LA MEILLEURE EQUIPE DU MONDE FACE A LA DEUXIEME MEILLEURE EQUIPE DU MONDE EN 2025!
Allez hop hop hop
On s'installe
On s'installe
Lien PSG Barça svp mon IPTV fonctionne pas
Le Baps va les rendre LOCOS
Aya cette humiliation.
Attention au double pivot Pedri - De Jong. Ces 2 là contrôlent tout.
Lien PSG Barça svp mon IPTV fonctionne pas
Ça fait pas longtemps que je l'ai mais maintenant je comprends qu'il y a de fortes chances que ça ne fonctionne pas pour les gros matchs
Le Baps va les rendre LOCOS
Lien PSG Barça svp mon IPTV fonctionne pas
Ça existe encore en 2025 des IPTV qui beug ?
ANTI CUCK GAUCHISTE BLANC
Ça existe encore en 2025 des IPTV qui beug ?
Y a aucune chaîne qui va pas seulement canal ahi
Le Baps va les rendre LOCOS
Ça fait pas longtemps que je l'ai mais maintenant je comprends qu'il y a de fortes chances que ça ne fonctionne pas pour les gros matchs
Ca valait le coup de sortir la CB
Attention au double pivot Pedri - De Jong. Ces 2 là contrôlent tout.
Cet expert en palette.
Yamal vs Nuno Mendes, le duel de feu
Dommage pour Zabarnyi.
Barcelona's NEW Gameplan is Evil
Hansi Flick's approach led Barca to win 3 titles this season; beating Real Madrid in 4 straight Clasicos, humiliating them on several occasions. Flick revitalized the squad. Barcelona is now dominating la liga in a way never seen since Pep Guardiola and Luis Enrique's eras. Even though Xavi gave Barcelona 1 Liga and 1 Supercup, the style didn't really click. Barca suffered 3 defeats in a row against Real Madrid during 2023 / 2024 season. The Supercup final 4 - 1 defeat was particularly painful for them. In 2022 / 2023 season, defeats against Bayern Munich and a draw against Inter Milan eliminated Barcelona in the group stage, forcing them to play the Europa League, which Barcelona couldn't even win, somehow losing to Manchester United. Against Donetsk and Antwerp, there were inexplicable defeats. Childish mistakes, lack of talents and a team that looked made of paper. Then came the defeat in UCL quarter final against PSG in 2024 at Camp Nou. By the end of the season, Barcelona looked broken tactically and mentally, with lack of clear identity, stalled prospects and no real vision for the future. It's when they bring on Hansi Flick who brings a mental, tactical and football revolution. Hansi Flick rebuilt Barcelona in record time. He brought back its competitivity, winning mentality and its pride. They won la Liga, the Supercup and Copa Del Rey, beating all their domestic rivals. Even if they didn't reach the UCL final, barely losing to Inter Milan, they were the top scoring team in the tournament, made epic comebacks delivered unforgettable performances and played attacking football. Even Pep Guardiola praised Hansi Flick's system. It was a change of mentalities, tactics, automations, rythm, intensity and above all, purpose. 4 2 3 1 formation is Flick's basis system. But he gave a level of flexibility and precision only a few could have imagine. In that structure, every player found their ideal role.
And Hansi Flick did all of that while not betraying the club's philosophy. He just reinterpreted it bringing back the essence of Cruyff's positional play. Possession had now a purpose, meaning and edge. It wasn't passing for the ake of passing or keeping the ballin harmless zones. The ball moved with rythm, switchd sides with surgical speed and looked to break lines. It was return to identity but a renewed one. What changed everything was the use of gegenpressing : pressing after losing the ball became a non negotiable principle. And the team turned into a synchronized machine Once they lost the ball, they launched into a fierce recovery mode. it wasn't running around. It was smart, tactically and precise pressure. Thsi high press not only stopped counter attacks but turned recoveries to lethal transitions. The most brillant aspect of this system is the freedom Flick gave to his players. These talents needed room to express themselves so he encouraged constant role interchanges on the pitch. Raphina was no longer for example stuck to the wing because he now operate more as a false attacking midfielder, drifting inside and arriving in the box like a second striker, and unleashing his powerful shots. At the same time, Alejandro Balde, who started as a fullback, morphed into a winger, stretching the left side, pushing higher up the pitch, providing width and depth. These movements were carefully designed mechanisms meant to create numerical superiority and confuse opposing defenses. Barce began attacking through constant rotations, surprise and fluidity. It was positional play with a modern engine. It's now an aggressive animal, dynamic and intelligent. Position was no longer a goal, it was a tool. The team structure was rebuilt to be functional, aggressive and deadly. In early games, the double pivot was formed by Caasdo and Pedri. It was a mix of muscle, control and flair.
Once De Jong returned to full form, double pivot was De Jong and Pedri and the system gained another layer of intelligence. This double pivot didn't just provide defensive balance. It also freed up Pedri to drive transitions and exploit the inner spaces. Another great innovation from Flick was to bring back the number 10 role. And Dani Olmo was crucial in that role, just like Fermin Lopez. Both taking space between the lines with their movements constantly disrupting defensive marks and opening passing lanes. They pierced defenses, forced jewels and pulled center backs out of position. Meanwhile chaos unfolded on the wings with Raphina not being glued to the touchline anymore. He became an inside forward starting from the wing and cutting into central zones. That movement combined with the striker's runs in behind, the second pivot stepping out and Yamal holding width on the right flank. If opponents laid wide, attacking midfielders and inside attacking players exploited the gaps, but close inwards and Yamal would be 1 v 1. Outside Baldé, even Koundé sometimes attacked. More chances, more control and less exposure. By daring to push the defensive line higher, Barcelona was able to attack opponents with overwhelming intensity began defending further up the pitch. That forced rivals to play quicker decisions, to play on the dedge of the offside to run more than usual. Without the ball, Barcelona would press until you suffocated and Real Madrid just like Bayern were completly neutralized by that offside trap.
The backline pushed further up while the opponent's last line dropped deeper. Flick abandonnd Xavi's passive possession game. The touch for the sake of touching died and instead it was a hybrid, everchanging, mutating style. If opponents opened space, Barcelona accelerated and if they needed to slow the match down, they could. And if they needed to kill the game with total control, they could do that too. Barcelona knew how to attack with fury and to manage the tempo with intelligence. But in order to achieve these aggressive and constant stylistic shifts within games, Hansi Flick has to squeeze every tool at his disposal. From 2024 to 2025, the club's finances were still battered from years of mismanagement and Flick knew on day 1 that his success wouldn't depend on who he could sign but rather how he would shape the players he already had. It was about regenerating from within. Cubarsi became essential because of his ability to play from the back with an uncommon composure especially for his age. He had the vision, ability to break lines with his passes and his tactical awareness was on point. Of course when rebuilding on the fly, mistakes were inevitable.
Hansi Flick's approach led Barca to win 3 titles this season; beating Real Madrid in 4 straight Clasicos, humiliating them on several occasions. Flick revitalized the squad. Barcelona is now dominating la liga in a way never seen since Pep Guardiola and Luis Enrique's eras. Even though Xavi gave Barcelona 1 Liga and 1 Supercup, the style didn't really click. Barca suffered 3 defeats in a row against Real Madrid during 2023 / 2024 season. The Supercup final 4 - 1 defeat was particularly painful for them. In 2022 / 2023 season, defeats against Bayern Munich and a draw against Inter Milan eliminated Barcelona in the group stage, forcing them to play the Europa League, which Barcelona couldn't even win, somehow losing to Manchester United. Against Donetsk and Antwerp, there were inexplicable defeats. Childish mistakes, lack of talents and a team that looked made of paper. Then came the defeat in UCL quarter final against PSG in 2024 at Camp Nou. By the end of the season, Barcelona looked broken tactically and mentally, with lack of clear identity, stalled prospects and no real vision for the future. It's when they bring on Hansi Flick who brings a mental, tactical and football revolution. Hansi Flick rebuilt Barcelona in record time. He brought back its competitivity, winning mentality and its pride. They won la Liga, the Supercup and Copa Del Rey, beating all their domestic rivals. Even if they didn't reach the UCL final, barely losing to Inter Milan, they were the top scoring team in the tournament, made epic comebacks delivered unforgettable performances and played attacking football. Even Pep Guardiola praised Hansi Flick's system. It was a change of mentalities, tactics, automations, rythm, intensity and above all, purpose. 4 2 3 1 formation is Flick's basis system. But he gave a level of flexibility and precision only a few could have imagine. In that structure, every player found their ideal role.
And Hansi Flick did all of that while not betraying the club's philosophy. He just reinterpreted it bringing back the essence of Cruyff's positional play. Possession had now a purpose, meaning and edge. It wasn't passing for the ake of passing or keeping the ballin harmless zones. The ball moved with rythm, switchd sides with surgical speed and looked to break lines. It was return to identity but a renewed one. What changed everything was the use of gegenpressing : pressing after losing the ball became a non negotiable principle. And the team turned into a synchronized machine Once they lost the ball, they launched into a fierce recovery mode. it wasn't running around. It was smart, tactically and precise pressure. Thsi high press not only stopped counter attacks but turned recoveries to lethal transitions. The most brillant aspect of this system is the freedom Flick gave to his players. These talents needed room to express themselves so he encouraged constant role interchanges on the pitch. Raphina was no longer for example stuck to the wing because he now operate more as a false attacking midfielder, drifting inside and arriving in the box like a second striker, and unleashing his powerful shots. At the same time, Alejandro Balde, who started as a fullback, morphed into a winger, stretching the left side, pushing higher up the pitch, providing width and depth. These movements were carefully designed mechanisms meant to create numerical superiority and confuse opposing defenses. Barce began attacking through constant rotations, surprise and fluidity. It was positional play with a modern engine. It's now an aggressive animal, dynamic and intelligent. Position was no longer a goal, it was a tool. The team structure was rebuilt to be functional, aggressive and deadly. In early games, the double pivot was formed by Caasdo and Pedri. It was a mix of muscle, control and flair.
Once De Jong returned to full form, double pivot was De Jong and Pedri and the system gained another layer of intelligence. This double pivot didn't just provide defensive balance. It also freed up Pedri to drive transitions and exploit the inner spaces. Another great innovation from Flick was to bring back the number 10 role. And Dani Olmo was crucial in that role, just like Fermin Lopez. Both taking space between the lines with their movements constantly disrupting defensive marks and opening passing lanes. They pierced defenses, forced jewels and pulled center backs out of position. Meanwhile chaos unfolded on the wings with Raphina not being glued to the touchline anymore. He became an inside forward starting from the wing and cutting into central zones. That movement combined with the striker's runs in behind, the second pivot stepping out and Yamal holding width on the right flank. If opponents laid wide, attacking midfielders and inside attacking players exploited the gaps, but close inwards and Yamal would be 1 v 1. Outside Baldé, even Koundé sometimes attacked. More chances, more control and less exposure. By daring to push the defensive line higher, Barcelona was able to attack opponents with overwhelming intensity began defending further up the pitch. That forced rivals to play quicker decisions, to play on the dedge of the offside to run more than usual. Without the ball, Barcelona would press until you suffocated and Real Madrid just like Bayern were completly neutralized by that offside trap.
The backline pushed further up while the opponent's last line dropped deeper. Flick abandonnd Xavi's passive possession game. The touch for the sake of touching died and instead it was a hybrid, everchanging, mutating style. If opponents opened space, Barcelona accelerated and if they needed to slow the match down, they could. And if they needed to kill the game with total control, they could do that too. Barcelona knew how to attack with fury and to manage the tempo with intelligence. But in order to achieve these aggressive and constant stylistic shifts within games, Hansi Flick has to squeeze every tool at his disposal. From 2024 to 2025, the club's finances were still battered from years of mismanagement and Flick knew on day 1 that his success wouldn't depend on who he could sign but rather how he would shape the players he already had. It was about regenerating from within. Cubarsi became essential because of his ability to play from the back with an uncommon composure especially for his age. He had the vision, ability to break lines with his passes and his tactical awareness was on point. Of course when rebuilding on the fly, mistakes were inevitable.
Je bascule sur le multiplex.
Yamal vs Nuno Mendes, le duel de feu
La revanche de la finale de la ligue des nations.
Barcelona vs PSG: The Tactical Blueprint of Modern Football
From man oriented pressing high up the pitch to fluid build up patterns that left the opponent outnumbered, both Enrique and Flick are at the forefront of this subtle tactical evolution. One of the most recent changes in football is how teams look to press. Specifically this man oriented aggressive press we see from some of the best teams in world football. High pressing was already done in the past but usually with 1 or 2 man disadvantage to keep an advantage in the defensive line and not be exposed at the back. But this resulted into the team in possession to play out from the back and move to an offensive position more easy. So by covering every single player further up the pitch, it means build up is no longer straightforward. The trick here is how teams deal with the goalkeeper who will always be the extra player. If we take a look at PSG, as soon as a pass is made into one of the center backs, the player on the opposite side would instantly close off a back pass to the keeper and it would force Barcelona into tricky positions like Koundé being trapped on the flank with every single option picked up. The hidden move for PSG is also to shift the whole balance of the team over to this side of the pitch. So we can see for example that Barcelona do have a free player on the opposite side but there is no way they can play it into him in this position and PSG have now effectively dealt with the extra player.
They now have a clear advantage but Barcelona do the same thing. The team switch from zonal to man marking as soon as the pass to the goalkeeper is triggered.
Barcelona are now in 4 2 3 1 and zonal. The pivots are necessarly locked and PSG's defender Zabarnyi has time on the ball.
PSG circulates around the back and when Pacho plays it back to the keeper, the press is triggered. Torres closes off a pass back to Pacho. Rashford holds his run to first block a pass out wide but is ready to close down the center back Zabarnyi if needed and the Barcelona's 3 midfielderss lock on the 3 PSG's midfielders.
But the msot crucial rotations are also happening at the back. Martin breaks off the defensive line to pick up the fullback and Cubarsi shifts over to pick up PSG's right winger. This leaves the back line in a 3 v 3 but it will be difficult from PSG to create from this position as there are no players in support.
Modern football is essentially this. In not even 10 seconds you need to be able to go from zonal to man marking and know what player you need to pick up. Once Barcelona were able to force one PSG player into the flank then the winger and the fullback of the opposite flank are no longer needed and can move over to help give a numerical advantage. The high line is also needed for this system to work. If PSG or Barcelona didn't start defending right on the halfway line then the spaces between the lines would be too much and even through you are locked into a man marking system, the player on the ball would have more time and space to pick out the right pass and everything would unravel. As the team in possession moves further up the pitch, the defensive team will shift to a zonal marking system with very few managers relying on man marking all across the pitch. As the team in possession moves further up the pitch, the defensive team will shift to a zonal marking system Here for example PSG is shifting to a zonal system.
There is a man disadavantage when it comes to pressing the center backs. But they have a man advantage at the back, defending 2 v 1. This is still an aggressive shape from PSG are there are 5 players actively pressing and 5 who are protecting the defense. The defensive line is high. So the team in possession essentially has 2 options to progress. Either attack the space in behind like they did with Yamal finding Olmo in the half space, or they can play between the lines which they also did. If PSG's center back stepping up to close down any player is not timed correctly, there is space from the ball to break forward.
Barcelona's first goal came from a similar idea with 5 Barcelona players pressing further up the pitch trying to win the ball back early.
This time with Yamal intercepting a pass from Vitinha. pushign forward and Barcelona moved the ball to Rashford who perfectly times his pass into Torres who finished the move. 
These defensive principles that we see both from Luis Enrique and from Hansi Flick generally reflect the majority of what the best teams in Europe are trying to do. What is interesting is how this way of defending is subsequently shaping every single attack. These defensive charges are forcing managers to find creative ways of attacking from the back. Because there are so few options during build up, it does mean that football is becoming slightly more direct withe goalkeepers going long directly into the attackers and looking to win the second ball. But in the moments where they do look to play out from the back, But in the moments they do look to play out from the back, there is a lot of interesting ideas and it's all down to the positionning of the fullbacks.
In recent years we have become so used to the idea of inverted fullbacks that it became the norm to see them in more central positions or already on the defensive line. But currently there is a big shift taking place in this role and it seems to be reverting to how they were mostly used 20 years ago. Because teams press more aggressively by keeping the fullbacks as wide as possible and connected to the center backs, it help stretch and create gaps further up the pitch. This is visible straight from build up. When a team successfully forces the opposition into one flank, they will shift over and leave the player on the opposite flank completly free. It became a common idea that this player was not useful staying this disconnected from the ball. But because teams are now tilting heavily when pressing, having a player completly opposite from the attack can be extremely beneficial.
We see it here with this long switch into Hakimi.
Even though the ball isn't perfect, Barcelona have no player in this position ready to press Hakimi.
It means PSG can move into midfield and force Barcelona back into a zonal marking system. Having the fullbacks stay wide helps circulate possession around the back and opens these pockets of space in the center for the 2 pivots to get on the ball. Something we see consistently both at Barcelona and PSG. And if the opposition gets to aggressive clowing down the fullbacks, then it opens up these 2 gaps mentionned earlier : in front of othe defense, or in behind.
From man oriented pressing high up the pitch to fluid build up patterns that left the opponent outnumbered, both Enrique and Flick are at the forefront of this subtle tactical evolution. One of the most recent changes in football is how teams look to press. Specifically this man oriented aggressive press we see from some of the best teams in world football. High pressing was already done in the past but usually with 1 or 2 man disadvantage to keep an advantage in the defensive line and not be exposed at the back. But this resulted into the team in possession to play out from the back and move to an offensive position more easy. So by covering every single player further up the pitch, it means build up is no longer straightforward. The trick here is how teams deal with the goalkeeper who will always be the extra player. If we take a look at PSG, as soon as a pass is made into one of the center backs, the player on the opposite side would instantly close off a back pass to the keeper and it would force Barcelona into tricky positions like Koundé being trapped on the flank with every single option picked up. The hidden move for PSG is also to shift the whole balance of the team over to this side of the pitch. So we can see for example that Barcelona do have a free player on the opposite side but there is no way they can play it into him in this position and PSG have now effectively dealt with the extra player.
They now have a clear advantage but Barcelona do the same thing. The team switch from zonal to man marking as soon as the pass to the goalkeeper is triggered.
Barcelona are now in 4 2 3 1 and zonal. The pivots are necessarly locked and PSG's defender Zabarnyi has time on the ball.
PSG circulates around the back and when Pacho plays it back to the keeper, the press is triggered. Torres closes off a pass back to Pacho. Rashford holds his run to first block a pass out wide but is ready to close down the center back Zabarnyi if needed and the Barcelona's 3 midfielderss lock on the 3 PSG's midfielders.
But the msot crucial rotations are also happening at the back. Martin breaks off the defensive line to pick up the fullback and Cubarsi shifts over to pick up PSG's right winger. This leaves the back line in a 3 v 3 but it will be difficult from PSG to create from this position as there are no players in support.
Modern football is essentially this. In not even 10 seconds you need to be able to go from zonal to man marking and know what player you need to pick up. Once Barcelona were able to force one PSG player into the flank then the winger and the fullback of the opposite flank are no longer needed and can move over to help give a numerical advantage. The high line is also needed for this system to work. If PSG or Barcelona didn't start defending right on the halfway line then the spaces between the lines would be too much and even through you are locked into a man marking system, the player on the ball would have more time and space to pick out the right pass and everything would unravel. As the team in possession moves further up the pitch, the defensive team will shift to a zonal marking system with very few managers relying on man marking all across the pitch. As the team in possession moves further up the pitch, the defensive team will shift to a zonal marking system Here for example PSG is shifting to a zonal system.
There is a man disadavantage when it comes to pressing the center backs. But they have a man advantage at the back, defending 2 v 1. This is still an aggressive shape from PSG are there are 5 players actively pressing and 5 who are protecting the defense. The defensive line is high. So the team in possession essentially has 2 options to progress. Either attack the space in behind like they did with Yamal finding Olmo in the half space, or they can play between the lines which they also did. If PSG's center back stepping up to close down any player is not timed correctly, there is space from the ball to break forward.
Barcelona's first goal came from a similar idea with 5 Barcelona players pressing further up the pitch trying to win the ball back early.
In recent years we have become so used to the idea of inverted fullbacks that it became the norm to see them in more central positions or already on the defensive line. But currently there is a big shift taking place in this role and it seems to be reverting to how they were mostly used 20 years ago. Because teams press more aggressively by keeping the fullbacks as wide as possible and connected to the center backs, it help stretch and create gaps further up the pitch. This is visible straight from build up. When a team successfully forces the opposition into one flank, they will shift over and leave the player on the opposite flank completly free. It became a common idea that this player was not useful staying this disconnected from the ball. But because teams are now tilting heavily when pressing, having a player completly opposite from the attack can be extremely beneficial.
We see it here with this long switch into Hakimi.
Even though the ball isn't perfect, Barcelona have no player in this position ready to press Hakimi.
It means PSG can move into midfield and force Barcelona back into a zonal marking system. Having the fullbacks stay wide helps circulate possession around the back and opens these pockets of space in the center for the 2 pivots to get on the ball. Something we see consistently both at Barcelona and PSG. And if the opposition gets to aggressive clowing down the fullbacks, then it opens up these 2 gaps mentionned earlier : in front of othe defense, or in behind.
AYAAAA
This is why modern football is becoming more entertaining once again. And because every single position is becoming an individual battle, it's giving space to more creative players to beat their opponent and finding huge advantages. Compare this to the positional ideology that dominated football over the past decade especially with Pep Guardiola's Man City. It wasn't necessarily the individual player that found the advantage but the system exploiting a specific space. And after a few years of teams figuring out how to defend against this style, it's no longer as effective as it used to be. Offensively speaking, all it takes now is for one player to beat their opponent and there are huge advantages. For example here Gérard Martin is beating Hakimi which makes PSG exposed.
And by going to the opposite flank which we know is a weak point of these man marking systems, Barcelona can quickly create a 2 v 1 and attack in behind. 
But PSG are doing the exact same thing. And we can see that in their equalizer. The advantage here for PSG actually came before they even played a pass. as a miscommunication in the center meant that Yamal was late to close down Pacho and there was a free pass into Mendes. 
With a perfectly timed one-two, the man marking system is exposed as Mendes has now beaten his direct opponent Koundé and there is a lot of space for him to run into. This forces the center backs to shift over and opens up a central gap for Mayulu who slots his shot past Szczęsny
These modern systems mean that the majority of chances aren't necessarly coming after a prolonged periods of possession but rather are being create from much deeper positions when there is still a lot of space to attack in behind the defense. However it's important to highlight that not every single successful team in the modern game plays this way. But these principles are certainly becoming more popular across managers and across leagues.
This is why modern football is becoming more entertaining once again. And because every single position is becoming an individual battle, it's giving space to more creative players to beat their opponent and finding huge advantages. Compare this to the positional ideology that dominated football over the past decade especially with Pep Guardiola's Man City. It wasn't necessarily the individual player that found the advantage but the system exploiting a specific space. And after a few years of teams figuring out how to defend against this style, it's no longer as effective as it used to be. Offensively speaking, all it takes now is for one player to beat their opponent and there are huge advantages. For example here Gérard Martin is beating Hakimi which makes PSG exposed.
With a perfectly timed one-two, the man marking system is exposed as Mendes has now beaten his direct opponent Koundé and there is a lot of space for him to run into. This forces the center backs to shift over and opens up a central gap for Mayulu who slots his shot past Szczęsny
These modern systems mean that the majority of chances aren't necessarly coming after a prolonged periods of possession but rather are being create from much deeper positions when there is still a lot of space to attack in behind the defense. However it's important to highlight that not every single successful team in the modern game plays this way. But these principles are certainly becoming more popular across managers and across leagues.
Monaco purifié.
Zabarnyi!
Why "Allegrism" is the Most Divisive Tactic in Serie A
At it's core, Allegri ball is all about calculated balance. It's a defensive first mentality, mostly focused on protecting the center, not over committing to a press and forcing the opponents into tricky spaces at once. He used multiple formations throughout his career like the 4 4 2 diamond and the 4 3 3 that earn him his first title with Juventus. But recently at AC Milan he is more known for his 3 5 2 and the compactness his teams adopt when they lose possession. The opposition's center backs are given the time they want to circulate possession but will find it very difficult to pick out a player in the center as the 2 forwards will rotate to block passing routes through the middle. One rotation that is typical of his teams is the way he closes down the opposition's fullbacks. While more aggressive managers would to push their wingbacks forward and slide into a back 4, Allegri wants his box to box midfielders to shift oveer to this side. This makes it difficult for the opponents to build through the center as the whole team shifts over to this flank. If they go down the line, then the wingback and the center back can quickly double up on the opponent. It means the opposition has a bit more space on the opposite flank but even when they break forward, the wingback isn't too far away to apply pressure. Majority of teams in Italy play with a back 3 so in this case it's usually the midfielders who step forward the wide center backs while the strikers will rotate to cover a pass into the holding midfielder. This cautious philosophy remains very similar when his teams want to build an attack. Allagri's attacks are very patient, often circulating possession around the back and not risking a pass forward, waiting for the right moment to strike. He is not someone who wants to push as high up the pitch as possible.
To ensure his team can circulate possession around the back, he ensures his team is as wide as possible and you oftn see these long switches of play from one flank to the other, trying to slowly open up gaps between the defenders. It's also important to note that Allegri isn't a positional manager. There isn't really a specific offensive shape his teams will adopt every time, preferring to focus more on overloads and giving some players the freedom to rotate. At Ac Milan this is someone like Christian Pulisic dropping deep into the midfield and often forming the tip of a midfield diamond with the 3 center backs, rotating all over and helping the team during the build up, while one of the box to box midfielders runs ahead and attack into the half space. But even in this situation his main priority is not to be exposed at the back. So players will consistently rotate under the ball to provide cover. It's by design that his teams rarely concede chances from counter as we can already see with AC Milan this season. And Allegri is h appy to lose one player an attack if it means he has more defensive cover. So this is generally speaking what brought him so much success throughout his career. Make sure the opponent can't score and if you can't nick a goal, that's 3 points in the back. When it works, fans love it like his first stint at Juventus. But when it doesn't, people are quick to call this approach outdated. Since his last Seria A title in 2019, football has undoubtly changed. Teams press more aggressively and defensive lines are higher. Most teams play up from the back and attack with more players. Because of all of these recent tactical changes, every manager has been forced to adapt in a way or another. For example, from opposition goal kicks, the vast majority of elite teams now press in a man marking system, attempting to rush a pass and give the team in possession no easy option. Allegri isn't doing that. He is pressing with 1 or 2 man disadvantage.
There is a compact force in the center which forces play instantly wide but these players usually have time to pick out a pass and move forward. The main priority is still to not get exposed at the back. AC Milan are not going to press you high. But in their deeper load block, there are some subtle hints of an evolution without losing the trademark ideology. Perfect example is their win 1 - 0 over Bologna. Bologna is a brillant team at forcing you back and will spam crosses into the box as much as possible. To adapt to this, the right wingback Saelemaekers being used more aggressively clowing down the fullback and essentially forming a 4 4 2 defensive shape. This meant AC Milan didn't have to drop as deep in the pitch during their defensive phase and were quicker to close down the opponent. When Bologna would move the ball out wide, it was very difficult for them to create an overload. Even when switching in the opposite flank there are still more defensive players in this position and it limited a very dangerous space Bologna always look to exploit. It also gave them important offensive advantages as Saelemaekers and Rabiot were quicker to join the attack just like we saw for their goal. AC Milan start spread out with the right wingback instantly pushing on the defensive line. This leaves a big central gap where the midfielders drop into. Interestingly, the pivot in this team is Luka Modric. But Allegri doesn't want to play directly into him. Rather the first pass from the center backs is often into Rabiot or Fofana with Modric then being an option for the third man pass. This is a brillant use for Modric. It means he is always facing the opponent's goal on the ball and can essentially act as a sort of quarterback, playing these long balls over the top. If AC Milan loses possession, he is instantly ready to provide cover and counter press the opponent. A massive defining factor in why AC Milan are currently doing so well.
. If the pass isn't into the midfielders then they will look for a line breaking pass into the forwards, again with support beneath them for the third man layoff. All of this can be seen in their first goal against Napoli, a wide stretched out shape. During the build up, Modric not giving the team an option and a line breaking pass into Pulisic who does brillantly on the left flank in this case and skips forward with the wingback Saelemaekers attacking the back post. In this team there are a lot of vertical runs ahead of the ball either from the strikers down the center, the box to box midfeilders in the half spaces, or the wingbacks in the flanks. And there are quite a few positional rotations between these players as well so it's not uncommon to see AC Milan attack with with a different set of players every time, something that is definitly a modern trend across Europe's best coaches. In the final third, Modric helps his team circulate possession by playing slightly deeper and it does mean that there are more players that are able to push forward. Allagri hasn't changed completly but he has changed in key areas. HIs football is still cautious and rooted in control but within the structure, there is more flexibility and willingness to adapt to the opponent. But maybe his biggest weakness is also his biggest strenght and he is a manager that refuses to follow trends. In a football world obsessed with pressing shapes and fluid attacking systems, Allegri has doubled down on what brought him success in the first place.
20 Problems with Liverpool and How to FIX THEM ALL!
I don't think Virgil Van Dijk is leading his team the way it needs to be led. When Liverpool get down, concede early, lose, the mentality of the team, it's just sulking. If someone gets past them, they are barely tracking back When the team loses, Van Dijk's countenance falls and the rest of the team falls with him. Konaté has fallen off a lot. Joe Gomez ain't good enough so maybe get Guehi in January 2026. As for Kerkez he probably needs some academy time. Kerkez also never uses his right foot which is a liability. Szoboszlai shouldn't be put in a right back position. Stick to Bradley, Calvin Ramsey or Frimpong. Mac Allister is declining and Liverpool should give him more time with the premium 11. He was maybe Liverpool's best midfielder during their Premiere League winning season. Salah is struggling and the best option would be to play him as a super sub instead of playing him full 90 minutes. As for Wirtz, I think he sees the game in an advanced way, a way the rest of his team didn't figure out yet. As for Isak he seems like he is waiting up front to be fed. Chiesea is Liverpool's best attacker yet Arne Slot is ghosting him. Against defensive vulnerability, Liverpool needs to limit chaos and exposure of their backline. Limit those long throws, corners, set pieces exposure to that backline. The high press has not been working with one player sometimes running around and the rest not following. Liverpool also doesn't have any tactical identity. They need to establish a solid 11 and build synergy between these guys. Then the solution against conceding first would be to start as a low block when out of possession. Liverpool got players who can counter like crazy. Then there is the mental fragility in close games. Everyone must defend. Then there is a strange management problem. Players are not played to their strenghts.
At it's core, Allegri ball is all about calculated balance. It's a defensive first mentality, mostly focused on protecting the center, not over committing to a press and forcing the opponents into tricky spaces at once. He used multiple formations throughout his career like the 4 4 2 diamond and the 4 3 3 that earn him his first title with Juventus. But recently at AC Milan he is more known for his 3 5 2 and the compactness his teams adopt when they lose possession. The opposition's center backs are given the time they want to circulate possession but will find it very difficult to pick out a player in the center as the 2 forwards will rotate to block passing routes through the middle. One rotation that is typical of his teams is the way he closes down the opposition's fullbacks. While more aggressive managers would to push their wingbacks forward and slide into a back 4, Allegri wants his box to box midfielders to shift oveer to this side. This makes it difficult for the opponents to build through the center as the whole team shifts over to this flank. If they go down the line, then the wingback and the center back can quickly double up on the opponent. It means the opposition has a bit more space on the opposite flank but even when they break forward, the wingback isn't too far away to apply pressure. Majority of teams in Italy play with a back 3 so in this case it's usually the midfielders who step forward the wide center backs while the strikers will rotate to cover a pass into the holding midfielder. This cautious philosophy remains very similar when his teams want to build an attack. Allagri's attacks are very patient, often circulating possession around the back and not risking a pass forward, waiting for the right moment to strike. He is not someone who wants to push as high up the pitch as possible.
To ensure his team can circulate possession around the back, he ensures his team is as wide as possible and you oftn see these long switches of play from one flank to the other, trying to slowly open up gaps between the defenders. It's also important to note that Allegri isn't a positional manager. There isn't really a specific offensive shape his teams will adopt every time, preferring to focus more on overloads and giving some players the freedom to rotate. At Ac Milan this is someone like Christian Pulisic dropping deep into the midfield and often forming the tip of a midfield diamond with the 3 center backs, rotating all over and helping the team during the build up, while one of the box to box midfielders runs ahead and attack into the half space. But even in this situation his main priority is not to be exposed at the back. So players will consistently rotate under the ball to provide cover. It's by design that his teams rarely concede chances from counter as we can already see with AC Milan this season. And Allegri is h appy to lose one player an attack if it means he has more defensive cover. So this is generally speaking what brought him so much success throughout his career. Make sure the opponent can't score and if you can't nick a goal, that's 3 points in the back. When it works, fans love it like his first stint at Juventus. But when it doesn't, people are quick to call this approach outdated. Since his last Seria A title in 2019, football has undoubtly changed. Teams press more aggressively and defensive lines are higher. Most teams play up from the back and attack with more players. Because of all of these recent tactical changes, every manager has been forced to adapt in a way or another. For example, from opposition goal kicks, the vast majority of elite teams now press in a man marking system, attempting to rush a pass and give the team in possession no easy option. Allegri isn't doing that. He is pressing with 1 or 2 man disadvantage.
There is a compact force in the center which forces play instantly wide but these players usually have time to pick out a pass and move forward. The main priority is still to not get exposed at the back. AC Milan are not going to press you high. But in their deeper load block, there are some subtle hints of an evolution without losing the trademark ideology. Perfect example is their win 1 - 0 over Bologna. Bologna is a brillant team at forcing you back and will spam crosses into the box as much as possible. To adapt to this, the right wingback Saelemaekers being used more aggressively clowing down the fullback and essentially forming a 4 4 2 defensive shape. This meant AC Milan didn't have to drop as deep in the pitch during their defensive phase and were quicker to close down the opponent. When Bologna would move the ball out wide, it was very difficult for them to create an overload. Even when switching in the opposite flank there are still more defensive players in this position and it limited a very dangerous space Bologna always look to exploit. It also gave them important offensive advantages as Saelemaekers and Rabiot were quicker to join the attack just like we saw for their goal. AC Milan start spread out with the right wingback instantly pushing on the defensive line. This leaves a big central gap where the midfielders drop into. Interestingly, the pivot in this team is Luka Modric. But Allegri doesn't want to play directly into him. Rather the first pass from the center backs is often into Rabiot or Fofana with Modric then being an option for the third man pass. This is a brillant use for Modric. It means he is always facing the opponent's goal on the ball and can essentially act as a sort of quarterback, playing these long balls over the top. If AC Milan loses possession, he is instantly ready to provide cover and counter press the opponent. A massive defining factor in why AC Milan are currently doing so well.
. If the pass isn't into the midfielders then they will look for a line breaking pass into the forwards, again with support beneath them for the third man layoff. All of this can be seen in their first goal against Napoli, a wide stretched out shape. During the build up, Modric not giving the team an option and a line breaking pass into Pulisic who does brillantly on the left flank in this case and skips forward with the wingback Saelemaekers attacking the back post. In this team there are a lot of vertical runs ahead of the ball either from the strikers down the center, the box to box midfeilders in the half spaces, or the wingbacks in the flanks. And there are quite a few positional rotations between these players as well so it's not uncommon to see AC Milan attack with with a different set of players every time, something that is definitly a modern trend across Europe's best coaches. In the final third, Modric helps his team circulate possession by playing slightly deeper and it does mean that there are more players that are able to push forward. Allagri hasn't changed completly but he has changed in key areas. HIs football is still cautious and rooted in control but within the structure, there is more flexibility and willingness to adapt to the opponent. But maybe his biggest weakness is also his biggest strenght and he is a manager that refuses to follow trends. In a football world obsessed with pressing shapes and fluid attacking systems, Allegri has doubled down on what brought him success in the first place.
I don't think Virgil Van Dijk is leading his team the way it needs to be led. When Liverpool get down, concede early, lose, the mentality of the team, it's just sulking. If someone gets past them, they are barely tracking back When the team loses, Van Dijk's countenance falls and the rest of the team falls with him. Konaté has fallen off a lot. Joe Gomez ain't good enough so maybe get Guehi in January 2026. As for Kerkez he probably needs some academy time. Kerkez also never uses his right foot which is a liability. Szoboszlai shouldn't be put in a right back position. Stick to Bradley, Calvin Ramsey or Frimpong. Mac Allister is declining and Liverpool should give him more time with the premium 11. He was maybe Liverpool's best midfielder during their Premiere League winning season. Salah is struggling and the best option would be to play him as a super sub instead of playing him full 90 minutes. As for Wirtz, I think he sees the game in an advanced way, a way the rest of his team didn't figure out yet. As for Isak he seems like he is waiting up front to be fed. Chiesea is Liverpool's best attacker yet Arne Slot is ghosting him. Against defensive vulnerability, Liverpool needs to limit chaos and exposure of their backline. Limit those long throws, corners, set pieces exposure to that backline. The high press has not been working with one player sometimes running around and the rest not following. Liverpool also doesn't have any tactical identity. They need to establish a solid 11 and build synergy between these guys. Then the solution against conceding first would be to start as a low block when out of possession. Liverpool got players who can counter like crazy. Then there is the mental fragility in close games. Everyone must defend. Then there is a strange management problem. Players are not played to their strenghts.
C'et juste pour Paris, mais ça tient. Défense un peu haute
