[WARNING Inter Barça ce soir] 🚨- LIVE MATCH pour Demi Finale LDC - Sondage 🔴

Henni va finir avec la corde, ce type est la malédiction et le moyen de faire des billets facile.

Chat noir ultime.

Ce mec là va vraiment porter un maillot du PSG juste pour essayer de les faire perdre.

Demain, PSG Arsenal.

Mais bordel, ce match là restera dans les mémoires à jamais.

20ème page.

Not ready.

Je suis content, bravo Milan

Le gagnant de cette ligue des champions soit ne l'a pas gagné depuis 15 ans ( Inter Milan ), soit ne l'a jamais gagné ( PSG et Arsenal ).

L'histoire est en marche.

Qualification méritée.

Nul

Et maintenant la défaite du PSG ce soir

L'une des meilleurs victoires de foot que j'ai assistée, perso, phénoménales les sensations.

Bravo d'avoir eu la vision, 31 mai la finale, je crois.

https://x.com/livescore/status/1919988565267878075

https://x.com/DeadlineDayLive/status/1919875850012434675

La tactique derrière Barcelone vs Inter Milan. Chaud.

The Insanity Of Flick's Barca | Barcelona 3-3 Inter Milan Tactical Analysis

Barcelona ended the match with over 70% of possession. Barcelona built with Koundé deeper alongside the 2 cb to ensure a numerical advantage against Inter Milan's front 2. First Inter's pressing approach saw either Di Marco or Dumfries push up to apply pressure on the third man. But if it wasn't executed well, there was a potential for Yamal to lure Bastoni out of position, creating an isolation with plenty of space behind the center back. So often, it was up to a midfielder to apply pressure on the third man, adding protection to deep areas while allowing them to be flexible with their center backs. But when Inter ld 2 - 0, they back off the press as the half wore on, becoming more passive deeper into a 5 3 2. EArly on, Martinez and Thuram stayed as high as possible so when Inter won the ball back, the 2 of them could look to hit, to hold up play, and allow the Italians to move up the pitch. But Barca were in their usual shape with the width being provided by Yamal on the right and Martin on the left though he wasn't as effective as Balde is usually. De Jong primarly operated as a single pivot with the rest of the side looking to cause overloads higher up the pitch between the lines. So when Inter's front 2 were higher up, De Jong was most of the time found too easily in the first half time particularly. De Jong was dictating the tempo of the game. So soon the front 2 began to drop deeper and deeper to help Inter protect zone 14. It led to a self fulfilling cycle of Inter seeing less and less of the ball. When they won it, they had noe one to hit. When dealing with wingers excelling in isolations, the usual way to render them useless is to make sure they never get the ball in the first place. But Inter's natural narrow defensive shape meant that especially Mkhitaryan was narrow, helping to protect the center. It was easy for Koundé to play the ball into Yamal.

Yamal had over 100 touches, third most behind Pedri and De Jong, which is almost unheard from a winger in this kind of game.Di Marco, probably wisely, didn't look to be touchtight on Yamal because Yamal would be more likely to turn him. Instead he sat off and Inter looked for another usually effective strategy, the double team. Mkhitaryan was tasked to come across to assist Di Marco. Here the problems began. During the 90 minutes, Bastoni tended to be more man oriented on Dani Olmo who operated in the right channel. As a result, room could be created for a runner that could be Koundé or Olmo. Though that strategy didn't lead directly to a goal, it was clear that Barcelona sensed a weakness in this region. And one of Flick's Barcelona strenght is fluidity and rotations. So we would see at times opposing movements to drag a center back before getting a runner in behind with Olmo often creating space for a midfielder to run beyond and Ferran Torres looking to do the same whenever possible. But Inter Milan's advantage was that the center was hard to penetrate. So they could deal with these rotations. But the real peentration came through Lamine Yamal on the right Despite Inter double teaming on Yamal, Yamal was able to consistently cause nightmare for Inter, often taking on both men and getting to the byline to whip in dangerous crosses even on his weak foot. And Barcelona having so many men between the lines meant that the midfield runners were ready to join Ferran to get on the end of crosses. The same occurred when Yamal was instead cutting infield to swing across towards the back post with the key being having plenty of runners causing danger. Sometimes the best tactical approach is to simply make sure that your best players get a lot of the ball. Out of possession, Barcelona took an hybrid approach to deal with Inter's build up, using 3 different pressing shapes depending on how Inter was setting up.

From the goalkick, Acerbi could push into a pivot position with the wide center backs tucking in. In this situation Inter shifted to a standard back 4, meaning that Barcelona could used their preferred pressing shape with Ferran dropping with Acerbi and Yamal and Raphina tucking in to press in advance of the striker. Alternatively, Acerbi and Bastoni could drop outside the goalkepper and in these scenarios, it was Ferran and Yamal who became the front 2 with Raphina dropping deeper to cover. A slight adaptation to their usual high pressing shape. Despite conceding 3 goals in open play, Barcelona looked decent defensively. Their adaptation here was simple with the front 3 committing to pressing the center backs. And in this match, Inter were not as aggressive in rotating their center backs within midfield as they usually did throughout the season. This made life easier for Barcelona when it came to defending, with only Acerbi occasionally pushing into the midfield. But Barcelona communicated effectively, passing on the center back, and maintaining the defensive shape. But where Barcelona looked vulnerable is something they struggled with all season, which is the weak side switch. Barcelona's wingers being high and narrow means that when the opposition begins the play down one flank, the back forward goes tend to naturally be drawn across the pitch. That means that a quick switch often sees the opposition's wide man get into a dangerous position because the winger defending high leaves the fullback potentially isolated which we saw sometimes when Inter Milan ventured to attack, especially in second half. In this half, Inter tried to take advantage of Barcelona's aggressive high line like many teams before. Like most of those teams, they were met with frustration with Mkhytaryan being slightly offside or the back line producing remarkable recoveries.

How Inter's Tactics Did The Impssible | Tactical Analysis : Barcelona 3-4 Inter Milan |

Barcelona ended with 71% possession. Early on, Inter pressed fiercely even from Barcelona's goal kicks with the front 2 ready to press the 2 center backs with Inter Milan's wingbacks Dumfries and Di Marco backing this up to press Barcelona's fullbacks, Garcia and Martin as they were confident that the physical back 3 could handle anything that came over the top. And this was the case with Szczęsny in the opening exchanges often being forced long more often than not, resulting in turnovers. Barella was also the glue of this press due to his engine. Whenever Thuram or Martinez were caught out of position temporarily or pressing the goalkepper, Barella never hesitated to keep De Jong in his cover shadow while pressing the remaining center back to ensure that Barcelona's back line never had the room to breathe. In early stages it was a combination of Inter's mentality and their setup that made the press successfull because the midfield was always backing it up. It was an unit coordinating. And we see that for the first goal with Di Marco and Dumfries's aggressive positioning in attack and in the press in general allowing Di Marco to be involved in the counter press and helping Inter to win the ball back from Olmo, then beat the offside trap from Barcelona for Dumfries to serve it on a plate for Martinez. But Inter's pressing shape was also showing that there were gaps that Barcelona could exploit. The positioning of Barcelona's wingers was always in consideration for Inter as whenever the wingbacks were pressing, they were exposing these spaces behind them which could lead a winger to receive freely or more likely a wide center back dragged into an isolated position. That's why at times we saw some hesitation from the pressing wingbacks. So especially when Inter Milan went ahead, Dumfries was more conservative in the press, which allowed Gérard Martin to have the space to advance because he wasn't seen as an attacking threat.
So Inter Milan didn't mind him getting the ball and advancing. They would be wrong in the second half. Anyway the front 2 pressing the 2 center backs meant that they couldn't be into controlled posssession phases as easily. Balde's presence in scenarios like this would have allowed Koundé to tuck in as the third man with a left back genuily providing threat high up the pitch. Barcelona would have got a 3 v 2 advantage in Inter Milan's press. But in the first half, Martin was not that big of an attacking threat, while he was not expected to invert either into the back line so instead it was Frenkie De Jong who was almost a full time central center back on the ball. in the build up just to allow Barcelona to hold on to the ball with a 3 v 2 advantage. But this in turn often forced Pedri or Olmo into a deeper position. Having De Jong that deep was not ideal as Flick's strategy was having his midfielders high up to allow them to create central overloads and we saw how threatening Barcelona could be when all of their 3 midfielders were higher up. We saw this when Inter pressed less and Barcelona got into settled positions. Instead of actually using a 4 2 3 1 or always having 2 free number 8, Pedri and Olmo operated deeper almost as a traditional 4 3 3 with they ley being looking to remain on Barella and Mkhitaryan's blind sides for a key reason. Particulary down the Barcelona ride we saw Yamal looking to receive deeper than usual and Di Marco as tight as he could. And because of his positioning behind Mkhitaryan, Bastoni had to push high up as Mkhitaryan couldn't pick up Olmo and this left massive gaps on Barcelona's right hand side which could be an opportunity for Olmo or even rarely Pedri when he drifted across the make the run into. At the same time it created not just isolations for Yamal, but isolations for plenty of room behind his man, which was good for him. But here is the thing.
Trailing, Barcelona began to pour more and more men forwards and as much as possible when defending, they kept the front 2 high, meaning that when Inter Milan won the ball, they always had at least 2 outlet options, Thuram and Martinez, who were expert at playing off to each other. Thuram in particular was masterful at holding up the ball and bringing his teammates into the game. But Inter was not just hitting and hoping to their front 2. The likes of Barella and the 2 wingbacks were looking to provide plenty of support whenever possible. A defining factor in this match was that these 2 teams had 2 things in common : whenever they lost the ball, they looked to counter press. When they won the ball, they looked to be extremely vertical in the counter attack rather than begin a possession phase. This made their transitional phases extremely important because when Barcelona lost the ball, Inter instantly committed men for those vertical passes. If Inter escaped the initial counterpress, they had acres of space to exploit. But if Barcelona was successful in the counterpress, they could take advantages of the spaces in just vacated behind their wingbacks. We saw that at some times. And Inter looked to do the same during transitions, looking to use the space between Barcelona's fullbacks. Whoever,controlled the transitional phases would control the match. It showed that the modern game's currency isn't possession but decisiveness after possession changes. But in reality, both sides struggled to control the transitional phases meaning that there was a lot of ping pong going on in the midfield at times.
During the second half, Gérard Martin decided he would make the most of the space left by Dumfries. He ended up with 129 touches, the most in the game. But rather than sticking to the by line and run into traffic, he produced outstanding crosses, aided by Barcelona committing plenty of men into the box. It led to Martin assisting twice, the first time for Eric Garcia, the right back, and the second time for Dani Olmo. And down the right hand side, the individual quality of Lamine Yamal continued to shine as he completed 14 dribbles during the match, the most by far in this match. Barcelona in general created plenty of chances that could have result as a goal. But despite having only 29% of possession, this was no Catenaccio style. In possession, Inter were interesting. Inter biased their back 5 to the right hand side from the goal kick with the right back moving up to the right wing and the right center back moving up to the right back. This forced Barca into their own lopsided shape with Martin staying deep to handle Dumfries and Raphina wide whilst down to the right, Yamal came narrow on Bastoni and Eric Garcia was very aggressive on Di Marco. But Inter always had the option to go long for their center forwards and more importantly, they only needed a single midfield pivot in the build up phase from the goal kick, which in turn allowed Barella and Mkhitaryan to take up these more advanced positions, ready to support the wide man or to receive the second ball from the center forwards. But the biggest threat came when Inter played short from the goal kick. Barca's left flank was well protected but having Garcia so high up left them vulnerable down their right flank due to the space in behind. Di Marco and Mkhitaryan consistently tried to combine to take advantage of that space.
Whether it was Di Marco looking to find Mkhitaryan, but more often used one two to get Di Marco into dangerous positions in that space, having initially dragged Garcia higher up. Taking advantage of this flank almost led to the opening goal with Bastoni dragging him off central, Di marco then drawing Garcia but this time, Bastoni made the run into the midfield to receive and then again Mkhitaryan was here to take advantage of that space who makes a good cross. It was also clear that Inter Milan would look to take advantage from that Barcelona's high defensive line. They got more occasions to do that than during the first leg. Firstly with Thuram timing his runs better, but also using a multi wave runs with midfield and wingback runners, meaning that Barcelona onlt only had to catch the first runner, but offside, but also the second wave runner, a much tougher proposition. For the entire season, Barcelona thrived in chaos and almost always came out on top but sometimes the champions of Europe aren't crowned for surviving for surviving chaos but rather for controlling chaos when it matters.