Chelsea looked to hit Man City with very quick transitions and counter attacks. They would try to feed the front 3 in the pockets of space either side of the centerbacks. Also Chelsea didn't look to press to high. And their compact shape made extremly difficult for City to play between the lines. In the other hand,, City took a more agressive approach when they didn't have the ball, playing with a high line and pressing the centerbacks as soon as possible.
With the wingbacks and Werner in front, it formed a square for Chelsea covering the whole pitch and making it difficult for City to defend against. And City had a lot of outlets as soon as they won the ball. Kanté moved into an area to create overloads. In the semi final of the FA Cup the same 2021 year, Fernandinho as a cdm would not allow him to turn and pick out any vertical pass. But with Gundogan in he was caught out as he likes to press higher on the pitch. Stones tried to close him down in this UCL final when Chelsea's goal was scored. Werner did a good run to drag Diaz out to open the center of the pitch for Kai Havertz to run into. This was poor from ZInchenko but the ball from Mount was worldclass. The tactical changes saw Guardiola in the second half replacing De Bruyne who went injured because of a collision with Rudiger, by Gabriel Jesus, a surprising change since most people expected Sergio Aguero. A cdm was introduced in the 65th minute but for Man City it was too late. The compact 5 of the back shape with Havertz and Mout dropping deep either side of Jorginho and Kanté, making impossible for City to create any chance. The formation for City moved more into a 4 1 3 2 in the final half hour of the match. James and CHilwell were pocketing Sterling and Mahrez. It would result in hopeless crosses in the box with Jesus and Aguero being outnumbered in 3 v 2.



Rma vs Liverpool UCL final 2022.
Both Liverpool and Real Madrid in the UCL 2022 final adopted a contrasting approach to the final with Liverpool having a vertical agressive approach but struggling to breka down Real Madrid low defensive block. Real Madrid had their 4 3 3 formation just like Liverpool but used differently. Liverpool on average kept a higher defensive line with Henderson pushing up further up in the right flank. In the other hand, Real madrid often kept Vinicius and Benzema higher on the pitch to help on the counter attacks. Real Madrid had barely 4 shoots while Liverpool had 24. But thanks to Courtois world class performacne as goalkepper, Madrid ended up winning this. When Real Madrid was trying to build up from the back, Liverpool kept a high press with Mané and Salah covering the 2 centerbacks. Trent would push up to cover Mendy. Henderson would often cover the space left behind Trent while Robertson on the left flank was not pushing as high compared to Trent on the right. Van DIjk was kept more centrally as possible mostly to watch out for Benzema. As a result, Real Madrid tried to overload the flanks and disrupt the central block. Most of Madrid's attacks came in the right flank with Carvajal pushing high and Valverde going into the half spaces between Robertson and Van Dijk. Benzema and Vinicius would occupy both Konaté and Trent. The initial plan was to force Liverpool to commit a lot of players into this flank to finally switch into the other flank. At the end, if Diaz was picking Carvajal, Modric could advance in the center of the pitch while if Modric was picked, it was Carvajal who would push higher to create 1 v 2 situation vs Robertson alongside Valverde. When defending, Real Madrid opted for a more defensive 4 4 2 with Modric joining Benzema in front.

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How Man City won Premiere League in 2024.

After winning the treble, the expectations were not that high for Man City now especially after the departure of Gundogan Outside him, Laporte, Cancelo, Mahjrez and Palmer were all leaving. It was made worse by the fact that John Stones spent most of the early part of the season unavailable. When De Bruyne went out with an injury during the first match of ths season, it was about to be a difficult season. At the beginning Guardiola still was prepared for the challenge and instead of John Stones, It was Akanji who would push from the defense to the midfield during the build up. But Akanji was more traditionnal centerback than Stones, raising some worries about how he would copte. If the Citys back 3 was pressed, Rodri would look to free himself to take the ball as much as possible as he could. He would often then look for the bounce pass to Akanji who would now receive the ball while facing the rest of the play. He was actually great. But Akanji still struggled more to turn back to the opposite goal when he got the ball compared to Stones which often led to a safe pass back to the center back. Even if City could deal with that, the miss of Rodri during the 2 games he was suspended against Arsenal and the Wolves during which City lost showed how important he was to the side. Pep tried to deal with that with replacing them by players like Kovacic and Bernardo Silva as a double pivot. Or play Rico Lexis from right back and invert Despite having great retainers of possession, they lacked penetrative passes that Rodri often made when he was here or the penetration Rodri is making ball to feet. But even when Rodri was in the starting XI, teams were beginning to figure out how to defend against Manchester City. More often the opposition looked to protect the center at all costs.
It would make it harder the City's midfielders to create danger on top. Opposite's wingers would operate narrow as well. Often you would see the opposition defend in narrow 4 4 2 with the front 2 not being bait into the press. Add that to the 2 central midfielders and you had a box defending shape to counter the box midfield City was using. Bernardo Silva would look to drop outside the narrow block to receive the ball The downside would be that there is one less attacking player upfront. This was not helped by the fact that Alvarez often got played as a 10 rather than a center forward. Alvarez had to be trusted at making the creative burden, something he couldn't do especially against such narrow defenses. Despite being a press skilled resistant midfielder it happened that Kovacic was put higher on the pitch more as a 10 than as a 6. The lack of plays into the center meant there were less services into Haaland. And to make things worse, Haaland had a less effective season in front of the goal considering the expected goals he missed and the expected goals he scored compared to the last season. Guardiola made the 2 wide center backs playing extremly wide, almost as traditionnal fullbacks. It was made to draw a presser out of the center block to create more passing lanes in the center. Despite having 2 v 1 in these wide regions, the central center back would be isolated. Also the wide center backs were unlickely to advance high. But having the opposition playing this narrow, it left more possibilities for the winger having 1 v 1 situations. However when City's wingers dropped deeper to receive the ball, the opposition could be very agressive to prevent the winger turning on the ball.
So Guardiola needed some individual brillances to make the difference and it came from Doku while Grealish is more a ball retainer with less ability to take on his man. Doku represented so many threats that the teams would often send their fullback mark him earlier or double team against him. But this would create room for the higher midfielder to get the ball to create. However Doku who was a solution, could also be a problem. Grealish tend to retain possession while Doku loose it more often. And with the wide center backs so wide, opposition would be ready to hit on the transitions if the ball was lost. Aside from Walker, the back 3 was not very quick. However Pep could look to be ultra agressive with Ederson being an extra center back, shifting the backline to a back 4. Advantage of this is that no matter if opposition was pressing gk and defenders or not, there was a free man to look for. If the opposition stayed narrow and defensive, the defenders would be free. It was a solution althought not an idea one since it was made by the wide center backs who were not as progressive as the miedfielers. Also even Ederson would not be too adventurous to force a man out of the press as if he lost the ball, City would wuickly concede without a goalkepper. That's why Man City had to rely on De Bruyne more than usual. However in De Bruyne's absence, Foden was more than happy to take his place. He was one of the most creative players of the season in his dribbling, passing and even shooting. However as limited creativity in the center and half spaces and Haaland as being the lone goalscorer, Pep needed Foden to start centrally as much as possible. Pep used often to invert his fullbacks. But as the season progressed he used them more and more traditionally, allowing one of them to operate wide to provide the width and on rare occasions both mens pushing high. Seeing Gvardiol and Walker in these positions became more and more comon.
It allowed the likes of Foden to be more times infield positions and to create centrally. He was able to pass the opposition defensive midfield line to create a potential for a shoot in the goal or assist. No wonder he won the Premiere League player of the season award. This added the benefits of freeing up Silva or Kovacic to drop in to provide the numerical overload in the deeper zones. It would make the progression less difficult as well as going into the creative zones. Man City still looked very bulverable on the counter attacks. Having Walker playing high doesn't help as even a player as fast as him can't gain so many ground to catch up if the advance between him and the opponent attacking his goal is too much. Also Walker took a step back defensivly Also having Akanji higher meant that a lot were asked to the center backs. So City conceded more than double the amount of goals on counter attacks than conceded during the 2022 2023 season. Despite this City was third before De Bruyne returned so they needed to make an exceptionnal finish. Then De Bruyne made his return, boosting not only his own stats and City's ones but also Haaland's ones. Despite De Bruyne moving out wide more often, him and De Bruyne still showed that they had a great understanding of each other. Also De Bruyne and Foden often made switches, drawing opponents and creating spaces for each other. Then at the end of the season, Bernardo Silva played more wide to facilitate De Bruyne and Foden playing centrally.