Je condamne fermement ce topic!
How PSG beat Liverpool in 2025.
The opening case of this match showcased Liverpool's agressive 4 2 4 press as they threatened to fully suffocate the Parisians. The same pressing structure that caused nightmares to some of the biggest teams of England. PSG at first didn't make exception. Szoboszlai joined the front 3, creating a first layer that looked almost impossible to penetrate.Time and time they were forced to go back to Donnaruma. But even here a man could continue his press, keeping the center back in his cover shadow. As a result PSG were often forced long. Initially the solution was Vitinha dropping alongside the center backs and Donnaruma during the goalkick with the hope to have both quantity and quality advantage since Vitinha is comfortable on pressure. Liverpool still was able at times to press the narrow men in the box still forcing PSG long and Donnaruma has a hard time to sometimes find the fullbacks directly. Turning point was when Luis Enrique made a subtle adjustment. Vitinha returned to his midfield position from the deeper zones and entrusting his back 4 to begin the build up. At first it was not a problem for Liverpool who could oeprate with a dedicated man to man shape in the midfield or with their 4 2 4. But the difference now was Dembelé starting to drop deeper and deeper meaning there was now a 4 v 3 in the midfield. It cause some indecisions in Liverpool's back 4, as we already saw in the first leg. Liverpool's center backs were often not backing up the press, meaning a Liverpool player higher up would have to choose between pressing a midfielder deep or dropping to Dembelé. It was a chooice between letting PSG having a relatively easy progression and allow a threat like Dembelé to roam between the lines. The best example was in the 12th minute, with the action leadinfg to PSG's goal with Dembelé dropping as a false 9 and the center backs not backing up the press due to the runners behind. So Dembelé can turns, finds Barcola on his right, leading to Dembelé's goal.
Szoboszlai had to reconsider his position and start deeper to not be completly overrun centrally. As a result, their press became more selective, opening the floodgates for PSG. But the key was that theyr were no longer building up in the center. Despite Szoboszlai staying more deep than before, Liverpool still wanted to keep high pressure with a winger often joining Jota's press more narrow, often Salah pressing Pacho while keeping Mendes in his cover shadow. However, Pacho's build up play was masterfull, taking his first touch higher up the pitch which had the double effect on the press. It drew Salahin further toward him It also changed the passing angle to Mendes meaning he was no longer in Salah's cover shadow. When Nuno Mendes was found, he had room to push up. And due to the presence of Dembelé, Liverpool was reluctant to cover. PSG's right flank told a similar story of tactical exploitation. Diaz was tasked with pressing from the left into Marquinhos. But PSG was now more composed under pressure. By finding the center backs first there was less dependency on Donnaruma's distribution. It also ensured that the winger was fully drawned onto Marquinhos, meaning that Hakimi was more easily found. It created a pressure dilemma for Robertson: either pressing Hakimi high up and leave space in behind for Barcola to exploit, either hold position and allow Hakimi time to progress the ball. The difficulty of this decision was coumpounded by Dembelé's false 9 positionning When he dropped deep, it became almost impossible for a center back to cover for Robertson. Because if for example Van Dijk drifted to cover, Dembelé could potentially exploit that space.
PSG's formation morphed throughout the match, sometimes forming a back 3 with 2 cb and 1 midfielder dropping. Other time Mendes was working as a third center back, specifically positionned to neutralize Salah on transition with the arrest defense while allowing the left winger to create an isolation against the right back, often Kvara against Trent. This structural flexibility made PSG difficult to counter. Then up the pitch, the fluid interchanging of positions between the attackers added another dimension to PSG's tactical approach. At times Dembelé would operate as a false 9 with Barcola wider but then they would rotate. Kvaratskhelia also rotated between the flanks, creating constant identification problems for Liverpool 's defenders and Dembelé's role was particularly effective in the final third. His ability to drop deep to receive was key but it was also possible through the movement of his teammates, the wingers and the midfielders particularly since their movements assured that both Van Dijk and Konaté were always hesitant to follow Dembelé when he dropped deep meaning that at times even when the runners did not go beyond, Dembelé could receive, turn and play out to the wingers in dangerous zones. Despite these sophisticated mechanisms, PSG struggled to convert their tactical advantage into goals, consistently reaching dangerous positions but lacking the clinical edge to make their dominance count on the scoreboard. Alisson kept Liverpool alive for a long time.
How PSG beat Liverpool in 2025.
The opening case of this match showcased Liverpool's agressive 4 2 4 press as they threatened to fully suffocate the Parisians. The same pressing structure that caused nightmares to some of the biggest teams of England. PSG at first didn't make exception. Szoboszlai joined the front 3, creating a first layer that looked almost impossible to penetrate.Time and time they were forced to go back to Donnaruma. But even here a man could continue his press, keeping the center back in his cover shadow. As a result PSG were often forced long. Initially the solution was Vitinha dropping alongside the center backs and Donnaruma during the goalkick with the hope to have both quantity and quality advantage since Vitinha is comfortable on pressure. Liverpool still was able at times to press the narrow men in the box still forcing PSG long and Donnaruma has a hard time to sometimes find the fullbacks directly. Turning point was when Luis Enrique made a subtle adjustment. Vitinha returned to his midfield position from the deeper zones and entrusting his back 4 to begin the build up. At first it was not a problem for Liverpool who could oeprate with a dedicated man to man shape in the midfield or with their 4 2 4. But the difference now was Dembelé starting to drop deeper and deeper meaning there was now a 4 v 3 in the midfield. It cause some indecisions in Liverpool's back 4, as we already saw in the first leg. Liverpool's center backs were often not backing up the press, meaning a Liverpool player higher up would have to choose between pressing a midfielder deep or dropping to Dembelé. It was a chooice between letting PSG having a relatively easy progression and allow a threat like Dembelé to roam between the lines. The best example was in the 12th minute, with the action leadinfg to PSG's goal with Dembelé dropping as a false 9 and the center backs not backing up the press due to the runners behind. So Dembelé can turns, finds Barcola on his right, leading to Dembelé's goal.
Szoboszlai had to reconsider his position and start deeper to not be completly overrun centrally. As a result, their press became more selective, opening the floodgates for PSG. But the key was that theyr were no longer building up in the center. Despite Szoboszlai staying more deep than before, Liverpool still wanted to keep high pressure with a winger often joining Jota's press more narrow, often Salah pressing Pacho while keeping Mendes in his cover shadow. However, Pacho's build up play was masterfull, taking his first touch higher up the pitch which had the double effect on the press. It drew Salahin further toward him It also changed the passing angle to Mendes meaning he was no longer in Salah's cover shadow. When Nuno Mendes was found, he had room to push up. And due to the presence of Dembelé, Liverpool was reluctant to cover. PSG's right flank told a similar story of tactical exploitation. Diaz was tasked with pressing from the left into Marquinhos. But PSG was now more composed under pressure. By finding the center backs first there was less dependency on Donnaruma's distribution. It also ensured that the winger was fully drawned onto Marquinhos, meaning that Hakimi was more easily found. It created a pressure dilemma for Robertson: either pressing Hakimi high up and leave space in behind for Barcola to exploit, either hold position and allow Hakimi time to progress the ball. The difficulty of this decision was coumpounded by Dembelé's false 9 positionning When he dropped deep, it became almost impossible for a center back to cover for Robertson. Because if for example Van Dijk drifted to cover, Dembelé could potentially exploit that space.
PSG's formation morphed throughout the match, sometimes forming a back 3 with 2 cb and 1 midfielder dropping. Other time Mendes was working as a third center back, specifically positionned to neutralize Salah on transition with the arrest defense while allowing the left winger to create an isolation against the right back, often Kvara against Trent. This structural flexibility made PSG difficult to counter. Then up the pitch, the fluid interchanging of positions between the attackers added another dimension to PSG's tactical approach. At times Dembelé would operate as a false 9 with Barcola wider but then they would rotate. Kvaratskhelia also rotated between the flanks, creating constant identification problems for Liverpool 's defenders and Dembelé's role was particularly effective in the final third. His ability to drop deep to receive was key but it was also possible through the movement of his teammates, the wingers and the midfielders particularly since their movements assured that both Van Dijk and Konaté were always hesitant to follow Dembelé when he dropped deep meaning that at times even when the runners did not go beyond, Dembelé could receive, turn and play out to the wingers in dangerous zones. Despite these sophisticated mechanisms, PSG struggled to convert their tactical advantage into goals, consistently reaching dangerous positions but lacking the clinical edge to make their dominance count on the scoreboard. Alisson kept Liverpool alive for a long time.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Udogie and Porro are the inverted fullbacks. They must give the 2 number 8 more freedom to occupy the positions into the half spaces and contribute more to the attack. Alsotheir positionning create a double pivot in central zones. These compacts presences make difficult for the opposition to execute central penetrative passes while the 2 centerbacks must be excellent ball playing defenders. It's necessary against high press from the opposition. Their ability to read the game with precision and make passes allow the team to bypass the opposition's first line of press effectivly. Finally the goalkepper assume the role of sweeper. He is tasked of attracting opposition's closing presser by holding the ball and opening up spaces so the others can be free. The tempo is fast while the defensive line is set up high. The team is encouraged to recover the ball quickly and start a counter attack.
In the final third, they often look for the overlap option. It encourages fullbacks and/or number 8 to make runs to open up spaces. The passing style and the goalkepper distribution are often shorts. It's typical to tiki taka style. Against Man United, Spurs reduced the opposition in the center by having their inverted fullbacks. This strategy created enough spaces for the flanks to go throught and forcing the opposition to stretch themselves, opening up gaps in the half space for the inverted fullback to go in and score the goal. The high line and the inverted fullbacks allowed Spurs to win the ball back higher on the pitch. This strategy let the opponent's defense exposed. United defended with 5 mens and a pivot. So to attack that the 2 inverted fullbacks advanced to form a 6 v 6 situation. To disrupt the structure, the fullback drift toward the winger to attract the marker from the fullback and creating a gap in the defensive line.
How Ten Hag Broke Pep's System | Tactical Analysis : Manchester City 1-2 Manchester United
City dominated the possession but United still outplayed them. Man United was happy to not have the ball, not having to press very high on the pitch. It meant that City's center backs got on the ball pretty easily. United allowed City to have possession as long as it was not in the center of their own half. Having Bruno in center forward, it was difficult to get the ball on the double pivots. He would drop on one of the pivots. Mc Tominay, an attacking miedfielder would push onto the remaining pivot. Ten Hag was willing to leave spaces out wide if it meant that half spaces were closed for City. Garnacho and Rashford tucked infield. United were playing narrow 4 2 4 with 2 mobiles engines leading the defensive efforts. Ten Hag did this because he noticed the shape City had used during recent matches with Pep using his fullbacks ore as traditionnal fullbacks. It would allowed the wingers like Foden or Silva to play more centrally into their natural positions. But now City hardly found anyone between the lines and with the double pivots covered, Bernardo Silva would drop deep to try to make a 3 v 2 situation against Fernandez and Mc Tominay. Foden drifted infield on the left hand side. So City's miedfield was often split into 3 attempted progressors and 2 attempted creators. But this hypothetical 3 v 2 was more a 4 v 2 in United's favor because the front 4 was so norrow and compact in his space. Ten Hag was willing to let City's fullbacks to get on the ball as they were barely a threat compared to the central players. It made it difficult to find the progressors and easier to stop the fullbacks who were not grade 1 v 1. Kovacic and Silva often dropped into the half spaces vacated left by the fullbacks.
But knowing there was one less men at the center, United could look to tigh up that City's men fairly easily in that zone. But this shape caused even more problems to Cyt due to the Rashford Walker dynamic. Walker being high gave Rashford too much of a head start on transitions. It forced City to restrategize with Walker and Bernardo Silva having to rotate. It was more dangerous than having Walker in that zone. But from the deeper zone Walker was less secure with his passing. He was often forcing passes into dangerous zones which could result into turnovers. The narrow 4 afforded Maino and Amrabat and the freedom to be more man oriented on the 2 creators, following them aroud the pitch and looking the make their lives miserables. They were willing to track them even when they looked for rooms in the fullbacks. But United's defensive shape was not impenetrable and Haaland would look to drop at times to play in one of the rushing miedfielders. This worked well when Haaland's touch was on point. But it was often not the case. On the left De Bruyne and Gvardiol would often switch roles. It meant De Bruyne would have more room to pick up a pass. But City looked the most dangerous when De Bruyne and Foden not spilt the pitch in hald but looked to overload one side. Since united pivots had 2 mens to pick up, it created opportunities of combinations. But with the 2 attacking mied committing to one side, it would often mean that during transitions, the far side fullback would potentially have room to attack if they received the ball. ALternativly a quick switch would also mean a guaranteed 1 v 1 against the fullback.
United were pretty comfortable men to men against the creators. But when the ball got wide one of the biggest game changers was having one of the progressors make a late run to create a 3 v 2 advantage and try to break United's defensive line shape. But when Kovacic or Rodri made the run they left the other pivot vulnerable on the transition as Walker would be instantly moving out wide to cover Rashford. So it leads United to play pretty easily throught the center, allowing United to settle with long and quick switches to the other side, like the one that led to Man United's second goal. Pep needed to change something and that change came from the magic Doku provided. Balls were passed much more on the left side to Doku. By comparision, Bernardo Silva had much less balls on the right side of the pitch during second half time compared to the first half time. This lead to an intense battle between Doku and Bissaka with both having their moments. But it's throught the secondary impact on Foden that Doku's impact was best shown. With Gvardiol coming in, Man United had to double team against Doku. That meant that with Stones also being a pivot, Foden had more spaces in this zone. Foden had during the second half more key passes and shot compared to the first half.
Jude Bellingham combined that traditionnal physicality of english players with the technical flair that let him fits in modern day football.
His progressive passes, passes into the final third and long balls completed increased. Dortmund generally are a ball dominant side that try to pin their opposition inside their own box. Therefore Bellingham was heavily involved in the final third play, using his ability of drifting between the lines unoticed to engage quick combinations. He was involving himself more in the opposite box, making more and more last minute runs to get a goalscoring opportunity or a goal scoring creating chance. For somebody playing as a traditionnal miedfield Bellingham already in the past as a lot of involvment in that final third.His touches in the box and his line breaking runs, he became a game changer for Dortmund.His shoot creating actions as well as his decision making were in progression. Ancelotti was the perfect man to get the best from Bellingham's new form. That's why Bellingham's move to real madrid was perfect. ot only Benzema going in Saudi meant that there was a hole in the 9 position, bu Ancelotti was also cursed with having too many high quality miedfielders. So the miedfield diamond was the solution for Ancelotti.Modric and Kross were aging but both were still far superior orchestrators from deep. Bellingham was a monster at carrying the ball from deep with his feet while Valverde had the ability to provide similar athleticism from deep. So instead found himself at the cutting edge of the diamond. When the game called for it, Bellingham could still momentally drop deeper to be the extra option.
His increased possession and security were still important in these deeper phases. But now with the forwards being both natural wingers who will take the drift wide, it was vital for Bellingham to provide a strong central presence. He didn't play as a centre forward or even as a false 9. He was very much an attacking miedfielder. He revealed his ability to find spaces to receive between the lines. He thrived in this role with world class miedfielders being able to find him being on the receiving end of progressive passes. As he developed a strong relationship with the forwards, his ability in tigher regions also improved. Bellingham often happened to be into the box at the right place at the right time. His shoots were now taken more at optimal positions compared to before where he had to make more long shoots. His goals and expected goals vastly increased as a result.
Udogie and Porro are the inverted fullbacks. They must give the 2 number 8 more freedom to occupy the positions into the half spaces and contribute more to the attack. Alsotheir positionning create a double pivot in central zones. These compacts presences make difficult for the opposition to execute central penetrative passes while the 2 centerbacks must be excellent ball playing defenders. It's necessary against high press from the opposition. Their ability to read the game with precision and make passes allow the team to bypass the opposition's first line of press effectivly. Finally the goalkepper assume the role of sweeper. He is tasked of attracting opposition's closing presser by holding the ball and opening up spaces so the others can be free. The tempo is fast while the defensive line is set up high. The team is encouraged to recover the ball quickly and start a counter attack.
In the final third, they often look for the overlap option. It encourages fullbacks and/or number 8 to make runs to open up spaces. The passing style and the goalkepper distribution are often shorts. It's typical to tiki taka style. Against Man United, Spurs reduced the opposition in the center by having their inverted fullbacks. This strategy created enough spaces for the flanks to go throught and forcing the opposition to stretch themselves, opening up gaps in the half space for the inverted fullback to go in and score the goal. The high line and the inverted fullbacks allowed Spurs to win the ball back higher on the pitch. This strategy let the opponent's defense exposed. United defended with 5 mens and a pivot. So to attack that the 2 inverted fullbacks advanced to form a 6 v 6 situation. To disrupt the structure, the fullback drift toward the winger to attract the marker from the fullback and creating a gap in the defensive line.
How Ten Hag Broke Pep's System | Tactical Analysis : Manchester City 1-2 Manchester United
City dominated the possession but United still outplayed them. Man United was happy to not have the ball, not having to press very high on the pitch. It meant that City's center backs got on the ball pretty easily. United allowed City to have possession as long as it was not in the center of their own half. Having Bruno in center forward, it was difficult to get the ball on the double pivots. He would drop on one of the pivots. Mc Tominay, an attacking miedfielder would push onto the remaining pivot. Ten Hag was willing to leave spaces out wide if it meant that half spaces were closed for City. Garnacho and Rashford tucked infield. United were playing narrow 4 2 4 with 2 mobiles engines leading the defensive efforts. Ten Hag did this because he noticed the shape City had used during recent matches with Pep using his fullbacks ore as traditionnal fullbacks. It would allowed the wingers like Foden or Silva to play more centrally into their natural positions. But now City hardly found anyone between the lines and with the double pivots covered, Bernardo Silva would drop deep to try to make a 3 v 2 situation against Fernandez and Mc Tominay. Foden drifted infield on the left hand side. So City's miedfield was often split into 3 attempted progressors and 2 attempted creators. But this hypothetical 3 v 2 was more a 4 v 2 in United's favor because the front 4 was so norrow and compact in his space. Ten Hag was willing to let City's fullbacks to get on the ball as they were barely a threat compared to the central players. It made it difficult to find the progressors and easier to stop the fullbacks who were not grade 1 v 1. Kovacic and Silva often dropped into the half spaces vacated left by the fullbacks.
But knowing there was one less men at the center, United could look to tigh up that City's men fairly easily in that zone. But this shape caused even more problems to Cyt due to the Rashford Walker dynamic. Walker being high gave Rashford too much of a head start on transitions. It forced City to restrategize with Walker and Bernardo Silva having to rotate. It was more dangerous than having Walker in that zone. But from the deeper zone Walker was less secure with his passing. He was often forcing passes into dangerous zones which could result into turnovers. The narrow 4 afforded Maino and Amrabat and the freedom to be more man oriented on the 2 creators, following them aroud the pitch and looking the make their lives miserables. They were willing to track them even when they looked for rooms in the fullbacks. But United's defensive shape was not impenetrable and Haaland would look to drop at times to play in one of the rushing miedfielders. This worked well when Haaland's touch was on point. But it was often not the case. On the left De Bruyne and Gvardiol would often switch roles. It meant De Bruyne would have more room to pick up a pass. But City looked the most dangerous when De Bruyne and Foden not spilt the pitch in hald but looked to overload one side. Since united pivots had 2 mens to pick up, it created opportunities of combinations. But with the 2 attacking mied committing to one side, it would often mean that during transitions, the far side fullback would potentially have room to attack if they received the ball. ALternativly a quick switch would also mean a guaranteed 1 v 1 against the fullback.
United were pretty comfortable men to men against the creators. But when the ball got wide one of the biggest game changers was having one of the progressors make a late run to create a 3 v 2 advantage and try to break United's defensive line shape. But when Kovacic or Rodri made the run they left the other pivot vulnerable on the transition as Walker would be instantly moving out wide to cover Rashford. So it leads United to play pretty easily throught the center, allowing United to settle with long and quick switches to the other side, like the one that led to Man United's second goal. Pep needed to change something and that change came from the magic Doku provided. Balls were passed much more on the left side to Doku. By comparision, Bernardo Silva had much less balls on the right side of the pitch during second half time compared to the first half time. This lead to an intense battle between Doku and Bissaka with both having their moments. But it's throught the secondary impact on Foden that Doku's impact was best shown. With Gvardiol coming in, Man United had to double team against Doku. That meant that with Stones also being a pivot, Foden had more spaces in this zone. Foden had during the second half more key passes and shot compared to the first half.
Jude Bellingham combined that traditionnal physicality of english players with the technical flair that let him fits in modern day football.
His progressive passes, passes into the final third and long balls completed increased. Dortmund generally are a ball dominant side that try to pin their opposition inside their own box. Therefore Bellingham was heavily involved in the final third play, using his ability of drifting between the lines unoticed to engage quick combinations. He was involving himself more in the opposite box, making more and more last minute runs to get a goalscoring opportunity or a goal scoring creating chance. For somebody playing as a traditionnal miedfield Bellingham already in the past as a lot of involvment in that final third.His touches in the box and his line breaking runs, he became a game changer for Dortmund.His shoot creating actions as well as his decision making were in progression. Ancelotti was the perfect man to get the best from Bellingham's new form. That's why Bellingham's move to real madrid was perfect. ot only Benzema going in Saudi meant that there was a hole in the 9 position, bu Ancelotti was also cursed with having too many high quality miedfielders. So the miedfield diamond was the solution for Ancelotti.Modric and Kross were aging but both were still far superior orchestrators from deep. Bellingham was a monster at carrying the ball from deep with his feet while Valverde had the ability to provide similar athleticism from deep. So instead found himself at the cutting edge of the diamond. When the game called for it, Bellingham could still momentally drop deeper to be the extra option.
His increased possession and security were still important in these deeper phases. But now with the forwards being both natural wingers who will take the drift wide, it was vital for Bellingham to provide a strong central presence. He didn't play as a centre forward or even as a false 9. He was very much an attacking miedfielder. He revealed his ability to find spaces to receive between the lines. He thrived in this role with world class miedfielders being able to find him being on the receiving end of progressive passes. As he developed a strong relationship with the forwards, his ability in tigher regions also improved. Bellingham often happened to be into the box at the right place at the right time. His shoots were now taken more at optimal positions compared to before where he had to make more long shoots. His goals and expected goals vastly increased as a result.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Why Ten Hag's Tactics Are Getting Exposed
Ten Hag didn't find any consistency level with Man United. Their pressing shape looked different every week. The opposition had too much space. On top of that, their offensive tactics were becoming too predictable and easy to counter. Man United were conceding too many chances. In their defeat against Spurs in 2024, Man United defended with 4 4 2 structure which made sens considering how Postecoglou wanted to move up the pitch their fullbacks forward and creating a wide line of 4 across midfield with players like Kulusevksi and Maddison rotating or attacking in behind. The main issue was the initial 3 v 2 formed with the 2 center backs + Betancur outnumbering Fernandez and ZrikzeeMan United front 2 tried to force Tottenham out wide where the wingers were ready to double up on any player in this position Spurs took advantage of this by slowly circulating the ball around the back adn stretching the space between the first 2 lines, making it impossible for Man United to press the 2 center backs, meaning that Man United's front 2, caught in ths triangle, couldn't win the ball back. A lot of time Spurs would play back to their gk creating a 4 v 2 situation and forcing Man United to even more pushing players forward, creating bigger gaps in behind as the players in the midfield would have to cover more ground between them. They would move the ball out wide, creating overlaps against Mazraoui and Dalot. It comes down to Man United letting too much space between the lines. In thier 3 - 0 loss against Liverpool, Man United wanted in 2024 to man mark both McAllistair and Gravenberch, which exposed a bigger gap between midfield and defense with Casemiro constantly caught in 2 v 1 situation. The threat of pacy wingers and fear of being caught in behind meant the defense struggled to clsoe of the space between the lines, making it easier for midfielders to receive on the turn. The defensive unit acted as a separate bloc from the offensive unit.
It was down probably to fear and pace. With De Ligt and Martinez they are more comfortable pushing forward rather than running back towards their own goal. So they compensated too much by starting deep on the pitch. Man United leaving gaps + slow midfielders needing to cover, it's no ownder Man United sturggled especially when Maino was used further up the pitch to press the defensive line. Offensively, Man United sometimes could be dangerous but even their offensive shape was not that good. Their in possession game seemed to change depending on the opponent but their main route they moved down were the 2 flanks mostly through Rashford or Garnacho. Vs Spurs Fernandez and Zirkzee constantly dropped to receive with the wingers staying as high as possible. As Spurs defenders followed these movement sin the center, it created space in behind that they could exploit directly. But such moves. But not only they lakced a goalscorer on top, Man United couldn't get the ball up the pitch at first place with opponents finding relatively easy to clown down any forward option.
Why The Abramovich Approach Would Have Saved United in the Post-Fergie
What about a blueprint that guaranteed instant success, demanded the highest standars and had no tolerance for failure. That's how Roman Abramovich did at Chelsea. For Man United, since Fergie left it has been a roller coster of different managers with different tactics, visions and players. David Moyes struggled with an aging squad. Then Van Gaal with his rigid possession heavy system, bringing players like Schweinsteiger and Depay, both gone not too long after he was sacked. then came Mourinho who took a win now approach, demanding big money signings like Lukaku, Pogba, Matic. He won trophies but clashed with the board and players, leading to another rebuild wih Solskjaer who wanted to restore Man United's DNA, signing young promising players like Sancho and Bissaka. But results dipped. Ralf Rangnick came as an interim, criticizing the clubs's structure and calling for drastical changes. Ten Hag arrived with his disciplined, possession based style investing in former Ajax players like Antony, Lisandro Martinez. He initially brought some stability, even winning the Carabao Cup and most importantly the FA Cup. But inconsistency saw him dismissed. Now Ruben Amorim is in charge after knowing success at Sporting. Every time a new manager comes in, the squad gets reshuffled, new tactics get drilled in. Man United are stuck in a circle making it almost impossible to get success. Abramovich at Chelsea also didn't care about long term project. You won or you are gone. Chelsea also went throught managers like a deck of cards but got 2 UCL and 5 Premiere League titles, plus other domestic trophies. Meanwhile Man United spent the last decade waiting for their managers to build something only to tear it down a few years later. Chelsea took a similar approach.
Mourinho, Ancelotti and Conte were all elite managers but when the results dipped, they ended up being shown the door. Even mid season, sackings worked like when Di Matteo stepped in and won the UCL in 2012. Tuchel replaced Lampard and delivered another UCL in 2021. Solskjaer had way too much time, Van Gaal had a second season despite the fact that things weren't going anywhere. With Ten Hag they should have end it after tha FA Cup win who was the tree hiding the desert. They suffered humiliating defeats and off the pitch dramas. What if Man United focused purely on winning?, cutting ties with underperforming managers and bringing in the right coach who gets results immediatly. Chelsea didn't waste time building dynasties. They won first and figured out the rest later. Maybe Man United should have done this instead of chasing after the next Ferguson.
Why Ten Hag's Tactics Are Getting Exposed
Ten Hag didn't find any consistency level with Man United. Their pressing shape looked different every week. The opposition had too much space. On top of that, their offensive tactics were becoming too predictable and easy to counter. Man United were conceding too many chances. In their defeat against Spurs in 2024, Man United defended with 4 4 2 structure which made sens considering how Postecoglou wanted to move up the pitch their fullbacks forward and creating a wide line of 4 across midfield with players like Kulusevksi and Maddison rotating or attacking in behind. The main issue was the initial 3 v 2 formed with the 2 center backs + Betancur outnumbering Fernandez and ZrikzeeMan United front 2 tried to force Tottenham out wide where the wingers were ready to double up on any player in this position Spurs took advantage of this by slowly circulating the ball around the back adn stretching the space between the first 2 lines, making it impossible for Man United to press the 2 center backs, meaning that Man United's front 2, caught in ths triangle, couldn't win the ball back. A lot of time Spurs would play back to their gk creating a 4 v 2 situation and forcing Man United to even more pushing players forward, creating bigger gaps in behind as the players in the midfield would have to cover more ground between them. They would move the ball out wide, creating overlaps against Mazraoui and Dalot. It comes down to Man United letting too much space between the lines. In thier 3 - 0 loss against Liverpool, Man United wanted in 2024 to man mark both McAllistair and Gravenberch, which exposed a bigger gap between midfield and defense with Casemiro constantly caught in 2 v 1 situation. The threat of pacy wingers and fear of being caught in behind meant the defense struggled to clsoe of the space between the lines, making it easier for midfielders to receive on the turn. The defensive unit acted as a separate bloc from the offensive unit.
It was down probably to fear and pace. With De Ligt and Martinez they are more comfortable pushing forward rather than running back towards their own goal. So they compensated too much by starting deep on the pitch. Man United leaving gaps + slow midfielders needing to cover, it's no ownder Man United sturggled especially when Maino was used further up the pitch to press the defensive line. Offensively, Man United sometimes could be dangerous but even their offensive shape was not that good. Their in possession game seemed to change depending on the opponent but their main route they moved down were the 2 flanks mostly through Rashford or Garnacho. Vs Spurs Fernandez and Zirkzee constantly dropped to receive with the wingers staying as high as possible. As Spurs defenders followed these movement sin the center, it created space in behind that they could exploit directly. But such moves. But not only they lakced a goalscorer on top, Man United couldn't get the ball up the pitch at first place with opponents finding relatively easy to clown down any forward option.
Why The Abramovich Approach Would Have Saved United in the Post-Fergie
What about a blueprint that guaranteed instant success, demanded the highest standars and had no tolerance for failure. That's how Roman Abramovich did at Chelsea. For Man United, since Fergie left it has been a roller coster of different managers with different tactics, visions and players. David Moyes struggled with an aging squad. Then Van Gaal with his rigid possession heavy system, bringing players like Schweinsteiger and Depay, both gone not too long after he was sacked. then came Mourinho who took a win now approach, demanding big money signings like Lukaku, Pogba, Matic. He won trophies but clashed with the board and players, leading to another rebuild wih Solskjaer who wanted to restore Man United's DNA, signing young promising players like Sancho and Bissaka. But results dipped. Ralf Rangnick came as an interim, criticizing the clubs's structure and calling for drastical changes. Ten Hag arrived with his disciplined, possession based style investing in former Ajax players like Antony, Lisandro Martinez. He initially brought some stability, even winning the Carabao Cup and most importantly the FA Cup. But inconsistency saw him dismissed. Now Ruben Amorim is in charge after knowing success at Sporting. Every time a new manager comes in, the squad gets reshuffled, new tactics get drilled in. Man United are stuck in a circle making it almost impossible to get success. Abramovich at Chelsea also didn't care about long term project. You won or you are gone. Chelsea also went throught managers like a deck of cards but got 2 UCL and 5 Premiere League titles, plus other domestic trophies. Meanwhile Man United spent the last decade waiting for their managers to build something only to tear it down a few years later. Chelsea took a similar approach.
Mourinho, Ancelotti and Conte were all elite managers but when the results dipped, they ended up being shown the door. Even mid season, sackings worked like when Di Matteo stepped in and won the UCL in 2012. Tuchel replaced Lampard and delivered another UCL in 2021. Solskjaer had way too much time, Van Gaal had a second season despite the fact that things weren't going anywhere. With Ten Hag they should have end it after tha FA Cup win who was the tree hiding the desert. They suffered humiliating defeats and off the pitch dramas. What if Man United focused purely on winning?, cutting ties with underperforming managers and bringing in the right coach who gets results immediatly. Chelsea didn't waste time building dynasties. They won first and figured out the rest later. Maybe Man United should have done this instead of chasing after the next Ferguson.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
How Pep Reached His Final Form | Tactical Analysis 22/23 - Manchester City
How Pep Guardiola's Man City won the treble in 2023?
During 2022/2023, City won the treble finally winnning the UCL. And Guardiola managed to find solutions to every single tactical problems. Not having a false 9 anymore with Haaland coming already meant that City had to adapt their tactics. At times before City even played with 2 false 9 with De Bruyne and Bernardo Silva. But most of the times it was either Jesus either Sterling. Walker often tucked in with the left back inverting. With the 9 dropping deep, they outnumbered always the opposition's miedfield. Haaland stayed now high up on the pitch, looking to hold defenders. This meant that miedfield had not a miedfield 5 anymore but a miedfield 4. Early we saw Walker and Cancelo or Zinchenko move into the miedfield region, making it a 2 3 shape rather than 3 2 shape. With Haaland's presence, it put the opposite team with 2 chooice, either following him closely when he threat to make runs in behind. But this would open up more spaces in half spaces for Bernardo Silva and De Bruyne. But when the team tried to compact their shape in the miedfield, Haaland could thrive. With the 2 free 8 coming into half spaces, it forced the opposition's miedfielder wider, it opened passing line and even if Haaland was not a false 9, he dropped to link up the play when he could. Even off ball, defenders tended to converge around Haaland trying to stop him. This could allow the free 8, either De Buryne either Bernardo Silva, making quick dashes ahead of Haaland, either the wingers sneaking in close to their posts. Despite a lot of wins, City sometimes looked defensivly a bit shaky by times. At least the world cup break allowed them to rebuild themselves tactically. Cancelo would often push up to help creating spaces in half spaces and with the fullbacks bringing the width on the sides, it could become a nightmare to defend against this.
But to bring balances, someone like Bernardo Silva would drop alongside Rodri. Despite Walker making progression technically, he was still not at ZInchenko or Cancelo's level when it comes to inverted fullbacks. So Pep previously used him as defensive inverted fullback. At least Walker could use his pace to prevent any counter attack opportunities. But now higher on the pitch, he often would confront the ball carrier on the transition. And on the other side, Cancelo didn't have that much space to recover meaning that the 2 cb were often overwhelmed. Also oppositions started to compact their shape to stop progression thought the center and defend as narrow as humanly possible. That means the wingers would be the only width providers here. As soon as Walker got the ball a miedfielder would often look to press. The center backs as a result had more owners to carry the ball into the miedfield regions, trying to pull a miedfielder higher for pressing. But teams sometimes defended so anrrow that if the wingers wanted to have the ball, they had to drop deep, outside of the miedfield block to create the angle to receive;
The fullbacks then played more wide, outside of their defensive shape. so they could receive outside of the blcok, allowing the wingers to stay higher. With teams often using a back 3, Walker was used in a more offensive way to overlap. But Rodri could be quickly left exposed in the transitions. With Haaland, if City could not pass the miedfield block, they would often choose long balls into him. But with Walker picking an injury, it would lead Guardiola to try and experiment a solution. Stones would start as a right back against Wolves, inverting effortlessly and trying to help the build up anc control the play, a clear upgrade on Walker. However with Cancelo inverting, the problem was now the defensive holes as Sontes recovery pace was not as fast as Walker's. But with Stones being injured, Pep Guardiola had to find a diferent solution again. That lead to experimenting a back 3 against Liverpool, allowing more solidity. In others matches they kept their back 4 with Akanji being right back often inverting with Cancelo which for a while seemed like the solution. But Cancelo had the prospensity to push higher or wider in inopportune moments, isolating Rodri, or to make dangerous passes would would be prone to turnovers.
He then experimented with Bernardo Silva as left back being the controller and invert and keeping Akanji deep. Despite winning With City facing numerous charges from others clubs, Guardiola seeked his troops, mobilizing them in a siege mentality. Nathan Aké played impressivly all the season. When City played a back 3 or had Akanji as a inverted right back, Aké's ability as left footed left center back has been a key to thrive outside narrow blocks as he naturally had the passing angle. So Pep trust him to start as his defensive inverted fullback Now he needed a controller sitting deep alongside Rodri who would retain the ball rather than venture too far forward as Cancelo. Lewis was tested for this role at first. Lewis's eagernss and intelligence when inverting was impressive seamlessly taking over the Cancelo role, never complicating things and instead being safe in possession of the ball. But also when needed driving a bit high on the pitch into the miedfield and seeking out teamates higher on the pitch. Grealish on the left wing was flouishing as Ak" outside their narrow block meant he could easy find Grealish down the line and Grealish could stay high. But despite this, there were still concerns for Pep. Off the ball there was uncertainty about facing off against elite wingers Stones then returned from injury and took his role. It's when his ability in this role chocked everyone Stones was excellent on the ball like Lexis and good defensivly like Walker. But the calibers of opposite's wingers would then become even higher with the likes of Sané, Vinicius, Martinelli, Coman, etc... Of course Stones have good defensive ability but Guardiola had an ace to assume.
And Walker came back as a game changer. But since Guardiola still coudln't trust him as a controlling inverting fullback, To make things work, heprobably remembered City's match against Arsenal in 3rd Fabruary 2019. Fernandinho started as center back. But on possession, Fernandinho would push from cb into the miedfield to overload it. So during the win against Chelsea in 2023 when City won 1 0, Rodri started as cb. But the problem is that despite being the best cdm in the world, him being cb meant that he was not early available in that miedfield when City regain the ball. Instead he would have to take times to shuffle into the miedfield only when the ball was under control possession. So Walker was put at right back and Stones at right center back, moving into the miedfield when needed while Walker would tuck in. Then with the return of Dias, he could be put as the central cb, and this, alongside the shut down ability of Aké and Walker, saw City elevating himself to a diferent level. City would go on to win a treble this season.
How Pep Reached His Final Form | Tactical Analysis 22/23 - Manchester City
How Pep Guardiola's Man City won the treble in 2023?
During 2022/2023, City won the treble finally winnning the UCL. And Guardiola managed to find solutions to every single tactical problems. Not having a false 9 anymore with Haaland coming already meant that City had to adapt their tactics. At times before City even played with 2 false 9 with De Bruyne and Bernardo Silva. But most of the times it was either Jesus either Sterling. Walker often tucked in with the left back inverting. With the 9 dropping deep, they outnumbered always the opposition's miedfield. Haaland stayed now high up on the pitch, looking to hold defenders. This meant that miedfield had not a miedfield 5 anymore but a miedfield 4. Early we saw Walker and Cancelo or Zinchenko move into the miedfield region, making it a 2 3 shape rather than 3 2 shape. With Haaland's presence, it put the opposite team with 2 chooice, either following him closely when he threat to make runs in behind. But this would open up more spaces in half spaces for Bernardo Silva and De Bruyne. But when the team tried to compact their shape in the miedfield, Haaland could thrive. With the 2 free 8 coming into half spaces, it forced the opposition's miedfielder wider, it opened passing line and even if Haaland was not a false 9, he dropped to link up the play when he could. Even off ball, defenders tended to converge around Haaland trying to stop him. This could allow the free 8, either De Buryne either Bernardo Silva, making quick dashes ahead of Haaland, either the wingers sneaking in close to their posts. Despite a lot of wins, City sometimes looked defensivly a bit shaky by times. At least the world cup break allowed them to rebuild themselves tactically. Cancelo would often push up to help creating spaces in half spaces and with the fullbacks bringing the width on the sides, it could become a nightmare to defend against this.
But to bring balances, someone like Bernardo Silva would drop alongside Rodri. Despite Walker making progression technically, he was still not at ZInchenko or Cancelo's level when it comes to inverted fullbacks. So Pep previously used him as defensive inverted fullback. At least Walker could use his pace to prevent any counter attack opportunities. But now higher on the pitch, he often would confront the ball carrier on the transition. And on the other side, Cancelo didn't have that much space to recover meaning that the 2 cb were often overwhelmed. Also oppositions started to compact their shape to stop progression thought the center and defend as narrow as humanly possible. That means the wingers would be the only width providers here. As soon as Walker got the ball a miedfielder would often look to press. The center backs as a result had more owners to carry the ball into the miedfield regions, trying to pull a miedfielder higher for pressing. But teams sometimes defended so anrrow that if the wingers wanted to have the ball, they had to drop deep, outside of the miedfield block to create the angle to receive;
The fullbacks then played more wide, outside of their defensive shape. so they could receive outside of the blcok, allowing the wingers to stay higher. With teams often using a back 3, Walker was used in a more offensive way to overlap. But Rodri could be quickly left exposed in the transitions. With Haaland, if City could not pass the miedfield block, they would often choose long balls into him. But with Walker picking an injury, it would lead Guardiola to try and experiment a solution. Stones would start as a right back against Wolves, inverting effortlessly and trying to help the build up anc control the play, a clear upgrade on Walker. However with Cancelo inverting, the problem was now the defensive holes as Sontes recovery pace was not as fast as Walker's. But with Stones being injured, Pep Guardiola had to find a diferent solution again. That lead to experimenting a back 3 against Liverpool, allowing more solidity. In others matches they kept their back 4 with Akanji being right back often inverting with Cancelo which for a while seemed like the solution. But Cancelo had the prospensity to push higher or wider in inopportune moments, isolating Rodri, or to make dangerous passes would would be prone to turnovers.
He then experimented with Bernardo Silva as left back being the controller and invert and keeping Akanji deep. Despite winning With City facing numerous charges from others clubs, Guardiola seeked his troops, mobilizing them in a siege mentality. Nathan Aké played impressivly all the season. When City played a back 3 or had Akanji as a inverted right back, Aké's ability as left footed left center back has been a key to thrive outside narrow blocks as he naturally had the passing angle. So Pep trust him to start as his defensive inverted fullback Now he needed a controller sitting deep alongside Rodri who would retain the ball rather than venture too far forward as Cancelo. Lewis was tested for this role at first. Lewis's eagernss and intelligence when inverting was impressive seamlessly taking over the Cancelo role, never complicating things and instead being safe in possession of the ball. But also when needed driving a bit high on the pitch into the miedfield and seeking out teamates higher on the pitch. Grealish on the left wing was flouishing as Ak" outside their narrow block meant he could easy find Grealish down the line and Grealish could stay high. But despite this, there were still concerns for Pep. Off the ball there was uncertainty about facing off against elite wingers Stones then returned from injury and took his role. It's when his ability in this role chocked everyone Stones was excellent on the ball like Lexis and good defensivly like Walker. But the calibers of opposite's wingers would then become even higher with the likes of Sané, Vinicius, Martinelli, Coman, etc... Of course Stones have good defensive ability but Guardiola had an ace to assume.
And Walker came back as a game changer. But since Guardiola still coudln't trust him as a controlling inverting fullback, To make things work, heprobably remembered City's match against Arsenal in 3rd Fabruary 2019. Fernandinho started as center back. But on possession, Fernandinho would push from cb into the miedfield to overload it. So during the win against Chelsea in 2023 when City won 1 0, Rodri started as cb. But the problem is that despite being the best cdm in the world, him being cb meant that he was not early available in that miedfield when City regain the ball. Instead he would have to take times to shuffle into the miedfield only when the ball was under control possession. So Walker was put at right back and Stones at right center back, moving into the miedfield when needed while Walker would tuck in. Then with the return of Dias, he could be put as the central cb, and this, alongside the shut down ability of Aké and Walker, saw City elevating himself to a diferent level. City would go on to win a treble this season.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Rma vs Man City 2023.
Tactical Analysis : Real Madrid 1-1 Man City | How Ancelotti Shut Down The City Build Up|
Real Madrid knew that if they played in their default defensive shape, there was the risk of City having the numerical advantage in the midfield as City likes to use the midfield box. So Real Madrid had to be more agressive than usual in the press to prevent this situation from occuring in first place. Madrid pressed high to prevent City from building up easily. Stones started deep then would be pushing up to be the second pivot alongside Rodri. But with the high press we often saw Gundogan having to drop deep instead to be the other pivot. Valverde and Modric were looking to press City's double pivot. This meant that Kross could be free to follow De Bruyne. Benzema was ready to apply pressure on Stones while Rodrygo was closer to Dias. At times this meant City would have to go longer. But City still tried to find advantages into the midfield with De Bruyne pushing on the same half space than Gundogan meaning that with Kross following him, there was a potential for Haaland to drop a bit deeper to be found between the lines. But De Bruyne could tuck in to receive the ball in deeper regions. Sometimes City was still able to make their box midfield box after passing the first wave of pressure. With Benzema being on Dias, it meant that the wide centerback, Walker and Akanji were often the outlet options. If Akanji had the ball, Rodrygo would look to press while while Vinicius would look to do the same in Walker's case. Even if the wingers dropped deeper to receive, Real Madrid's fullbacks were very agressive on them. Into the midfield, Man City looked for isolation situations, with Bernardo Silva against Camavinga.
Althought Camavinga often forced Silva to make a back pass, it sometimes created opportunities for guys like De Brune to make runs between the fullbacks and the centerbacks. De Bruyne got a good shooting opportunity this way. But Real Madrid's players adapted to this by having Valverde often dropping into the right half space It would temporarly form a back 5. So the midfield was still 2 v 2 as the wide centerbacks could focus on their man. And these half spaces runs would be more easy to track by Real Madrid. If Valverde was in the midfield, Real Madrid was sitting deep and narrow. When the ball was played to their wingers, Carvajal and Camavinga closed their man down while the rest of the back shift across here. Camavinga was often targetting, with balls being played to Bernardo Silva and De Bruyne making underlapping runs to potentially receive and cross. However, Vinicius often was slow to track back after Real Madrid was attacking So Guardiola was willing to take the risk to have Walker overlap down the right handside at times to make it 2 v 1 against Camavinga. However with Stones pushing in the midfield, it would leave City vulnerable during the defensive phases. If Vinicius got the ball, he had Benzema to support him with only Akanji and Dias to stop them for a few seconds.
When defending, Man City was playing in 4 4 2 with De Bruyne joining Haaland in front and the rest of the midfield shifting across. From goalkick, Rudiger and Alaba would provide the passing outlets to Courtois with Haaland and De Bruyen looking to cose them down. So they could play it to their fullbacks which would draw City's wingers. But then, Real Madrid would be the one having numerical advantage in the midfield with Kross often being the option as the pivot. Later in the game, in defensive phases, Man City would look for piston press with one man pressing at time and the other looking to cover Toni Kross. Sometimes we saw Toni Kross joining the backline meaning that they had a 3 v 2 advantage while the midfield had their 2 v 2 situation. Madrid also looked to overload often the left handside with Modric and Camavinga switching positions, Vinicius and Benzema often dropping into these regions. That meant that Carvajal and Rodrygo both could occupy the wide regions in the right and be options for quick long switches with both of them often interchanging positions. Eventually, both sides were tactically matched and it took individual brillance from players to make the difference.
We saw similarities with the first leg with Stones pushing up in the midfield. The back 3 consisted then of Akanji, Walker and Dias. Gundogan and De Bruyne pushed higher on the pitch into the half spaces. The press for real madrid would be start with Benzema and then Modric who would look to cover on of the double pivots. But to not have 1 v 2, Vinicius and Rodrygo would operate extremly narrow, allowing Valverde and Kross deeper and pick up the men in the half spaces, making the progression more difficult centrally. Since the double pivots were often pressed a lot, the wide centerbacks had the ball very often. If the ball went to the wide center back, it would be easy for real madrid's wingers to come out and apply pressure. Camavinga and Carvajal would be very agressive against Man City's wingers City's wingers pushed high, forcing real madrid's fullbacks to stay deep. Because of the wingers and Modric pressing the double pivots, Real Madrid was able to deal with the players in the half spaces with Valverde dropping deep allowing Real Madrid to shift from a back 4 to a back 5 to match City's front 5. If City's pivots were able to turn that would change the game completly. Man City's movements often allowed Stones and Rodri to drag Madrid's mens into pressing them, meaning that Walker was free to receive in wider regions. When Walker is drawing Vinicius from his narrow position, that left Modric more isolated and combinatinos between Rodri and Stones often allowed Stones to receive, makes the turn and drives into the heart of the midfield. In these situations, Valverde couldnt afford to drop that deep as they would leave Man City overloard the midfield too easily, meaning that Man City often managed to outnumber Real Madrid's backline. We also saw how both Grealish and Bernardo Silva were good against their fullbacks in 1 v 1 situations.
When the fullback got tight, players in the half spaces were making consistent runs someitmes only trakced by midfilder.
How One Simple Change Made Man City European Champions
During the UCL 2023 final, Man City lined up in their comon 3 2 4 1 formation with John Stones being the second pivot alongside Rodri, forming this box miedfield in the center of the pitch. Inter Milan stuck to their 3 5 2 line up. The majority of the first half, Man City held the ball in their first half. They struggled to build any substancial attack. Inter Milan's intentions were clear and they dictated Man City's tempo effectivly. First they looked to press City high up <hich is the initial idea from being to block off the central places into the 2 pivots being shadow marked by the strikers. However one rotation forced Inter to adapt their positionning while City lined up as 3 2 4 1 it instnatly transformed into a 3 4 3 diamond. The iconic system used Cruyff's total football This rotation meant Rodri could pick up a position between 2 centerbacks with De Bruyne and Stones shifting outwide. Calhanoglou was positionned into Rodri's one to counter this. Bastoni shifted to man mark Stones. While it was a 3 v 2 initially at the back, Barella started closing down Ake to form a 3 v 3. WHile it seemed to leave a mansure in the center, Dumfries or Dammian would push up to even out the center. This made life very difficult for Man City as Inter defended very well from this position. WHat made Man City so dangerous during the season was their ability to play throught the center. But Inter assured that this was not going to happen. With Man City's miedfielders going wider and wider, it left the center of the pitch more vacated, resulting in City circulating the ball around the back with Inter having a clear pressing triggers and continuously forcing them back, resulting in Man City to look over the center block directly to Haaland. But Acerbi completly man marked him, resulting in Haaland having only one shoot in the box for the entire first half.
Damian or Bastoni would shift to cover City's miedfielde while the other would join Acerbi to form a 2 v 1 vs Haaland. While Inter kept this shape and defended very well,t heir main issue was that they couldn't build any substancial attack, looking for the forwards to hit City directly on the counters. City kept an interesting 4 2 4 defensive shape with the central box ensuring City could outnumber into the central 3. The interesting aspect of this shape is having Stones playing as a right back to ensure City would not be outnumbered in the defense with Inter's wingbacks. A change from Guardiola included a more tight miedfield. Gundogan and Stones operated more in the half spaces with the outlets options in the flanks being Silva or Grealish. Silva would drop his positionning more frequent and would be more involved into City's play. It resulted in Di Marco being draw out of his line, giving more space for Stones or Foden to run in. Subsequently, it freed more spaces in the center to rotate from flank to flank.
Rma vs Man City 2023.
Tactical Analysis : Real Madrid 1-1 Man City | How Ancelotti Shut Down The City Build Up|
Real Madrid knew that if they played in their default defensive shape, there was the risk of City having the numerical advantage in the midfield as City likes to use the midfield box. So Real Madrid had to be more agressive than usual in the press to prevent this situation from occuring in first place. Madrid pressed high to prevent City from building up easily. Stones started deep then would be pushing up to be the second pivot alongside Rodri. But with the high press we often saw Gundogan having to drop deep instead to be the other pivot. Valverde and Modric were looking to press City's double pivot. This meant that Kross could be free to follow De Bruyne. Benzema was ready to apply pressure on Stones while Rodrygo was closer to Dias. At times this meant City would have to go longer. But City still tried to find advantages into the midfield with De Bruyne pushing on the same half space than Gundogan meaning that with Kross following him, there was a potential for Haaland to drop a bit deeper to be found between the lines. But De Bruyne could tuck in to receive the ball in deeper regions. Sometimes City was still able to make their box midfield box after passing the first wave of pressure. With Benzema being on Dias, it meant that the wide centerback, Walker and Akanji were often the outlet options. If Akanji had the ball, Rodrygo would look to press while while Vinicius would look to do the same in Walker's case. Even if the wingers dropped deeper to receive, Real Madrid's fullbacks were very agressive on them. Into the midfield, Man City looked for isolation situations, with Bernardo Silva against Camavinga.
Althought Camavinga often forced Silva to make a back pass, it sometimes created opportunities for guys like De Brune to make runs between the fullbacks and the centerbacks. De Bruyne got a good shooting opportunity this way. But Real Madrid's players adapted to this by having Valverde often dropping into the right half space It would temporarly form a back 5. So the midfield was still 2 v 2 as the wide centerbacks could focus on their man. And these half spaces runs would be more easy to track by Real Madrid. If Valverde was in the midfield, Real Madrid was sitting deep and narrow. When the ball was played to their wingers, Carvajal and Camavinga closed their man down while the rest of the back shift across here. Camavinga was often targetting, with balls being played to Bernardo Silva and De Bruyne making underlapping runs to potentially receive and cross. However, Vinicius often was slow to track back after Real Madrid was attacking So Guardiola was willing to take the risk to have Walker overlap down the right handside at times to make it 2 v 1 against Camavinga. However with Stones pushing in the midfield, it would leave City vulnerable during the defensive phases. If Vinicius got the ball, he had Benzema to support him with only Akanji and Dias to stop them for a few seconds.
When defending, Man City was playing in 4 4 2 with De Bruyne joining Haaland in front and the rest of the midfield shifting across. From goalkick, Rudiger and Alaba would provide the passing outlets to Courtois with Haaland and De Bruyen looking to cose them down. So they could play it to their fullbacks which would draw City's wingers. But then, Real Madrid would be the one having numerical advantage in the midfield with Kross often being the option as the pivot. Later in the game, in defensive phases, Man City would look for piston press with one man pressing at time and the other looking to cover Toni Kross. Sometimes we saw Toni Kross joining the backline meaning that they had a 3 v 2 advantage while the midfield had their 2 v 2 situation. Madrid also looked to overload often the left handside with Modric and Camavinga switching positions, Vinicius and Benzema often dropping into these regions. That meant that Carvajal and Rodrygo both could occupy the wide regions in the right and be options for quick long switches with both of them often interchanging positions. Eventually, both sides were tactically matched and it took individual brillance from players to make the difference.
We saw similarities with the first leg with Stones pushing up in the midfield. The back 3 consisted then of Akanji, Walker and Dias. Gundogan and De Bruyne pushed higher on the pitch into the half spaces. The press for real madrid would be start with Benzema and then Modric who would look to cover on of the double pivots. But to not have 1 v 2, Vinicius and Rodrygo would operate extremly narrow, allowing Valverde and Kross deeper and pick up the men in the half spaces, making the progression more difficult centrally. Since the double pivots were often pressed a lot, the wide centerbacks had the ball very often. If the ball went to the wide center back, it would be easy for real madrid's wingers to come out and apply pressure. Camavinga and Carvajal would be very agressive against Man City's wingers City's wingers pushed high, forcing real madrid's fullbacks to stay deep. Because of the wingers and Modric pressing the double pivots, Real Madrid was able to deal with the players in the half spaces with Valverde dropping deep allowing Real Madrid to shift from a back 4 to a back 5 to match City's front 5. If City's pivots were able to turn that would change the game completly. Man City's movements often allowed Stones and Rodri to drag Madrid's mens into pressing them, meaning that Walker was free to receive in wider regions. When Walker is drawing Vinicius from his narrow position, that left Modric more isolated and combinatinos between Rodri and Stones often allowed Stones to receive, makes the turn and drives into the heart of the midfield. In these situations, Valverde couldnt afford to drop that deep as they would leave Man City overloard the midfield too easily, meaning that Man City often managed to outnumber Real Madrid's backline. We also saw how both Grealish and Bernardo Silva were good against their fullbacks in 1 v 1 situations.
When the fullback got tight, players in the half spaces were making consistent runs someitmes only trakced by midfilder.
How One Simple Change Made Man City European Champions
During the UCL 2023 final, Man City lined up in their comon 3 2 4 1 formation with John Stones being the second pivot alongside Rodri, forming this box miedfield in the center of the pitch. Inter Milan stuck to their 3 5 2 line up. The majority of the first half, Man City held the ball in their first half. They struggled to build any substancial attack. Inter Milan's intentions were clear and they dictated Man City's tempo effectivly. First they looked to press City high up <hich is the initial idea from being to block off the central places into the 2 pivots being shadow marked by the strikers. However one rotation forced Inter to adapt their positionning while City lined up as 3 2 4 1 it instnatly transformed into a 3 4 3 diamond. The iconic system used Cruyff's total football This rotation meant Rodri could pick up a position between 2 centerbacks with De Bruyne and Stones shifting outwide. Calhanoglou was positionned into Rodri's one to counter this. Bastoni shifted to man mark Stones. While it was a 3 v 2 initially at the back, Barella started closing down Ake to form a 3 v 3. WHile it seemed to leave a mansure in the center, Dumfries or Dammian would push up to even out the center. This made life very difficult for Man City as Inter defended very well from this position. WHat made Man City so dangerous during the season was their ability to play throught the center. But Inter assured that this was not going to happen. With Man City's miedfielders going wider and wider, it left the center of the pitch more vacated, resulting in City circulating the ball around the back with Inter having a clear pressing triggers and continuously forcing them back, resulting in Man City to look over the center block directly to Haaland. But Acerbi completly man marked him, resulting in Haaland having only one shoot in the box for the entire first half.
Damian or Bastoni would shift to cover City's miedfielde while the other would join Acerbi to form a 2 v 1 vs Haaland. While Inter kept this shape and defended very well,t heir main issue was that they couldn't build any substancial attack, looking for the forwards to hit City directly on the counters. City kept an interesting 4 2 4 defensive shape with the central box ensuring City could outnumber into the central 3. The interesting aspect of this shape is having Stones playing as a right back to ensure City would not be outnumbered in the defense with Inter's wingbacks. A change from Guardiola included a more tight miedfield. Gundogan and Stones operated more in the half spaces with the outlets options in the flanks being Silva or Grealish. Silva would drop his positionning more frequent and would be more involved into City's play. It resulted in Di Marco being draw out of his line, giving more space for Stones or Foden to run in. Subsequently, it freed more spaces in the center to rotate from flank to flank.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
How Pep Dismantled Ancelotti | Tactical Analysis : Manchester City 4-0 Real Madrid|
We saw similarities with the first leg with Stones pushing up in the miedfield. The back 3 consisted then of Akanji, Walker and Dias. Gundogan and De Bruyne pushed higher on the pitch into the half spaces. The press for real madrid would be start with Benzema and then Modric who would look to cover on of the double pivots. But to not have 1 v 2, Vinicius and Rodrygo would operate extremly narrow, allowing Valverde and Kross deeper and pick up the men in the half spaces, making the progression more difficult centrally. Since the double pivots were often pressed a lot, the wide centerbacks had the ball very often. If the ball went to the wide center back, it would be easy for real madrid's wingers to come out and apply pressure. Camavinga and Carvajal would be very agressive against Man City's wingers City's wingers pushed high, forcing real madrid's fullbacks to stay deep. Because of the wingers and Modric pressing the double pivots, Real Madrid was able to deal with the players in the half spaces with Valverde dropping deep allowing Real Madrid to shift from a back 4 to a back 5 to match City's front 5. If City's pivots were able to turn that would change the game completly. Man City's movements often allowed Stones and Rodri to drag Madrid's mens into pressing them, meaning that Walker was free to receive in wider regions. When Walker is drawing Vinicius from his narrow position, that left Modric more isolated and combinatinos between Rodri and Stones often allowed Stones to receive, makes the turn and drives into the heart of the miedfield. In these situations, Valverde couldnt afford to drop that deep as they would leave Man City overloard the miedfield too easily, meaning that Man City often managed to outnumber Real Madrid's backline. We also saw how both Grealish and Bernardo Silva were good against their fullbacks in 1 v 1 situations.
When the fullback got tight, players in the half spaces were making consistent runs someitmes only trakced by miedfielder.
Tactical Analysis : Real Madrid 1-0 Liverpool | How Ancelotti Won The Champions League (again)|
Both Liverpool and Real Madrid in the UCL 2022 final adopted a contrasting approach to the final with Liverpool having a vertical agressive approach but struggling to breka down Real Madrid low defensive block. Real Madrid had their 4 3 3 formation just like Liverpool but used differently. Liverpool on average kept a higher defensive line with Henderson pushing up further up in the right flank. In the other hand, Real madrid often kept Vinicius and Benzema higher on the pitch to help on the counter attacks. Real Madrid had barely 4 shoots while Liverpool had 24. But thanks to Courtois world class performacne as goalkepper, Madrid ended up winning this. When Real Madrid was trying to build up from the back, Liverpool kept a high press with Mané and Salah covering the 2 centerbacks. Trent would push up to cover Mendy. Henderson would often cover the space left behind Trent while Robertson on the left flank was not pushing as high compared to Trent on the right. Van DIjk was kept more centrally as possible mostly to watch out for Benzema. As a result, Real Madrid tried to overload the flanks and disrupt the central block. Most of Madrid's attacks came in the right flank with Carvajal pushing high and Valverde going into the half spaces between Robertson and Van Dijk. Benzema and Vinicius would occupy both Konaté and Trent. The initial plan was to force Liverpool to commit a lot of players into this flank to finally switch into the other flank. At the end, if Diaz was picking Carvajal, Modric could advance in the center of the pitch while if Modric was picked, it was Carvajal who would push higher to create 1 v 2 situation vs Robertson alongside Valverde. When defending, Real Madrid opted for a more defensive 4 4 2 with Modric joining Benzema in front.
How Pep Dismantled Ancelotti | Tactical Analysis : Manchester City 4-0 Real Madrid|
We saw similarities with the first leg with Stones pushing up in the miedfield. The back 3 consisted then of Akanji, Walker and Dias. Gundogan and De Bruyne pushed higher on the pitch into the half spaces. The press for real madrid would be start with Benzema and then Modric who would look to cover on of the double pivots. But to not have 1 v 2, Vinicius and Rodrygo would operate extremly narrow, allowing Valverde and Kross deeper and pick up the men in the half spaces, making the progression more difficult centrally. Since the double pivots were often pressed a lot, the wide centerbacks had the ball very often. If the ball went to the wide center back, it would be easy for real madrid's wingers to come out and apply pressure. Camavinga and Carvajal would be very agressive against Man City's wingers City's wingers pushed high, forcing real madrid's fullbacks to stay deep. Because of the wingers and Modric pressing the double pivots, Real Madrid was able to deal with the players in the half spaces with Valverde dropping deep allowing Real Madrid to shift from a back 4 to a back 5 to match City's front 5. If City's pivots were able to turn that would change the game completly. Man City's movements often allowed Stones and Rodri to drag Madrid's mens into pressing them, meaning that Walker was free to receive in wider regions. When Walker is drawing Vinicius from his narrow position, that left Modric more isolated and combinatinos between Rodri and Stones often allowed Stones to receive, makes the turn and drives into the heart of the miedfield. In these situations, Valverde couldnt afford to drop that deep as they would leave Man City overloard the miedfield too easily, meaning that Man City often managed to outnumber Real Madrid's backline. We also saw how both Grealish and Bernardo Silva were good against their fullbacks in 1 v 1 situations.
When the fullback got tight, players in the half spaces were making consistent runs someitmes only trakced by miedfielder.
Tactical Analysis : Real Madrid 1-0 Liverpool | How Ancelotti Won The Champions League (again)|
Both Liverpool and Real Madrid in the UCL 2022 final adopted a contrasting approach to the final with Liverpool having a vertical agressive approach but struggling to breka down Real Madrid low defensive block. Real Madrid had their 4 3 3 formation just like Liverpool but used differently. Liverpool on average kept a higher defensive line with Henderson pushing up further up in the right flank. In the other hand, Real madrid often kept Vinicius and Benzema higher on the pitch to help on the counter attacks. Real Madrid had barely 4 shoots while Liverpool had 24. But thanks to Courtois world class performacne as goalkepper, Madrid ended up winning this. When Real Madrid was trying to build up from the back, Liverpool kept a high press with Mané and Salah covering the 2 centerbacks. Trent would push up to cover Mendy. Henderson would often cover the space left behind Trent while Robertson on the left flank was not pushing as high compared to Trent on the right. Van DIjk was kept more centrally as possible mostly to watch out for Benzema. As a result, Real Madrid tried to overload the flanks and disrupt the central block. Most of Madrid's attacks came in the right flank with Carvajal pushing high and Valverde going into the half spaces between Robertson and Van Dijk. Benzema and Vinicius would occupy both Konaté and Trent. The initial plan was to force Liverpool to commit a lot of players into this flank to finally switch into the other flank. At the end, if Diaz was picking Carvajal, Modric could advance in the center of the pitch while if Modric was picked, it was Carvajal who would push higher to create 1 v 2 situation vs Robertson alongside Valverde. When defending, Real Madrid opted for a more defensive 4 4 2 with Modric joining Benzema in front.
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How Pep Won The League With His Weakest Tactics | Man City 2023/24 Tactical Analysis
After winning the treble, the expectations were not that high for Man City now especially after the departure of Gundogan Outside him, Laporte, Cancelo, Mahjrez and Palmer were all leaving. It was made worse by the fact that John Stones spent most of the early part of the season unavailable. When De Bruyne went out with an injury during the first match of ths season, it was about to be a difficult season. At the beginning Guardiola still was prepared for the challenge and instead of John Stones, It was Akanji who would push from the defense to the midfield during the build up. But Akanji was more traditionnal centerback than Stones, raising some worries about how he would copte. If the Citys back 3 was pressed, Rodri would look to free himself to take the ball as much as possible as he could. He would often then look for the bounce pass to Akanji who would now receive the ball while facing the rest of the play. He was actually great. But Akanji still struggled more to turn back to the opposite goal when he got the ball compared to Stones which often led to a safe pass back to the center back. Even if City could deal with that, the miss of Rodri during the 2 games he was suspended against Arsenal and the Wolves during which City lost showed how important he was to the side. Pep tried to deal with that with replacing them by players like Kovacic and Bernardo Silva as a double pivot. Or play Rico Lexis from right back and invert Despite having great retainers of possession, they lacked penetrative passes that Rodri often made when he was here or the penetration Rodri is making ball to feet. But even when Rodri was in the starting XI, teams were beginning to figure out how to defend against Manchester City. More often the opposition looked to protect the center at all costs.
It would make it harder the City's midfielders to create danger on top. Opposite's wingers would operate narrow as well. Often you would see the opposition defend in narrow 4 4 2 with the front 2 not being bait into the press. Add that to the 2 central midfielders and you had a box defending shape to counter the box midfield City was using. Bernardo Silva would look to drop outside the narrow block to receive the ball The downside would be that there is one less attacking player upfront. This was not helped by the fact that Alvarez often got played as a 10 rather than a center forward. Alvarez had to be trusted at making the creative burden, something he couldn't do especially against such narrow defenses. Despite being a press skilled resistant midfielder it happened that Kovacic was put higher on the pitch more as a 10 than as a 6. The lack of plays into the center meant there were less services into Haaland. And to make things worse, Haaland had a less effective season in front of the goal considering the expected goals he missed and the expected goals he scored compared to the last season. Guardiola made the 2 wide center backs playing extremly wide, almost as traditionnal fullbacks. It was made to draw a presser out of the center block to create more passing lanes in the center. Despite having 2 v 1 in these wide regions, the central center back would be isolated. Also the wide center backs were unlickely to advance high. But having the opposition playing this narrow, it left more possibilities for the winger having 1 v 1 situations. However when City's wingers dropped deeper to receive the ball, the opposition could be very agressive to prevent the winger turning on the ball.
So Guardiola needed some individual brillances to make the difference and it came from Doku while Grealish is more a ball retainer with less ability to take on his man. Doku represented so many threats that the teams would often send their fullback mark him earlier or double team against him. But this would create room for the higher midfielder to get the ball to create. However Doku who was a solution, could also be a problem. Grealish tend to retain possession while Doku loose it more often. And with the wide center backs so wide, opposition would be ready to hit on the transitions if the ball was lost. Aside from Walker, the back 3 was not very quick. However Pep could look to be ultra agressive with Ederson being an extra center back, shifting the backline to a back 4. Advantage of this is that no matter if opposition was pressing gk and defenders or not, there was a free man to look for. If the opposition stayed narrow and defensive, the defenders would be free. It was a solution althought not an idea one since it was made by the wide center backs who were not as progressive as the miedfielers. Also even Ederson would not be too adventurous to force a man out of the press as if he lost the ball, City would wuickly concede without a goalkepper. That's why Man City had to rely on De Bruyne more than usual. However in De Bruyne's absence, Foden was more than happy to take his place. He was one of the most creative players of the season in his dribbling, passing and even shooting. However as limited creativity in the center and half spaces and Haaland as being the lone goalscorer, Pep needed Foden to start centrally as much as possible. Pep used often to invert his fullbacks. But as the season progressed he used them more and more traditionally, allowing one of them to operate wide to provide the width and on rare occasions both mens pushing high. Seeing Gvardiol and Walker in these positions became more and more comon.
It allowed the likes of Foden to be more times infield positions and to create centrally. He was able to pass the opposition defensive midfield line to create a potential for a shoot in the goal or assist. No wonder he won the Premiere League player of the season award. This added the benefits of freeing up Silva or Kovacic to drop in to provide the numerical overload in the deeper zones. It would make the progression less difficult as well as going into the creative zones. Man City still looked very bulverable on the counter attacks. Having Walker playing high doesn't help as even a player as fast as him can't gain so many ground to catch up if the advance between him and the opponent attacking his goal is too much. Also Walker took a step back defensivly Also having Akanji higher meant that a lot were asked to the center backs. So City conceded more than double the amount of goals on counter attacks than conceded during the 2022 2023 season. Despite this City was third before De Bruyne returned so they needed to make an exceptionnal finish. Then De Bruyne made his return, boosting not only his own stats and City's ones but also Haaland's ones. Despite De Bruyne moving out wide more often, him and De Bruyne still showed that they had a great understanding of each other. Also De Bruyne and Foden often made switches, drawing opponents and creating spaces for each other. Then at the end of the season, Bernardo Silva played more wide to facilitate De Bruyne and Foden playing centrally.
How Pep Won The League With His Weakest Tactics | Man City 2023/24 Tactical Analysis
After winning the treble, the expectations were not that high for Man City now especially after the departure of Gundogan Outside him, Laporte, Cancelo, Mahjrez and Palmer were all leaving. It was made worse by the fact that John Stones spent most of the early part of the season unavailable. When De Bruyne went out with an injury during the first match of ths season, it was about to be a difficult season. At the beginning Guardiola still was prepared for the challenge and instead of John Stones, It was Akanji who would push from the defense to the midfield during the build up. But Akanji was more traditionnal centerback than Stones, raising some worries about how he would copte. If the Citys back 3 was pressed, Rodri would look to free himself to take the ball as much as possible as he could. He would often then look for the bounce pass to Akanji who would now receive the ball while facing the rest of the play. He was actually great. But Akanji still struggled more to turn back to the opposite goal when he got the ball compared to Stones which often led to a safe pass back to the center back. Even if City could deal with that, the miss of Rodri during the 2 games he was suspended against Arsenal and the Wolves during which City lost showed how important he was to the side. Pep tried to deal with that with replacing them by players like Kovacic and Bernardo Silva as a double pivot. Or play Rico Lexis from right back and invert Despite having great retainers of possession, they lacked penetrative passes that Rodri often made when he was here or the penetration Rodri is making ball to feet. But even when Rodri was in the starting XI, teams were beginning to figure out how to defend against Manchester City. More often the opposition looked to protect the center at all costs.
It would make it harder the City's midfielders to create danger on top. Opposite's wingers would operate narrow as well. Often you would see the opposition defend in narrow 4 4 2 with the front 2 not being bait into the press. Add that to the 2 central midfielders and you had a box defending shape to counter the box midfield City was using. Bernardo Silva would look to drop outside the narrow block to receive the ball The downside would be that there is one less attacking player upfront. This was not helped by the fact that Alvarez often got played as a 10 rather than a center forward. Alvarez had to be trusted at making the creative burden, something he couldn't do especially against such narrow defenses. Despite being a press skilled resistant midfielder it happened that Kovacic was put higher on the pitch more as a 10 than as a 6. The lack of plays into the center meant there were less services into Haaland. And to make things worse, Haaland had a less effective season in front of the goal considering the expected goals he missed and the expected goals he scored compared to the last season. Guardiola made the 2 wide center backs playing extremly wide, almost as traditionnal fullbacks. It was made to draw a presser out of the center block to create more passing lanes in the center. Despite having 2 v 1 in these wide regions, the central center back would be isolated. Also the wide center backs were unlickely to advance high. But having the opposition playing this narrow, it left more possibilities for the winger having 1 v 1 situations. However when City's wingers dropped deeper to receive the ball, the opposition could be very agressive to prevent the winger turning on the ball.
So Guardiola needed some individual brillances to make the difference and it came from Doku while Grealish is more a ball retainer with less ability to take on his man. Doku represented so many threats that the teams would often send their fullback mark him earlier or double team against him. But this would create room for the higher midfielder to get the ball to create. However Doku who was a solution, could also be a problem. Grealish tend to retain possession while Doku loose it more often. And with the wide center backs so wide, opposition would be ready to hit on the transitions if the ball was lost. Aside from Walker, the back 3 was not very quick. However Pep could look to be ultra agressive with Ederson being an extra center back, shifting the backline to a back 4. Advantage of this is that no matter if opposition was pressing gk and defenders or not, there was a free man to look for. If the opposition stayed narrow and defensive, the defenders would be free. It was a solution althought not an idea one since it was made by the wide center backs who were not as progressive as the miedfielers. Also even Ederson would not be too adventurous to force a man out of the press as if he lost the ball, City would wuickly concede without a goalkepper. That's why Man City had to rely on De Bruyne more than usual. However in De Bruyne's absence, Foden was more than happy to take his place. He was one of the most creative players of the season in his dribbling, passing and even shooting. However as limited creativity in the center and half spaces and Haaland as being the lone goalscorer, Pep needed Foden to start centrally as much as possible. Pep used often to invert his fullbacks. But as the season progressed he used them more and more traditionally, allowing one of them to operate wide to provide the width and on rare occasions both mens pushing high. Seeing Gvardiol and Walker in these positions became more and more comon.
It allowed the likes of Foden to be more times infield positions and to create centrally. He was able to pass the opposition defensive midfield line to create a potential for a shoot in the goal or assist. No wonder he won the Premiere League player of the season award. This added the benefits of freeing up Silva or Kovacic to drop in to provide the numerical overload in the deeper zones. It would make the progression less difficult as well as going into the creative zones. Man City still looked very bulverable on the counter attacks. Having Walker playing high doesn't help as even a player as fast as him can't gain so many ground to catch up if the advance between him and the opponent attacking his goal is too much. Also Walker took a step back defensivly Also having Akanji higher meant that a lot were asked to the center backs. So City conceded more than double the amount of goals on counter attacks than conceded during the 2022 2023 season. Despite this City was third before De Bruyne returned so they needed to make an exceptionnal finish. Then De Bruyne made his return, boosting not only his own stats and City's ones but also Haaland's ones. Despite De Bruyne moving out wide more often, him and De Bruyne still showed that they had a great understanding of each other. Also De Bruyne and Foden often made switches, drawing opponents and creating spaces for each other. Then at the end of the season, Bernardo Silva played more wide to facilitate De Bruyne and Foden playing centrally.
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Argentina vs Brazil 2021 Copa America final.
Argentina 1-0 Brazil Analysis |How Argentina won the Copa America|
Argentina step on a 4 4 2 shape. Brazil in the other hand sticked with the same formation that got them into the final with the 4 3 3. When Argentina had the ball, the Brazilian forwards were tasked to press them. Brazil sometimes committed even 4 players high on the pitch However there were periods on the game where Brazil wasn't able to press as high on the pitch. When it happened Argentina's right back tucked in allowing Argentina to keep possession in a 3 2 system. Paredes and De Paul were operating as a double pivot in the midfield while the 3 defenders provided the base behind them, allowing Acuna as a left back to play much higher. We also saw Lo Celso coming infield from the left so he could receive the ball and make the turn. In these areas, he was often joined by Messi would would be seen drifting from his position upfront in order to get more touches on the ball in deeper areas. Messi did that during a good part of his carrer. However he struggled to have a bigger impact on his match than what he probably expected. Making runs forward in these advanced areas of the pitch is Acuna's strenght when operating as a fullback both for club and country even if Brazil did a relativly good job at limiting his threat into the final third; On the right handside of the pitch, the danger came from a winger rather from a fullback. Di Maria would start wide before making runs inside with his strong left foot. We saw Di Maria providing the width quite a lot. But the biggest impact of course came from central areas as he chipped the ball over Ederson to score the only goal of the match after Sandro's mistake in defense. While Brazil had the ball in their own third we sometimes saw Argentina looking to put them under pressure. So we saw both center backs splitting to play alongside the keeper.
However up the pitch Brazil looked to build in slighty diferent way from Argentina by using their center 2 3 shape to progress the ball. Just like Argentina however, Brazil's left back played much higher. Lodi looked so to play higher on the pitch. But Argentina managed the situation well. Lodi providing the width meant that both Neymar and Richarlison were able to play extremly narrow with Neymar dropping deep to receive the ball before running at the opposition's backline. Paqueta was then given the license to play as rthe most advanced player of the midfield 3, making runs into the final third in order to support the attack. Another reason Brazil struggled that much in the right handside was Danilo not making that many runs in front, meaning that Argentina could often double team up on him and limit Everton's impact.
Argentina vs Brazil 2021 Copa America final.
Argentina 1-0 Brazil Analysis |How Argentina won the Copa America|
Argentina step on a 4 4 2 shape. Brazil in the other hand sticked with the same formation that got them into the final with the 4 3 3. When Argentina had the ball, the Brazilian forwards were tasked to press them. Brazil sometimes committed even 4 players high on the pitch However there were periods on the game where Brazil wasn't able to press as high on the pitch. When it happened Argentina's right back tucked in allowing Argentina to keep possession in a 3 2 system. Paredes and De Paul were operating as a double pivot in the midfield while the 3 defenders provided the base behind them, allowing Acuna as a left back to play much higher. We also saw Lo Celso coming infield from the left so he could receive the ball and make the turn. In these areas, he was often joined by Messi would would be seen drifting from his position upfront in order to get more touches on the ball in deeper areas. Messi did that during a good part of his carrer. However he struggled to have a bigger impact on his match than what he probably expected. Making runs forward in these advanced areas of the pitch is Acuna's strenght when operating as a fullback both for club and country even if Brazil did a relativly good job at limiting his threat into the final third; On the right handside of the pitch, the danger came from a winger rather from a fullback. Di Maria would start wide before making runs inside with his strong left foot. We saw Di Maria providing the width quite a lot. But the biggest impact of course came from central areas as he chipped the ball over Ederson to score the only goal of the match after Sandro's mistake in defense. While Brazil had the ball in their own third we sometimes saw Argentina looking to put them under pressure. So we saw both center backs splitting to play alongside the keeper.
However up the pitch Brazil looked to build in slighty diferent way from Argentina by using their center 2 3 shape to progress the ball. Just like Argentina however, Brazil's left back played much higher. Lodi looked so to play higher on the pitch. But Argentina managed the situation well. Lodi providing the width meant that both Neymar and Richarlison were able to play extremly narrow with Neymar dropping deep to receive the ball before running at the opposition's backline. Paqueta was then given the license to play as rthe most advanced player of the midfield 3, making runs into the final third in order to support the attack. Another reason Brazil struggled that much in the right handside was Danilo not making that many runs in front, meaning that Argentina could often double team up on him and limit Everton's impact.
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Argentina France 2022 World Cup final.
How Argentina Turn France STRENGTH Into WEAKNESS to Win World Cup - Tactics: Argentina vs France
Argentina changed his tactics after losing their first match against Saudi Arabia. Every match became a knock out match for them. France had 4 attacking minded players while having 6 players focused on defending. Deschamps opted for a variation of 4 2 3 1 which can also be described as a 4 2 4 defending Tchouaméni had a free role in the midfield which only focused on defense. The 4 attackers alongside Rabiot were focused on keeping the shape intact upfront while the backline took care of any attempt to get in behind with each flank covered by 2 players. Tchouaméni was left with a free role in the middle to cover any gap in the shape. While Tchouaméni covered spaces in front of the backline, Rabiot worked with the front 4 to create a shape that could press the opponent while maintaining defensive cohesion. Rabiot essentially acted as a box to box midfielder. This way France ensured defensive stability while being a threat forward. After Argentina's loss against Saudi Arabia, they changed tactics. After that the tactics consisted of 3 main things. First, stability in the midfield. Secondly, when attacking, focus on freeing Messi up. Then finally to ensure defensive stability by making up for Messi's shortcoming while defending. Because of this, Messi being lax up top when Argentina are defending doesn't affect the team in a negative way. If Argentina have Messi pressing a lot, Messi will struggle to make an impact during the decisive moments, moments that usually make the difference at this level. Messi can single handedly create something out of thin air. So instead of constricting players like him to a specific role caging their potential, it's crucial to cater players like Messi so the offense doesn't get compromised in the quest of beign defensively solid. It's why Alvarez has been a blessing for the team as his work rate protects Argentina upfront while giving Messi a helping hand when necessary.
There were always 2 players on Messi's side so even if Messi fails to stop the opponent or loses possession, Argentina had an overload in that area in order to stop any threat from France. Because of this slanted shape, Di Maria did not have a lot of cover on his side so if he waits, the opponent would exploit the gaps on his side and advance further up. Because of this Di Maria was asked to press with vigor the second a player in his side was passed to. That was the only way to force the opponent to make a rash move. Meanwhile, the defenders were tasked to man mark the french attackers, allowing the wide players to focus on their targets instea of getting distracted. Argentina switched their tactics based on the playstyle of their opponent. So not only do they have to worry about their principles but also adapting to the strenghts and weaknesses of the opponents. Argentina's task was to deny France's attack any opportunity. Even through Mbappé scored an hatrick, France's attack was severly hampered for most of the match. That's because of Argentina's defensive tactics. The tactic focused on France's 4 attacking players, Mbappé, Giroud, Griezmann and Dembelé. They were targete d in multiple ways to ensure they couldn't do what they wanted when attacking or defending. The tactic behind this was to disconnect France's front line from the rest of the team. That's why with the whole team focusing on cutting out space between the lines, it became easy for Argentina to win second balls, disrupting France's tactic to play long balls to Giroud in order to bypass the press. France rely on vertical passes after quickly rotating to the other side with Varane usually finding Dembelé or Griezmann which allows France to get in dangerous positions. France used this to create their second and winning goal against England. But with defenders man marking the french regardless if they dropped deep or not, it became difficult for France to do anything close to Argentina's box.
Argentina didn't do this in their previous games and they usually focused on pressing their opponents which was mostly initiated by Alvarez. When Argentina got on the ball, their main plan finally began.The left back and Di Maria went up on the left which kept Dembelé back. Mc Allistair being on the left half space occupied Griezmann. who needed help from Tchouaméni to cover that side. Rabiot needed to come over to help covering the midfield properly. This left Argentina's rigt half space wide open, especially considering that France's players on that side were more attacking minded. Pushing Dembelé back forced his teamates to adapt to a new shape wich put a lot of responsabilities on the defensive midfielders. It required the auxiliary players to help out in defense. And because of France's of fielding an attacking line up but playing defensive tactics, it came back to haunt them. Deschmaps took out Dembelé and Giroud before the first half ended, switching to a 4 1 4 1 but by then, France had already conceded 2 goals. That's why Argentina seemed they were in full control during the vast majority of the match. But then Scaloni took out Di Maria who was crucial at holding France back. A few minutes after, Deschmap took Griezmann and Hernandez since Argentina's tactics forced forced him to drop deeper just to get involved. With the entrance of a winger and a midfielder, France finally overlaoded the midfield until they got a penalty, that started the come back. After that, the tactics seemed like just a back up, emotions start to take over and things seem to open up.
Tactical Analysis : Argentina 3-3 France | Messi and Mbappe Show Why They're The Best |
Argentina was agressive with the ball from the start and France defended in a loopsided 4 4 2 with Mbappé staying high on the pitch alongside Giroud with Rabiot shifting to the left handside and Griezmann looking to drop in when possible. Scaloni's first good decision of that final was playing Di Maria on the left handside and not on the right handside. France's left handside tended to be a bit weaked because of Mbappé sticking higher up the pitch for the most part. Argentina was also agressive with the posistionning of their fullbacks. Down the right handside, Molina would push up early and althought Mbappé tracked back more than what we have seen during the tournament, his attacking instincts still took over. This was made worse by the fact that these regions in Argentina's right hand side were where Messi liked to operate the most. This overload in the right handside was exacerbated by the fact that De Paul also liked to operate on this side.This caused problems because if Rabiot stayed central there would be an easy overload against Hernandez. But when he came across it would also force Tchouaméni to come across to compensate for the overload on this side. In previous matches Griezmann has been effecitve at dropping deep in these occasions, allowing France to keep their shape.
In this final he was caught more up on the pitch as when Argentina was building up he could be drawn to a man who would drop deep to receive the ball from the center backs. Initially in this gap, Mc Allistair was willing to push higher up which would force Jules Koundé to move infield with Tagliafico also looking to move high. Because of that Argentina consistently could make a switch to Di Maria on the left hand side. And Di Maria had the beating of Koundé during that first half time. Hypothetically Dembelé could drop deep to cover Di Maria. However on the ball, Argentina shifted to a very brave 2 2 6 with Tagliafico pushing very high to create a front 6. The way the width was used was also different because down Argentina's right, Molina's main role was to tie Hernandez which would give Messi more space in these right handside regions or allowing to drift infield with De Paul shifting out wide. On the left handside, Taglafico had to occupy Dembelé which would give to Argentina the opportunity to find Di Maria as a free man. During transitions we also saw similar principles for Argentina. In the action leading to the penalty we see that Tagliafico is tying Dembelé while Koundé was on Mc Allistair, meaning that Di Maria was the free man out wide.
Argentina France 2022 World Cup final.
How Argentina Turn France STRENGTH Into WEAKNESS to Win World Cup - Tactics: Argentina vs France
Argentina changed his tactics after losing their first match against Saudi Arabia. Every match became a knock out match for them. France had 4 attacking minded players while having 6 players focused on defending. Deschamps opted for a variation of 4 2 3 1 which can also be described as a 4 2 4 defending Tchouaméni had a free role in the midfield which only focused on defense. The 4 attackers alongside Rabiot were focused on keeping the shape intact upfront while the backline took care of any attempt to get in behind with each flank covered by 2 players. Tchouaméni was left with a free role in the middle to cover any gap in the shape. While Tchouaméni covered spaces in front of the backline, Rabiot worked with the front 4 to create a shape that could press the opponent while maintaining defensive cohesion. Rabiot essentially acted as a box to box midfielder. This way France ensured defensive stability while being a threat forward. After Argentina's loss against Saudi Arabia, they changed tactics. After that the tactics consisted of 3 main things. First, stability in the midfield. Secondly, when attacking, focus on freeing Messi up. Then finally to ensure defensive stability by making up for Messi's shortcoming while defending. Because of this, Messi being lax up top when Argentina are defending doesn't affect the team in a negative way. If Argentina have Messi pressing a lot, Messi will struggle to make an impact during the decisive moments, moments that usually make the difference at this level. Messi can single handedly create something out of thin air. So instead of constricting players like him to a specific role caging their potential, it's crucial to cater players like Messi so the offense doesn't get compromised in the quest of beign defensively solid. It's why Alvarez has been a blessing for the team as his work rate protects Argentina upfront while giving Messi a helping hand when necessary.
There were always 2 players on Messi's side so even if Messi fails to stop the opponent or loses possession, Argentina had an overload in that area in order to stop any threat from France. Because of this slanted shape, Di Maria did not have a lot of cover on his side so if he waits, the opponent would exploit the gaps on his side and advance further up. Because of this Di Maria was asked to press with vigor the second a player in his side was passed to. That was the only way to force the opponent to make a rash move. Meanwhile, the defenders were tasked to man mark the french attackers, allowing the wide players to focus on their targets instea of getting distracted. Argentina switched their tactics based on the playstyle of their opponent. So not only do they have to worry about their principles but also adapting to the strenghts and weaknesses of the opponents. Argentina's task was to deny France's attack any opportunity. Even through Mbappé scored an hatrick, France's attack was severly hampered for most of the match. That's because of Argentina's defensive tactics. The tactic focused on France's 4 attacking players, Mbappé, Giroud, Griezmann and Dembelé. They were targete d in multiple ways to ensure they couldn't do what they wanted when attacking or defending. The tactic behind this was to disconnect France's front line from the rest of the team. That's why with the whole team focusing on cutting out space between the lines, it became easy for Argentina to win second balls, disrupting France's tactic to play long balls to Giroud in order to bypass the press. France rely on vertical passes after quickly rotating to the other side with Varane usually finding Dembelé or Griezmann which allows France to get in dangerous positions. France used this to create their second and winning goal against England. But with defenders man marking the french regardless if they dropped deep or not, it became difficult for France to do anything close to Argentina's box.
Argentina didn't do this in their previous games and they usually focused on pressing their opponents which was mostly initiated by Alvarez. When Argentina got on the ball, their main plan finally began.The left back and Di Maria went up on the left which kept Dembelé back. Mc Allistair being on the left half space occupied Griezmann. who needed help from Tchouaméni to cover that side. Rabiot needed to come over to help covering the midfield properly. This left Argentina's rigt half space wide open, especially considering that France's players on that side were more attacking minded. Pushing Dembelé back forced his teamates to adapt to a new shape wich put a lot of responsabilities on the defensive midfielders. It required the auxiliary players to help out in defense. And because of France's of fielding an attacking line up but playing defensive tactics, it came back to haunt them. Deschmaps took out Dembelé and Giroud before the first half ended, switching to a 4 1 4 1 but by then, France had already conceded 2 goals. That's why Argentina seemed they were in full control during the vast majority of the match. But then Scaloni took out Di Maria who was crucial at holding France back. A few minutes after, Deschmap took Griezmann and Hernandez since Argentina's tactics forced forced him to drop deeper just to get involved. With the entrance of a winger and a midfielder, France finally overlaoded the midfield until they got a penalty, that started the come back. After that, the tactics seemed like just a back up, emotions start to take over and things seem to open up.
Tactical Analysis : Argentina 3-3 France | Messi and Mbappe Show Why They're The Best |
Argentina was agressive with the ball from the start and France defended in a loopsided 4 4 2 with Mbappé staying high on the pitch alongside Giroud with Rabiot shifting to the left handside and Griezmann looking to drop in when possible. Scaloni's first good decision of that final was playing Di Maria on the left handside and not on the right handside. France's left handside tended to be a bit weaked because of Mbappé sticking higher up the pitch for the most part. Argentina was also agressive with the posistionning of their fullbacks. Down the right handside, Molina would push up early and althought Mbappé tracked back more than what we have seen during the tournament, his attacking instincts still took over. This was made worse by the fact that these regions in Argentina's right hand side were where Messi liked to operate the most. This overload in the right handside was exacerbated by the fact that De Paul also liked to operate on this side.This caused problems because if Rabiot stayed central there would be an easy overload against Hernandez. But when he came across it would also force Tchouaméni to come across to compensate for the overload on this side. In previous matches Griezmann has been effecitve at dropping deep in these occasions, allowing France to keep their shape.
In this final he was caught more up on the pitch as when Argentina was building up he could be drawn to a man who would drop deep to receive the ball from the center backs. Initially in this gap, Mc Allistair was willing to push higher up which would force Jules Koundé to move infield with Tagliafico also looking to move high. Because of that Argentina consistently could make a switch to Di Maria on the left hand side. And Di Maria had the beating of Koundé during that first half time. Hypothetically Dembelé could drop deep to cover Di Maria. However on the ball, Argentina shifted to a very brave 2 2 6 with Tagliafico pushing very high to create a front 6. The way the width was used was also different because down Argentina's right, Molina's main role was to tie Hernandez which would give Messi more space in these right handside regions or allowing to drift infield with De Paul shifting out wide. On the left handside, Taglafico had to occupy Dembelé which would give to Argentina the opportunity to find Di Maria as a free man. During transitions we also saw similar principles for Argentina. In the action leading to the penalty we see that Tagliafico is tying Dembelé while Koundé was on Mc Allistair, meaning that Di Maria was the free man out wide.
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Tactical Analysis : Argentina 3-3 France | Messi and Mbappe Show Why They're The Best |
Even when Griezmann looked to press Fernandez it would create problems as when Argentina had the ball on the right handside, both Tchouaméni and Rabiot would be dragged across because Argentina had so many numbers on the right handside. That would leave spaces in the midfield, meaning that with quick passes, Argentina could find Mc Allistair bursting forward, which would lead to problems higher up the pitch. Argentina also overloaded the midfield because with the fullbacks being very agressive, Messi could have a free role, acting like an attacking midfielder so Argentina could have a 4 v 2 centrally or if Griezmann came back in time or Rabiot shifted centrally, a 4 v 3. Deschamps responded by bringing on Kolo Muani and Thuram on the pitch. allowing them to alter their defensive shape.Thuram would move to the left while Mbappé would be up centrally. So even if Griezmann was caught high up the pitch, Tchouaméni and Rabiot could act as a dedicated double pivot with Thuram on the left wing. So it became more difficult for Argentina to overload this right hand side and even when they did it would not be both Rabiot and Tchouaméni who would come across but rather one of them. And Griezmann could still drop to form what looked like a 4 5 1. With Molina pushing high, the pace of Mbappé combined with Thuram could be dangerous in counter attacks. Even in possession, France came from barely 40% of possession before the substitution to 50% after the double substitution. When it was possible, France looked to build up with a back 3 as Argentina was defending with a front 2 So Koundé would be the fullback tucking in while Hernandez pushed higher on the left handside. An ideal situation would see Rabiot pushing up high alongside Griezmann but in this final he was more willing to drop as a second pivot alongside Tchouaméni.
One thing that Argentina also did well was to protect the center of the pitch, primarly using the cover shadowss of the 2 forwards although Alvarez was more willing to apply pressure to the 2 center backs. When he applied the pressure, the pivots were willing to back it up. Dembelé also dropped deep to drag his fullback up front and open up spaces for Griezmann to run in behind for either Dembelé to pass to either Koundé to directly find. Argentina dealt with this by using pressure. Alvarez applied pressure on Varane so he couldn't make his difficult progressive passes and having a work horse like Di Maria meant that as soon that the ball was received by Koundé, Di Maria came to press him. When this happened Dembelé dropped deeper and Tagliafico followed him so Dembelé couldn't turn and make the pass. And even when Griezmann attempted these runs in behind, Mc Allistair was disciplined enough to track him. Instead of pressing, Messi's role was to cut off the pass into the central lane. And even if the ball worked this way in, the insane work rate of De Paul was extremely important as he would have to cover across for Messi. whever this was Hernandez or Rabiot looking to make the run in behind. We also initially, when Mbappé didn't have success out wide, Hernandez looking to provide all the width and Mbappé acting as a second forward alongside Giroud. Having an extra man up here would also allow Rabiot to drop alongside Tchouaméni. Especially when the Argentinian pivots were backing up the press of the forwards, Mbappé and Giroud would both look to drop in between the lines to receive the ball. Despite leaving gaps in the defense, the center backs were agressive, following their man. Argentina had to hope that the pressure from the forwards would make the passes into these central gaps too difficult. And it worked. Also Hernandez being very high, Argentina looked to exploit the space left behind him during transitions, especially at the beginning of the second half.
So Deschamps subbed off Hernandez for Camavinga who as a midfielder would tend to be more conservative rather than overlapping. The first thing substitutions brought to France was flexibility. Thuram could remain wide when needed but Mbappé doesn't particulary like being confined as a center forward but instead likes to drift around. So what we could see when France had the ball higher up the pitch was him shfting to the left handside and Thuram taking his place more centrally. That freedom, particulary when Hernandez was still on would allow Mbappé to drift around the pitch as there was a center forward and a man down the left hand side providing the width. Also Kolo Muani being a threat on the right hand side meant that France could effectively attack with a 4 2 4 with the front 4 looking for man to man situations against Argentina's defenders and looking to rotate positions when needed. When the width was bring on by Hernandez or Camavinga, this freed Mbappé even more with him dropping deeper to get on the ball ans really make an impact on the game, which he ended up doing. Another advantage provided was that when the ball went wide, they had now more numbers attacking the box, in addition to the fact that they could go longer with more mens around the ball.
Tactical Analysis : Argentina 3-3 France | Messi and Mbappe Show Why They're The Best |
Even when Griezmann looked to press Fernandez it would create problems as when Argentina had the ball on the right handside, both Tchouaméni and Rabiot would be dragged across because Argentina had so many numbers on the right handside. That would leave spaces in the midfield, meaning that with quick passes, Argentina could find Mc Allistair bursting forward, which would lead to problems higher up the pitch. Argentina also overloaded the midfield because with the fullbacks being very agressive, Messi could have a free role, acting like an attacking midfielder so Argentina could have a 4 v 2 centrally or if Griezmann came back in time or Rabiot shifted centrally, a 4 v 3. Deschamps responded by bringing on Kolo Muani and Thuram on the pitch. allowing them to alter their defensive shape.Thuram would move to the left while Mbappé would be up centrally. So even if Griezmann was caught high up the pitch, Tchouaméni and Rabiot could act as a dedicated double pivot with Thuram on the left wing. So it became more difficult for Argentina to overload this right hand side and even when they did it would not be both Rabiot and Tchouaméni who would come across but rather one of them. And Griezmann could still drop to form what looked like a 4 5 1. With Molina pushing high, the pace of Mbappé combined with Thuram could be dangerous in counter attacks. Even in possession, France came from barely 40% of possession before the substitution to 50% after the double substitution. When it was possible, France looked to build up with a back 3 as Argentina was defending with a front 2 So Koundé would be the fullback tucking in while Hernandez pushed higher on the left handside. An ideal situation would see Rabiot pushing up high alongside Griezmann but in this final he was more willing to drop as a second pivot alongside Tchouaméni.
One thing that Argentina also did well was to protect the center of the pitch, primarly using the cover shadowss of the 2 forwards although Alvarez was more willing to apply pressure to the 2 center backs. When he applied the pressure, the pivots were willing to back it up. Dembelé also dropped deep to drag his fullback up front and open up spaces for Griezmann to run in behind for either Dembelé to pass to either Koundé to directly find. Argentina dealt with this by using pressure. Alvarez applied pressure on Varane so he couldn't make his difficult progressive passes and having a work horse like Di Maria meant that as soon that the ball was received by Koundé, Di Maria came to press him. When this happened Dembelé dropped deeper and Tagliafico followed him so Dembelé couldn't turn and make the pass. And even when Griezmann attempted these runs in behind, Mc Allistair was disciplined enough to track him. Instead of pressing, Messi's role was to cut off the pass into the central lane. And even if the ball worked this way in, the insane work rate of De Paul was extremely important as he would have to cover across for Messi. whever this was Hernandez or Rabiot looking to make the run in behind. We also initially, when Mbappé didn't have success out wide, Hernandez looking to provide all the width and Mbappé acting as a second forward alongside Giroud. Having an extra man up here would also allow Rabiot to drop alongside Tchouaméni. Especially when the Argentinian pivots were backing up the press of the forwards, Mbappé and Giroud would both look to drop in between the lines to receive the ball. Despite leaving gaps in the defense, the center backs were agressive, following their man. Argentina had to hope that the pressure from the forwards would make the passes into these central gaps too difficult. And it worked. Also Hernandez being very high, Argentina looked to exploit the space left behind him during transitions, especially at the beginning of the second half.
So Deschamps subbed off Hernandez for Camavinga who as a midfielder would tend to be more conservative rather than overlapping. The first thing substitutions brought to France was flexibility. Thuram could remain wide when needed but Mbappé doesn't particulary like being confined as a center forward but instead likes to drift around. So what we could see when France had the ball higher up the pitch was him shfting to the left handside and Thuram taking his place more centrally. That freedom, particulary when Hernandez was still on would allow Mbappé to drift around the pitch as there was a center forward and a man down the left hand side providing the width. Also Kolo Muani being a threat on the right hand side meant that France could effectively attack with a 4 2 4 with the front 4 looking for man to man situations against Argentina's defenders and looking to rotate positions when needed. When the width was bring on by Hernandez or Camavinga, this freed Mbappé even more with him dropping deeper to get on the ball ans really make an impact on the game, which he ended up doing. Another advantage provided was that when the ball went wide, they had now more numbers attacking the box, in addition to the fact that they could go longer with more mens around the ball.
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Christmas Tree Formation(4-3-2-1) Explained | Football Tactics
4 3 2 1 christmas tree formation.
Major issue of 4 3 2 1 is the lack of natural width. With 3 central midfielders protecting the back 4, and 3 attacking midfielders free to roam around them and one striker in front. So the fullbacks are expected to provide almost all the width and to have the engine to push up and down for the whole match. France for example in the 1998 WC that they ended up winning lined up in 4 3 2 1 with Zidane and Djorkaeff as the 2 attacking midfielders. But this was only possible because they got a 3 mens wall behind them with Didier Deschamps, Emmanuel Petit and Christian Karembeu. It was the fluidity of this system that propelled France to World Cup glory. Aimé Jacquet, the manager back then, gave almost all his players the option to roam forward especially with the fullbacks, Lizarazu and Thuram who provided crucial width with the system. Henry was the striker up front. Overall it was a predominant defensive system with France conceding just 2 goals in 7 games. Jacquet needed a system that would release the attacking artistry of Zinédine Zidane without feeling the effects of his defensive inaptitude. And he got that with the 4 3 2 1.
Another fantastic example of a 4 3 2 1 being excellently applied was the AC Milan team under Carlo Ancelotti. They listed the 2007 UCL with that compo. Maldini and Nesta were the 2 center backs in front of the goalkepper Dida. Jankulovski and Cafu were the fullbacks providing the width In the central midfield 3, Massimo Ambrosini was an intelligent defensively sound player. And Gattuso was a fearsome ball winning midfielder. They both shielded Andrea Pirlo, the deep lying playmaker, aka the Regista. With Gattuso and Ambronisi alongside him, Pirlo had less defensive burden and could focus more on linking up the midfield and the attack with his stunning long passing range. Ahead of them there were Clarence Seedorf and Kaka who were expected to provided width and support the striker and to get into the box to finish off moves. Inzaghi led the line as a lone striker, who was often criticized for his lack of technical skills but was an incredible goal poacher. Again here, fluidity was the key to the success of the 4 3 2 1.
REGISTA | The Midfielder Who Controls The Flow Of The Game
Regista.
First image coming to mind when we talk about the role of a defensive midfielder is a player protecting the entry of the penalty area in front of his defense and whose main role is to disrupt the opposite team's attack. But the cdm doesn't have to be limited to a role of a defender. There is often a role demanded to them that require qualities like defined technic, vision, good decision making, long passes, short passes, and others abilities. This role had become known world wide as the Regista. Regista is an italian term routinely translated into the " director ". This term captures the essence of the player assigned to the role, as one is responsible for orchestrating the team during the game. The best example for tha trole is Andrea Pirlo who seemed to glide across the pitch with his elegant style. First things coming to mind about him are his perfect long passes, his spectacular vision of the game, his ability to dictate the tempo of the match and others things that are often used to describe a classic elite number 10 player. On paper, it was like Pirlo played as a number 6. The AC Milan team that won the 2007 UCL under Carlo Ancelotti won with a 4 3 2 1 formation THeir most technical midfielders were in the first midfield position, and PIrlo was playing in the center of this 3 man second line. However the first time this kind of role was experimented was back in the 1930's when the Italien team under Vittorio Pozzo wanted one of his defenders to take on this role. Instead of using a 3 defenders formation, Pozzo switched to a 2 3 5 formation, moving his central defender to the midfield line and assigning him the role of the team's organizer. It was the true origin of the Regista role.
Outside Pirlo, others players as played the Regista role at a point of their career, like Xabi Alonso, Busquets, Toni Kross and Jorginho. One of their main skills is their precise long passes. If you want a player with exceptionnal passing abilities to showcase their skills with more freedom to execute these long passes, playing them in the Regista role might be a solution. It's a zone with less pressure than the more advanced areas, allowing the Regista to use their game intelligence and more space for their precise passes. For example against a team defending in a 4 4 2, the area of highest pressure is in the area between the 2 lines of 4, where the attacking midfielder is operating. Althought the Regista can advance by times, he usually plays in front of the second opposite's line and behind the front 2. They have more freedom to create advantages according to the opponent's defensive structure. One of the principles of building up from the back is to create a numerical supeiority over the opponent's first line of pressure, meaning that if the opponents is having one player only up front marking the 2 center backs, it's enough. But if there is a front 2, the team need 3 and if the opposition uses 3 players, we keep it 4. The player responsible for reading the opponent's setup and coordinating the build up is the Regista. If the Regista plays in a 4 3 3 formation against a team pressing in a 4 1 3 2 formation, naturally it's 2 center backs against 2 forwards. So the Regista could drop between the center backs to create a numerical superiority during the build up. And it's unlikely the direct marker would follow him and if he did, he would leave a gap that could be exploited.
If at 1 point the opponent changed his structure to have only 1 player up front, the Regista could start playing their first line. The Regista is willing to read the game and manipulate the situation to put themselves into an advantageous position like receiving an uncovered ball where they have the freedom to choose the best course of action. Crucial aspects of a Regista are decision making and technical execution. Receiving the ball facing the game, they might for instance opt for a long pass behind the opponent's defensive line. Or a ground pass into the space between the lines, across to the opposite side or simply a sideways pass. However having a very good Regista won't be as effective if the forwards cannot make movements to break through the opposite defensive lines or exploit spaces behind the opponent's defensive line. If the team lacks cohesive offensive movements from the middle to the front, the Regista will likely be underutilized and might be forced to play safe passes sideways. It's like having Steph Curry in his basket team but not having him able to shoot somehow. Once the offensive role was covered, it's now time to talk about the defensive role of the Regista.
Registas are generally players with a more technical profile and migh not stand out for their physical dueling skills althought that doesn't mean they can't do it. However, via their positionning deeper parts of the pitch, these are players who defend more through positionning, occupying space, focusing on cutting passing lanes for possible interceptions rather than engaging in physical duels. Considering the team's defensive system, it's also important to have midfielder with a strong marking characteristic to accompany the Regista. Going back to the 2007 AC Milan's team, Pirlo was the Regista but he had Gattuso by his side to be the player strong in duels. To sum it up, the role of a Regista in football goes far beyond being a defensive midfielder. He is the director of the team. But of course he needs teammates who can enhance their potential both in defensive and offensive moments. By the way, the player used by Vittorio Pozzo for the Italin team back then in the 1930's decade was Charlue Roberts. Then in the 1950's, Hungrary national team had Nandor Hidegkuti, who was considered more as the first false 9 in history. Also the Brazilian 1970 side used Gerson as a Regista alongside Clodoaldo. The Selecao's athleticism and fluidity tended to compensate for the natural overload that tended to occur when a central midfield axis employs a Regista.
Christmas Tree Formation(4-3-2-1) Explained | Football Tactics
4 3 2 1 christmas tree formation.
Major issue of 4 3 2 1 is the lack of natural width. With 3 central midfielders protecting the back 4, and 3 attacking midfielders free to roam around them and one striker in front. So the fullbacks are expected to provide almost all the width and to have the engine to push up and down for the whole match. France for example in the 1998 WC that they ended up winning lined up in 4 3 2 1 with Zidane and Djorkaeff as the 2 attacking midfielders. But this was only possible because they got a 3 mens wall behind them with Didier Deschamps, Emmanuel Petit and Christian Karembeu. It was the fluidity of this system that propelled France to World Cup glory. Aimé Jacquet, the manager back then, gave almost all his players the option to roam forward especially with the fullbacks, Lizarazu and Thuram who provided crucial width with the system. Henry was the striker up front. Overall it was a predominant defensive system with France conceding just 2 goals in 7 games. Jacquet needed a system that would release the attacking artistry of Zinédine Zidane without feeling the effects of his defensive inaptitude. And he got that with the 4 3 2 1.
Another fantastic example of a 4 3 2 1 being excellently applied was the AC Milan team under Carlo Ancelotti. They listed the 2007 UCL with that compo. Maldini and Nesta were the 2 center backs in front of the goalkepper Dida. Jankulovski and Cafu were the fullbacks providing the width In the central midfield 3, Massimo Ambrosini was an intelligent defensively sound player. And Gattuso was a fearsome ball winning midfielder. They both shielded Andrea Pirlo, the deep lying playmaker, aka the Regista. With Gattuso and Ambronisi alongside him, Pirlo had less defensive burden and could focus more on linking up the midfield and the attack with his stunning long passing range. Ahead of them there were Clarence Seedorf and Kaka who were expected to provided width and support the striker and to get into the box to finish off moves. Inzaghi led the line as a lone striker, who was often criticized for his lack of technical skills but was an incredible goal poacher. Again here, fluidity was the key to the success of the 4 3 2 1.
REGISTA | The Midfielder Who Controls The Flow Of The Game
Regista.
First image coming to mind when we talk about the role of a defensive midfielder is a player protecting the entry of the penalty area in front of his defense and whose main role is to disrupt the opposite team's attack. But the cdm doesn't have to be limited to a role of a defender. There is often a role demanded to them that require qualities like defined technic, vision, good decision making, long passes, short passes, and others abilities. This role had become known world wide as the Regista. Regista is an italian term routinely translated into the " director ". This term captures the essence of the player assigned to the role, as one is responsible for orchestrating the team during the game. The best example for tha trole is Andrea Pirlo who seemed to glide across the pitch with his elegant style. First things coming to mind about him are his perfect long passes, his spectacular vision of the game, his ability to dictate the tempo of the match and others things that are often used to describe a classic elite number 10 player. On paper, it was like Pirlo played as a number 6. The AC Milan team that won the 2007 UCL under Carlo Ancelotti won with a 4 3 2 1 formation THeir most technical midfielders were in the first midfield position, and PIrlo was playing in the center of this 3 man second line. However the first time this kind of role was experimented was back in the 1930's when the Italien team under Vittorio Pozzo wanted one of his defenders to take on this role. Instead of using a 3 defenders formation, Pozzo switched to a 2 3 5 formation, moving his central defender to the midfield line and assigning him the role of the team's organizer. It was the true origin of the Regista role.
Outside Pirlo, others players as played the Regista role at a point of their career, like Xabi Alonso, Busquets, Toni Kross and Jorginho. One of their main skills is their precise long passes. If you want a player with exceptionnal passing abilities to showcase their skills with more freedom to execute these long passes, playing them in the Regista role might be a solution. It's a zone with less pressure than the more advanced areas, allowing the Regista to use their game intelligence and more space for their precise passes. For example against a team defending in a 4 4 2, the area of highest pressure is in the area between the 2 lines of 4, where the attacking midfielder is operating. Althought the Regista can advance by times, he usually plays in front of the second opposite's line and behind the front 2. They have more freedom to create advantages according to the opponent's defensive structure. One of the principles of building up from the back is to create a numerical supeiority over the opponent's first line of pressure, meaning that if the opponents is having one player only up front marking the 2 center backs, it's enough. But if there is a front 2, the team need 3 and if the opposition uses 3 players, we keep it 4. The player responsible for reading the opponent's setup and coordinating the build up is the Regista. If the Regista plays in a 4 3 3 formation against a team pressing in a 4 1 3 2 formation, naturally it's 2 center backs against 2 forwards. So the Regista could drop between the center backs to create a numerical superiority during the build up. And it's unlikely the direct marker would follow him and if he did, he would leave a gap that could be exploited.
If at 1 point the opponent changed his structure to have only 1 player up front, the Regista could start playing their first line. The Regista is willing to read the game and manipulate the situation to put themselves into an advantageous position like receiving an uncovered ball where they have the freedom to choose the best course of action. Crucial aspects of a Regista are decision making and technical execution. Receiving the ball facing the game, they might for instance opt for a long pass behind the opponent's defensive line. Or a ground pass into the space between the lines, across to the opposite side or simply a sideways pass. However having a very good Regista won't be as effective if the forwards cannot make movements to break through the opposite defensive lines or exploit spaces behind the opponent's defensive line. If the team lacks cohesive offensive movements from the middle to the front, the Regista will likely be underutilized and might be forced to play safe passes sideways. It's like having Steph Curry in his basket team but not having him able to shoot somehow. Once the offensive role was covered, it's now time to talk about the defensive role of the Regista.
Registas are generally players with a more technical profile and migh not stand out for their physical dueling skills althought that doesn't mean they can't do it. However, via their positionning deeper parts of the pitch, these are players who defend more through positionning, occupying space, focusing on cutting passing lanes for possible interceptions rather than engaging in physical duels. Considering the team's defensive system, it's also important to have midfielder with a strong marking characteristic to accompany the Regista. Going back to the 2007 AC Milan's team, Pirlo was the Regista but he had Gattuso by his side to be the player strong in duels. To sum it up, the role of a Regista in football goes far beyond being a defensive midfielder. He is the director of the team. But of course he needs teammates who can enhance their potential both in defensive and offensive moments. By the way, the player used by Vittorio Pozzo for the Italin team back then in the 1930's decade was Charlue Roberts. Then in the 1950's, Hungrary national team had Nandor Hidegkuti, who was considered more as the first false 9 in history. Also the Brazilian 1970 side used Gerson as a Regista alongside Clodoaldo. The Selecao's athleticism and fluidity tended to compensate for the natural overload that tended to occur when a central midfield axis employs a Regista.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Back three formations.
Pourquoi les formations Back-Three gagnent en popularité | Tactiques 3-4-3/3-5-2 Why Back-Three Formations Are Increasing in Popularity | 3-4-3/3-5-2 Tactics
3 4 3 formation was introduced in Italy when there were an excess of elite centerbacks. However nowadays, this formation is very often the sign of a very offensive tactic. Tuchel used this with Chelsea and won the UCL with it. Antonio Conte used to dominated the Serie A League with Juventus in a 3 5 2 formation. Inzhagi took Inter Milan in the UCL final with a 3 5 2 formation. Also during the 2020/2021 season, Simeone used a 3 4 3 formation with a back 3. Leipzig during the same season ended in the second place behind Bayern Munich with one of the best defensive record of Europe. Starting in the back 3, the center cb will play the role of a libero often. He can be defined as a ball played sweeper, carrying the ball and helping advancing the ball to start the attack. But he will also be the last line when the opposition are attacking. Before moving to Bayern, Upamecano has been excellent for Leipzig in this position with the most accurate passes per match for a defender in the Bundesliga. He also had the most clearances in the team. The libero will be supported by 2 others center backs which functions will be to cover and worry about long balls behind them when they loose the possession. But they also need to be good ball playing center backs considering they will be more likely than others to receive the ball from the goalkepper. They will have to break the first line of the opposite's offensive pressure. Bastoni in Inter Milan is a good example for this role. In a 3 4 3, the wingbacks will be among the most crucial players here because they will be the ones providing width in the attacks. But they will also create a defensive numerical superiority when out of possession.
They will need to support both attack and defense consistently during the whole match. The center midfielders are the bridge between the defense and the attack. Often in 3 4 3 formations, you will see one more attacking minded midfielder for one deep lying playmaker. Jorginho and Kovacic are a good example of this. It's worth noting that the miedfielders will have a tendency to be more defensive than in others formations like 4 3 3 and they will not be a lot relied to during attacks. In 3 4 3, the wingers are essentials during counter attacks, using their pace to attack the opposition's defense. When on possession, they usually shift in half spaces and act as insider attackers. A false 9 can provide options for the midfielders while a pure 9 or pure striker stay further in the last third. If one of the 3 attackers is dropping along with the midfielders, it can become a 3 5 2. During the build up, the back 3 will ensure the goalkepper has enough passing options with the wide center backs usually dropping on the sides/edges of the box. And the wingbacks pushing high alongside the 2 center midfielders. The goalkepper can send the ball to the wingbacks directly. Each wide center back can create triangle passing options with the wingback and the center miedfielder. If the winger shift out wide, it will create a diamond shape with the 3 others players. WIth many passing options on the wing, the opposition will be force to commit a lot of players to close the spaces. But that often mean that the other flank has a lot of spaces, meaning that rapid switching to the other flank can be very effective. But if the opposition decide to stay wide to cover this, then it's freeing spaces in the center so the striker can drop deep to receive the ball or for the center box to box miedfielder to attack.
In the final third when put on the back foot, the opposition will have to commit a lot of players to cover the spaces and during a complete attack, the formation can often look like a 3 2 5 or a 3 3 4. With a front 5, quick options can be created with the wingback combining either with the winger either with the striker, sometimes even with the midfielder. It can help the team to go behind the defense to receive crosses. Also with 5 players attacking the opposition's defense, the 2 miedfielders can choose to overload to side where the ball is. The team can choose to sacrifice one of the 5 players in front to put one more player in the miedfielder which will mean there will be one more player at the edge of the box throw balls in front of make long shoots. When it comes down to the build up, things are often similar between the 3 4 3 and the 3 5 2 formations. But when coming to the opposition's final third, the difference is being seen more easily. The 3 4 3 will have a tendancy to preserve hisnatural width and stretch the opposition in front. By doing this they can exploit the spaces between the defenders. While the 3 5 2 in the other hand will aim to play more narrow and more direct, sacrificing one part of the width for an extra player in the midfield to help supporting the striker. When out of possession, the front 3 of the 3 4 3 is often asked to pressure the opposition high on the pitch and try to force them to make mistakes near their final third. Also it allows the wingbacks of the 3 4 3 to push up and pin the opposition's fullbacks. It will allows the front 3 to target the passes in the center. However it can also be effective for the teams who prefer to stay back and that only start engaging the press when the opposition is starting entering in the miedfield. By doing this, they often pass into a 5 4 1 while defending.
The midfield must be capable to prevent all passes in the middle of the pitch, eventually forcing the opposition to play out wide where the team will be capable to effectively defend, with a wingback and a wide center covering the half spaces. In the final defensive phase, we can fully see the importance of the libero. The central center back will cover others players and provide extra support if necessary and cover the others players mistakes if someone is out of position and making sure there is no gap in the middle. When defending in a 5 4 1 formation, the lone striker will be the main chance for the counter attacks. With 3 center backs, it will be difficult for the opposition to outnumber them in the box. However the problem of this formation requires the team to perfectly work together and have a very good chem. In a back 3, the team can quickly find itself vulnerable to quick counter attacks. The opposite's wingers can be pushed behind on the wing, and quickly find themselves on 1 v 1 situations against a wide center back. Also having only 2 center miedfielders can expose wide areas of the miedfield The miedfield must shield effectively the back 3. Otherwise it will become vulnerable to balls being played between the lines. FInally the libero will carrying the ball further on the pitch cannot afford to loose the ball while carrying the attack. Because with the wingbacks already pushing up ion the pitch, the central carrying center back loosing ball mean that the team will be put immediatly on the back foot and the otthers defenders will be outnumbered. It can be an excellent counter formation to the 4 3 3 and 4 2 3 1 formations who are among the most comons in football.
Back three formations.
Pourquoi les formations Back-Three gagnent en popularité | Tactiques 3-4-3/3-5-2 Why Back-Three Formations Are Increasing in Popularity | 3-4-3/3-5-2 Tactics
3 4 3 formation was introduced in Italy when there were an excess of elite centerbacks. However nowadays, this formation is very often the sign of a very offensive tactic. Tuchel used this with Chelsea and won the UCL with it. Antonio Conte used to dominated the Serie A League with Juventus in a 3 5 2 formation. Inzhagi took Inter Milan in the UCL final with a 3 5 2 formation. Also during the 2020/2021 season, Simeone used a 3 4 3 formation with a back 3. Leipzig during the same season ended in the second place behind Bayern Munich with one of the best defensive record of Europe. Starting in the back 3, the center cb will play the role of a libero often. He can be defined as a ball played sweeper, carrying the ball and helping advancing the ball to start the attack. But he will also be the last line when the opposition are attacking. Before moving to Bayern, Upamecano has been excellent for Leipzig in this position with the most accurate passes per match for a defender in the Bundesliga. He also had the most clearances in the team. The libero will be supported by 2 others center backs which functions will be to cover and worry about long balls behind them when they loose the possession. But they also need to be good ball playing center backs considering they will be more likely than others to receive the ball from the goalkepper. They will have to break the first line of the opposite's offensive pressure. Bastoni in Inter Milan is a good example for this role. In a 3 4 3, the wingbacks will be among the most crucial players here because they will be the ones providing width in the attacks. But they will also create a defensive numerical superiority when out of possession.
They will need to support both attack and defense consistently during the whole match. The center midfielders are the bridge between the defense and the attack. Often in 3 4 3 formations, you will see one more attacking minded midfielder for one deep lying playmaker. Jorginho and Kovacic are a good example of this. It's worth noting that the miedfielders will have a tendency to be more defensive than in others formations like 4 3 3 and they will not be a lot relied to during attacks. In 3 4 3, the wingers are essentials during counter attacks, using their pace to attack the opposition's defense. When on possession, they usually shift in half spaces and act as insider attackers. A false 9 can provide options for the midfielders while a pure 9 or pure striker stay further in the last third. If one of the 3 attackers is dropping along with the midfielders, it can become a 3 5 2. During the build up, the back 3 will ensure the goalkepper has enough passing options with the wide center backs usually dropping on the sides/edges of the box. And the wingbacks pushing high alongside the 2 center midfielders. The goalkepper can send the ball to the wingbacks directly. Each wide center back can create triangle passing options with the wingback and the center miedfielder. If the winger shift out wide, it will create a diamond shape with the 3 others players. WIth many passing options on the wing, the opposition will be force to commit a lot of players to close the spaces. But that often mean that the other flank has a lot of spaces, meaning that rapid switching to the other flank can be very effective. But if the opposition decide to stay wide to cover this, then it's freeing spaces in the center so the striker can drop deep to receive the ball or for the center box to box miedfielder to attack.
In the final third when put on the back foot, the opposition will have to commit a lot of players to cover the spaces and during a complete attack, the formation can often look like a 3 2 5 or a 3 3 4. With a front 5, quick options can be created with the wingback combining either with the winger either with the striker, sometimes even with the midfielder. It can help the team to go behind the defense to receive crosses. Also with 5 players attacking the opposition's defense, the 2 miedfielders can choose to overload to side where the ball is. The team can choose to sacrifice one of the 5 players in front to put one more player in the miedfielder which will mean there will be one more player at the edge of the box throw balls in front of make long shoots. When it comes down to the build up, things are often similar between the 3 4 3 and the 3 5 2 formations. But when coming to the opposition's final third, the difference is being seen more easily. The 3 4 3 will have a tendancy to preserve hisnatural width and stretch the opposition in front. By doing this they can exploit the spaces between the defenders. While the 3 5 2 in the other hand will aim to play more narrow and more direct, sacrificing one part of the width for an extra player in the midfield to help supporting the striker. When out of possession, the front 3 of the 3 4 3 is often asked to pressure the opposition high on the pitch and try to force them to make mistakes near their final third. Also it allows the wingbacks of the 3 4 3 to push up and pin the opposition's fullbacks. It will allows the front 3 to target the passes in the center. However it can also be effective for the teams who prefer to stay back and that only start engaging the press when the opposition is starting entering in the miedfield. By doing this, they often pass into a 5 4 1 while defending.
The midfield must be capable to prevent all passes in the middle of the pitch, eventually forcing the opposition to play out wide where the team will be capable to effectively defend, with a wingback and a wide center covering the half spaces. In the final defensive phase, we can fully see the importance of the libero. The central center back will cover others players and provide extra support if necessary and cover the others players mistakes if someone is out of position and making sure there is no gap in the middle. When defending in a 5 4 1 formation, the lone striker will be the main chance for the counter attacks. With 3 center backs, it will be difficult for the opposition to outnumber them in the box. However the problem of this formation requires the team to perfectly work together and have a very good chem. In a back 3, the team can quickly find itself vulnerable to quick counter attacks. The opposite's wingers can be pushed behind on the wing, and quickly find themselves on 1 v 1 situations against a wide center back. Also having only 2 center miedfielders can expose wide areas of the miedfield The miedfield must shield effectively the back 3. Otherwise it will become vulnerable to balls being played between the lines. FInally the libero will carrying the ball further on the pitch cannot afford to loose the ball while carrying the attack. Because with the wingbacks already pushing up ion the pitch, the central carrying center back loosing ball mean that the team will be put immediatly on the back foot and the otthers defenders will be outnumbered. It can be an excellent counter formation to the 4 3 3 and 4 2 3 1 formations who are among the most comons in football.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Tactics Explained: Mourinho's Chelsea (2004-2006)
Mourinho's Chelsea is one of the most innovative team ever seen tactically. They got into semi final of UCL but weren't semented into the absolute top clubs of the Premiere League yet until Mourinho came. It took 2 entire seaons for the opposite teams to start knowing how to deal with this because they never seen that before. Chelsea had Cech gk, Terry and Carvalho cb, Gallas and Ferreira fullbacks, Makelele holding midfielder, Essien and Lampard as box to box midfielders, Robben and Duff wingers and finally Dorgba forward. Gudjohnsen could replace Drogba forward as well. To the english teams, using a holding midfielder, Makelele in this pure 6 role, was mindblowing back then. Premiere League was obsessed with 4 4 2 back then whatever it was Man United, Arsenal. They always had 2 center midfielders. It gave teams balance with 2 players in every single positions of the pitch outside gk. During build up, both cb separated a bit wide with both fullbacks pushing slightly further up and Makelele dropping, forming a bow with the 2 cb and the gk. Generally teams had one ball playing center back and the other heading balls out, tackling, and all conventionnal things. Chelsea had 2 ball playing centerbacks. Both cb would be free to carry the ball higher on the pitch when opposition sit deep in their 4 4 2, to help the rest of the team to advance. But when they pressed higher theere were almost always Makelele free in the center. Chelsea had now 2 cb and 3 miedfielders so 5 players centrally. There was always a free men in the center of the miedfield. If teams choosed to defend them in 4 4 1 1 to cover all the 3 miedfielders including Makelele so, they couldn't defend both Terry and Carvalho with only one isolated forward. Even if when defending in 4 4 2, Makele was covered and a wide men was going to defend against the free miedfielder, this left a fullback free and in this Chelsea's system they made also something very innovative with fullbacks.
Before Mourinho came in the Premiere League, fullbacks almost never attacked the way they are attacking nowadays. In Chelsea, fullbacks provided the width to form a front 5. Mostly Chelsea's wingers may have the job of staying close to the touchline and provide crosses, they also often inverted them in the middle of the game. It could be one fullback only going high and make the winger invert with Lampard making a late run to form a front 5. Bridge in the left was a good attacking fullback. Makelele often moved into the spaces the fullback vacated to maintain that regular structure. Chelsea often ended in ridiculous situations where they still had their back 4 with one player, being either Essien or Tiago patrolling these central spaces. Chelsea was still stable, defensive and quite boring by times. But they conceded only 15 goals in one season mostly because they dominated the ball. During the same season they scored between 70 and 75 goals. Also It was difficult to attack against this Chelsea team because Mourinho didn't play with 2 good overlapping fullbacks and 2 inverting wingers. He only played with one at time. Sometimes during a game he woudl change the side in which it's happening. Chelsea could attack either down the middle with numerical superiority, either down the flanks where they could hurt others teams in different ways. Also Cech played sometimes long balls to Drogba. Some would think that against a 4 4 2 with numerical disadvantage it's stupid but it's not. Drogba received critics during his 2 first seasons in Chelsea because he wasn't a prolific goalscorer despite his potential. But Drogba was good at bullying the defenders and creating spaces for his teamates. Theorically even with Lampard's runs, both cb could close down Drogba and Lampard. But Lampard was one of the best of the world for his late timing runs in the box. Also Drogba was capable of attracting both centerbacks often, swapping between which one is marking him.
Les tactiques gagnantes des triples de Jupp Heynckes expliquées | Analyse tactique du Bayern Munich 2012/13 |
From the back, Neuer was one of the best ball playing gk, being a third man in the build up phase if the centerbacks were being pressed, allowing them to play out more easily because of their numerical supeirority. In fact most of the teams weren't doing high press as they knew that as soon as Bayern would pass the first line of pressure, they were men short further back as the men who pressed would be on the wrong side of the ball and were basically inactive defenders. Both cb, Boateng and Dante were comfortable on the ball. On rare occasion when they were under pressure they could play long balls as they had a target men like Mnadzukic who could hold up the play. Those 2 had the most accurate long passes per match in the Bundesliga. But most of the times they went short to the midfielders. In the first phase both Alaba and Lahm as fullbacks made themselves available for short passes. Once received they were superb on the ball, laying the ball into their pivots or their attacking midfielder. Or playing the ball down the line to their winger. More often than most of the teams, Bayern looked to penetrate by the center of the pitch. Schweinsteiger and Javi Martinez were the pivots with Schweinsteiger being sometimes more a box to box and Martinez being purely defensive. Both were excellent on the ball, helping retaining possession in tight areas. If both cb were pressed, Martinez tended to drop between the 2. With Schweinsteiger isolated, Toni Kross who was playing as an attacking midfielder also showed that he was comfortable being in deeper regions as he would show later both for Real Madrid and Germany. But when Muller played instead of Kross, he tended to stay higher up the pitch in these phases. Schweinsteiger was the heart of the team with an average of 74 passes per game. However Bayern's major threats were in the wide regions with Robben and Ribery who were often hugging the touchline.
Bayern used the middle of the pitch as a basis to attack wider regions. Schweinstiger was the player facilitating this with more than 11 long balls attempted and completing 9 on 11 on average. So their wingers could be in 1 v 1 situations and cause damages. When the ball went to Toni Kross instead, Schweinsteiger pushed higher up to create overloads in these high regions. Both weren't hesitating to strikr from range when they had the opportunity. But more comon was the presence of the 2 drawing the opposition more centrally, opening more rooms on the flanks. Kross was excellent at constently switching the play to the wingers to perpetually shift the defenders from side to side and bring their key mens to 1 v 1 with the fullback. Once the ball is wide, the winger come on life. Both were inverted, meaning that they wanted to dribble their opponent and Robben was more likely to attempt his signature cold shoot from these half space regions with 2 dribbles per game and 2,9 shoots with more than half of them coming from outside the box. Ribéry was more creative in this role. When he cut in, he could also have a shoot but also dribble the ball to the forward to finish. He was also comfortable cutting back on his weak foot to attack the byline and cross where Mandzukic who is good in the airs, could look to finish. But the wingers were consisteltly assisted by their fullbacks who were the keys to overlap. Lahm had 11 assists while Alaba had 3. Muller also changed the dynamic of his team as when he played as an attacking midfielder, he combined with Mandzukic who often pulled ouf to the left, which created spaces for Muller who would look to finish.
But his most comon role was on the right wing when Robben was injured. He rarely took on his fullback. Instead he would give it to Lahm who was supported by Kross while Muller made his way into the box. Then Mandzukic and Mullere were the perfect aerial targets while Swhweinsteiger was the box to box midfielder moving in these areas to help flooding the box. As a result, these 3 scored the most headed goals for their team with 7 goals for Mandzukic and 4 goals for Schweinsteiger and Muller. Off the ball Keybckes used a lot of counterpress. Pressing foten started with Mandzukic harassing the centerbacks until they are forced to play long or go wide. Here the winger would press him. The defensive line tended to be higher. And their fullbacks particulary followed their men high. They made the pitch big when they had the ball but off the ball they shifted to one side to cut off options, making the pitch looking smaller when defending. Once winning the ball back there were a lot of players who could take advantage of long balls When defending for long phases, Bayern went into a 4 5 1 with the wingers dropping deep to assist the defenders. High lines helped to facilitate counter attacks. This was made possible because they had a sweeper keeper like Manuel Neuer who was capable of dominating and clearing the ball when it was played into dangerous regions near him. But in UCL, they could switch their tactics and make it a more counter attacking style when it was necessary. The paces of Robben and Ribéry meant that during turnovers, they could take advantages of the space left behind. This combined with the long passing range of the whole backline and midfield meant that the line breaker passing could come from anywhere and then the wingers and the forward were deadly.
Tactics Explained: Mourinho's Chelsea (2004-2006)
Mourinho's Chelsea is one of the most innovative team ever seen tactically. They got into semi final of UCL but weren't semented into the absolute top clubs of the Premiere League yet until Mourinho came. It took 2 entire seaons for the opposite teams to start knowing how to deal with this because they never seen that before. Chelsea had Cech gk, Terry and Carvalho cb, Gallas and Ferreira fullbacks, Makelele holding midfielder, Essien and Lampard as box to box midfielders, Robben and Duff wingers and finally Dorgba forward. Gudjohnsen could replace Drogba forward as well. To the english teams, using a holding midfielder, Makelele in this pure 6 role, was mindblowing back then. Premiere League was obsessed with 4 4 2 back then whatever it was Man United, Arsenal. They always had 2 center midfielders. It gave teams balance with 2 players in every single positions of the pitch outside gk. During build up, both cb separated a bit wide with both fullbacks pushing slightly further up and Makelele dropping, forming a bow with the 2 cb and the gk. Generally teams had one ball playing center back and the other heading balls out, tackling, and all conventionnal things. Chelsea had 2 ball playing centerbacks. Both cb would be free to carry the ball higher on the pitch when opposition sit deep in their 4 4 2, to help the rest of the team to advance. But when they pressed higher theere were almost always Makelele free in the center. Chelsea had now 2 cb and 3 miedfielders so 5 players centrally. There was always a free men in the center of the miedfield. If teams choosed to defend them in 4 4 1 1 to cover all the 3 miedfielders including Makelele so, they couldn't defend both Terry and Carvalho with only one isolated forward. Even if when defending in 4 4 2, Makele was covered and a wide men was going to defend against the free miedfielder, this left a fullback free and in this Chelsea's system they made also something very innovative with fullbacks.
Before Mourinho came in the Premiere League, fullbacks almost never attacked the way they are attacking nowadays. In Chelsea, fullbacks provided the width to form a front 5. Mostly Chelsea's wingers may have the job of staying close to the touchline and provide crosses, they also often inverted them in the middle of the game. It could be one fullback only going high and make the winger invert with Lampard making a late run to form a front 5. Bridge in the left was a good attacking fullback. Makelele often moved into the spaces the fullback vacated to maintain that regular structure. Chelsea often ended in ridiculous situations where they still had their back 4 with one player, being either Essien or Tiago patrolling these central spaces. Chelsea was still stable, defensive and quite boring by times. But they conceded only 15 goals in one season mostly because they dominated the ball. During the same season they scored between 70 and 75 goals. Also It was difficult to attack against this Chelsea team because Mourinho didn't play with 2 good overlapping fullbacks and 2 inverting wingers. He only played with one at time. Sometimes during a game he woudl change the side in which it's happening. Chelsea could attack either down the middle with numerical superiority, either down the flanks where they could hurt others teams in different ways. Also Cech played sometimes long balls to Drogba. Some would think that against a 4 4 2 with numerical disadvantage it's stupid but it's not. Drogba received critics during his 2 first seasons in Chelsea because he wasn't a prolific goalscorer despite his potential. But Drogba was good at bullying the defenders and creating spaces for his teamates. Theorically even with Lampard's runs, both cb could close down Drogba and Lampard. But Lampard was one of the best of the world for his late timing runs in the box. Also Drogba was capable of attracting both centerbacks often, swapping between which one is marking him.
Les tactiques gagnantes des triples de Jupp Heynckes expliquées | Analyse tactique du Bayern Munich 2012/13 |
From the back, Neuer was one of the best ball playing gk, being a third man in the build up phase if the centerbacks were being pressed, allowing them to play out more easily because of their numerical supeirority. In fact most of the teams weren't doing high press as they knew that as soon as Bayern would pass the first line of pressure, they were men short further back as the men who pressed would be on the wrong side of the ball and were basically inactive defenders. Both cb, Boateng and Dante were comfortable on the ball. On rare occasion when they were under pressure they could play long balls as they had a target men like Mnadzukic who could hold up the play. Those 2 had the most accurate long passes per match in the Bundesliga. But most of the times they went short to the midfielders. In the first phase both Alaba and Lahm as fullbacks made themselves available for short passes. Once received they were superb on the ball, laying the ball into their pivots or their attacking midfielder. Or playing the ball down the line to their winger. More often than most of the teams, Bayern looked to penetrate by the center of the pitch. Schweinsteiger and Javi Martinez were the pivots with Schweinsteiger being sometimes more a box to box and Martinez being purely defensive. Both were excellent on the ball, helping retaining possession in tight areas. If both cb were pressed, Martinez tended to drop between the 2. With Schweinsteiger isolated, Toni Kross who was playing as an attacking midfielder also showed that he was comfortable being in deeper regions as he would show later both for Real Madrid and Germany. But when Muller played instead of Kross, he tended to stay higher up the pitch in these phases. Schweinsteiger was the heart of the team with an average of 74 passes per game. However Bayern's major threats were in the wide regions with Robben and Ribery who were often hugging the touchline.
Bayern used the middle of the pitch as a basis to attack wider regions. Schweinstiger was the player facilitating this with more than 11 long balls attempted and completing 9 on 11 on average. So their wingers could be in 1 v 1 situations and cause damages. When the ball went to Toni Kross instead, Schweinsteiger pushed higher up to create overloads in these high regions. Both weren't hesitating to strikr from range when they had the opportunity. But more comon was the presence of the 2 drawing the opposition more centrally, opening more rooms on the flanks. Kross was excellent at constently switching the play to the wingers to perpetually shift the defenders from side to side and bring their key mens to 1 v 1 with the fullback. Once the ball is wide, the winger come on life. Both were inverted, meaning that they wanted to dribble their opponent and Robben was more likely to attempt his signature cold shoot from these half space regions with 2 dribbles per game and 2,9 shoots with more than half of them coming from outside the box. Ribéry was more creative in this role. When he cut in, he could also have a shoot but also dribble the ball to the forward to finish. He was also comfortable cutting back on his weak foot to attack the byline and cross where Mandzukic who is good in the airs, could look to finish. But the wingers were consisteltly assisted by their fullbacks who were the keys to overlap. Lahm had 11 assists while Alaba had 3. Muller also changed the dynamic of his team as when he played as an attacking midfielder, he combined with Mandzukic who often pulled ouf to the left, which created spaces for Muller who would look to finish.
But his most comon role was on the right wing when Robben was injured. He rarely took on his fullback. Instead he would give it to Lahm who was supported by Kross while Muller made his way into the box. Then Mandzukic and Mullere were the perfect aerial targets while Swhweinsteiger was the box to box midfielder moving in these areas to help flooding the box. As a result, these 3 scored the most headed goals for their team with 7 goals for Mandzukic and 4 goals for Schweinsteiger and Muller. Off the ball Keybckes used a lot of counterpress. Pressing foten started with Mandzukic harassing the centerbacks until they are forced to play long or go wide. Here the winger would press him. The defensive line tended to be higher. And their fullbacks particulary followed their men high. They made the pitch big when they had the ball but off the ball they shifted to one side to cut off options, making the pitch looking smaller when defending. Once winning the ball back there were a lot of players who could take advantage of long balls When defending for long phases, Bayern went into a 4 5 1 with the wingers dropping deep to assist the defenders. High lines helped to facilitate counter attacks. This was made possible because they had a sweeper keeper like Manuel Neuer who was capable of dominating and clearing the ball when it was played into dangerous regions near him. But in UCL, they could switch their tactics and make it a more counter attacking style when it was necessary. The paces of Robben and Ribéry meant that during turnovers, they could take advantages of the space left behind. This combined with the long passing range of the whole backline and midfield meant that the line breaker passing could come from anywhere and then the wingers and the forward were deadly.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Bayern Munich's 2020/21 Tactics Explained | How Hansi Flick Has Made Them So Good |
Hansi Flick made veterans like Muller, Neuer and Boateng central in the process to turn Bayern into the best team in the world. Flick also gave Kimmich his preferred defensive midfield role fulltime, completing his transition from right back. We also saw his ability to trust youngsters like Davies, overseeing his transition from a winger prospect who made 14 appearances, most of them as a winger, to becoming one of the best left backs in the world. This was faciliated by the versatility of Alaba, who went from being one of the best left backs of the world to one of the best center backs.It served creating harmony within the squad. In the Bundesliga, his preferred formation looked like a 4 2 3 1. Long balls from Neuer or the center backs were a good option because the presence of Lewandowski or Muller as aerial targets with guys like Gnabry, Sané or Coman as runners. However with 58% of possession, Bayern was still overall a possession oriented team. Bayern being good on build up helped a lot with opposition often choosing to sit deep and compact the spaces in crucial zones. Having 2 centerbacks good under pressure meant that we saw less Kimmich coming to provide the support and instead, stayed higher to provide options between the lines. If Bayern were pressed higher by a front 2, Pavard oftne dropped from a right back to a right center back. And despite being left footed, Sané hugged the right touchline in the first phase, providing the width. This could then possibly draw an opposition's winger higher up, leaving Sané for a potential 1 v 1. Boateng has the responsability to expand the play with longer balls, mostly into the wingers when they start high and wide. Alaba in the other hand played more often the ball slightly into feet, looking to connect with the man near him. However unlike the right where Sané provides the width, Gnabry or Coman both tend to tuck infield with Davies having instead to move higher up the pitch.
This by times left him free to receive from Boateng. Also, Kimmich staying as a pivot instead of dropping into the center back zone allowed Goretzka to push higher up between the lines. If the opponent continued to try and press high, Alaba could play a penetrative and progressive pass into a player between the lines. Alaba had the second highest penetrating passes into the third third despite being deep just behind Kimmich and slightly ahead of Pavard. So if the opposition drops deep to cope with this, this opens up an option for Kimmich who is afforded more spaces. So at times, teams will look to sit on Kimmich who can thn move laterally to the right to open up more spaces as we can see Goretzka dropping deeper to receive and support while Alaba can look to push up higher on the left, particularly if they are dominating possession. None of Goretzka and Kimmich play only as a pivot like Busquets but instead, they were playing with more fluidity with Kimmich having a tendency to stay a bit deeper than Goretzka even though we could see the opposite happening. Then with men often supporting him between the lines, Muller was often able to find some spaces Add to that the fact that Lewandowski had the strenght to hold off a man, and his elusive movements meant that he oftne found spaces without having to hold off a man. By times we saw Lewandowski dropping deeper and because he was such a threat, a center back often tried to stay tight which created the spaces for runners in behind. But Bayern looked mostly to attack in the flanks. Coman on the left was playing like a traditionnal winger, bypassing the line and trying to cross in while combining with Davies. Gnabry in the other hand liked to operate as an inside forward so in this case, Davies had more offensive responsabilities, providing most of the width, and Alaba having to move higher up.
The front 4 showed a lot of fluidity, interchanging regularly. We saw particularly Muller and Sané combining a lot. Pavard tended to stay deeper initially, allowing Sané to have his 1 v 1, meaning that the opposition's winger is caught higher up. When Sané goes infield, his fullback instinctly goes with him while the defensive midfielder doesn't want to stay too far away from here because of Gnabry and Goretzka. So Muller often had momentary spaces down the right, where he could look for the cross. Muller, under Flick, ended up second in term of crosses attempted, ahead of Gnabry and Sané but just behind Coman. We sometimes saw Pavard arrivign late to get across in and one of Bayern's strenght how many numbers they could commit into the box This includes Lewandowski, Muller, Goretzka and the far side winger. This is where we see the main difference between Kimmich and Goretzka as Kimmich prefers to stay deeper to act as the main creative force, looking for crosses from the half spaces of shots from the rebound. As a result, no team attempted more crosses than the Bavarians when Flick was in charge. If the opposition stays in his default shape, there will always be a man free for a header So the central midfielders are naturally dragged deeper into the box, allowing Bayern to counterpress efficiently. No team had lower passes per defensive action than Bayern Munich in the league. This was because there is a large distance now between the midfielders who wins the ball to the forward so Bayern can easily swarn him.But Bayern's weakness was that with both pivots high and one of their fullbacks at least, if the first layer of pressing if broken, the opposition had access to spaces to run into.
Even from a situation like a goalkick, Bayern looked to press high initially pushing up Goretzka alongside Muller to make a 4 1 4 1. As soon the ball went wide, Bayern looked to shut off all options. This involved again pushing the line high up early so they could be vulnerable over the top. And Alaba and Davies pace combined with Neuer as sweeper keeper means they often dealt with this but it was still risky regardless. As a result, their defense was not really excellent. But Bayern's qualities easily made up for it.
How Barcelona Pierced The Atletico Madrid Armour | Atletico Madrid 2-4 Barcelona
As usual Athlético Madrid looked to sit deep and frustrate Barcelona. They lined up in their usual classic 4 4 2 and although the sporadically pressed high the majority of the play took place in Athletico's half. Barcelona had their usual 4 3 3 high line shape with Koundé tucking in from the back while Balde and Yamal were tasked to provide the width for Barca, allowing them to have more numbers centrally to try to create the overload. With Alvarez and Griezmann as the 2 forwards, sitting deep on Barcelona's pivots, if Pedri stayed in his pivot position it would have been easier to cut off passes alongside Casado. So Pedri pushed higher as often as he could instead to try to combine with Olmo and Raphina to overload Athlético's double pivot, De Paul and Barrios who could become man oriented on Pedri and Olmo. While initially Raphina moved infield, Llorente would follow his man. Central overload meant that Balde would have the space and that overload in the middle could translate to men looking to flood the box. But Athlético's defense fended off these crosses. That caused Athlético Madrid troubles was the rotations at Barcelona's left side with Pedri often beginning to drift wide rather than staying central. De Paul who was man oriented would follow him, creating gaps in Athlético Madrid's desired compact shape. Olmo or Lewandowski could then drop here. But often It was Raphina who looked to move even deeper and moving more centrally, causing more issues to Llorente. He had the high and wide Balde to look onto but Llorente also found himself dragged by Raphina creating gaps in the backline for Barcelona runners. Athlético adapted, falling back with a back 5 into a 5 4 1 with Simeone moving to the right wingback defender allowing Llorente to be tighter on Raphina with lessy worry about Balde potentially free out wide.
The 5 4 1 soon morphed into a 5 3 2 defensive shape which gave them better central protection, forcing Barcelona out wide while having the advantage of having both of their forwards higher and ready for the counter. It bought Athléti some defensive success and Barcelona had it difficult to get into the half spaces despite putting numbers in the center. When Barcelona lost the ball they were looking to quickly counter press. This led to Barcelona's best chances of the first half. But it was also their biggest weakness as Athlético constantly looked to hit on the break. Having a high line meant that their oppoennts also had more rooms to exploit. Alvarez in particular found success in playing off the shoulder especially down the left with Koundé joining at times the attack. Barcelona was down 1 0 at the first half but in the second, Hansi Flick made changes that would turn the tide around. Ferran Torres was introduced, creating a shift in their attacking. Ferran moved on the left allowing Raphina to move permanently for the match into an attacking midfield position. At first it seemed redundant to have both Balde and Torres in the left as Athlético could deal with this. But it allowed to give Lamine Yamal more support on the right side as Raphina could move from central region to Yamal's side to provide support. In the first half this supporting role had been played by Koundé who looked to arrive late to overlap or underlap when Barcelona had controlled possession. But now Barcelona was more dangerous because of this change. Combined with Torres attacking instinct to get an extra body on the box when needed. The second goal os the best example for that.
Bayern Munich's 2020/21 Tactics Explained | How Hansi Flick Has Made Them So Good |
Hansi Flick made veterans like Muller, Neuer and Boateng central in the process to turn Bayern into the best team in the world. Flick also gave Kimmich his preferred defensive midfield role fulltime, completing his transition from right back. We also saw his ability to trust youngsters like Davies, overseeing his transition from a winger prospect who made 14 appearances, most of them as a winger, to becoming one of the best left backs in the world. This was faciliated by the versatility of Alaba, who went from being one of the best left backs of the world to one of the best center backs.It served creating harmony within the squad. In the Bundesliga, his preferred formation looked like a 4 2 3 1. Long balls from Neuer or the center backs were a good option because the presence of Lewandowski or Muller as aerial targets with guys like Gnabry, Sané or Coman as runners. However with 58% of possession, Bayern was still overall a possession oriented team. Bayern being good on build up helped a lot with opposition often choosing to sit deep and compact the spaces in crucial zones. Having 2 centerbacks good under pressure meant that we saw less Kimmich coming to provide the support and instead, stayed higher to provide options between the lines. If Bayern were pressed higher by a front 2, Pavard oftne dropped from a right back to a right center back. And despite being left footed, Sané hugged the right touchline in the first phase, providing the width. This could then possibly draw an opposition's winger higher up, leaving Sané for a potential 1 v 1. Boateng has the responsability to expand the play with longer balls, mostly into the wingers when they start high and wide. Alaba in the other hand played more often the ball slightly into feet, looking to connect with the man near him. However unlike the right where Sané provides the width, Gnabry or Coman both tend to tuck infield with Davies having instead to move higher up the pitch.
This by times left him free to receive from Boateng. Also, Kimmich staying as a pivot instead of dropping into the center back zone allowed Goretzka to push higher up between the lines. If the opponent continued to try and press high, Alaba could play a penetrative and progressive pass into a player between the lines. Alaba had the second highest penetrating passes into the third third despite being deep just behind Kimmich and slightly ahead of Pavard. So if the opposition drops deep to cope with this, this opens up an option for Kimmich who is afforded more spaces. So at times, teams will look to sit on Kimmich who can thn move laterally to the right to open up more spaces as we can see Goretzka dropping deeper to receive and support while Alaba can look to push up higher on the left, particularly if they are dominating possession. None of Goretzka and Kimmich play only as a pivot like Busquets but instead, they were playing with more fluidity with Kimmich having a tendency to stay a bit deeper than Goretzka even though we could see the opposite happening. Then with men often supporting him between the lines, Muller was often able to find some spaces Add to that the fact that Lewandowski had the strenght to hold off a man, and his elusive movements meant that he oftne found spaces without having to hold off a man. By times we saw Lewandowski dropping deeper and because he was such a threat, a center back often tried to stay tight which created the spaces for runners in behind. But Bayern looked mostly to attack in the flanks. Coman on the left was playing like a traditionnal winger, bypassing the line and trying to cross in while combining with Davies. Gnabry in the other hand liked to operate as an inside forward so in this case, Davies had more offensive responsabilities, providing most of the width, and Alaba having to move higher up.
The front 4 showed a lot of fluidity, interchanging regularly. We saw particularly Muller and Sané combining a lot. Pavard tended to stay deeper initially, allowing Sané to have his 1 v 1, meaning that the opposition's winger is caught higher up. When Sané goes infield, his fullback instinctly goes with him while the defensive midfielder doesn't want to stay too far away from here because of Gnabry and Goretzka. So Muller often had momentary spaces down the right, where he could look for the cross. Muller, under Flick, ended up second in term of crosses attempted, ahead of Gnabry and Sané but just behind Coman. We sometimes saw Pavard arrivign late to get across in and one of Bayern's strenght how many numbers they could commit into the box This includes Lewandowski, Muller, Goretzka and the far side winger. This is where we see the main difference between Kimmich and Goretzka as Kimmich prefers to stay deeper to act as the main creative force, looking for crosses from the half spaces of shots from the rebound. As a result, no team attempted more crosses than the Bavarians when Flick was in charge. If the opposition stays in his default shape, there will always be a man free for a header So the central midfielders are naturally dragged deeper into the box, allowing Bayern to counterpress efficiently. No team had lower passes per defensive action than Bayern Munich in the league. This was because there is a large distance now between the midfielders who wins the ball to the forward so Bayern can easily swarn him.But Bayern's weakness was that with both pivots high and one of their fullbacks at least, if the first layer of pressing if broken, the opposition had access to spaces to run into.
Even from a situation like a goalkick, Bayern looked to press high initially pushing up Goretzka alongside Muller to make a 4 1 4 1. As soon the ball went wide, Bayern looked to shut off all options. This involved again pushing the line high up early so they could be vulnerable over the top. And Alaba and Davies pace combined with Neuer as sweeper keeper means they often dealt with this but it was still risky regardless. As a result, their defense was not really excellent. But Bayern's qualities easily made up for it.
How Barcelona Pierced The Atletico Madrid Armour | Atletico Madrid 2-4 Barcelona
As usual Athlético Madrid looked to sit deep and frustrate Barcelona. They lined up in their usual classic 4 4 2 and although the sporadically pressed high the majority of the play took place in Athletico's half. Barcelona had their usual 4 3 3 high line shape with Koundé tucking in from the back while Balde and Yamal were tasked to provide the width for Barca, allowing them to have more numbers centrally to try to create the overload. With Alvarez and Griezmann as the 2 forwards, sitting deep on Barcelona's pivots, if Pedri stayed in his pivot position it would have been easier to cut off passes alongside Casado. So Pedri pushed higher as often as he could instead to try to combine with Olmo and Raphina to overload Athlético's double pivot, De Paul and Barrios who could become man oriented on Pedri and Olmo. While initially Raphina moved infield, Llorente would follow his man. Central overload meant that Balde would have the space and that overload in the middle could translate to men looking to flood the box. But Athlético's defense fended off these crosses. That caused Athlético Madrid troubles was the rotations at Barcelona's left side with Pedri often beginning to drift wide rather than staying central. De Paul who was man oriented would follow him, creating gaps in Athlético Madrid's desired compact shape. Olmo or Lewandowski could then drop here. But often It was Raphina who looked to move even deeper and moving more centrally, causing more issues to Llorente. He had the high and wide Balde to look onto but Llorente also found himself dragged by Raphina creating gaps in the backline for Barcelona runners. Athlético adapted, falling back with a back 5 into a 5 4 1 with Simeone moving to the right wingback defender allowing Llorente to be tighter on Raphina with lessy worry about Balde potentially free out wide.
The 5 4 1 soon morphed into a 5 3 2 defensive shape which gave them better central protection, forcing Barcelona out wide while having the advantage of having both of their forwards higher and ready for the counter. It bought Athléti some defensive success and Barcelona had it difficult to get into the half spaces despite putting numbers in the center. When Barcelona lost the ball they were looking to quickly counter press. This led to Barcelona's best chances of the first half. But it was also their biggest weakness as Athlético constantly looked to hit on the break. Having a high line meant that their oppoennts also had more rooms to exploit. Alvarez in particular found success in playing off the shoulder especially down the left with Koundé joining at times the attack. Barcelona was down 1 0 at the first half but in the second, Hansi Flick made changes that would turn the tide around. Ferran Torres was introduced, creating a shift in their attacking. Ferran moved on the left allowing Raphina to move permanently for the match into an attacking midfield position. At first it seemed redundant to have both Balde and Torres in the left as Athlético could deal with this. But it allowed to give Lamine Yamal more support on the right side as Raphina could move from central region to Yamal's side to provide support. In the first half this supporting role had been played by Koundé who looked to arrive late to overlap or underlap when Barcelona had controlled possession. But now Barcelona was more dangerous because of this change. Combined with Torres attacking instinct to get an extra body on the box when needed. The second goal os the best example for that.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
How Barcelona’s NEW Tactic is Breaking Traditions!
Barcelona used to be known for its famous tiki taka and possession style. It turned now into a vertical side thriving on risky passes and intense gegenpressing. The same style that resulted to Bayern defeating Barcelone 8 2 back in 2020. But Hansi Flick's gegenpressing style is adapted to Barcelona's old tradition. Xavi's Barcelone continued the tradition of playing a possession based football with a proper structure and multiple patterns. However with the time many oppositions adapted and can predict rotationnal patterns with the structure. It made Barcelona more predictable and rigid with players unwilling to leave their comfort zoneand surprise the markers. This resulted This resulted in less chances occasions and wasterful ball possession. Flick gave them the freedom to break away from their traditionnal style of play and move closer toward team chemistry and relationnism. It made Barcelona more flexible with movements harder to predict. Flick emphasize at getting into the final third as quick as possible. However with Barcelona's traditionnal tiki take style it needed more patience to break through the opposition's lines which can slow down reaching the attacking area quickly. So Flick adopted a riskier method of build up. Instead of overloading the numbers in the build up, he let almost all his players in the advanced positions. Rather than having his players close to each other, he stretch his players far apart to make the pitch as big as possible. With the traditionnal method of having players close to each other, the opposition focus on one area. By speading the players it maximize the spaces that the opposition need to defend.
Rather than passing sideways or taking many touches in the build up, either pass now should have a purpose of going forward either vertically or diagonically. However the opposition's low block can easily block any direct pass from the back. But it's where Flick is different from Xavi with Barcelona. Instead of advanced players having a specific zone to operate in, they have freedom to randomly move into any position. As a result, rather than focusin on the ball carrier, the opposition's low block constantly try to track and guess the random movements of the forwards. It often leave spaces at the backline.If the opposition is too rigid however and stick into their zonal shape then the positionnal freedom alone may not be enough to create spaces for direct passes. So in these scearios when the ball is with the centerback, isntead of waiting for the front to generate space, he carries the ball forward reaching the second line of defense, creating an unprecedented situation. If the opposition doesn't engage the cb, he can easily break through and engage the backline. In the other hand, sending their second line toward him destabilize their zonal space and create spaces for the others. However when playing against a strong pressing side that uses high line, it can result in a disaster. In such cases, Flick often adapts by splitting the center backs wide and positionning the pivots vertically while the ball sided fullbacks retreats to partner with the pivot. This creates an asymetric 3 2 shape which provides multiple passing angle from the centerbacks. And they use this asymetric shape to pull the opposition's frontline from oneside to the other. It increases the spaces in the opposite line and on the opposite side where the far sided fullback and the number 10 are ready to receive a direct pass.
However, switching to the opposite side can result into loosing possession. So Flick uses his pivots as the key connectors to the attacking half. For example when the cb has the ball he can pass it to the pivot who can quickly pass to the bottom pivot. This movement pulls the oppositon's frontline closer. It then opens space in the wide for the fullback to receive a direct pass as a third man. When Barcelona is into the opposite's half, under Xavi, the formation looked like a 3 2 5 with the wingers hugging the touchline with the 2 box to box midfielders attacking the half spaces. The left back would move as a second pivot. While this shape looks agressive and has all the zones covered, it was quite rigid and predictable. Under Flick, it becomes more flexible. You will often see the wingers inverting to join the cam ( number 10 ) and creating a central overload. You also might see Yamal staying wide with the striker dropping deep. These positions act as a joker role in Flick's system who would constantly roam around to create spaces for vertical spaces. For example when the cb has the ball you might see 2 of these players dropping deep to receive the ball. It forcefully forces the opposition's second line to engage forward which increases the gap with the last line where the third one is ready to drop deep and receive the second touch who can then again pass to the incoming runner. This pull the last line forward as well which create space behind them for the last player to receive the final touch and face the keeper directly. For this style to work you need players intelligent enough and with a sharp vision to make accurate direct passes. It requires mental training just as physical.
With more players operating in the central areas the opposition is forced to narrow down their structure. This creates a large amount of space for wide players like Yamal to receive and use his dribbbling to create opportunities. Whenever Barcelona plays a free kick or take a cross, Flick instructs Yamal to stay out of the crowded areas and position himself around the edge of the box or zone 14. Due to excellent dribbling and shooting skills, Yamal become very dangerous in these zones. However the ball must reach the final third first. Flick relies heavily on both pivots and center backs to deliver line breaking passes at the right moments. At Bayern, Hansi Flick used players like Thiago and Kimmich who were masters at finding spaces and executing direct spaces. However this approach can be a double edged sword for Barcelona. As with 9 or 10 players contributing to the attack as playmakers, there is sometimes a lack of defensive focus, leading to a lack of control. It makes it difficult to restrict counter attacks efficiently. To solve this, Flick has brought the German way of counterpressing at Barcelona.where he is conditionning his players to respond quickly after loosing the ball and use their energy and stamina to win it back rapidly. If even with this the ball is not won, then it creates a huge amount of space at the back for the opposition to exploit. SoSo Hansi Flick relies on his energetic players who can cover large distances quickly to halt counterattacks. As a result you often see the keeper quickly coming out of his box as a sweeper keeper. You sometimes also see wingers ilke Raphina or Yamal dropping deep to stop these counters. However with pressing and running you need more stamina from these players.
So there is a risk of frequent injuries. Flick only has 18 players at disposabl for 2024 so he had to manage the risk and maintain rotations within players to avoid injuries or else this tactic would backfire with no proper players at the right positions. Due to Lewandowski's age he may not be able to constantly press and engage with the opposition's backline. So flick assigns him to a more passive role where he drops deepper to partner with the 10 and cover the opposition's pivots. Meanwhile both younger wingers take on the responsability of pressing the back line. It forms a narrow 4 2 2 2 shape with all central positions marked. It forces the opposition to go wide to the isolated fullback. As it's done, Barcelone quickly deploys their own wideback to apply press on the ball carrier while the rest of the line shifts to cover and tightly mark al ball sided forwards. However if the opposition plays with a back 3 and so plays with attacking fullbacks/wingbacks then they can outnumber Barcelona's fullbacks. In such scenarios Flick abandon his preferred shape and let the stricker move up to maintain an overload against the back line while one of the pivots join the cam. This widens their shape and gives them more coverage in wide areas. However if the opposition manages to bypass the set up and enters into the attacking half, Barcelona quickly switch to a 4 4 2 setup. Instead of trying to stay compact and zonal, Flickasks his players to keep pressing agressively. As soon as the opposition make direct pass it triggers the pressing from behind and force them to return the pass. Then the front line initiate their man press to push them wider.
How Barcelona’s NEW Tactic is Breaking Traditions!
Barcelona used to be known for its famous tiki taka and possession style. It turned now into a vertical side thriving on risky passes and intense gegenpressing. The same style that resulted to Bayern defeating Barcelone 8 2 back in 2020. But Hansi Flick's gegenpressing style is adapted to Barcelona's old tradition. Xavi's Barcelone continued the tradition of playing a possession based football with a proper structure and multiple patterns. However with the time many oppositions adapted and can predict rotationnal patterns with the structure. It made Barcelona more predictable and rigid with players unwilling to leave their comfort zoneand surprise the markers. This resulted This resulted in less chances occasions and wasterful ball possession. Flick gave them the freedom to break away from their traditionnal style of play and move closer toward team chemistry and relationnism. It made Barcelona more flexible with movements harder to predict. Flick emphasize at getting into the final third as quick as possible. However with Barcelona's traditionnal tiki take style it needed more patience to break through the opposition's lines which can slow down reaching the attacking area quickly. So Flick adopted a riskier method of build up. Instead of overloading the numbers in the build up, he let almost all his players in the advanced positions. Rather than having his players close to each other, he stretch his players far apart to make the pitch as big as possible. With the traditionnal method of having players close to each other, the opposition focus on one area. By speading the players it maximize the spaces that the opposition need to defend.
Rather than passing sideways or taking many touches in the build up, either pass now should have a purpose of going forward either vertically or diagonically. However the opposition's low block can easily block any direct pass from the back. But it's where Flick is different from Xavi with Barcelona. Instead of advanced players having a specific zone to operate in, they have freedom to randomly move into any position. As a result, rather than focusin on the ball carrier, the opposition's low block constantly try to track and guess the random movements of the forwards. It often leave spaces at the backline.If the opposition is too rigid however and stick into their zonal shape then the positionnal freedom alone may not be enough to create spaces for direct passes. So in these scearios when the ball is with the centerback, isntead of waiting for the front to generate space, he carries the ball forward reaching the second line of defense, creating an unprecedented situation. If the opposition doesn't engage the cb, he can easily break through and engage the backline. In the other hand, sending their second line toward him destabilize their zonal space and create spaces for the others. However when playing against a strong pressing side that uses high line, it can result in a disaster. In such cases, Flick often adapts by splitting the center backs wide and positionning the pivots vertically while the ball sided fullbacks retreats to partner with the pivot. This creates an asymetric 3 2 shape which provides multiple passing angle from the centerbacks. And they use this asymetric shape to pull the opposition's frontline from oneside to the other. It increases the spaces in the opposite line and on the opposite side where the far sided fullback and the number 10 are ready to receive a direct pass.
However, switching to the opposite side can result into loosing possession. So Flick uses his pivots as the key connectors to the attacking half. For example when the cb has the ball he can pass it to the pivot who can quickly pass to the bottom pivot. This movement pulls the oppositon's frontline closer. It then opens space in the wide for the fullback to receive a direct pass as a third man. When Barcelona is into the opposite's half, under Xavi, the formation looked like a 3 2 5 with the wingers hugging the touchline with the 2 box to box midfielders attacking the half spaces. The left back would move as a second pivot. While this shape looks agressive and has all the zones covered, it was quite rigid and predictable. Under Flick, it becomes more flexible. You will often see the wingers inverting to join the cam ( number 10 ) and creating a central overload. You also might see Yamal staying wide with the striker dropping deep. These positions act as a joker role in Flick's system who would constantly roam around to create spaces for vertical spaces. For example when the cb has the ball you might see 2 of these players dropping deep to receive the ball. It forcefully forces the opposition's second line to engage forward which increases the gap with the last line where the third one is ready to drop deep and receive the second touch who can then again pass to the incoming runner. This pull the last line forward as well which create space behind them for the last player to receive the final touch and face the keeper directly. For this style to work you need players intelligent enough and with a sharp vision to make accurate direct passes. It requires mental training just as physical.
With more players operating in the central areas the opposition is forced to narrow down their structure. This creates a large amount of space for wide players like Yamal to receive and use his dribbbling to create opportunities. Whenever Barcelona plays a free kick or take a cross, Flick instructs Yamal to stay out of the crowded areas and position himself around the edge of the box or zone 14. Due to excellent dribbling and shooting skills, Yamal become very dangerous in these zones. However the ball must reach the final third first. Flick relies heavily on both pivots and center backs to deliver line breaking passes at the right moments. At Bayern, Hansi Flick used players like Thiago and Kimmich who were masters at finding spaces and executing direct spaces. However this approach can be a double edged sword for Barcelona. As with 9 or 10 players contributing to the attack as playmakers, there is sometimes a lack of defensive focus, leading to a lack of control. It makes it difficult to restrict counter attacks efficiently. To solve this, Flick has brought the German way of counterpressing at Barcelona.where he is conditionning his players to respond quickly after loosing the ball and use their energy and stamina to win it back rapidly. If even with this the ball is not won, then it creates a huge amount of space at the back for the opposition to exploit. SoSo Hansi Flick relies on his energetic players who can cover large distances quickly to halt counterattacks. As a result you often see the keeper quickly coming out of his box as a sweeper keeper. You sometimes also see wingers ilke Raphina or Yamal dropping deep to stop these counters. However with pressing and running you need more stamina from these players.
So there is a risk of frequent injuries. Flick only has 18 players at disposabl for 2024 so he had to manage the risk and maintain rotations within players to avoid injuries or else this tactic would backfire with no proper players at the right positions. Due to Lewandowski's age he may not be able to constantly press and engage with the opposition's backline. So flick assigns him to a more passive role where he drops deepper to partner with the 10 and cover the opposition's pivots. Meanwhile both younger wingers take on the responsability of pressing the back line. It forms a narrow 4 2 2 2 shape with all central positions marked. It forces the opposition to go wide to the isolated fullback. As it's done, Barcelone quickly deploys their own wideback to apply press on the ball carrier while the rest of the line shifts to cover and tightly mark al ball sided forwards. However if the opposition plays with a back 3 and so plays with attacking fullbacks/wingbacks then they can outnumber Barcelona's fullbacks. In such scenarios Flick abandon his preferred shape and let the stricker move up to maintain an overload against the back line while one of the pivots join the cam. This widens their shape and gives them more coverage in wide areas. However if the opposition manages to bypass the set up and enters into the attacking half, Barcelona quickly switch to a 4 4 2 setup. Instead of trying to stay compact and zonal, Flickasks his players to keep pressing agressively. As soon as the opposition make direct pass it triggers the pressing from behind and force them to return the pass. Then the front line initiate their man press to push them wider.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
When the opposition tries to advance from the flanks, Hansi Flick uses his wingers to support the fullbacks to create a 2 v 1 and instead of tilting his shape to cover the half spaces, Flick keeps his central players in place and maintain a strong central overlaod against crosses. To cover these gaps you might see one of the front 2 tracking back, often the cam. When the ball is back, Flick prefers high intensity counter attacks where he uses his quick players like Raphina and Yamal to beat the opposition's back line. But the riskier the passes are, the greater the chances of errors are as well. It can leads to silly goals or red cards. Even with 1 less player on the pitch, instead of adding a defender, he still instructs his players to keep attacking and play forward. There is always a risk of conceding from this. Flick plays with a high line to win the ball in the attacking half. However when facing teams who adapt similar vertical principles, they could easily manipulate the Barcelona's high line by using their forwards and target long balls, using the forwards pace. With Barcelona's defense built on mobility they often lack strong defenders. Due to the high positionning of their fullbacks, Barcelona also spaces in the flanks behind them. On the right side, the gap is usually covered by the right pivot. However on the left, due to the advancing movement of the left pivot, Barcelona often struggles to cover the left flank. and has to tilt the back line which weaksn their central coverage against crosses. Barcelona obviously need defenders comfortable with the ball and capable of hitting accurate long rangers. Also he heavily relies on his center back Cubarsi who is just 17 years old like Yamal. Despite his age, Cubarsi possesses all the qualities needed to fit Hansi Flick's energy demanding system.
About the fullbacks, their roles are dependent of the movements from the wingers. On the left, players like Raphina or Torres often operate as false wingers, who starts out wide but usually stay central. This forces Balde to cover the left flank and maintain the width as a wingback. On the right, Yamal prefers to stay near the touchline before cutting inside with the ball. So Koundé typically remains deeper as a fullback to maintain a back 3. But he also advances to support Yamal by making underlapping and overlapping runs. As for the pivots, one would always remain deeper than the other, near the centerbacks, and act like a deep lying playmaker. The other pivot typically functions as a box to box midfielder. who usually operates forward to engageattack but also drops deep when defending. De Jong is the one acting more as a deep lying playmaker here. Most of the direct passes tend to originate from this position. On the left, players like Raphina or Torres often operate as false wingers, who starts out wide but usually stay central. This forces Balde to cover the left flank and maintain the width as a wingback. On the right, Yamal prefers to stay near the touchline before cutting inside with the ball. So Koundé typically remains deeper as a fullback to maintain a back 3. But he also advances to support Yamal by making underlapping and overlapping runs. As for the pivots, one would always remain deeper than the other, near the centerbacks, and act like a deep lying playmaker.
The other pivot typically functions as a box to box midfielder. who usually operates forward to engageattack but also drops deep when defending. De Jong is the one acting more as a deep lying playmaker here. Most of the direct passes tend to originate from this position. The number 10 is similar to a joker role with players like Raphina or Olmo often taking up this role. He would constantly roam randomly and interchange positions with almost all the players. On the right, Yamal use his dribbling qualities to bring goalscoring opportunities. On the left wing, players tend to stay less on the wing and move into spaces you don't expect a winger to be present in. Fianlly upfront similar to his role at Bayern, Lewandowski functions as a versatile complete forward who can drop deep to help to create central overloads and manipulate the opposition's back line, sometimes interchanging with the number 10.
Fabian Hürzeler is the Brighton's manager. It clearly looks like he is not using midfielders at all. He tends to combine both positionnism and relationsim philosophies. His system keep structures of positionnism but he also give certian players the freedome to roam bringing a bit of relationnism as well. Against a high pressing side going man to man, instead of overloading the backline with pivots, Fabian Hürzeler doesn't use them and pushes them further up the pitch to form a front 5. To fill that gap, he gets one of his center back into the pivot role while the goalkepper steps up to fill the vacated spot. This creates a massive 6 5 shape. With no players into the midfield, it forces the opposition's pivots to take a decision : either press the back line to restrict the build up. But then Brighton can play long balls to the front 5 where they have a numerical advantage against the back 4. If they track back to prevent the long balls. then Fabian can easily make build up with 6 v 4 superiority. It also stretchs the opposition's structure in both sides of the pitch. which creates a massive space in the central midfield. So he targets the area to connect both sides. For example when the gk or the cb is in advanced position, the cb who moved into the cdm position usually drops deeper to receive the ball then pass it to the nearest center back. If this movement attracts the opposition's front line toward the back 3, which then frees up the wide fullbacks to invert into the central space, and receive third pass to continue to advance. However when the ball is with the fullback, they will see the advanced pivot dropping deep and then making a forward pass to the advanced center back. These movements pull the opposiiton's deeper markers forward, freeing up the front line to receive the final pass. and gain the numerical superiority against the vulnerable back line.
However if the opposition prioritizes their defense over pressing, it wouldn't work that much so Fabian switches to his plan B approach where one of his advanced pivots drops deep and join the false 6 while the other pivot and the stricker acts like 2 number 10. So instead of maintaining 2 horizontal lines, Hürzeler overloads the midfield to create 2 extra lines. By doing this, it forces the opposition to stretch their structure vertically which allow to create space either by targetting the center backs, either by outnumbering the central spaces with their box midfield. Into the attacking half, the structure looks like either a 3 0 7 either a 3 1 6. Fabian introduced the concept of false 10 who usually stay high up the pitch most of the time. However with almost no midfielders at the center,there is no direct connexion between the back line and the front line. So Fabian often let his middle defenders of the back 3 to advance and act as a false pivot. By having 6 or 7 players joining the front line, Brighton often outnumbers the opposition back line by gaining a + 2 advantage in each area. However even with this overload, if the front line is placed horizontallly, the opposition typically prioritizes protecting the central areas. This reduces the effectiveness of the front overload, forcing them to rely on long crosses or through balls from the wide. To tackle this, Fabian gives both false 10 the freedom to seek relationnism, constantly roaming where the ball is. and help the fornt 5 wherever they need. For example when the wingback faces a 2 v 2 scenario alongside the winger, you will often see the false 10 drifting towards the ball carrier and create a numerical advantage on the wing. If the opposition try to commit more number here, it creates more spaces in central areas or in the opposite side, allowing rest of the front line to make runs between gaps.
This flexibility turns the false 10 into playmakers or forwards who create spaces for their teamates by pulling markers away or move into unexpected places to score. As a result, Marcel Hartel who never score more than 5 goals ina season as a pivot shockingly scored 21 goals and made 16 assists just by playing as a false 10 since Fabian took in charge. With only 3 players at the back it seems at first it's an invitation for the opposition to counter attack. Despite this the club is one of those who conceded the less goals. It's due to their clever counter pressing tactic. When they loose the ball, the 7 attackers are turned into 7 defenders. When the ball is lost the closest player press while the players further out are ready to close all the potential long passes with the players positionned a bit further back are positionned to to cover secondary passing options. If they can't win the ball back even with this, they quickly regroup into a compact defensive shape. The unique thing here is the narrow pentagon formed by the front 3 and the pivots. Reason for this is that whenever the opposition build up from deep, instead of man marking they maintain this shape to block all the central options of the ball carrier. Even if the opposition manages to pass it to the center. the pentagon immediatly presses the receiver from all sides =, forcing them to return the ball. This forces the opposition to go wide with the pivots being given the free role, they quickly move to cover wide passing options rather than staying central. Meanwhile the back line allows the wingback to make man to man agressive press on the ball carrier. It locks down the passing angles from all sides. If the opposition tries to retreat or move back, they quit their horizontal structure and appky an intense men press to push them even further back.
When the opposition tries to advance from the flanks, Hansi Flick uses his wingers to support the fullbacks to create a 2 v 1 and instead of tilting his shape to cover the half spaces, Flick keeps his central players in place and maintain a strong central overlaod against crosses. To cover these gaps you might see one of the front 2 tracking back, often the cam. When the ball is back, Flick prefers high intensity counter attacks where he uses his quick players like Raphina and Yamal to beat the opposition's back line. But the riskier the passes are, the greater the chances of errors are as well. It can leads to silly goals or red cards. Even with 1 less player on the pitch, instead of adding a defender, he still instructs his players to keep attacking and play forward. There is always a risk of conceding from this. Flick plays with a high line to win the ball in the attacking half. However when facing teams who adapt similar vertical principles, they could easily manipulate the Barcelona's high line by using their forwards and target long balls, using the forwards pace. With Barcelona's defense built on mobility they often lack strong defenders. Due to the high positionning of their fullbacks, Barcelona also spaces in the flanks behind them. On the right side, the gap is usually covered by the right pivot. However on the left, due to the advancing movement of the left pivot, Barcelona often struggles to cover the left flank. and has to tilt the back line which weaksn their central coverage against crosses. Barcelona obviously need defenders comfortable with the ball and capable of hitting accurate long rangers. Also he heavily relies on his center back Cubarsi who is just 17 years old like Yamal. Despite his age, Cubarsi possesses all the qualities needed to fit Hansi Flick's energy demanding system.
About the fullbacks, their roles are dependent of the movements from the wingers. On the left, players like Raphina or Torres often operate as false wingers, who starts out wide but usually stay central. This forces Balde to cover the left flank and maintain the width as a wingback. On the right, Yamal prefers to stay near the touchline before cutting inside with the ball. So Koundé typically remains deeper as a fullback to maintain a back 3. But he also advances to support Yamal by making underlapping and overlapping runs. As for the pivots, one would always remain deeper than the other, near the centerbacks, and act like a deep lying playmaker. The other pivot typically functions as a box to box midfielder. who usually operates forward to engageattack but also drops deep when defending. De Jong is the one acting more as a deep lying playmaker here. Most of the direct passes tend to originate from this position. On the left, players like Raphina or Torres often operate as false wingers, who starts out wide but usually stay central. This forces Balde to cover the left flank and maintain the width as a wingback. On the right, Yamal prefers to stay near the touchline before cutting inside with the ball. So Koundé typically remains deeper as a fullback to maintain a back 3. But he also advances to support Yamal by making underlapping and overlapping runs. As for the pivots, one would always remain deeper than the other, near the centerbacks, and act like a deep lying playmaker.
The other pivot typically functions as a box to box midfielder. who usually operates forward to engageattack but also drops deep when defending. De Jong is the one acting more as a deep lying playmaker here. Most of the direct passes tend to originate from this position. The number 10 is similar to a joker role with players like Raphina or Olmo often taking up this role. He would constantly roam randomly and interchange positions with almost all the players. On the right, Yamal use his dribbling qualities to bring goalscoring opportunities. On the left wing, players tend to stay less on the wing and move into spaces you don't expect a winger to be present in. Fianlly upfront similar to his role at Bayern, Lewandowski functions as a versatile complete forward who can drop deep to help to create central overloads and manipulate the opposition's back line, sometimes interchanging with the number 10.
Fabian Hürzeler is the Brighton's manager. It clearly looks like he is not using midfielders at all. He tends to combine both positionnism and relationsim philosophies. His system keep structures of positionnism but he also give certian players the freedome to roam bringing a bit of relationnism as well. Against a high pressing side going man to man, instead of overloading the backline with pivots, Fabian Hürzeler doesn't use them and pushes them further up the pitch to form a front 5. To fill that gap, he gets one of his center back into the pivot role while the goalkepper steps up to fill the vacated spot. This creates a massive 6 5 shape. With no players into the midfield, it forces the opposition's pivots to take a decision : either press the back line to restrict the build up. But then Brighton can play long balls to the front 5 where they have a numerical advantage against the back 4. If they track back to prevent the long balls. then Fabian can easily make build up with 6 v 4 superiority. It also stretchs the opposition's structure in both sides of the pitch. which creates a massive space in the central midfield. So he targets the area to connect both sides. For example when the gk or the cb is in advanced position, the cb who moved into the cdm position usually drops deeper to receive the ball then pass it to the nearest center back. If this movement attracts the opposition's front line toward the back 3, which then frees up the wide fullbacks to invert into the central space, and receive third pass to continue to advance. However when the ball is with the fullback, they will see the advanced pivot dropping deep and then making a forward pass to the advanced center back. These movements pull the opposiiton's deeper markers forward, freeing up the front line to receive the final pass. and gain the numerical superiority against the vulnerable back line.
However if the opposition prioritizes their defense over pressing, it wouldn't work that much so Fabian switches to his plan B approach where one of his advanced pivots drops deep and join the false 6 while the other pivot and the stricker acts like 2 number 10. So instead of maintaining 2 horizontal lines, Hürzeler overloads the midfield to create 2 extra lines. By doing this, it forces the opposition to stretch their structure vertically which allow to create space either by targetting the center backs, either by outnumbering the central spaces with their box midfield. Into the attacking half, the structure looks like either a 3 0 7 either a 3 1 6. Fabian introduced the concept of false 10 who usually stay high up the pitch most of the time. However with almost no midfielders at the center,there is no direct connexion between the back line and the front line. So Fabian often let his middle defenders of the back 3 to advance and act as a false pivot. By having 6 or 7 players joining the front line, Brighton often outnumbers the opposition back line by gaining a + 2 advantage in each area. However even with this overload, if the front line is placed horizontallly, the opposition typically prioritizes protecting the central areas. This reduces the effectiveness of the front overload, forcing them to rely on long crosses or through balls from the wide. To tackle this, Fabian gives both false 10 the freedom to seek relationnism, constantly roaming where the ball is. and help the fornt 5 wherever they need. For example when the wingback faces a 2 v 2 scenario alongside the winger, you will often see the false 10 drifting towards the ball carrier and create a numerical advantage on the wing. If the opposition try to commit more number here, it creates more spaces in central areas or in the opposite side, allowing rest of the front line to make runs between gaps.
This flexibility turns the false 10 into playmakers or forwards who create spaces for their teamates by pulling markers away or move into unexpected places to score. As a result, Marcel Hartel who never score more than 5 goals ina season as a pivot shockingly scored 21 goals and made 16 assists just by playing as a false 10 since Fabian took in charge. With only 3 players at the back it seems at first it's an invitation for the opposition to counter attack. Despite this the club is one of those who conceded the less goals. It's due to their clever counter pressing tactic. When they loose the ball, the 7 attackers are turned into 7 defenders. When the ball is lost the closest player press while the players further out are ready to close all the potential long passes with the players positionned a bit further back are positionned to to cover secondary passing options. If they can't win the ball back even with this, they quickly regroup into a compact defensive shape. The unique thing here is the narrow pentagon formed by the front 3 and the pivots. Reason for this is that whenever the opposition build up from deep, instead of man marking they maintain this shape to block all the central options of the ball carrier. Even if the opposition manages to pass it to the center. the pentagon immediatly presses the receiver from all sides =, forcing them to return the ball. This forces the opposition to go wide with the pivots being given the free role, they quickly move to cover wide passing options rather than staying central. Meanwhile the back line allows the wingback to make man to man agressive press on the ball carrier. It locks down the passing angles from all sides. If the opposition tries to retreat or move back, they quit their horizontal structure and appky an intense men press to push them even further back.
Excellent
Louis auguste je t'ai à l'œil
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Tactical Analysis: Bayern Munich 8-2 Barcelona | Flick’s Complete& Systematic Destruction Of Setien|
Barca wanted to play from the back, starting with Ter Stegen. From the goalkicks the centerbacks would position themselves inside the box while the fullbacks higher up. Bayern, keen to press , had men stationned just outwide the box ready to press, and they pushed their backline extremely high. Bayern could afford to play this very high line due to several factors. Firstly Barcelona didn't have any aerial targets with Suarez only winning only 1 aerial duel. In addition, none of their forwards of wingers are pacy. Couple this with Kimmich, Davies and Alaba all being quick enough to recover, no wonder why they were confident pushing the defensive line high. Bayern's pressing mechanism had variations but one of the most comons was having the extra midfielder willing to push high to cut off the option into Busquets. Bayern used a 4 4 2 press usually with Muller alongside Lewandowski although of course that varied. Once the ball want to one of the centerbacks, Lewandowski often dropped into the midfield onto Busquets to prevent central progression. And crucially, Bayern's wingers were willing to push narrower to potentially press a center back. Lewandowski deep and the wingers pushing narrow meant Bayern kept numbers in the midfield to maintain solidity where Barca have numbers. So if Barca could not work the ball wide into the fullbacks and went back to Ter Stegen, then Lewandowski would press, using his covershadow to keep Busquets marked and onto Ter Stegen and force him into a poor pass, as shown by the 71% pass accuracy by Ter Stegen, compared to Neuer's 88% passing accuracy.
Bayern's press paid off as we saw with Perisic's goal. Even when Barca managed to get pass the press, it was often through the outlets in the wide regions. either from the keeper, or through quick switches after a Bayern men came narrow. Barcelona's 4 4 2 was fluid and often looked like a diamond by times with Messi at the tip and Vidal pushing high almost as a forward. With so many central numbers, Bayern's wingers were often drawn in to defend narrowly, and Bayern didn't get punished for this because Barcelona didn't use traditionnal wingers. So at worst, Bayern would be 1 v 1 in the wide areas. Bayern wanted to deny any space in the central regions. That meant Barcelona's fullbacks were consistently the free mens. This combined with a high line was not really good for Bayern and we saw that in the own goal. We also see this in the second goal where Kimmich was drawn toward Suarez who was in the half space. So Messi finds Alba running behind the line. Perisic doesn't track deep, Kimmich is narrow, as moments earlier he was tracking Suarez. So Alba gets the ball behind the line, leading to Suarez's goal. However it was Semedo who was the main free outlet. Davis tended to tuck in both in high and deeper areas of the pitch, as Messi tended to drift into the right half space zone. And Semedo made hin run and several times, Barcelona found him in dangerous positions. But this area was also Bayern's strenght as if the ball was intercepted here, Semedo was caught high up the pitch, leading to players running into the vacated space. This leds to several Bayern Munich's goals.
With the ball, when Barcelona looked to press high in a 4 4 2, Bayern had at least 2 aerial targets who could combine and try to look for the space in behind the high line, which they managed a few times. Lewandowski and Muller won respectively 4 and 2 aerial duels. When defending, Barcelona used a flat 4 4 2 with Vidal and Young wide. To create numerical advantage against Barcelona's front 2, it was usually Thiago who dropped deep to form the back 3, allowing the fullbacks, Alaba and Davies, to push high up the pitch. Thiago could then switch the ball out wide to the fullback or winger. He attempted 5 long balls and completed all the 5. Allowing the fullbacks so high allowed the wingers to play inside the pitch. So if Goretzka couldn't be the outlet for Thiago, one of the wingers could drop into the midfield to provide an option as well. Having so many men between the lines caused problems for Barcelona. The heat map of the front 4 shows touches across the width of the pitch.This was helped by the fact that aging Messi and Suarez weren't contributing as much as they used too before. So Thiago could often bypass them to join the midfield and increase their overload. But the narrow Bayern's wingers meant they also pinned down Barcelona's wide midfielders deep as they were afraid to leave spaces between the lines. But this also created the problem of having Thiago too long on the ball. Goretzka time and time could be the third running man, knowing that Thiago had little to no pressure from opposition, creating an other passing line. Bayern also used the wide regions expertly. They could do this by drawing Barcelona's fullbacks out of position, often with Alaba moving into the left back position, when Thiago dropped deep, and this created space in b ehind for the run by the fullback. But the main way they did this was through 1 v 1.
This was faciliated by Bayern's narrow wingers and Barcelona's overly narrow midfield, meaning that Kimmich and Alaba were often in 1 v 1. Lewandowski was also very mobile, going by times into the half space for temporarily drawing a fullback, allowing Bayern to move higher up the pitch.Once they were in the wide regions, Bayern was dangerous, mostly by crosses, with Bayern having several numbers attacking the box.
Flick's Barcelona Just HUMILIATED Real Madrid | Tactical Analysis
Real Madrid looked to press in a 4 4 2 with Bellingham and Camavinga on the sides while Valverde and Tchouaméni would remain more as central miedfielders. Barcelona responded to this by playing with a back 3 with Koundé tucking in and Balde affording to be more agressive on the left handside. The way Ancelotti made Vinicius press gave Real Madrid defensive nightmares. Vinicius would press from out to in pretty much in a striaght line. This meant he never kept any Barcelona players in his cover shadow. He never cut out any of the passing lane during his approach so the center back had an easy pass to the miedfield or to Koundé if he wanted. So with 1 pass, Barcelona could easily take out both Vinicius and Mbappé out of the game. Vinicius didn't cover either Koundé either the pivot. Something that can be comon while pressing in a 4 4 2 is having a miedfielder joining the press rather than a winger. This could mean that the front 2 choose to be more passive. Both using their cover shadow to decrease the impact on the 3 v 2 in this region. Or even if a man is pressing they could still keep one of the pivotin their shadow allowing the center to be more protected. But with Vinicius pressing straight, Real Madrid was at disadvantage both at the front line and in the miedfield. Real Madrid tried to counter this disadvantage by playing in a compact 4 4 2 and having both Bellingham and Camavinga so narrow but then that would mean Valverde and Tchouaméni were tasked to press the double pivot much more agressively. Even that was not enough because Koundé could still receive on the outside. Then Camavinga would have to press him, breaking that compact narrow shape. It decreased the gap between the lines that Real Madrid tried to prevent. Being that agressive in the middile while at numerical disadvantage ended up being disastrous for Real Madrid. If a pivot received a pass and passed it to the cam, the cam could run into the back line with plenty of support ahead of him.
Also, Cubarsi's ability to break the lines could find that man in the 10 position. It was made worse by the fact that Lewandowski was never stationar and was wiliing to come deep. If a center back followed him, Lopez had a great movement to make. He was quick to identity the gaps and look to make the most of it. So Real Madrid tried to be more agressive by getting a center back into the 10 earlier and let the other center back handle Lewandowski in 1 v 1. However one trick maneuver or turn and the midfielder would be away from his marker and the opposition can get into extremly dangerous positions. We saw that when Olmo dragged Militao out of his position. Balde could afford to be more agressive on the build up, looking to provide the width and allowing Raphina to move into a 10 position. So Real Madrid had by time 2 number 10 to deal with between the lines. They could technically be 3 v 2 vs Real Madrid's center backs at times. Madrid, just like for their midfield, tried to counter this by playing more narrow, with both Vaazquez and Mendy, the fullbacks, to come more narrow to assist the center backs so when a man pressed, they had more cover. However that left Barcelona's fullbacks with more spaces, especially Balde. That meant that a lot was asked from Bellingham and Vazquez. Bellingham was supposed to be narrow to help the situation into the midfield but also track back while Vazquez had to worry about the secondary 10 while also worrying about Balde out wide. When Koundé pushed up as well, Vinicius tried to take the space behind him. Out of possession, Barcelona used their usual 4 2 4 pressing shape. with the wingers being expected to cover the center backs while Lopez and Lewandowski would cover the pivots. Barcelone was fine with leaving the sides vacated as both Mendy and Vazquez weren't as big of a threat on the ball.
Tactical Analysis: Bayern Munich 8-2 Barcelona | Flick’s Complete& Systematic Destruction Of Setien|
Barca wanted to play from the back, starting with Ter Stegen. From the goalkicks the centerbacks would position themselves inside the box while the fullbacks higher up. Bayern, keen to press , had men stationned just outwide the box ready to press, and they pushed their backline extremely high. Bayern could afford to play this very high line due to several factors. Firstly Barcelona didn't have any aerial targets with Suarez only winning only 1 aerial duel. In addition, none of their forwards of wingers are pacy. Couple this with Kimmich, Davies and Alaba all being quick enough to recover, no wonder why they were confident pushing the defensive line high. Bayern's pressing mechanism had variations but one of the most comons was having the extra midfielder willing to push high to cut off the option into Busquets. Bayern used a 4 4 2 press usually with Muller alongside Lewandowski although of course that varied. Once the ball want to one of the centerbacks, Lewandowski often dropped into the midfield onto Busquets to prevent central progression. And crucially, Bayern's wingers were willing to push narrower to potentially press a center back. Lewandowski deep and the wingers pushing narrow meant Bayern kept numbers in the midfield to maintain solidity where Barca have numbers. So if Barca could not work the ball wide into the fullbacks and went back to Ter Stegen, then Lewandowski would press, using his covershadow to keep Busquets marked and onto Ter Stegen and force him into a poor pass, as shown by the 71% pass accuracy by Ter Stegen, compared to Neuer's 88% passing accuracy.
Bayern's press paid off as we saw with Perisic's goal. Even when Barca managed to get pass the press, it was often through the outlets in the wide regions. either from the keeper, or through quick switches after a Bayern men came narrow. Barcelona's 4 4 2 was fluid and often looked like a diamond by times with Messi at the tip and Vidal pushing high almost as a forward. With so many central numbers, Bayern's wingers were often drawn in to defend narrowly, and Bayern didn't get punished for this because Barcelona didn't use traditionnal wingers. So at worst, Bayern would be 1 v 1 in the wide areas. Bayern wanted to deny any space in the central regions. That meant Barcelona's fullbacks were consistently the free mens. This combined with a high line was not really good for Bayern and we saw that in the own goal. We also see this in the second goal where Kimmich was drawn toward Suarez who was in the half space. So Messi finds Alba running behind the line. Perisic doesn't track deep, Kimmich is narrow, as moments earlier he was tracking Suarez. So Alba gets the ball behind the line, leading to Suarez's goal. However it was Semedo who was the main free outlet. Davis tended to tuck in both in high and deeper areas of the pitch, as Messi tended to drift into the right half space zone. And Semedo made hin run and several times, Barcelona found him in dangerous positions. But this area was also Bayern's strenght as if the ball was intercepted here, Semedo was caught high up the pitch, leading to players running into the vacated space. This leds to several Bayern Munich's goals.
With the ball, when Barcelona looked to press high in a 4 4 2, Bayern had at least 2 aerial targets who could combine and try to look for the space in behind the high line, which they managed a few times. Lewandowski and Muller won respectively 4 and 2 aerial duels. When defending, Barcelona used a flat 4 4 2 with Vidal and Young wide. To create numerical advantage against Barcelona's front 2, it was usually Thiago who dropped deep to form the back 3, allowing the fullbacks, Alaba and Davies, to push high up the pitch. Thiago could then switch the ball out wide to the fullback or winger. He attempted 5 long balls and completed all the 5. Allowing the fullbacks so high allowed the wingers to play inside the pitch. So if Goretzka couldn't be the outlet for Thiago, one of the wingers could drop into the midfield to provide an option as well. Having so many men between the lines caused problems for Barcelona. The heat map of the front 4 shows touches across the width of the pitch.This was helped by the fact that aging Messi and Suarez weren't contributing as much as they used too before. So Thiago could often bypass them to join the midfield and increase their overload. But the narrow Bayern's wingers meant they also pinned down Barcelona's wide midfielders deep as they were afraid to leave spaces between the lines. But this also created the problem of having Thiago too long on the ball. Goretzka time and time could be the third running man, knowing that Thiago had little to no pressure from opposition, creating an other passing line. Bayern also used the wide regions expertly. They could do this by drawing Barcelona's fullbacks out of position, often with Alaba moving into the left back position, when Thiago dropped deep, and this created space in b ehind for the run by the fullback. But the main way they did this was through 1 v 1.
This was faciliated by Bayern's narrow wingers and Barcelona's overly narrow midfield, meaning that Kimmich and Alaba were often in 1 v 1. Lewandowski was also very mobile, going by times into the half space for temporarily drawing a fullback, allowing Bayern to move higher up the pitch.Once they were in the wide regions, Bayern was dangerous, mostly by crosses, with Bayern having several numbers attacking the box.
Flick's Barcelona Just HUMILIATED Real Madrid | Tactical Analysis
Real Madrid looked to press in a 4 4 2 with Bellingham and Camavinga on the sides while Valverde and Tchouaméni would remain more as central miedfielders. Barcelona responded to this by playing with a back 3 with Koundé tucking in and Balde affording to be more agressive on the left handside. The way Ancelotti made Vinicius press gave Real Madrid defensive nightmares. Vinicius would press from out to in pretty much in a striaght line. This meant he never kept any Barcelona players in his cover shadow. He never cut out any of the passing lane during his approach so the center back had an easy pass to the miedfield or to Koundé if he wanted. So with 1 pass, Barcelona could easily take out both Vinicius and Mbappé out of the game. Vinicius didn't cover either Koundé either the pivot. Something that can be comon while pressing in a 4 4 2 is having a miedfielder joining the press rather than a winger. This could mean that the front 2 choose to be more passive. Both using their cover shadow to decrease the impact on the 3 v 2 in this region. Or even if a man is pressing they could still keep one of the pivotin their shadow allowing the center to be more protected. But with Vinicius pressing straight, Real Madrid was at disadvantage both at the front line and in the miedfield. Real Madrid tried to counter this disadvantage by playing in a compact 4 4 2 and having both Bellingham and Camavinga so narrow but then that would mean Valverde and Tchouaméni were tasked to press the double pivot much more agressively. Even that was not enough because Koundé could still receive on the outside. Then Camavinga would have to press him, breaking that compact narrow shape. It decreased the gap between the lines that Real Madrid tried to prevent. Being that agressive in the middile while at numerical disadvantage ended up being disastrous for Real Madrid. If a pivot received a pass and passed it to the cam, the cam could run into the back line with plenty of support ahead of him.
Also, Cubarsi's ability to break the lines could find that man in the 10 position. It was made worse by the fact that Lewandowski was never stationar and was wiliing to come deep. If a center back followed him, Lopez had a great movement to make. He was quick to identity the gaps and look to make the most of it. So Real Madrid tried to be more agressive by getting a center back into the 10 earlier and let the other center back handle Lewandowski in 1 v 1. However one trick maneuver or turn and the midfielder would be away from his marker and the opposition can get into extremly dangerous positions. We saw that when Olmo dragged Militao out of his position. Balde could afford to be more agressive on the build up, looking to provide the width and allowing Raphina to move into a 10 position. So Real Madrid had by time 2 number 10 to deal with between the lines. They could technically be 3 v 2 vs Real Madrid's center backs at times. Madrid, just like for their midfield, tried to counter this by playing more narrow, with both Vaazquez and Mendy, the fullbacks, to come more narrow to assist the center backs so when a man pressed, they had more cover. However that left Barcelona's fullbacks with more spaces, especially Balde. That meant that a lot was asked from Bellingham and Vazquez. Bellingham was supposed to be narrow to help the situation into the midfield but also track back while Vazquez had to worry about the secondary 10 while also worrying about Balde out wide. When Koundé pushed up as well, Vinicius tried to take the space behind him. Out of possession, Barcelona used their usual 4 2 4 pressing shape. with the wingers being expected to cover the center backs while Lopez and Lewandowski would cover the pivots. Barcelone was fine with leaving the sides vacated as both Mendy and Vazquez weren't as big of a threat on the ball.