Imagine la tronche des autres connectés, ils ressemblent à quoi en ton avis ?
Bordel les allemands qui continuent d’huer Cucurella ces rageux ayaaaa
Le goulag c'est la pression, nourrit l'instinct de révolution, donc niksamère la modération
Bordel les allemands qui continuent d’huer Cucurella ces rageux ayaaaa
Finito, carton.
A demain ?
A demain ?
j'y serai perso, bn
Le goulag c'est la pression, nourrit l'instinct de révolution, donc niksamère la modération
j'y serai perso, bn
Bonui
Trop facile pour le PSG.
Arsenal Dominated The Ball, But Something Was Missing
Even before the opening goal, Arsenal dominated the ball. Early on Arsenal tried to operate with a single pivot with Rice looking to drop deep between the center backs. But City defending in a 4 4 2 especially with Bernardo looking to stay touch tight with Rice. So Zubimendi often had to drop alongside Rice to have a double pivot. In these cases Reijnders and Rodri could stay deep. But at times Raya and the center backs could get on the ball and bait City's front 2 into more aggressive pressing. When this happens, Rodri and Reijnders had to back up the press and Calafiori moved into the midfield regions meaning that he and Merino could potentially be options between the lines. Either played without the ball with a narrow front 2 so space were often on the sides. It could be Calafiora but early on Rice drifted into the left back zone. Haaland and Bernardo were not man marking but zonal so Rice had more space on the left. When Foden was drawn to press Rice, Arsenal could go to the final third more easily. But Arsenal changed tactics. Rather than operating with 2 men wide, either Trossard or Calafiori would move into the half space earlier hoping to make life harder for Khusanov. But Foden had them in his cover shadow. So he knew that pass was not possible, allowing Khusanov to move onto the wide man. And Foden could press the man if neeeded as long as the man higher up was still in his cover shadow. If Aresnal was able to get the ball out on the flank early, there would be 2 v 1 with the man in the half space able to make a run to receive. This would have happened more if the wide man initially dropped deep so Khusanov wasn't only worried about covering his horizontal space but also the vertical space. But for most part the wide men for Arsenal both tended to be quite high up the pitch. But there was an advantageattacking to Arsenal of this new shape.
Trossard threatened to be the difference maker because if Calafiori was wide, this tended to unlock the Belgian, letting him drift into more central space, picking up the ball unmarked. Once the initial defensive line was broken, Doku was sometimes caught higher up with Timber and Arsenal had the opportunity to find Madueke in an isolation against O'Reilly. But when he was on the pitch, O'Reilly was a rock defensively. When Arsenal moved higher up, Man City made a good job at dropping into a compact 4 4 2. Arsenal had touches everywhere on the pitch except in zone 14, the most dangerous part of the pitch. In second half, City were more passive in defense and Arsenal decided they didn't need to drop into a double pivot as there was less pressure on the build up. They entrusted Rice to do all of the early progression allowing Zubimendi to push higher up and Enze on for Merino. If Reijnders pushed up into Zubimendi, Eze could receive more freely. But if he stayed on Eze, Zubimendi would receive before moving up the pitch. But Arsenal also struggled the break the lines to get the ball to Eze consistently. But when Eze received he was excellent at receiving on the half turn and combining seamlessly with Saka on the right. and then offer making runs into the half space. These runs and Arsenal's adaptability to get between the lines were a huge reason of why City switched to a 5 4 1. It made it even harder for Arsenal to break the line and find a man between the lines. But City also had a wingback ready to rpess Saka when he got the ball while the wide center back would be ready to adress any run into the half space from Eze.
Comment Arteta a forcé Pep à jouer avec une défense à 7
City used a 4 1 4 1, Arsenal a 4 3 3. Rice was used deep as a pivot. When Raya was on the ball the cente rbacks would split wide with left back Calafiori either moving inside to form the box midfield or would hug the touchline with Trossard moving inside. In defense Man City doesn't adopt a man marking system. This match had Reijnders hovering between the 2 pivots and play in a 2 man disadvantage when considering the goalkeeper. Calafiora, Trossard and RIce often rotated. Zubimendi and Rice often dropped next to the defenders to get the ball meaning that at times Arsenal could end up with 5 outfield players behind the line of the ball. That meant City would schuffle from side to side to stop any ball through the middle.
.
Arsenal Dominated The Ball, But Something Was Missing
Even before the opening goal, Arsenal dominated the ball. Early on Arsenal tried to operate with a single pivot with Rice looking to drop deep between the center backs. But City defending in a 4 4 2 especially with Bernardo looking to stay touch tight with Rice. So Zubimendi often had to drop alongside Rice to have a double pivot. In these cases Reijnders and Rodri could stay deep. But at times Raya and the center backs could get on the ball and bait City's front 2 into more aggressive pressing. When this happens, Rodri and Reijnders had to back up the press and Calafiori moved into the midfield regions meaning that he and Merino could potentially be options between the lines. Either played without the ball with a narrow front 2 so space were often on the sides. It could be Calafiora but early on Rice drifted into the left back zone. Haaland and Bernardo were not man marking but zonal so Rice had more space on the left. When Foden was drawn to press Rice, Arsenal could go to the final third more easily. But Arsenal changed tactics. Rather than operating with 2 men wide, either Trossard or Calafiori would move into the half space earlier hoping to make life harder for Khusanov. But Foden had them in his cover shadow. So he knew that pass was not possible, allowing Khusanov to move onto the wide man. And Foden could press the man if neeeded as long as the man higher up was still in his cover shadow. If Aresnal was able to get the ball out on the flank early, there would be 2 v 1 with the man in the half space able to make a run to receive. This would have happened more if the wide man initially dropped deep so Khusanov wasn't only worried about covering his horizontal space but also the vertical space. But for most part the wide men for Arsenal both tended to be quite high up the pitch. But there was an advantageattacking to Arsenal of this new shape.
Trossard threatened to be the difference maker because if Calafiori was wide, this tended to unlock the Belgian, letting him drift into more central space, picking up the ball unmarked. Once the initial defensive line was broken, Doku was sometimes caught higher up with Timber and Arsenal had the opportunity to find Madueke in an isolation against O'Reilly. But when he was on the pitch, O'Reilly was a rock defensively. When Arsenal moved higher up, Man City made a good job at dropping into a compact 4 4 2. Arsenal had touches everywhere on the pitch except in zone 14, the most dangerous part of the pitch. In second half, City were more passive in defense and Arsenal decided they didn't need to drop into a double pivot as there was less pressure on the build up. They entrusted Rice to do all of the early progression allowing Zubimendi to push higher up and Enze on for Merino. If Reijnders pushed up into Zubimendi, Eze could receive more freely. But if he stayed on Eze, Zubimendi would receive before moving up the pitch. But Arsenal also struggled the break the lines to get the ball to Eze consistently. But when Eze received he was excellent at receiving on the half turn and combining seamlessly with Saka on the right. and then offer making runs into the half space. These runs and Arsenal's adaptability to get between the lines were a huge reason of why City switched to a 5 4 1. It made it even harder for Arsenal to break the line and find a man between the lines. But City also had a wingback ready to rpess Saka when he got the ball while the wide center back would be ready to adress any run into the half space from Eze.
Comment Arteta a forcé Pep à jouer avec une défense à 7
City used a 4 1 4 1, Arsenal a 4 3 3. Rice was used deep as a pivot. When Raya was on the ball the cente rbacks would split wide with left back Calafiori either moving inside to form the box midfield or would hug the touchline with Trossard moving inside. In defense Man City doesn't adopt a man marking system. This match had Reijnders hovering between the 2 pivots and play in a 2 man disadvantage when considering the goalkeeper. Calafiora, Trossard and RIce often rotated. Zubimendi and Rice often dropped next to the defenders to get the ball meaning that at times Arsenal could end up with 5 outfield players behind the line of the ball. That meant City would schuffle from side to side to stop any ball through the middle.
.
Chelsea 3 - 1 Bayern
The Best Tactical Match Of The Season So Far
Chelsea's tactics were pretty solid but this was a day where Bayern's risks paid off. Early Bayern would shift in a back 3 during build up with Kimmich looking for spaces outside the center backsand between the center backs. But Chelsea was comfortable pressing man to man. Because of how Chelsea set up in defense, the weakness was in Chelsea's right flank. When Chelsea defended they were in a vey lopsided 4 5 1 with Palmer at times looking like atucked in winger. Especially if Neuer was the third man, allowing the left center back wider or if Tah was more aggressive in pushing high with the ball, Palmer could be drawn into a center forward position making it a lopsided 4 4 2. But when Palmer came centrally, no one in the midfield was shifitng across leading to situations when Stanisic as left back received with no one pressuring him. In the midfield when possible, Chelsea looked to be aggressive in their man to man press of Bayern's midfield. Bayern looked to break this through constant rotations. But it's not just a forward dropping and a midfield running in beyond. Botht he forward and the attacking midfielder would drop very deep forcing Chelsea into a decision and often, Chelsea looked ton continue to be aggressive with their man to man press meaning that a defensive midfielder and a center back were drawn out of position leaving gaping holes in the most important parts of the pitch. In the first half if Neuer was the third man with Stanisic ready to receive on the outside left of the pitch and Olise holding the width down the right, it was often Laimer from his right back position who had the freedom to operate as a free man finding space wherever appropriate. Chelsea were quickly forced into trade offs beacuse we could at time see the remaining pivot, often Caicedo dropping off. But that would mean that the aggressive man to man press in the midfield had all of a sudden disappeared.
So Chelsea could isntead shift to a hybrid system that combined both zonal and man to man principles where when the forwards initially began to drop deep, the center back and the pivot would be man to man whilst their men were in their zones. Once they dropped too deep, they would look to pass that man on to one of their teammates higher up the pitch. That sounds great in theory and it did work at times but this system requires immaculate communication. So switching to it mid match when your opponent is consistently rotating isn't the easiest thing to do. It led to sequences where James is initially picking up Gnabry. Gnabry then rotates with Pavlovitch and James is unsure whether he should pick him up or Kane. Chalobah then picks Kane up and now James and Palmer are on who should pick up the drop in Pavlovitch and who should pick up the left back instead. Run into it and it culminates in a scenario where 4 Chelsea players are picking up 2 Bayern players. It shows that Bayern's rotations were able to unsettle Chelsea. When Stanisic had the ball, Gusto would look to press and prevent easy possession butthat distance would often leave time for Stanisic to get his head up and assess the situation before Gusto got to him. All of this was combined by Kane and Gnabry dropping deep often leaving big gaps in the defense And the center back who moved out to cover Gusto would now be isolated on the flank. But we also saw a Bayern's midfielder often coming wide for a potential 2 v 1 against Chalobah. One better example of Bayern's danger was when Laimer received outside Palmer and drew Gusto high up the pitch. Gnabry and Diaz have rotated but the principle is the same : 1 Chelsea's center back is drawn wide and the other is drawn high onto the dropping Kane and Diaz begins to draw Caicedo much like Gnabry had been doing. So Laimer plays into Diaz and makes the supporting run and because Bayer had forced this odd positioning, Laimer had acres of space to run into.
He then draws Tosin which creates space for Harry Kane who has a huge chance. From the goal kick, Chelsea's game plan was to maintain a traditional back 4. Just like out of possession phases, Palmer wasn't operating like a traditional winger, moving infield early instead. In these phases, Kane and Gnabry were the front 2 for Bayern. With these 3 men looking to be narrow on the 2 pivots. No matter which flank Chelsea built down, Bayern could get immediate pressure on the back line and once the fullback got the ball, the ball side winger could then apply pressure on that fullback while the ball far winger picked up the far side pivot, ensuring that there were no easy outlet. In that deeper open play build up, Bayern were in a 4 4 2 with Chelsea reverting to their 3 2 5 with Gusto pushing on while Cucurella tucked in which is interesting because recently we saw more of a single pivot in Chelsea's system to allow 3 men between the lines before the front 3. But this more secure double pivot system might be their approach against higher caliber opponents this season. And if Chelsea took defensive risks by giving the Bayern's left back space, Bayern took the word risk to the next level. The issue for Bayern when they were in their 4 4 2 is that they were 4 v 2 down in the midfield and their double pivot was committed to trying to stop Chelsea playing high up the pitch by pushing up which left the 2 Chelsea number 10s free. Bayern took risk by being aggressive with the man to man press, having a defender push up onto Enzo and Upamecano was often tasked with being hyperaggressive with the remaining 10, meaning that Tah was often 1 v 1 against Joao Pedro. And we saw them ducking out in the first half, leading to a Tah booking and a half time substitution.
Chelsea were also having success with their front 5 as their 5 v 4 advantage allowed them to manipulate Bayern's back line. Down the left, Neto would draw Laimer and if Fernandez moved across, 2 of Chelsea's back line had been drawn wide, creating room here for a forward to run into, creatinga 1 v 1 again. Or even simple switch situations that saw Gusto consistently get into dangerous positions as Palmer's infield runs would draw in the fullback, leaving Gusto with space to make the run. This was one of the most fascinating tactical matches this season so far.
The Best Tactical Match Of The Season So Far
Chelsea's tactics were pretty solid but this was a day where Bayern's risks paid off. Early Bayern would shift in a back 3 during build up with Kimmich looking for spaces outside the center backsand between the center backs. But Chelsea was comfortable pressing man to man. Because of how Chelsea set up in defense, the weakness was in Chelsea's right flank. When Chelsea defended they were in a vey lopsided 4 5 1 with Palmer at times looking like atucked in winger. Especially if Neuer was the third man, allowing the left center back wider or if Tah was more aggressive in pushing high with the ball, Palmer could be drawn into a center forward position making it a lopsided 4 4 2. But when Palmer came centrally, no one in the midfield was shifitng across leading to situations when Stanisic as left back received with no one pressuring him. In the midfield when possible, Chelsea looked to be aggressive in their man to man press of Bayern's midfield. Bayern looked to break this through constant rotations. But it's not just a forward dropping and a midfield running in beyond. Botht he forward and the attacking midfielder would drop very deep forcing Chelsea into a decision and often, Chelsea looked ton continue to be aggressive with their man to man press meaning that a defensive midfielder and a center back were drawn out of position leaving gaping holes in the most important parts of the pitch. In the first half if Neuer was the third man with Stanisic ready to receive on the outside left of the pitch and Olise holding the width down the right, it was often Laimer from his right back position who had the freedom to operate as a free man finding space wherever appropriate. Chelsea were quickly forced into trade offs beacuse we could at time see the remaining pivot, often Caicedo dropping off. But that would mean that the aggressive man to man press in the midfield had all of a sudden disappeared.
So Chelsea could isntead shift to a hybrid system that combined both zonal and man to man principles where when the forwards initially began to drop deep, the center back and the pivot would be man to man whilst their men were in their zones. Once they dropped too deep, they would look to pass that man on to one of their teammates higher up the pitch. That sounds great in theory and it did work at times but this system requires immaculate communication. So switching to it mid match when your opponent is consistently rotating isn't the easiest thing to do. It led to sequences where James is initially picking up Gnabry. Gnabry then rotates with Pavlovitch and James is unsure whether he should pick him up or Kane. Chalobah then picks Kane up and now James and Palmer are on who should pick up the drop in Pavlovitch and who should pick up the left back instead. Run into it and it culminates in a scenario where 4 Chelsea players are picking up 2 Bayern players. It shows that Bayern's rotations were able to unsettle Chelsea. When Stanisic had the ball, Gusto would look to press and prevent easy possession butthat distance would often leave time for Stanisic to get his head up and assess the situation before Gusto got to him. All of this was combined by Kane and Gnabry dropping deep often leaving big gaps in the defense And the center back who moved out to cover Gusto would now be isolated on the flank. But we also saw a Bayern's midfielder often coming wide for a potential 2 v 1 against Chalobah. One better example of Bayern's danger was when Laimer received outside Palmer and drew Gusto high up the pitch. Gnabry and Diaz have rotated but the principle is the same : 1 Chelsea's center back is drawn wide and the other is drawn high onto the dropping Kane and Diaz begins to draw Caicedo much like Gnabry had been doing. So Laimer plays into Diaz and makes the supporting run and because Bayer had forced this odd positioning, Laimer had acres of space to run into.
He then draws Tosin which creates space for Harry Kane who has a huge chance. From the goal kick, Chelsea's game plan was to maintain a traditional back 4. Just like out of possession phases, Palmer wasn't operating like a traditional winger, moving infield early instead. In these phases, Kane and Gnabry were the front 2 for Bayern. With these 3 men looking to be narrow on the 2 pivots. No matter which flank Chelsea built down, Bayern could get immediate pressure on the back line and once the fullback got the ball, the ball side winger could then apply pressure on that fullback while the ball far winger picked up the far side pivot, ensuring that there were no easy outlet. In that deeper open play build up, Bayern were in a 4 4 2 with Chelsea reverting to their 3 2 5 with Gusto pushing on while Cucurella tucked in which is interesting because recently we saw more of a single pivot in Chelsea's system to allow 3 men between the lines before the front 3. But this more secure double pivot system might be their approach against higher caliber opponents this season. And if Chelsea took defensive risks by giving the Bayern's left back space, Bayern took the word risk to the next level. The issue for Bayern when they were in their 4 4 2 is that they were 4 v 2 down in the midfield and their double pivot was committed to trying to stop Chelsea playing high up the pitch by pushing up which left the 2 Chelsea number 10s free. Bayern took risk by being aggressive with the man to man press, having a defender push up onto Enzo and Upamecano was often tasked with being hyperaggressive with the remaining 10, meaning that Tah was often 1 v 1 against Joao Pedro. And we saw them ducking out in the first half, leading to a Tah booking and a half time substitution.
Chelsea were also having success with their front 5 as their 5 v 4 advantage allowed them to manipulate Bayern's back line. Down the left, Neto would draw Laimer and if Fernandez moved across, 2 of Chelsea's back line had been drawn wide, creating room here for a forward to run into, creatinga 1 v 1 again. Or even simple switch situations that saw Gusto consistently get into dangerous positions as Palmer's infield runs would draw in the fullback, leaving Gusto with space to make the run. This was one of the most fascinating tactical matches this season so far.
J'ai été grave occupé aujourd'hui j'ai pas pu faire le topic
Le Baps va les rendre LOCOS
