La tactique derrière Barcelone vs Inter Milan. Chaud.
The Insanity Of Flick's Barca | Barcelona 3-3 Inter Milan Tactical Analysis
Barcelona ended the match with over 70% of possession. Barcelona built with Koundé deeper alongside the 2 cb to ensure a numerical advantage against Inter Milan's front 2. First Inter's pressing approach saw either Di Marco or Dumfries push up to apply pressure on the third man. But if it wasn't executed well, there was a potential for Yamal to lure Bastoni out of position, creating an isolation with plenty of space behind the center back. So often, it was up to a midfielder to apply pressure on the third man, adding protection to deep areas while allowing them to be flexible with their center backs. But when Inter ld 2 - 0, they back off the press as the half wore on, becoming more passive deeper into a 5 3 2. EArly on, Martinez and Thuram stayed as high as possible so when Inter won the ball back, the 2 of them could look to hit, to hold up play, and allow the Italians to move up the pitch. But Barca were in their usual shape with the width being provided by Yamal on the right and Martin on the left though he wasn't as effective as Balde is usually. De Jong primarly operated as a single pivot with the rest of the side looking to cause overloads higher up the pitch between the lines. So when Inter's front 2 were higher up, De Jong was most of the time found too easily in the first half time particularly. De Jong was dictating the tempo of the game. So soon the front 2 began to drop deeper and deeper to help Inter protect zone 14. It led to a self fulfilling cycle of Inter seeing less and less of the ball. When they won it, they had noe one to hit. When dealing with wingers excelling in isolations, the usual way to render them useless is to make sure they never get the ball in the first place. But Inter's natural narrow defensive shape meant that especially Mkhitaryan was narrow, helping to protect the center. It was easy for Koundé to play the ball into Yamal.
Yamal had over 100 touches, third most behind Pedri and De Jong, which is almost unheard from a winger in this kind of game.Di Marco, probably wisely, didn't look to be touchtight on Yamal because Yamal would be more likely to turn him. Instead he sat off and Inter looked for another usually effective strategy, the double team. Mkhitaryan was tasked to come across to assist Di Marco. Here the problems began. During the 90 minutes, Bastoni tended to be more man oriented on Dani Olmo who operated in the right channel. As a result, room could be created for a runner that could be Koundé or Olmo. Though that strategy didn't lead directly to a goal, it was clear that Barcelona sensed a weakness in this region. And one of Flick's Barcelona strenght is fluidity and rotations. So we would see at times opposing movements to drag a center back before getting a runner in behind with Olmo often creating space for a midfielder to run beyond and Ferran Torres looking to do the same whenever possible. But Inter Milan's advantage was that the center was hard to penetrate. So they could deal with these rotations. But the real peentration came through Lamine Yamal on the right Despite Inter double teaming on Yamal, Yamal was able to consistently cause nightmare for Inter, often taking on both men and getting to the byline to whip in dangerous crosses even on his weak foot. And Barcelona having so many men between the lines meant that the midfield runners were ready to join Ferran to get on the end of crosses. The same occurred when Yamal was instead cutting infield to swing across towards the back post with the key being having plenty of runners causing danger. Sometimes the best tactical approach is to simply make sure that your best players get a lot of the ball. Out of possession, Barcelona took an hybrid approach to deal with Inter's build up, using 3 different pressing shapes depending on how Inter was setting up.
From the goalkick, Acerbi could push into a pivot position with the wide center backs tucking in. In this situation Inter shifted to a standard back 4, meaning that Barcelona could used their preferred pressing shape with Ferran dropping with Acerbi and Yamal and Raphina tucking in to press in advance of the striker. Alternatively, Acerbi and Bastoni could drop outside the goalkepper and in these scenarios, it was Ferran and Yamal who became the front 2 with Raphina dropping deeper to cover. A slight adaptation to their usual high pressing shape. Despite conceding 3 goals in open play, Barcelona looked decent defensively. Their adaptation here was simple with the front 3 committing to pressing the center backs. And in this match, Inter were not as aggressive in rotating their center backs within midfield as they usually did throughout the season. This made life easier for Barcelona when it came to defending, with only Acerbi occasionally pushing into the midfield. But Barcelona communicated effectively, passing on the center back, and maintaining the defensive shape. But where Barcelona looked vulnerable is something they struggled with all season, which is the weak side switch. Barcelona's wingers being high and narrow means that when the opposition begins the play down one flank, the back forward goes tend to naturally be drawn across the pitch. That means that a quick switch often sees the opposition's wide man get into a dangerous position because the winger defending high leaves the fullback potentially isolated which we saw sometimes when Inter Milan ventured to attack, especially in second half. In this half, Inter tried to take advantage of Barcelona's aggressive high line like many teams before. Like most of those teams, they were met with frustration with Mkhytaryan being slightly offside or the back line producing remarkable recoveries.
The Insanity Of Flick's Barca | Barcelona 3-3 Inter Milan Tactical Analysis
Barcelona ended the match with over 70% of possession. Barcelona built with Koundé deeper alongside the 2 cb to ensure a numerical advantage against Inter Milan's front 2. First Inter's pressing approach saw either Di Marco or Dumfries push up to apply pressure on the third man. But if it wasn't executed well, there was a potential for Yamal to lure Bastoni out of position, creating an isolation with plenty of space behind the center back. So often, it was up to a midfielder to apply pressure on the third man, adding protection to deep areas while allowing them to be flexible with their center backs. But when Inter ld 2 - 0, they back off the press as the half wore on, becoming more passive deeper into a 5 3 2. EArly on, Martinez and Thuram stayed as high as possible so when Inter won the ball back, the 2 of them could look to hit, to hold up play, and allow the Italians to move up the pitch. But Barca were in their usual shape with the width being provided by Yamal on the right and Martin on the left though he wasn't as effective as Balde is usually. De Jong primarly operated as a single pivot with the rest of the side looking to cause overloads higher up the pitch between the lines. So when Inter's front 2 were higher up, De Jong was most of the time found too easily in the first half time particularly. De Jong was dictating the tempo of the game. So soon the front 2 began to drop deeper and deeper to help Inter protect zone 14. It led to a self fulfilling cycle of Inter seeing less and less of the ball. When they won it, they had noe one to hit. When dealing with wingers excelling in isolations, the usual way to render them useless is to make sure they never get the ball in the first place. But Inter's natural narrow defensive shape meant that especially Mkhitaryan was narrow, helping to protect the center. It was easy for Koundé to play the ball into Yamal.
Yamal had over 100 touches, third most behind Pedri and De Jong, which is almost unheard from a winger in this kind of game.Di Marco, probably wisely, didn't look to be touchtight on Yamal because Yamal would be more likely to turn him. Instead he sat off and Inter looked for another usually effective strategy, the double team. Mkhitaryan was tasked to come across to assist Di Marco. Here the problems began. During the 90 minutes, Bastoni tended to be more man oriented on Dani Olmo who operated in the right channel. As a result, room could be created for a runner that could be Koundé or Olmo. Though that strategy didn't lead directly to a goal, it was clear that Barcelona sensed a weakness in this region. And one of Flick's Barcelona strenght is fluidity and rotations. So we would see at times opposing movements to drag a center back before getting a runner in behind with Olmo often creating space for a midfielder to run beyond and Ferran Torres looking to do the same whenever possible. But Inter Milan's advantage was that the center was hard to penetrate. So they could deal with these rotations. But the real peentration came through Lamine Yamal on the right Despite Inter double teaming on Yamal, Yamal was able to consistently cause nightmare for Inter, often taking on both men and getting to the byline to whip in dangerous crosses even on his weak foot. And Barcelona having so many men between the lines meant that the midfield runners were ready to join Ferran to get on the end of crosses. The same occurred when Yamal was instead cutting infield to swing across towards the back post with the key being having plenty of runners causing danger. Sometimes the best tactical approach is to simply make sure that your best players get a lot of the ball. Out of possession, Barcelona took an hybrid approach to deal with Inter's build up, using 3 different pressing shapes depending on how Inter was setting up.
From the goalkick, Acerbi could push into a pivot position with the wide center backs tucking in. In this situation Inter shifted to a standard back 4, meaning that Barcelona could used their preferred pressing shape with Ferran dropping with Acerbi and Yamal and Raphina tucking in to press in advance of the striker. Alternatively, Acerbi and Bastoni could drop outside the goalkepper and in these scenarios, it was Ferran and Yamal who became the front 2 with Raphina dropping deeper to cover. A slight adaptation to their usual high pressing shape. Despite conceding 3 goals in open play, Barcelona looked decent defensively. Their adaptation here was simple with the front 3 committing to pressing the center backs. And in this match, Inter were not as aggressive in rotating their center backs within midfield as they usually did throughout the season. This made life easier for Barcelona when it came to defending, with only Acerbi occasionally pushing into the midfield. But Barcelona communicated effectively, passing on the center back, and maintaining the defensive shape. But where Barcelona looked vulnerable is something they struggled with all season, which is the weak side switch. Barcelona's wingers being high and narrow means that when the opposition begins the play down one flank, the back forward goes tend to naturally be drawn across the pitch. That means that a quick switch often sees the opposition's wide man get into a dangerous position because the winger defending high leaves the fullback potentially isolated which we saw sometimes when Inter Milan ventured to attack, especially in second half. In this half, Inter tried to take advantage of Barcelona's aggressive high line like many teams before. Like most of those teams, they were met with frustration with Mkhytaryan being slightly offside or the back line producing remarkable recoveries.