AYAAAA
This is why modern football is becoming more entertaining once again. And because every single position is becoming an individual battle, it's giving space to more creative players to beat their opponent and finding huge advantages. Compare this to the positional ideology that dominated football over the past decade especially with Pep Guardiola's Man City. It wasn't necessarily the individual player that found the advantage but the system exploiting a specific space. And after a few years of teams figuring out how to defend against this style, it's no longer as effective as it used to be. Offensively speaking, all it takes now is for one player to beat their opponent and there are huge advantages. For example here Gérard Martin is beating Hakimi which makes PSG exposed.
And by going to the opposite flank which we know is a weak point of these man marking systems, Barcelona can quickly create a 2 v 1 and attack in behind. 
But PSG are doing the exact same thing. And we can see that in their equalizer. The advantage here for PSG actually came before they even played a pass. as a miscommunication in the center meant that Yamal was late to close down Pacho and there was a free pass into Mendes. 
With a perfectly timed one-two, the man marking system is exposed as Mendes has now beaten his direct opponent Koundé and there is a lot of space for him to run into. This forces the center backs to shift over and opens up a central gap for Mayulu who slots his shot past Szczęsny
These modern systems mean that the majority of chances aren't necessarly coming after a prolonged periods of possession but rather are being create from much deeper positions when there is still a lot of space to attack in behind the defense. However it's important to highlight that not every single successful team in the modern game plays this way. But these principles are certainly becoming more popular across managers and across leagues.
This is why modern football is becoming more entertaining once again. And because every single position is becoming an individual battle, it's giving space to more creative players to beat their opponent and finding huge advantages. Compare this to the positional ideology that dominated football over the past decade especially with Pep Guardiola's Man City. It wasn't necessarily the individual player that found the advantage but the system exploiting a specific space. And after a few years of teams figuring out how to defend against this style, it's no longer as effective as it used to be. Offensively speaking, all it takes now is for one player to beat their opponent and there are huge advantages. For example here Gérard Martin is beating Hakimi which makes PSG exposed.
With a perfectly timed one-two, the man marking system is exposed as Mendes has now beaten his direct opponent Koundé and there is a lot of space for him to run into. This forces the center backs to shift over and opens up a central gap for Mayulu who slots his shot past Szczęsny
These modern systems mean that the majority of chances aren't necessarly coming after a prolonged periods of possession but rather are being create from much deeper positions when there is still a lot of space to attack in behind the defense. However it's important to highlight that not every single successful team in the modern game plays this way. But these principles are certainly becoming more popular across managers and across leagues.
Monaco purifié.
Topic foot 2025-2026
https://onche.org/topic/9[...]football-saison-2025-2026
Zabarnyi!
Why "Allegrism" is the Most Divisive Tactic in Serie A
At it's core, Allegri ball is all about calculated balance. It's a defensive first mentality, mostly focused on protecting the center, not over committing to a press and forcing the opponents into tricky spaces at once. He used multiple formations throughout his career like the 4 4 2 diamond and the 4 3 3 that earn him his first title with Juventus. But recently at AC Milan he is more known for his 3 5 2 and the compactness his teams adopt when they lose possession. The opposition's center backs are given the time they want to circulate possession but will find it very difficult to pick out a player in the center as the 2 forwards will rotate to block passing routes through the middle. One rotation that is typical of his teams is the way he closes down the opposition's fullbacks. While more aggressive managers would to push their wingbacks forward and slide into a back 4, Allegri wants his box to box midfielders to shift oveer to this side. This makes it difficult for the opponents to build through the center as the whole team shifts over to this flank. If they go down the line, then the wingback and the center back can quickly double up on the opponent. It means the opposition has a bit more space on the opposite flank but even when they break forward, the wingback isn't too far away to apply pressure. Majority of teams in Italy play with a back 3 so in this case it's usually the midfielders who step forward the wide center backs while the strikers will rotate to cover a pass into the holding midfielder. This cautious philosophy remains very similar when his teams want to build an attack. Allagri's attacks are very patient, often circulating possession around the back and not risking a pass forward, waiting for the right moment to strike. He is not someone who wants to push as high up the pitch as possible.
To ensure his team can circulate possession around the back, he ensures his team is as wide as possible and you oftn see these long switches of play from one flank to the other, trying to slowly open up gaps between the defenders. It's also important to note that Allegri isn't a positional manager. There isn't really a specific offensive shape his teams will adopt every time, preferring to focus more on overloads and giving some players the freedom to rotate. At Ac Milan this is someone like Christian Pulisic dropping deep into the midfield and often forming the tip of a midfield diamond with the 3 center backs, rotating all over and helping the team during the build up, while one of the box to box midfielders runs ahead and attack into the half space. But even in this situation his main priority is not to be exposed at the back. So players will consistently rotate under the ball to provide cover. It's by design that his teams rarely concede chances from counter as we can already see with AC Milan this season. And Allegri is h appy to lose one player an attack if it means he has more defensive cover. So this is generally speaking what brought him so much success throughout his career. Make sure the opponent can't score and if you can't nick a goal, that's 3 points in the back. When it works, fans love it like his first stint at Juventus. But when it doesn't, people are quick to call this approach outdated. Since his last Seria A title in 2019, football has undoubtly changed. Teams press more aggressively and defensive lines are higher. Most teams play up from the back and attack with more players. Because of all of these recent tactical changes, every manager has been forced to adapt in a way or another. For example, from opposition goal kicks, the vast majority of elite teams now press in a man marking system, attempting to rush a pass and give the team in possession no easy option. Allegri isn't doing that. He is pressing with 1 or 2 man disadvantage.
There is a compact force in the center which forces play instantly wide but these players usually have time to pick out a pass and move forward. The main priority is still to not get exposed at the back. AC Milan are not going to press you high. But in their deeper load block, there are some subtle hints of an evolution without losing the trademark ideology. Perfect example is their win 1 - 0 over Bologna. Bologna is a brillant team at forcing you back and will spam crosses into the box as much as possible. To adapt to this, the right wingback Saelemaekers being used more aggressively clowing down the fullback and essentially forming a 4 4 2 defensive shape. This meant AC Milan didn't have to drop as deep in the pitch during their defensive phase and were quicker to close down the opponent. When Bologna would move the ball out wide, it was very difficult for them to create an overload. Even when switching in the opposite flank there are still more defensive players in this position and it limited a very dangerous space Bologna always look to exploit. It also gave them important offensive advantages as Saelemaekers and Rabiot were quicker to join the attack just like we saw for their goal. AC Milan start spread out with the right wingback instantly pushing on the defensive line. This leaves a big central gap where the midfielders drop into. Interestingly, the pivot in this team is Luka Modric. But Allegri doesn't want to play directly into him. Rather the first pass from the center backs is often into Rabiot or Fofana with Modric then being an option for the third man pass. This is a brillant use for Modric. It means he is always facing the opponent's goal on the ball and can essentially act as a sort of quarterback, playing these long balls over the top. If AC Milan loses possession, he is instantly ready to provide cover and counter press the opponent. A massive defining factor in why AC Milan are currently doing so well.
. If the pass isn't into the midfielders then they will look for a line breaking pass into the forwards, again with support beneath them for the third man layoff. All of this can be seen in their first goal against Napoli, a wide stretched out shape. During the build up, Modric not giving the team an option and a line breaking pass into Pulisic who does brillantly on the left flank in this case and skips forward with the wingback Saelemaekers attacking the back post. In this team there are a lot of vertical runs ahead of the ball either from the strikers down the center, the box to box midfeilders in the half spaces, or the wingbacks in the flanks. And there are quite a few positional rotations between these players as well so it's not uncommon to see AC Milan attack with with a different set of players every time, something that is definitly a modern trend across Europe's best coaches. In the final third, Modric helps his team circulate possession by playing slightly deeper and it does mean that there are more players that are able to push forward. Allagri hasn't changed completly but he has changed in key areas. HIs football is still cautious and rooted in control but within the structure, there is more flexibility and willingness to adapt to the opponent. But maybe his biggest weakness is also his biggest strenght and he is a manager that refuses to follow trends. In a football world obsessed with pressing shapes and fluid attacking systems, Allegri has doubled down on what brought him success in the first place.
20 Problems with Liverpool and How to FIX THEM ALL!
I don't think Virgil Van Dijk is leading his team the way it needs to be led. When Liverpool get down, concede early, lose, the mentality of the team, it's just sulking. If someone gets past them, they are barely tracking back When the team loses, Van Dijk's countenance falls and the rest of the team falls with him. Konaté has fallen off a lot. Joe Gomez ain't good enough so maybe get Guehi in January 2026. As for Kerkez he probably needs some academy time. Kerkez also never uses his right foot which is a liability. Szoboszlai shouldn't be put in a right back position. Stick to Bradley, Calvin Ramsey or Frimpong. Mac Allister is declining and Liverpool should give him more time with the premium 11. He was maybe Liverpool's best midfielder during their Premiere League winning season. Salah is struggling and the best option would be to play him as a super sub instead of playing him full 90 minutes. As for Wirtz, I think he sees the game in an advanced way, a way the rest of his team didn't figure out yet. As for Isak he seems like he is waiting up front to be fed. Chiesea is Liverpool's best attacker yet Arne Slot is ghosting him. Against defensive vulnerability, Liverpool needs to limit chaos and exposure of their backline. Limit those long throws, corners, set pieces exposure to that backline. The high press has not been working with one player sometimes running around and the rest not following. Liverpool also doesn't have any tactical identity. They need to establish a solid 11 and build synergy between these guys. Then the solution against conceding first would be to start as a low block when out of possession. Liverpool got players who can counter like crazy. Then there is the mental fragility in close games. Everyone must defend. Then there is a strange management problem. Players are not played to their strenghts.
Why "Allegrism" is the Most Divisive Tactic in Serie A
At it's core, Allegri ball is all about calculated balance. It's a defensive first mentality, mostly focused on protecting the center, not over committing to a press and forcing the opponents into tricky spaces at once. He used multiple formations throughout his career like the 4 4 2 diamond and the 4 3 3 that earn him his first title with Juventus. But recently at AC Milan he is more known for his 3 5 2 and the compactness his teams adopt when they lose possession. The opposition's center backs are given the time they want to circulate possession but will find it very difficult to pick out a player in the center as the 2 forwards will rotate to block passing routes through the middle. One rotation that is typical of his teams is the way he closes down the opposition's fullbacks. While more aggressive managers would to push their wingbacks forward and slide into a back 4, Allegri wants his box to box midfielders to shift oveer to this side. This makes it difficult for the opponents to build through the center as the whole team shifts over to this flank. If they go down the line, then the wingback and the center back can quickly double up on the opponent. It means the opposition has a bit more space on the opposite flank but even when they break forward, the wingback isn't too far away to apply pressure. Majority of teams in Italy play with a back 3 so in this case it's usually the midfielders who step forward the wide center backs while the strikers will rotate to cover a pass into the holding midfielder. This cautious philosophy remains very similar when his teams want to build an attack. Allagri's attacks are very patient, often circulating possession around the back and not risking a pass forward, waiting for the right moment to strike. He is not someone who wants to push as high up the pitch as possible.
To ensure his team can circulate possession around the back, he ensures his team is as wide as possible and you oftn see these long switches of play from one flank to the other, trying to slowly open up gaps between the defenders. It's also important to note that Allegri isn't a positional manager. There isn't really a specific offensive shape his teams will adopt every time, preferring to focus more on overloads and giving some players the freedom to rotate. At Ac Milan this is someone like Christian Pulisic dropping deep into the midfield and often forming the tip of a midfield diamond with the 3 center backs, rotating all over and helping the team during the build up, while one of the box to box midfielders runs ahead and attack into the half space. But even in this situation his main priority is not to be exposed at the back. So players will consistently rotate under the ball to provide cover. It's by design that his teams rarely concede chances from counter as we can already see with AC Milan this season. And Allegri is h appy to lose one player an attack if it means he has more defensive cover. So this is generally speaking what brought him so much success throughout his career. Make sure the opponent can't score and if you can't nick a goal, that's 3 points in the back. When it works, fans love it like his first stint at Juventus. But when it doesn't, people are quick to call this approach outdated. Since his last Seria A title in 2019, football has undoubtly changed. Teams press more aggressively and defensive lines are higher. Most teams play up from the back and attack with more players. Because of all of these recent tactical changes, every manager has been forced to adapt in a way or another. For example, from opposition goal kicks, the vast majority of elite teams now press in a man marking system, attempting to rush a pass and give the team in possession no easy option. Allegri isn't doing that. He is pressing with 1 or 2 man disadvantage.
There is a compact force in the center which forces play instantly wide but these players usually have time to pick out a pass and move forward. The main priority is still to not get exposed at the back. AC Milan are not going to press you high. But in their deeper load block, there are some subtle hints of an evolution without losing the trademark ideology. Perfect example is their win 1 - 0 over Bologna. Bologna is a brillant team at forcing you back and will spam crosses into the box as much as possible. To adapt to this, the right wingback Saelemaekers being used more aggressively clowing down the fullback and essentially forming a 4 4 2 defensive shape. This meant AC Milan didn't have to drop as deep in the pitch during their defensive phase and were quicker to close down the opponent. When Bologna would move the ball out wide, it was very difficult for them to create an overload. Even when switching in the opposite flank there are still more defensive players in this position and it limited a very dangerous space Bologna always look to exploit. It also gave them important offensive advantages as Saelemaekers and Rabiot were quicker to join the attack just like we saw for their goal. AC Milan start spread out with the right wingback instantly pushing on the defensive line. This leaves a big central gap where the midfielders drop into. Interestingly, the pivot in this team is Luka Modric. But Allegri doesn't want to play directly into him. Rather the first pass from the center backs is often into Rabiot or Fofana with Modric then being an option for the third man pass. This is a brillant use for Modric. It means he is always facing the opponent's goal on the ball and can essentially act as a sort of quarterback, playing these long balls over the top. If AC Milan loses possession, he is instantly ready to provide cover and counter press the opponent. A massive defining factor in why AC Milan are currently doing so well.
. If the pass isn't into the midfielders then they will look for a line breaking pass into the forwards, again with support beneath them for the third man layoff. All of this can be seen in their first goal against Napoli, a wide stretched out shape. During the build up, Modric not giving the team an option and a line breaking pass into Pulisic who does brillantly on the left flank in this case and skips forward with the wingback Saelemaekers attacking the back post. In this team there are a lot of vertical runs ahead of the ball either from the strikers down the center, the box to box midfeilders in the half spaces, or the wingbacks in the flanks. And there are quite a few positional rotations between these players as well so it's not uncommon to see AC Milan attack with with a different set of players every time, something that is definitly a modern trend across Europe's best coaches. In the final third, Modric helps his team circulate possession by playing slightly deeper and it does mean that there are more players that are able to push forward. Allagri hasn't changed completly but he has changed in key areas. HIs football is still cautious and rooted in control but within the structure, there is more flexibility and willingness to adapt to the opponent. But maybe his biggest weakness is also his biggest strenght and he is a manager that refuses to follow trends. In a football world obsessed with pressing shapes and fluid attacking systems, Allegri has doubled down on what brought him success in the first place.
20 Problems with Liverpool and How to FIX THEM ALL!
I don't think Virgil Van Dijk is leading his team the way it needs to be led. When Liverpool get down, concede early, lose, the mentality of the team, it's just sulking. If someone gets past them, they are barely tracking back When the team loses, Van Dijk's countenance falls and the rest of the team falls with him. Konaté has fallen off a lot. Joe Gomez ain't good enough so maybe get Guehi in January 2026. As for Kerkez he probably needs some academy time. Kerkez also never uses his right foot which is a liability. Szoboszlai shouldn't be put in a right back position. Stick to Bradley, Calvin Ramsey or Frimpong. Mac Allister is declining and Liverpool should give him more time with the premium 11. He was maybe Liverpool's best midfielder during their Premiere League winning season. Salah is struggling and the best option would be to play him as a super sub instead of playing him full 90 minutes. As for Wirtz, I think he sees the game in an advanced way, a way the rest of his team didn't figure out yet. As for Isak he seems like he is waiting up front to be fed. Chiesea is Liverpool's best attacker yet Arne Slot is ghosting him. Against defensive vulnerability, Liverpool needs to limit chaos and exposure of their backline. Limit those long throws, corners, set pieces exposure to that backline. The high press has not been working with one player sometimes running around and the rest not following. Liverpool also doesn't have any tactical identity. They need to establish a solid 11 and build synergy between these guys. Then the solution against conceding first would be to start as a low block when out of possession. Liverpool got players who can counter like crazy. Then there is the mental fragility in close games. Everyone must defend. Then there is a strange management problem. Players are not played to their strenghts.
C'et juste pour Paris, mais ça tient. Défense un peu haute
Les admins svp, vous branlez pas sur du prn 12k 360° VR, ça fait lagguer onche
Monaco déjà de retour !
Topic foot 2025-2026
https://onche.org/topic/9[...]football-saison-2025-2026
Monaco déjà de retour !
Ayaaa, mais non, ils l'ont fait
Les admins svp, vous branlez pas sur du prn 12k 360° VR, ça fait lagguer onche
Ayaaa, mais non, ils l'ont fait
Il a nettoyé la lucarne.
Topic foot 2025-2026
https://onche.org/topic/9[...]football-saison-2025-2026
Ayaaa 1 - 0.
How Chelsea Stopped The Champions
When Chelsea built from deep, Liverpool defended in a lopsided 4 4 2 with Gakpo dropping deep and the midfield going man to man. Liverpool stopped Chelsea from playing through the center most of the time but they walked into Chelsea's trap especially down the left handside. Because in the 4 4 2, Salah had to join Isak in the press to apply man to man pressure to the center backs to force a pass backwards or a long ball where Van Dijk and Konaté would win most of the aerial duels. Salah had to cut the pass through Cucurella by putting him in his cover shadow. But if he got his angle slightly wrong, Cucurella could receive freely forcing Gravenberch to cover the wide region. Even if Salah got his angle perfectly, Enzo could drop deep knowing Gravenberch would follow him, then make a 1 touch pass into Cucurella with Salah not tracking back for most of the part. If Gravenberch came across, Liverpool would be 1 man less in the midfield. Even for the first goal if Caicedo didn't produce such a finish, Garnacho was completly free. But if Cucurella committed high, Salah was perfectly positioned to make the run into the space during transitions. Slot changed things by putting Szoboszlai pressing alongside Isak while keeping Caicedo in his cover shadow. But if Caicedo created the perfect angle for the pass he had time to turn and try to take advantage of the 3 v 2 in the midfield. Or Van Dijk could be drawn out of position to try to even up the numbers in the midfield. Even when Salah was used more wide, there was still a potential 2 v 1 against Bradley because he wasn't a defensive monster. So Slot reverted again to having Salah pressing the center back to have absolute solidity in the center. And the left side overload ended up being essential to the winner.
Just like Liverpool, Chelsea stopped most of their opponent's play through the center. And just like Liverpool were dependent on a wide man to look to apply the pressure in Garnacho. But Garnacho did a much better job consistently cutting out the line to Bradley. Even if he didn't succeed, he was backed up by Cucurella who would push up as Chelsea shifted to a 3 with Neto on the far right side dropping deeper. So where Liverpool looked to gain the advantage was through the center. If Chelsea's midfield were all occupied by going man to man, it presented the opportunity for a fourth man to make the difference. At first it was Isak dropping deep. It could have been successfull had the center back not be so aggressive in dropping with his man. Liverpool even looked to tweak this with Isak moving left and Gakpo being the fourth man. But again the center back did a good job at initially tracking the dropping forward and then passing him on as he drifted wide, allowing him to still be aggressive on the actual fourth man. When Wirte came and dropped a lot, Caicedo was hesitant to follow because of that ability from the forward and the wide man to drop into the space created. While at the same time the opposing movement from the dropping forward and the running midfielder could lead to situations where Liverpool almost took advantage.
How Chelsea Stopped The Champions
When Chelsea built from deep, Liverpool defended in a lopsided 4 4 2 with Gakpo dropping deep and the midfield going man to man. Liverpool stopped Chelsea from playing through the center most of the time but they walked into Chelsea's trap especially down the left handside. Because in the 4 4 2, Salah had to join Isak in the press to apply man to man pressure to the center backs to force a pass backwards or a long ball where Van Dijk and Konaté would win most of the aerial duels. Salah had to cut the pass through Cucurella by putting him in his cover shadow. But if he got his angle slightly wrong, Cucurella could receive freely forcing Gravenberch to cover the wide region. Even if Salah got his angle perfectly, Enzo could drop deep knowing Gravenberch would follow him, then make a 1 touch pass into Cucurella with Salah not tracking back for most of the part. If Gravenberch came across, Liverpool would be 1 man less in the midfield. Even for the first goal if Caicedo didn't produce such a finish, Garnacho was completly free. But if Cucurella committed high, Salah was perfectly positioned to make the run into the space during transitions. Slot changed things by putting Szoboszlai pressing alongside Isak while keeping Caicedo in his cover shadow. But if Caicedo created the perfect angle for the pass he had time to turn and try to take advantage of the 3 v 2 in the midfield. Or Van Dijk could be drawn out of position to try to even up the numbers in the midfield. Even when Salah was used more wide, there was still a potential 2 v 1 against Bradley because he wasn't a defensive monster. So Slot reverted again to having Salah pressing the center back to have absolute solidity in the center. And the left side overload ended up being essential to the winner.
Just like Liverpool, Chelsea stopped most of their opponent's play through the center. And just like Liverpool were dependent on a wide man to look to apply the pressure in Garnacho. But Garnacho did a much better job consistently cutting out the line to Bradley. Even if he didn't succeed, he was backed up by Cucurella who would push up as Chelsea shifted to a 3 with Neto on the far right side dropping deeper. So where Liverpool looked to gain the advantage was through the center. If Chelsea's midfield were all occupied by going man to man, it presented the opportunity for a fourth man to make the difference. At first it was Isak dropping deep. It could have been successfull had the center back not be so aggressive in dropping with his man. Liverpool even looked to tweak this with Isak moving left and Gakpo being the fourth man. But again the center back did a good job at initially tracking the dropping forward and then passing him on as he drifted wide, allowing him to still be aggressive on the actual fourth man. When Wirte came and dropped a lot, Caicedo was hesitant to follow because of that ability from the forward and the wide man to drop into the space created. While at the same time the opposing movement from the dropping forward and the running midfielder could lead to situations where Liverpool almost took advantage.
1 0 Barca
Les admins svp, vous branlez pas sur du prn 12k 360° VR, ça fait lagguer onche
C'et juste pour Paris, mais ça tient. Défense un peu haute
Torres, nonobstant, pouvons-nous être surpris ? Ce PSG n'est pas complet pour ce soir.
Big nigger cock. Jew Women want big black cocks deep inside
Vous voyez Paris finir dans les 8 premiers ?
Les admins svp, vous branlez pas sur du prn 12k 360° VR, ça fait lagguer onche
Vous voyez Paris finir dans les 8 premiers ?
Vous voyez Paris finir dans les 8 premiers ?
Vous voyez Paris finir dans les 8 premiers ?
Ils jouent que du lourd.
Topic foot 2025-2026
https://onche.org/topic/9[...]football-saison-2025-2026
Mendes trop fort.
How Kompany Built Europe's Most Dangerous Attack
Kompany is using aggressive tactics often with 2 players providing cover, 2 players circulating possession and 6 players overloading the defensive line. From the build up it's often Kimmich dropping deep with the right back Laimer already being on the defensive line and creating a 2 v 1 with Olise. These rotations out wide from the holding midfielder creates a lot of pressing issues for the opponents. Do you sit back and allow Kimmich to slowly gain ground or do you press him and risk exposing the center where players like Kane and Gnabry will have more time on the ball.If the opponents get too aggressive then these direct passes over the top are the next solution. With so many forward rotations their build up often looks like a situation where everyone pinning the defenders back and with space to push forward Vincent Kompany is a manager who loves trapping the opponent in their own half. Almost 2 thirds of all Bayern's possession takes place into the opponent's final third.This is where the 2 2 6 shape comes into play. There is so many rotations in this team that they rarely actually resemble this shape. There are 3 key zones where Bayern want to progress the ball. First there is the control zone deeper where there is generally 4 players, the 2 center backs and the 2 holding midfielders. Their duty is to circulate possession and find passes into the front 6. To make it possible there are coutless of different shapes they can adopt. The pivots might be in the midfield to form a box with the center backs, they might form a diamond or might even vacate the center entirely. Anyone can rotate in and out of his zone. Kane might drop deep to collect the ball with Goretzka pushing forward or Olise likes to come in more central position. At times it can even be 5 or 6 players moving the ball around in this area. The next area is the space out wide. which is where the majority of their attacking moves originate from.
.
This area is mostly occupied by the fullback and the winger. The only instructions are one in the half space and one out wide. It's irrevelant which player it is and it's mostly down to the presence of that player. Olise is more comfortable starting out wide but on the other hand, Luis Diaz is often more inverted. Obviously other players are allowed into this zone like Gnabry or even Kane can end up in any of these spaces and it can even lead to a quick overload with a lot of players shifting to one side of the pitch. For example Bayern can put almost all their players on one side of the pitch except 2, often the fullback and the winger who stay on the opposite side ready to attack forward and ready for a switch. Or exploit the defense over committing to one flank and play it directly in behind through the middle. The 2 players out wide are not on the same line. The player out wide will look to stay on the defensive line while the one in the half space will stay a bit deeper. This means Bayern can look to go directly in behind or they can go into the winger with a run into the half space. And these opposite movements create a lot of disruption in the opposition's defensive shape. Finally the last space we see in attack is this central space in front of the defensive line. Maybe the trickiest for the opponent to stop because a lot of time there is no one there. Kane and Gnabry will rotate all over and as Bayern pushes forward, anyone can end up in these positions. The main idea of Kompany is that during attacking phases this space is not that important during the build up. And if you can overload the midfield with as many players as possible, then you will essentially hold on to the ball as much as you want.
The opposition's center backs can't be too aggressive because there is still the threat of this direct ball in behind into the wingers. So they need to stay in line with the fullbacks to ensure that if Bayern play a ball over the top, then it's as wide as possible.This leaves essentially the center backs with nothing to do when Bayern are building their attack. But it's when Bayern enters the final third that we see this zone being flooded with players, runners in behind. Majority of goals of them this season so far are coming from these balls into pockets of space either side of the center backs. Either finishing the shot directly or then looking for cutbacks back arcoss the balls. Because of all these rotations that took place during build up, any player can end up finishing off the move. With 18 goals and 3 assists in 10 matches, Kane has been obviously the main talking point. But all of Bayern's frontline has been on fire with Diaz, Olise and Gnabry all off to great starts as well. Diaz has been a phenomenal addition and is comfortable in this dynamic front 6 This aggressive shape should in theory make them vulnerable at the back but it's not the case and so far they have one of the best defensive records as well. So far they have the lowest xG from counters conceded in the Bundesliga and by far the best defensive record in general. It's all down to the incredible off the ball work rate.
The first priority as soon as possession is lost is to chase down the opponent with a relentless gegenpress. Because they are able to get so many players forward it also means the defenders are in close proximity so are quick to close everyone down. When Bayern counter press there are 3 zones that spread out from where the ball is of varying intensity. First zone has an all out press, chasing the ball and quickly rushing the pass. Then a second larger zone sees players step off their men slightly encouraging the pass into feet so they can then close them down. But also ready to run backwards if the press is broken. In this area it's not uncommon for them to have an extra player as well. Finally in the last zone players are more in a zonal position. The attackers are positioned in a way to instnatly be a threat if possession is won whilst also being quick to close down their man if needed. And the defenders will ensure they are covering any dangerous space in behind. But they also carry this aggression into their normal defensive phase as well. And Bayern just like the majority of elite teams in Europe right now are pressing with a man oriented system. Straight from goal kicks they are right on the edge of the opponent's box, following every movement and not keeping to any specific defensive shape. So many times this has led the opponents looking to play the ball over the top and Bayern simply regaining the ball and starting their attack. In the moments where they do need to drop a bit deeper, then one interesting element is that their most advanced player isn't Harry Kane but Gnabry. This has some extremely benefical consequences when counterattacking, as it means they have a quick player ready to attack the space in behind and Kane's passing range can be used to instantly pick out this run.
How Kompany Built Europe's Most Dangerous Attack
Kompany is using aggressive tactics often with 2 players providing cover, 2 players circulating possession and 6 players overloading the defensive line. From the build up it's often Kimmich dropping deep with the right back Laimer already being on the defensive line and creating a 2 v 1 with Olise. These rotations out wide from the holding midfielder creates a lot of pressing issues for the opponents. Do you sit back and allow Kimmich to slowly gain ground or do you press him and risk exposing the center where players like Kane and Gnabry will have more time on the ball.If the opponents get too aggressive then these direct passes over the top are the next solution. With so many forward rotations their build up often looks like a situation where everyone pinning the defenders back and with space to push forward Vincent Kompany is a manager who loves trapping the opponent in their own half. Almost 2 thirds of all Bayern's possession takes place into the opponent's final third.This is where the 2 2 6 shape comes into play. There is so many rotations in this team that they rarely actually resemble this shape. There are 3 key zones where Bayern want to progress the ball. First there is the control zone deeper where there is generally 4 players, the 2 center backs and the 2 holding midfielders. Their duty is to circulate possession and find passes into the front 6. To make it possible there are coutless of different shapes they can adopt. The pivots might be in the midfield to form a box with the center backs, they might form a diamond or might even vacate the center entirely. Anyone can rotate in and out of his zone. Kane might drop deep to collect the ball with Goretzka pushing forward or Olise likes to come in more central position. At times it can even be 5 or 6 players moving the ball around in this area. The next area is the space out wide. which is where the majority of their attacking moves originate from.
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This area is mostly occupied by the fullback and the winger. The only instructions are one in the half space and one out wide. It's irrevelant which player it is and it's mostly down to the presence of that player. Olise is more comfortable starting out wide but on the other hand, Luis Diaz is often more inverted. Obviously other players are allowed into this zone like Gnabry or even Kane can end up in any of these spaces and it can even lead to a quick overload with a lot of players shifting to one side of the pitch. For example Bayern can put almost all their players on one side of the pitch except 2, often the fullback and the winger who stay on the opposite side ready to attack forward and ready for a switch. Or exploit the defense over committing to one flank and play it directly in behind through the middle. The 2 players out wide are not on the same line. The player out wide will look to stay on the defensive line while the one in the half space will stay a bit deeper. This means Bayern can look to go directly in behind or they can go into the winger with a run into the half space. And these opposite movements create a lot of disruption in the opposition's defensive shape. Finally the last space we see in attack is this central space in front of the defensive line. Maybe the trickiest for the opponent to stop because a lot of time there is no one there. Kane and Gnabry will rotate all over and as Bayern pushes forward, anyone can end up in these positions. The main idea of Kompany is that during attacking phases this space is not that important during the build up. And if you can overload the midfield with as many players as possible, then you will essentially hold on to the ball as much as you want.
The opposition's center backs can't be too aggressive because there is still the threat of this direct ball in behind into the wingers. So they need to stay in line with the fullbacks to ensure that if Bayern play a ball over the top, then it's as wide as possible.This leaves essentially the center backs with nothing to do when Bayern are building their attack. But it's when Bayern enters the final third that we see this zone being flooded with players, runners in behind. Majority of goals of them this season so far are coming from these balls into pockets of space either side of the center backs. Either finishing the shot directly or then looking for cutbacks back arcoss the balls. Because of all these rotations that took place during build up, any player can end up finishing off the move. With 18 goals and 3 assists in 10 matches, Kane has been obviously the main talking point. But all of Bayern's frontline has been on fire with Diaz, Olise and Gnabry all off to great starts as well. Diaz has been a phenomenal addition and is comfortable in this dynamic front 6 This aggressive shape should in theory make them vulnerable at the back but it's not the case and so far they have one of the best defensive records as well. So far they have the lowest xG from counters conceded in the Bundesliga and by far the best defensive record in general. It's all down to the incredible off the ball work rate.
The first priority as soon as possession is lost is to chase down the opponent with a relentless gegenpress. Because they are able to get so many players forward it also means the defenders are in close proximity so are quick to close everyone down. When Bayern counter press there are 3 zones that spread out from where the ball is of varying intensity. First zone has an all out press, chasing the ball and quickly rushing the pass. Then a second larger zone sees players step off their men slightly encouraging the pass into feet so they can then close them down. But also ready to run backwards if the press is broken. In this area it's not uncommon for them to have an extra player as well. Finally in the last zone players are more in a zonal position. The attackers are positioned in a way to instnatly be a threat if possession is won whilst also being quick to close down their man if needed. And the defenders will ensure they are covering any dangerous space in behind. But they also carry this aggression into their normal defensive phase as well. And Bayern just like the majority of elite teams in Europe right now are pressing with a man oriented system. Straight from goal kicks they are right on the edge of the opponent's box, following every movement and not keeping to any specific defensive shape. So many times this has led the opponents looking to play the ball over the top and Bayern simply regaining the ball and starting their attack. In the moments where they do need to drop a bit deeper, then one interesting element is that their most advanced player isn't Harry Kane but Gnabry. This has some extremely benefical consequences when counterattacking, as it means they have a quick player ready to attack the space in behind and Kane's passing range can be used to instantly pick out this run.
Nuno Mendes putain, quel kiffe
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Les admins svp, vous branlez pas sur du prn 12k 360° VR, ça fait lagguer onche