[LDC] Demi-Finale retour PSG - Arsenal

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What is a False Nine?

The false 9 is a deep lying striker who drifts away from the center backs into a danger area between the lines, which cause problems to the defense who wonder whether they need to track the player of stay in place. While this term was popularized by Pep Guardiola who utilized Lionel Messi as a false 9 for Barcelona, and by Cesc Fabregas playing in the euro 2012 as a false 9, the idea was popularized by the so called Danube school in the 1930s and was also used by the Hungrarians of the 1950s. Traditional the number 9 has always been football's center forward. The numeros came from a match in 1928, when Sheffield Wednesday played against Arsenal, and Chelsea played against Swansea Town. The 9 took up the central, most advanced position in 2 3 5 formation. Althought the numerization of the defense and midfield could vary depending of the continent, the 9 being the center forward is widely spread across the globe. The 9 plays right in front of the defense or as a pivot, looking to play with the midfielders or another striker more deep. Their role is to score, to get on the end of crosses, to run for through balls. The traditional 9 is a focal point, leading the line and playing against the center backs, trying to find space in behind them to score. Matthias Sindelar, Austrian striker who palyed for Austrian's national side int eh 1930s is probably the first well known false 9 althought Jonathan Wilson noted that a striker playing deeper was not that uncommon. In fact, it was common across central Europe and it was a feature in Argentina's club River Plate in the same area. Sindelar's frame wasn't suited to true 9 so he played deeper to find space and make the wingers and other wide players play. Nandor Hidegkuti did the same for Hungrary national team. These 2 terrorized the English teams who were used to physical number 9, strong, traditional but relatively immobiles.
Pep Guardiola played Lionel Messi as false 9 because of his positional play theory which can be summarized by the superiority created between the lines of pressure through rehearsed movements and rapid passing. Messi was instructed to drop deeper while the wingers either came infield, or stayed wide depending on where the ball was. It created either a triangle, either a diamond or available passes for the midfielders in possession. At least one of the passing options was between the lines of the opposition's midfield and defense. Luca Spalletti's AS Roma side in the 2006 / 2007 season used Francesco Totti as a sort of false 9 before Messi, but he was more of an attacking creative midfielder with some striking duties rather than a striker who dropped off. Neverless, AS Roma's fluid attacking was probably a prompt for tacticians who wanted to exploit the potential of overloads between the lines. With the right personnel, false 9 can be devastative. While most modern teams swapped from man marking to zonal marking, the movement of a good false 9 will create some problems for any back line. Either a center back pushes up on the false 9, isolating his center back partner, dragging in a fullback to cover, either he lets the false 9 dropping deep and it allows the false 9 space and time to either pass or shoot. A midfielder can also drop to mark the false 9, but it creates another overload higher up the pitch. Players finding space and receiving the ball between the lines will cause problems for the opposition. But the greater need for compactness, the rise of more pressing systems and return of back 3 or 5 formations meant that we saw less false 9s in recent seasons.




With Dembélé drifting into pockets of space across the pitch and PSG constantly shifting their shape to create numerical advantages, Arsenal was pinned at the back and looked out of rythm for the first 25 minutes. But Arteta made a key adjustment in their build up and how they press. While it was a 4 3 3 on paper, PSG used a back 3 during build up in diamond structure with Vitinha in the center at the top. Hakimi was used as a wingback, also sometimes moving into central positions. Vitinha would also rotate on the left out wid freeing the flank for Mendes to push forward, with Fabian Ruiz as the holding midfielder. The rotations freed space in the center for either Ruiz, Neves, Hakimi or Dembélé. Dembélé was often playing in line with the midfielders and isolating Arsenal's center backs, meaning PSG could outnumber Arsenal's midfield and find space to attack forward. Their opening goal came at the end of a 26 passes sequence where the rotations can be seen. Eventually as Dembélé get the space to attack the backline PSG is able to pin Arsenal's defenders into place with Kvara, Fabian Ruiz on the left flank and Doué, Neves and even Hakimi on the right flank. As Rice double teams on Kvara with Timber, it frees up space in the edge of the box for Dembélé who finishes the move brillantly. When it came to pressing, PSG adopted a man oriented system and if Arsenal could bypass this ilne, there were a lot of space for them to move into. But more often than not, PSG was able to regain possession high up the pitch. After 25 minutes, Arsenal gradually stopped playing out from the back and instead went long more frequently into their front 4. It found more success althoguh no leading to clear goalscoring chances. It allowed at least to slow the game down, get some free kicks and slowly find their groove into the game as PSG would be stretched with their agressive press. Then these long balls meant that PSG were building out from the back more often.
So Arsenal started to be more agressive in the press. Slowly they switched into a more man oriented system, giving PSG's backline less time to build. They started following Dembélé's movements more closely and overall they were more agressive high up the pitch.So PSG were forced to go long more often. It means that Rice and Merino were able to move the game onto a more physical level. They were able to bring a bit more control into the game. But Arsenal's biggest chance in first half came from Martinelli after they exploited PSG's pressing system weakness. Given Enrique's instructions to PSG players to go man to man when defending, it meant each player had a direct opponent they needed to latch onto. In this game it meant that Hakimi was responsible for picking up Arsenal's left back, Lewis Skelly who would often invert to a more central position. When Skelly was able to turn, it exposed a big gape on Hakimi's flank for Arsenal to move into with a 3 v 2 overload against 2 defenders. Martinelli is then denied by Donnarumma. In second half, the same pattern was seen with Declan Rice breaking forward and finding a free player on Hakimi's flank, the player being Trossard. But Donnarumma made a big save. Arsenal were more agressive in the press in second half and looked to play a lot more direct than they did in the first half. Raya was used in a much more advanced position when building from open play to help Arsenal to bypass PSG's press. Whilst PSG in possession attempted to slow down the tempo of the game as much as possible and run down the clock. Second half had more fouls and counterattacking situations for both teams, making it more chaotic. While Arsenal finished the game with a higher xG then PSG, Paris still created dangerous opportunities with Barcola and Ramos, both players who were subbed on during the second half. The midfield battle was overall entertaining to watch.

Arsenal started strongly in and out of possession. It was clear that set pieces would be a clear area they would look to exploit to make the most of their physicality. So they committed plenty of men for corners and opted for long throws throughout the match. In possession, Arsenal looked to build with a back 2 rather than with a back 3, with Timber. This is because out of possession, PSG didn't press with a front 2 which could have resulted potentially in Arsenal facing a man to man pressure if they built with a back 2. And with Lewis Skelly tucking in early to cause a midfield overload, the Gunners moght have welcomed PSG committing a midfielder to press one of the center backs in a front 2 as this would have meant 1 less man in the midfield and a potentially even bigger overload. But instead PSG stuck with just 1 forward in the defensive phase and rotating center forwards often pressed alone for PSG and if they couldn't cut off the passing lane between the center backs for example when Raya had the ball, Arsenal would get in possession pretty easily and push aggressively into the midfield to try to pick out a pass higher. As for Timber, he took up more of these traditional attacking fullback zones on the flank and that's why PSG often had a lopsided defensive shape as the PSG wingers roughly tracked their fullback with Kvara ofen finding himself almost in a left back position while Barcola was often a bit more central on the other side. So Arsenal tried to take advantage of the opportunity spotted down the left. As the center forward, often being Doué, often pressing Saliba, Kiwior, the other center back pushed very wide, leaving only Saliba as a central man, knowing that Barcola had vacated his right hand side. Kiwior was so wide sometimes that he received it in the left back zone and could find a man immediatly higher up the pitch.
It almost backfired at them when Barcola read the pass from Saliba to Kiwior, intercepted it and started the counter attack with Doué. Declan Rice was the tip of the left hand side of the Arsenal's pentagon. So he often moved into the space down to Arsenal's left hand side outside of PSG's midfield. This was halped by the fact that PSG's midfield tended to defend extremely narrow as they were concerned by Arsenal potentially causing central overloads. This meant that Arsenal could often find either Rice who could then drive centrally or more often release Martinelli. Alternatively, Rice's inside position often drew Hakimi infield a lot earlier, freeing the direct switch to Martinelli. So Martinelli often found himself in 1 v 1 situations against Hakimi. He attempted the most dribbles on the pitch with a mitigated success, having 4 dribbles completed out of 9. Even when he managed to get passed Hakimi, he never managed to get the killer cross. But this shape still caused problems to PSG especially in the second half when Merino was more aggressively dropping deep often to the left hand side alongside Rice or to the left hand side to allow Rice to start deeper instead. PSG didn't want a man to receive in this dangerous zone unchallenged where they could potentially create. But rather than having Marquinhos to push up from center back, as Rice or Merino could have drop even deeper, dragging Marquinhos too far out of position. So the responsability fell on Hakimi to push up on the man in that space. And with Marquinhos not wanting to grant Arsenal's left winger the space to turn, he moved out wide, creating a chasm in the defensive line that Arsenal could potentially exploit. And at a point, the Parisians almost paid for it.

Hakimi was aggressive on Rice so when Trossard receives, Marquinhos had to recover centrally, meaning that Calafiori had the room to cross, and Pacho had been forced across the pitch to cover for Marquinhos, allowing Saka to get into an optimal position. But the majority fo Arsenal's plays did come down their right hand side. Again, PSG's passive defensive shape meant that it could be easier for Arsenal to progress as Kvara was oftenq uite deep. As a result at times, Saliba could directly find Timber or if Timber was under pressure, Odegaard would drop into the right back spot. Again, because of the potential midfield overload with Merino dropping, PSG's midfield could be hesitant to move out wide to press. So Odegaard could find more room here and be the man to progress the ball down the right hand flank. The end goal was almost always to find Saka in as close to an isolation as possible. But Kvara's defensive discipline shone. Whenever he was pushing Timber up but also dropping deep to try and double team on Saka if the ball did go past him at first asking. And PSG operated effectively as an unit as in the scenarios where the winger couldn't get back, Vitinha was usually straight across to back Mendes up. The Parisians wanted to avoid Saka cutting in to have shots. So when double teaming him, if Timber didn't overlap to take a man away, they looked to force Saka down the byline instead. But crucially, Arsenal may have anticipated this as it was clear that on the back post, Rice from that attacking position as well as Martinelli out wide, attacked the back post everytime they could, looking to overpower Hakimi and Marquinhos. And they got close at that, especially with Rice's header at the very beginning of the match. But for all of this attacking play, the risk for Arsenal was clear as especially in settled offensive play, Lewis Skelly and Timber were both quite high up.
So in the transitions, PSG could look lethal when they committed numbers to the transition into these regions. Coming into the tie, PSG were happy to primarily counter attack. In the build up to PSG's second, we see Timber very high, meaning that when there is a turnover, Kvara advances into the box relatively unchallenged. It resulted in PSG's second goal. While this was primarily an out of possession performance from PSG, PSG still did something in possession. Arsenal knew they had to press early and they were effective in doing so with Odegaard often joining Merino, ready to press the center backs from the goal kick, forcing PSG to go long as their fullbacks were being covered by the Arsenal's wingers. Odegaard and Merino could switch to a more piston press with one man pressing the center back while the other man covered a midfielder, ensuring that Arsenal were rarely outnumbered in the central zones, something they were conscious off as in the first leg, whenever the center forward, Dembélé, dropped deep into the midfield. That combined with the pressure on the ball meant that Arsenal were able to win the ball off PSG high up fairly often, leading to transitional opportunities. As a result, PSG went long more often than they would like. In more open play situations, like in the first leg, PSG always built with a back 3 to outnumber the Arsenal's front 2 as they always pressed in a 4 4 2. And we saw Saka having more hesitation pressing aggressively due to the scenarios we saw in the first leg where whenever Saka pressed Mendes, Kvara was able to have isolations against Timber. But more interestingly for PSG was when there was a midfielder who became the third man, freeing Mendes to push higher up.
As with Arsenal needing goals, Saka would not be tracking that deep on Mendes when he pushed high up and isntead would be drawn into pressing that third man, allowing Kvara to infield to have closer connections with the center forward, meaning where PSG were struggling playing through the central press or Arsenal, having 2 men higher up the pitch gave them the ability to play over the press instead when they needed.

With Partey returning for the second leg, Trossard was replaced and Merino was starting as the striker up top. Partey returning allowed Rice to play in a more advanced position, something we saw all season, allowing Arsenal to press more aggressively and get more players into the box. This was what happened in the first minutes of the game with Arsenal winning the ball high up on the pitch and forcing long balls from PSG's back line. This led to a move with Timber winning possession high up the pitch and finding Declan Rice in the back post whose header narrowly misses the goal. Donnarumma's early long kicks into the right flank allowed Arsenal to easily win the aerial duel with Arsenal committing more physical players compared to PSG's smaller, more dynamic wingers and midfielders. Throwings and corners were also advantages used by Arsenal. They also take an excessive amout of time while taking their free kicks, throwings when deep from the opposition's half. This leads for the opposition to feel more pressure as they defend the box for long periods of time. This pressure led to Arsenal's biggest chance of the first half with Odegaard forcing Donnarumma to make an incredible save. Arsenal's shape was also focused on giving PSG's center backs nothing to latch onto and isolating their wingers in a 1 v 1. Firstly Lewis Skelly would invert alongside Partey will Timber would move up in the half space on PSG's left back, forcing Kvara to help out more defensively against Saka. On Arsenal's left flank, Merino would meanwhile shift out wide closer to Martinelli If Arsenal needed someone on the right, it would be Odegaard allowing Arsenal to rotate and outnumber PSG's initial press which was focused on keeping a more man oriented system and was subsequently dragged out of position more frequently.
When starting from the back, the 2 center backs splitted wide and with Saliba pushing forward, he is able to find Timber and Saka in a 2 v 1 against Mendes, giving time for Saka to cut inside and find Martinelli on the left who won another corner. Arsenal's right flank was dangerous for PSG a lot of time, with Saliba having a lot of space to run into and gave Arsenal a lot of confidence that they could continue this pressure for the whole game. PSG's problems could be also aprtially due to Dembélé's absence in first half due to barely coming back from injury, forcing Enrique to come up with a last day solution. Only starting with the 16th minute, PSG started to find a decent spell of possession which resulted into a dangerous opportunity for Kvara after combining with Doué in the center. Whilst PSG's first attempts mostly came from long balls on the right, the focus started to shift more onto the left flank. But the true switch came with a more aggressive defensive mentality, not allowing Arsenal to build as easily as they were from the right flank. Kvara started to push forther up the pitch and even if it left Mendes in 2 v 1, by not allowing Arsenal to play out, it meant Arsenal couldn't exploit it. it was this increased pressure that led to an indirect free kick in the 25th minute with Kvara pushing on Declan Rice and being brought down, which led to Fabian Ruiz's goal. This change of pressure from PSG also changed how Arsenal went to buid. David Raya started going long more frequently. While Arsenal was able to win the aerial duels most of the time thanks mostly to Merino, the main problem for Arsenal in this game and for most of their season was the lack of a big threat in the box.
In open play, it was hard for Arsenal players to break PSG's defensive line. Even when Saka dribbled and crosses or passed, it was rarely met with a teammate who could finish off the move. The second half continued with relatively similar approaches. Arsenal was still looking toothless from structured attacks and exposed to counter attacks from PSG. While Arsenal overall dominated the midfield battle, PSG started increasing their chances coming from out wide. So it still left Arsenal exposed in certain situations. Saka was the only real threat in the box during the second half. After Vitinha missed a penalty, Dembélé entered in the 70th minute and immediatly picked the position of false 9 in which he was so dangerous during the first leg. Whilst he starts up top, his movements away from the defense as a false 9 makes him extremely difficult to pick up and also allowed PSG to move centrally more frequently, with Dembélé's assist for Hakimi to make it 2 - 0. Arteta tried to make som eadjustments with the introduction of Calafiori and Trossard and this helped Arsenal to score 1 goal after rossard's deflected cross landed nicely for Saka. Shortly after, Saka missed the chance to make it 2 - 2 and the match ended 2 - 1 for PSG, 3 - 1 on aggregate.