[LDC] FINALE PSG - INTER MILAN

J'étais au bar hier avec des potes et l'ambiance était folle

Par contre toutes les teens avaoent leur quoicoubeh de pocket

This was one of the most dominant performance we ever saw in an UCL final. PSG had 60% of possession. We saw 2 versions of Inter's defense and each of them revealed 2 different weaknesses. They could look to press man to man against PSG's back 4 with both of their wingbacks pushing up onto PSG's fullbacks. And it was one of the only time Inter Milan looked effective without the ball. Donnarumma wasn't taking risks in this scenario, often going long for Doué against Bastoni where Bastoni sometimes came out on top. But why didn't it continue? At times it did with the ballside wingback pushing up onto the deeper fullback, but this aggressive press was high risk, meaning that if the pressing wingback was bypassed, the center back was isolated on an island against an elite winger, especially if the midfield had been high, backing up the press. Dumfries was caught high up the pitch, meaning that Kvara had plenty of room and here Pavard is already concerned. Kvara draws Pavard, meaning that the back 3 loses their compact shape. Inter still reorienting with their back line now in disarray as they had still been recovering, allowing Doué on the blind side, leading to the opener from Hakimi. As the game progressed, Inter Milan became more and more desperate to get a goal back, they had to walk themselves into this trap at an increasing rate. As the Inter's wingbacks had to be more aggressive and that Inter had to win the ball high as much as they could, this led to more isolations as the game went on. But even before, when Inter was looking to be passive, PSG still had their ways They first rendered the man to man press useless by shifting into a dynamic back 3. Initially in these situations, Barella looked to make up the difference while keeping a midfielder under his cover shadow.

But Vitinha or Ruiz were quick to sniff out the space outside of Mendes and Barella, effectively creating a 2 v 1 against Barella, meaning that if the Italians kept pressing, it would have been too easy for Ruiz to then drive into the midfield where Inter would have been underloaded. Barella had to drop back and so the 3 v 2 made it easier for PSG to hold on the ball. And as PSG became more dominant, the back 3 changed as it was Vitinha dropping deep to become the third man, increasing their control of possession even more and allowing Mendes to move higher into the half space on the left. This helped creating an isolation for Kvara as Pavard would now be occupied by Mendes, allowing Kvara to drop deeper and pick up a ball with space behidn Dumfries to attack. But it wasn't just the left channel where PSG were dominant. They had success in all 3 vertical thirds. The key to this was manipulating Inter Milan's midfield 3 all game. The trio tends to remain compact and narrow, and when possibled, focused on protecting the center. Of course that's not always possible but the man to man scenario seemed like a benefit on paper. But on the situations discussed, with Vitinha or Ruiz beginning the midfield shift to the left, Inter Milan's midfielders had to follow to maintain a man to man situation. And because the 5 3 2 is such a narrow shape in defense, PSG's right hand side would now be underloaded. Dembélé as a false 9 recognized these scenarios consistently, often dropping into the space off to the right to potentially be a line breaking option. The key of course, was the fact that if any of the center backs had pushed high to cover him, they created more room for a runner into the space. Or if Dembélé had received it to feed himself, he is perfectly capable of turning a center back and then running at the last line.

But a key cog in all of this when the ball was on the left was Hakimi who formed who formed the remaining point of that golden right hand side with Doué or Dembélé forcing the wingback Di Marco to remain deep. Hakimi was effectively the free man down the right and his decision making had to be great, knowing when to drop deep and be an easy outlet option, but also be a deadly runner who could attack any gaps that were created due to the movement of the forwards ahead of him. Dembélé and Doué often rotated but when Doué was at center forward position, he was happy to move into the left hand half space to allow potential isolations. But the key was PSG's ability to create space both ways on the pitch. The back 3 always had options as their midifeld would primarly show for the ball and this would in turn force Inter's midfield high as well. he wingers and Hakimi would continue to create depth by making runs in behind. So now the space between the lines had increased. And this played into PSG's third goal as they forced Inter's midfield high as they were chasing the game. Dembélé instantly recognized the space, helped by Kvara being on the shoulder, meaning that inter's back 3 were now not pressing as an unit. So when Acerbi jumps, it creates a gap in the back line that the midfielder can then expose, creating a 3 v 2. So Inter was trapped in a situation where the 3 v 3 press in the midfield could mutate to being 5 v 3 down in an instant. And PSg's pesThis shape from PSG led to turnovers in dangerous positions unlike Barcelona's shape. On the forward, both pressing from PSG and Barcelona look the same with a forward pressing Bastoni and a fullback arriving late on Di Marco.
The difference comes down to intensity + coordination. When Bastoni found the pass against Barcelona, Yamal's intensity dipped and that was paired with no midfielder backing up the press onto Mkhitaryan, meaning it was essentially a 3 v 2 for Inter. As for PSG, Doué was on Bastoni while Neves was rotating with Hakimi, applying pressure on Di Marco. But one of the keys is that Hakimi was straight onto Mkhitaryan in the midfield, cutting out that passing option and Doué remained touch tight on Bastoni, meaning that both Doué and Hakimi are ready to intercept the pass infield. PSG's press was intense from the goal kick as well as in the open play with the man to man orientation beiing key for the forwards. At the goal kick, Kvara would remain deep with Pavard, allowing Dembélé and Doué to deal with the 2 remaining center backs and having 2 men ready to defend their left meant that Inter tended to avoid this flank. The PSG midfielders would back up the press effectively. It meant that Inter was invariably forced wide where Hakimi and Neves coordinated brillantly. Neves would take up this hybrid position ready to hop onto Di Marco or drop onto a midfielder. So if Inter found a way through the center, Neves would tuck in, with Hakimi pushing up down the flank. But if they immediatly found Di Marco instead, Hakimi would then be the one to tuck in on the free midfield man, allowing Neves to press from wide.
But in all of this, PSG still had the option of the simpler direct press with Hakimi pushing up as a traditional fullback. In open play again, the forwards were man to man, meaning a flatter front 3 and crucially the midfield could still be man to man. The obvious risk if they pressed like this was the potential creation of a man to man situation of the 2 forwards against the 2 center backs. So in reality, PSG tended to commit really one fullback at a time, the ballside fullback, making this pressing shape more effective. This meant that Inter midfielders were drawn towards their own center backs to provide passing options. So the only way Inter could effectively get out, because the midfield was still pressed man to man was going long to the forwards, which did have its moments of being effective. But it would have been much more effective if all 3 Inter midfielders weren't dropping deep. And at least one of them was pushing high up to win the second ball which might be the reason for Inzaghi's change in the second half, bringing on Augusto. PSG's press meant that the Inter Milan's center backs were forced to try and play a double line break while being under extreme pressure. The midfield options were non existent due to that pressure. But if the center was inaccessible, the surprising thing is that Inter didn't look to take advantage of the flanks more. Because of Hakimi being so high up, both Thuram and Martinez pushed out wide to support the wide play, with huge gaps being created between Mendes and Pacho that Inter over the game could have potentially exploited. Overall this UCL final was a symbol of what can happen when tactical perfection is paired with extreme individual brillance to create an unstoppable force and perhaps a taste of what the next phase of tactical evolution looks like.

PSG kicked the ball out at the beginning for a throwing and applying pressure in Inter Milan's half. For the majority of first half, Inter sat in a 5 3 2 deep shape. The 3 midfielders would try to screen any ball to Dembélé while the 2 forwards would try to close down the center backs. But PSg rotations mean that they rarely ressemble the 4 3 3 they start on paper. At the back in possession, PSG would always look to keep a line of 3. At times it was formed with the 2 center backs and the left back Mendes but most of the time, it was Vitinha that dropped into this pocket of space in the left hand side. It frees up a gap in the center that can be filled in different ways qhich subsequently frees up more gaps as PSg moves up the pitch. It meant firstly that Mendes could push either on the wing or in the half space to give support to Kvara. This allows PSG to have instantly 2 players out wide on each flank, meaning that as they circulate possession from side to side, it was nearly impossible for Inter Milan's wingbacks to effectively close them down and were getting constantly overrun. The wide center backs are often forced out of their line to help out but as the phase of possession continues, it eventually leaves gaps in behind the wingbacks and the rest of the defense where PSG can move into. Most of PSg progression would come in from these positions out wide and would slowly move further and further up the pitch. From here, it was total control for PSG. They would keep players out wide on both flanks to stretch the pitch and there were an incredible amount of rotations in the center. In Enrique's system, the key focal point in attack is Dembélé, who is not fixed in the center and he can move all over the defensive line and even into the midfield as PSG rotate. And as he moves, the players around him also adapt and pick up the vacant spaces.
So it doesn't take long before all the players are in completly different positions from where they started. And this is what we saw with PSG's opening goal. The move starts by regaining possession high up the pitch thank to their press. From here we can see how the players have already rotated slightly with the right winger due now playing down the middle and Dembélé in the right half space. Kvara pushes forward and seems as if Inter's intructions were to double up on him at least, because the whole of Inter's defense and midfield gets packed into the box. A quick combination with Fabian Ruiz and VItinha can receive the ball with no player immediatly ready to apply pressure. A perfectly timed run from Doué into the space and Inter could not stop his pass into Hakimi who finishes off the move brillantly. This early goal sets up the tone for the rest of the match. The moments Inter tried to get higher up the pitch, they got instantly exposed to the speed and efficiency at which PSG could counter. The second goal highlights that. PSg's pressing shape was probably the main reason of why they were so dominant in this final. After the Inter Barcelona semi final, one of the biggest criticism Hansi Flick received was about over using the high line and how it left them exposed of Inter's style of play. PSG did the same thing but with the difference being the intensity with which they close down the goalkepeer. Inter Milan is a team who can be fluid on possession with players rotating and picking up different positions and with these, they can quickly expose teams. But Sommer needs time on the ball to drag the opposition's press out of shape and find the right pass. And that night,
Dembélé simply gave Sommer no time to make a proper decision. His press was relentless and he sprinted towards the goalkepper for almost the entirety of the time he was on the pitch which forced Inter to either try to beat the press and play out from the back, only to realize they had no free option ahead of them, or playing long balls for the attacking duo Thuram and Martinez. Generally speaking those 2 did a decent job at winning some of these aerial duels. But because they had little support around them and the rest of PSG's defense would instantly drop to cover any run forward, these attacks quickly vanished into nothing. The only real threat from Inter going forward was when they gained a corner or a free kick in a deep position. And even from these positions, PSG were able to defend very effectively. After being down 2 0, Inter had to choose between trying to build from the back only for them to go long almost every time, either try and press PSG high up the pitch and become increasingly exposed to transitions. And that's exactly what happened in the second half. Inter kept leaving bigger and bigger gaps between the lines as the game went on. Doué's goal to make it 3 - 0 demontrates it perfectly. Vitinha moves the ball into the center and Inter are out of balance into their press, trying to close down the players ahead of them but not aware of the gap in behind. Dembélé could then drop and drag Acerbi out of position and then with a brillant heel back pass, finds Vitinha on the overlpa, swiftly moving the ball out wide into Doué who finishes off the move. Kvara's goal to make it 4 - 0 came from a transition while Mayulu's goal to make it 5 - 0 was once again after a structured move through the lines and into the box. From the control in possession, the relentless press and the speed of the transitions this was one of the most dominant and controlling performance in history of UCL finals.