[Foot - LDC 2025] FC Barcelone - PSG + AS Monaco - Man City (21H)

DE QUELLE PLANETE IL VIENT MENDES AYAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Lien streaming les kheys..... Merci...

De rien.

Barcola pas loin.



Arteta Just Did What Alonso Couldn’t

Atlético for the most part were happy to sit slightly deeper in the early exchanges with the Arsenal center backs seeing a lot of the ball and progressing through their own third pretty easily. As Arsenal shifted to a single pivot system, Sorloth and Alvarez would either sit on Zubimendi or at most they used a piston press with one man remaining on the pivot whilt the other pressed the center back, depending on whether it was Saliba or Gabriel on the ball. As Arsenal pushed up the pitch we saw as usual they like to build with a back 3 with both Timber and Skelly happy to push in depending on the situation although Timber was more willing to overlap on the outside to assist Saka, allowing Saka to move inside of the pitch. Initially Simeone looked to set up defensively similarly to how he did against Madrid. That was by having Simeone to a right wingback with Llorente tucking in so that Atlético Madrid were in a 5 3 2. This shape has a natural advantage of being very strong through the middle and effectively funneling the opponents wide from where Atlético would fancy themselves to deal with the aerial ball. If the winger tried to take on their man instead. Atlétci would at least have time to shift across and assist the wingback. If Arsenal had set up in one of their most preferred structures offensively, which often ends up as a front 5 with the centerl midfielders having pushed higher Atlétci would be perfectly positioned to go man to man with the front line and most importantly, deal with these men in the half spaces. But Arsenal's shape on the pitch was instantly destabilizing. Rice was actually very rarely in this position on the left half space. With Lewis Skelly moving out wide, Barrios begins to shfit in case he ha to press him and Llorente is unsure whether he should follow this deep and create a hole in the back 5 structure or hold his position, potentially leaving Declan Rice free.
So Atléti shifted to a 4 4 2 with Simeone to a more traditional right midfielder position to press Lewis Skelly. Llorente was then wide and now rather than having both forwards on a single pivot, Alvarez and Sorloth sat on Zubimendi and Rice. What Arsenal did well was having constant rotations on the left hand side At times Atlético adapted quite easily but in other times, when Lewis Skelly moved into the midfield, Simeone would be drawn in and with Martinelli holding the width down the left, Llorente could then be drawn out, growing the gap between himself and the center back and making room for potential runs in behind. The left rotations could destabilize Atlético's shape, allowing Arsenal to move off the pitch easily. These left rotations paid off for Arsenal's second goal with Lewis Skelly moving infield. We see temporary indecision as Llorente is unsure if Simeone will move out wide towards Rice, meaning that he would have to push up onto Skelly or would he hold his position. So once Lewis Skelly is able to get past Simeone, it means that Llorente is now 3 v 1 down including Martinelli and Rice. Eventually this gives Martinelli the room for the finish.

Mais frappe

4 corners

Le cyborg a encore frappé.

Jaune sévère pour Nuno Mendes

Trop facile pour le Norvégien, ils avaient 3 jours ouvrés pour intervenir.

l'équipe de la mi temps

Passionnante première mi-temps

Du très haut niveau pour le moment de la part des 2 équipes.



How Amorim’s Risky Tactics Beat Liverpool

Initially it looked like Manchester United were set up in a conventional 5 4 1. Cunha was the highest forward for most of the match. He was the trigger that dictated how Man United defended. He tended to only press when Konaté was on the ball if it was a back 2 or Kerkez if he had tucked in as the third center back Cunha was the press trigger for Mbeumo to move out to in to apply pressure. on the left sided outlet so that the shape suddently became a very lopsided 5 3 2. But especiallywhen Kerkez was a little bit wider, if the left back was looking for room on the flank, it became Diallo's role to back up the press and give more shape to that United midfield with De Ligt then moving slightly wider so United were more in a 4 4 2, applying much higher pressure. This could work in theory but there were holes in this defensive structure. Firstly, in these initial phases, Gakpo was hugging the touchline. And because Man United's defensive shape was flexible, at times being a regular back 5 meant that De Ligt could stay here and at a moment's notice shift into a back 4, meaning that now De Ligt would have a lot of room to make up and try and move to the right back zone in a short period of time. But Liverpool's use of midfield also made the 4 4 2 gameplan a lot less effective. In this match, Gravenberch was a solo pivot, maybe even a solo midfielder at times because it was rare seeing either Mac Allister or Szoboszlai dropping deep to assist him. Instead they stayed high between the lines and that meant when United were in a back 5, De Ligt's attention was on the midfielder between the lines. So shifting to a back 4 would have meant leaving a free man between the lines. So this could lead to some indecisions from the center backs on who to pick up.
As the first half wore on, Kerkez began varying his position a lot more, not just staying wide behind the presser but now also moving inside into this slot which was a lot harder for Diallo to follow into because he still had to worry about Gakpo wide and this made it a lot easier for Kerkez to receive and this triangle of Kerkez, Gakpo and Mac Allister made it difficult for Man United to track. So it's a surprise no t much came from the left side threat. Gravenberch being like a single midfielder creates a single point of failure. If the defensive team is able to cut out the pivot entirely, the progression down the flanks become slow and predictable. Or if they can press him strategically, they can win the ball back and be running at the defense instantly. But before coming off, Gravenberch didn't face any of these issues. Having the second most touches, he was able to dictate the game completly. This was because when Man United were defending in their 5 4 1, rather than keeping Cunha high 2 v 1 down where he wouldn't have much success anyway, it would have been better to have him deep, tying Gravenberch and forcing the center backs to make riskier progressive passes. But in this match Cunha did this either through Amorim's choice or Cunha not having the discipline, meaning that Gravenberch got on the ball easily. Though it could lead to situations where Cunha and Mbeumo press ahead of Gravenberch, leaving Gravenberch completly free. If the pivots were backing up the press, you got situations where Fernandez is higher up the pitch and Casemiro is left 2 v 1 down against Liverpool's pivots. Even when they arrived high up the pitch, Liverpool's chief aim was to have multiple men between the lines who they could look to play into. So it was rarely just these 2 between the lines. When Kerkez was wide, Gakpo moved infield and Salah could do similarly on the other side if Conor Bradley was providing the width.
Liverpool were consistently having success with this with players able to receive between the lines. But they weren't able to find that killer pass. Isak and the fullbacks were keys as Liverpool kept trying to break down Man United's defense. Instead of being in the front line like a traditional line, Isak almost permaneltly took a kind of attacking midfielder role alongside Szoboszlai which had 2 effects. Firstly, the central defender had no direct reference point so Harry Maguire found himself drawn higher up the pitch onto one of the midfielders between the lines much like De Ligt while at the same time the left center back Shaw had to drop with Isak making the back line a lot more unsteady. Though from this shape, Liverpool's fullbacks looked to be the men to break the crooked line, be Kerkez or Bradley. So as the game went on, rather than change the shep to one with more direct midfield protection, Amorim just changed the spaces that his players took up. With the midfield 4 now defending a lot narrower and deeper, making it much harder to find those piercing passes between the lines. But in all of this Man United looked dangerous. Firstly in counter attacks especially when Kerkez has pushed higher up the pitch. Bruno Fernandez's positioning through it caused issues on the defensive end of things, left him perfectly positioned to take advantage of the space behind the fullback. And with Liverpool's rest defense being fairy high, it meant that Fernandez had acres of spaces to hit on transitions which he did more than once. When Liverpool made a raft of changes, switching to a 4 4 2 / 4 2 4 when they were chasing the game, it left the midfield looking extremely sparse especially because both Gravenberch and Mac Allister would look to take advantage of the space outside of United's narrow midfield.
Despite Szoboszlai inverting from right back to try and provide more steel in the midfield, Man United still found it easier to walk the way through the center after Liverpool changed shape. But even in control possession, United identified the weakness in Liverpool. In general, Manchester United took no risks probably due to going ahead so early and Man United constantly went long under any pressure. But when they had some control, they saw a tweark in Liverpool's pressing shape. Often this season we see Liverpool press in more of a 4 4 2 or even a 3 5 2 with Salah joining the forward and Gakpo dropping deep. But because of Man United's back 3, Liverpool's front 3 simply went man to man and this was disastrous. Manchester United didn't have to do anything dramatic. A simple ball to the wingback would often see Diallo get into isolations against Kerkez. That was probably one of the better scenarios because even more than that, the movement of Kerkez left a massive gap between himself and Van Dijk, meaning either Cunha or Mbeumo constantly had acres of room in the half space to run into. Or to just receive and play infield, meaning despite having just a fraction of possession, Man United often looked just as dangerous as Liverpool.

La mi temps était interminable.

PAS DE BUTS MAIS DU LOURD POUR LE PSG

Putain j'ai de ces bugs sur mon stream, ça casse les couilles

Rien de pire.

Putain mais les présentateurs qui font chier avec le classement, gneu gneu machin est dans la zone d'élimination,

Connard c'est que le deuxième match