[LDC] Demi-Finale retour PSG - Arsenal

Le football, il a évolué.

J'ai vu ça avant le match et là, réaction Henni.

Mohamed Henni en colère après la qualification de PSG en finale de la ligue des champions( fou)
7 mai 2025

Il pompait Benzema a fond

Mais pour te dire il parle plus de Benzema du tout, il parle que de Giroud

Il est totalement broken

Comme les algeriens débiles

Il a aucun buzz en plus, il est obligé d'utiliser des multi-comptes

What is a False Nine?

The false 9 is a deep lying striker who drifts away from the center backs into a danger area between the lines, which cause problems to the defense who wonder whether they need to track the player of stay in place. While this term was popularized by Pep Guardiola who utilized Lionel Messi as a false 9 for Barcelona, and by Cesc Fabregas playing in the euro 2012 as a false 9, the idea was popularized by the so called Danube school in the 1930s and was also used by the Hungrarians of the 1950s. Traditional the number 9 has always been football's center forward. The numeros came from a match in 1928, when Sheffield Wednesday played against Arsenal, and Chelsea played against Swansea Town. The 9 took up the central, most advanced position in 2 3 5 formation. Althought the numerization of the defense and midfield could vary depending of the continent, the 9 being the center forward is widely spread across the globe. The 9 plays right in front of the defense or as a pivot, looking to play with the midfielders or another striker more deep. Their role is to score, to get on the end of crosses, to run for through balls. The traditional 9 is a focal point, leading the line and playing against the center backs, trying to find space in behind them to score. Matthias Sindelar, Austrian striker who palyed for Austrian's national side int eh 1930s is probably the first well known false 9 althought Jonathan Wilson noted that a striker playing deeper was not that uncommon. In fact, it was common across central Europe and it was a feature in Argentina's club River Plate in the same area. Sindelar's frame wasn't suited to true 9 so he played deeper to find space and make the wingers and other wide players play. Nandor Hidegkuti did the same for Hungrary national team. These 2 terrorized the English teams who were used to physical number 9, strong, traditional but relatively immobiles.
Pep Guardiola played Lionel Messi as false 9 because of his positional play theory which can be summarized by the superiority created between the lines of pressure through rehearsed movements and rapid passing. Messi was instructed to drop deeper while the wingers either came infield, or stayed wide depending on where the ball was. It created either a triangle, either a diamond or available passes for the midfielders in possession. At least one of the passing options was between the lines of the opposition's midfield and defense. Luca Spalletti's AS Roma side in the 2006 / 2007 season used Francesco Totti as a sort of false 9 before Messi, but he was more of an attacking creative midfielder with some striking duties rather than a striker who dropped off. Neverless, AS Roma's fluid attacking was probably a prompt for tacticians who wanted to exploit the potential of overloads between the lines. With the right personnel, false 9 can be devastative. While most modern teams swapped from man marking to zonal marking, the movement of a good false 9 will create some problems for any back line. Either a center back pushes up on the false 9, isolating his center back partner, dragging in a fullback to cover, either he lets the false 9 dropping deep and it allows the false 9 space and time to either pass or shoot. A midfielder can also drop to mark the false 9, but it creates another overload higher up the pitch. Players finding space and receiving the ball between the lines will cause problems for the opposition. But the greater need for compactness, the rise of more pressing systems and return of back 3 or 5 formations meant that we saw less false 9s in recent seasons.




With Dembélé drifting into pockets of space across the pitch and PSG constantly shifting their shape to create numerical advantages, Arsenal was pinned at the back and looked out of rythm for the first 25 minutes. But Arteta made a key adjustment in their build up and how they press. While it was a 4 3 3 on paper, PSG used a back 3 during build up in diamond structure with Vitinha in the center at the top. Hakimi was used as a wingback, also sometimes moving into central positions. Vitinha would also rotate on the left out wid freeing the flank for Mendes to push forward, with Fabian Ruiz as the holding midfielder. The rotations freed space in the center for either Ruiz, Neves, Hakimi or Dembélé. Dembélé was often playing in line with the midfielders and isolating Arsenal's center backs, meaning PSG could outnumber Arsenal's midfield and find space to attack forward. Their opening goal came at the end of a 26 passes sequence where the rotations can be seen. Eventually as Dembélé get the space to attack the backline PSG is able to pin Arsenal's defenders into place with Kvara, Fabian Ruiz on the left flank and Doué, Neves and even Hakimi on the right flank. As Rice double teams on Kvara with Timber, it frees up space in the edge of the box for Dembélé who finishes the move brillantly. When it came to pressing, PSG adopted a man oriented system and if Arsenal could bypass this ilne, there were a lot of space for them to move into. But more often than not, PSG was able to regain possession high up the pitch. After 25 minutes, Arsenal gradually stopped playing out from the back and instead went long more frequently into their front 4. It found more success althoguh no leading to clear goalscoring chances. It allowed at least to slow the game down, get some free kicks and slowly find their groove into the game as PSG would be stretched with their agressive press. Then these long balls meant that PSG were building out from the back more often.
So Arsenal started to be more agressive in the press. Slowly they switched into a more man oriented system, giving PSG's backline less time to build. They started following Dembélé's movements more closely and overall they were more agressive high up the pitch.So PSG were forced to go long more often. It means that Rice and Merino were able to move the game onto a more physical level. They were able to bring a bit more control into the game. But Arsenal's biggest chance in first half came from Martinelli after they exploited PSG's pressing system weakness. Given Enrique's instructions to PSG players to go man to man when defending, it meant each player had a direct opponent they needed to latch onto. In this game it meant that Hakimi was responsible for picking up Arsenal's left back, Lewis Skelly who would often invert to a more central position. When Skelly was able to turn, it exposed a big gape on Hakimi's flank for Arsenal to move into with a 3 v 2 overload against 2 defenders. Martinelli is then denied by Donnarumma. In second half, the same pattern was seen with Declan Rice breaking forward and finding a free player on Hakimi's flank, the player being Trossard. But Donnarumma made a big save. Arsenal were more agressive in the press in second half and looked to play a lot more direct than they did in the first half. Raya was used in a much more advanced position when building from open play to help Arsenal to bypass PSG's press. Whilst PSG in possession attempted to slow down the tempo of the game as much as possible and run down the clock. Second half had more fouls and counterattacking situations for both teams, making it more chaotic. While Arsenal finished the game with a higher xG then PSG, Paris still created dangerous opportunities with Barcola and Ramos, both players who were subbed on during the second half. The midfield battle was overall entertaining to watch.

With Partey returning for the second leg, Trossard was replaced and Merino was starting as the striker up top. Partey returning allowed Rice to play in a more advanced position, something we saw all season, allowing Arsenal to press more aggressively and get more players into the box. This was what happened in the first minutes of the game with Arsenal winning the ball high up on the pitch and forcing long balls from PSG's back line. This led to a move with Timber winning possession high up the pitch and finding Declan Rice in the back post whose header narrowly misses the goal. Donnarumma's early long kicks into the right flank allowed Arsenal to easily win the aerial duel with Arsenal committing more physical players compared to PSG's smaller, more dynamic wingers and midfielders. Throwings and corners were also advantages used by Arsenal. They also take an excessive amout of time while taking their free kicks, throwings when deep from the opposition's half. This leads for the opposition to feel more pressure as they defend the box for long periods of time. This pressure led to Arsenal's biggest chance of the first half with Odegaard forcing Donnarumma to make an incredible save. Arsenal's shape was also focused on giving PSG's center backs nothing to latch onto and isolating their wingers in a 1 v 1. Firstly Lewis Skelly would invert alongside Partey will Timber would move up in the half space on PSG's left back, forcing Kvara to help out more defensively against Saka. On Arsenal's left flank, Merino would meanwhile shift out wide closer to Martinelli If Arsenal needed someone on the right, it would be Odegaard allowing Arsenal to rotate and outnumber PSG's initial press which was focused on keeping a more man oriented system and was subsequently dragged out of position more frequently.
When starting from the back, the 2 center backs splitted wide and with Saliba pushing forward, he is able to find Timber and Saka in a 2 v 1 against Mendes, giving time for Saka to cut inside and find Martinelli on the left who won another corner. Arsenal's right flank was dangerous for PSG a lot of time, with Saliba having a lot of space to run into and gave Arsenal a lot of confidence that they could continue this pressure for the whole game. PSG's problems could be also aprtially due to Dembélé's absence in first half due to barely coming back from injury, forcing Enrique to come up with a last day solution. Only starting with the 16th minute, PSG started to find a decent spell of possession which resulted into a dangerous opportunity for Kvara after combining with Doué in the center. Whilst PSG's first attempts mostly came from long balls on the right, the focus started to shift more onto the left flank. But the true switch came with a more aggressive defensive mentality, not allowing Arsenal to build as easily as they were from the right flank. Kvara started to push forther up the pitch and even if it left Mendes in 2 v 1, by not allowing Arsenal to play out, it meant Arsenal couldn't exploit it. it was this increased pressure that led to an indirect free kick in the 25th minute with Kvara pushing on Declan Rice and being brought down, which led to Fabian Ruiz's goal. This change of pressure from PSG also changed how Arsenal went to buid. David Raya started going long more frequently. While Arsenal was able to win the aerial duels most of the time thanks mostly to Merino, the main problem for Arsenal in this game and for most of their season was the lack of a big threat in the box.
In open play, it was hard for Arsenal players to break PSG's defensive line. Even when Saka dribbled and crosses or passed, it was rarely met with a teammate who could finish off the move. The second half continued with relatively similar approaches. Arsenal was still looking toothless from structured attacks and exposed to counter attacks from PSG. While Arsenal overall dominated the midfield battle, PSG started increasing their chances coming from out wide. So it still left Arsenal exposed in certain situations. Saka was the only real threat in the box during the second half. After Vitinha missed a penalty, Dembélé entered in the 70th minute and immediatly picked the position of false 9 in which he was so dangerous during the first leg. Whilst he starts up top, his movements away from the defense as a false 9 makes him extremely difficult to pick up and also allowed PSG to move centrally more frequently, with Dembélé's assist for Hakimi to make it 2 - 0. Arteta tried to make som eadjustments with the introduction of Calafiori and Trossard and this helped Arsenal to score 1 goal after rossard's deflected cross landed nicely for Saka. Shortly after, Saka missed the chance to make it 2 - 2 and the match ended 2 - 1 for PSG, 3 - 1 on aggregate.