J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE! 
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
Aya 200 pages.
Tuchel's tactics at Chelsea.
Tuchel brought consistency and slight twiks as well. His line up were either a 3 4 2, either a 3 4 1 2. He had players he would consistently start while only the wide attackers would rotate often with Havertz, Zieg and Hudson coming to replace Mount and Werner when needed. Also the right wingback position with Reece James and H Odoi rotating. Across the 2 formations, the build up are quite similar. Tuchel liked to keep possession of the ball. It started from the goalkepper who had a lot of options with the wide centerbacks spreasing wide, allowing the wingbacks to push up. It made it harder for opponents to press as Chelsea had 5 players deep, 3 centerbacks and 2 central miedfielder. And of course the gk, being either Mendy either Kepa. CHelsea passed the first phase relativly unchallenged since a man to man press made them vulnerable deeper. Higher up in the build up, Chelsea often maintained a 3 2 shape which gave them many options. Azpilicueta and Rudiger both as wide centerbacks had the responsability to carry the ball into the miedfield third to pass the first line of pressure and open up more passing options. If the opponent pressed with a front 3, in 4 3 3 in particular, Chelsea would often use the wide regions to their advantage with a wingback dropping deeper while the inside forward would occupy the wide regions left by the wingbacks. Alternativly, the forwards could drop into the wide regions instead. A double pivot made of Jorginho and Kovacic or Kanté had been crucial for their system. They were comfortable with the ball, creating options to receive the ball between the lines and often able to combine into tigh spaces to bypass their markers. Jorginho tended to be the deepest of the 2, acting like a metronome, looking to rotate the ball around the pitch.
So Kovacic was given more responsability and freedom at progressing the ball. Some teams would often go man to man against Chelsea's double pivots. Kovacic took advantage of this, using his dribbling ability to get pass his man. So Chelsea had a man advantage higher up. Mout is also capable of dropping deep to give numerical advantages in the miedfield when needed. He has been effective at doing this, picking the ball and play it to the runners and forwards ahead of him. So we coudl see Chelsea creating sides overloads to create spaces. Due to the pivots being trapped so closely, it often involved both of them moving wide, sometimes on the left, dragging the opposite miedfielder across with Mount dropping into these spaces created in the miedfield to receive helped by the winger ahead of him or occasionally by the wingback. We also saw sometimes 2 inside forwards dropping deep almost in the miedfield so the shape often looked like a box. which often made the opposition's miedfield to decide between pressing high and pressure the pivot which allow mens to be between the lines. Or dropping deeper and giving Jorginho and Kovacic more spaces Higher on the pitch, Chelsea used wide combinations between the forwards and the wingbacks. Down the left, Alonso was one of the best in the world in his position while Werner would try to get behind the defender or to be slightly deeper to get the ball, dragging the fullback infield, allowing the wingback to make his run out wide. Werner did that more often than being in the box to finish off, which could translate a lack of confidence.
Chelsea's attacking structure meant that they sometimes had a 5 v 4 advantage. And Chelsea had been brillant on the right side too. If the fullback choosed to pick Chelsea's right wingback, then Mount could often receive the ball in the half space. And once the fulllback close him down, he find the wingback in a great position to get a cross. In 4 3 1 2, Azpilicueta push even higher to find the width. Mount and an inside forward combined with one often dropping deep, creating space in the backline for the other to attack. In 3 4 1 2, when defending, Abraham and Werner could press the centerbacks while Mout stay deeper to cut off a center option, forcing the opposition to play outwide. Then, Chelsea's wingback could push higher to apply the pressure quickly. It was facilitated by the back 3, as they could shift to a back 4 rapidly to ensure that the opposition in not free to use these spaces. Similarly, when opponent build with 3, Mount could push up into the first line of pressure alongside the 2 others to maintain the man to man press with Jorginho and Kovacic pushing higher up in these phases to cover the central options. As they only had a double pivot, this press could be broken if the opposition had 3 mens here. It was often the trigger for Chelsea to drop into a more stable shape, a 5 4 1 with the inside forwards moving wider to prevent overloads. They then slow down the opponent and make it harder for them to create opportunities. And with 3 centerbacks, they can defend the box well. It's worth noticing that by the end of 2020/2021 season, It was Kanté who came to replace Kovacic in that midfield. And he did a very great job here. And at the end of the day, Tuchel managed to win the UCL with Chelsea in 2021 just one year after reaching the final with PSG and loosing it barely, prooving he was definitly an elite manager.
UCL final 2021 tactics.
In this final, Chelsea stick to their 3 4 2 1 with Kanté and Jorginho being the center miedfielders. But Guardiola made a lot of changes that surprised everyone. Walker, Diaz, Stones and Zinchenko were the defenders as expected. But the miedfield was more surprising with Guardiola starting Gundogan as the holding miedfielder with Bernardo Silva and Phil Foden respectivly on the right and left. No cdm. No Rodri or Fernandinho. The front 3 having Sterling in the left, De Bruyne in front and Mahrez also caught a lot of people off guard. The essential idea was to have 6 offensive minded players who could pass and be fluid in their positionning with the wingers cutting inside, De Bruyne as a false 9 and allowing both Silva and Foden to attack the backline to pressure Chelsea's back 3. But City lost valuable protection in front of the back 4 by having Gundogan as a holding miedfielder. During the first hald, Chelsea was able to exploit it a lot of times. The main idea of having Sterling in the left despite him being out of form was for him to find pockets of spaces between Chelsea"'s right wingback and Chelsea's right center back. And Gundogan was forced into a more defensive role even throught he had been excellent in a more offensive minded position. With Kanté dominating the miedfield for Chelsea, Foden became lost in here. Tuchel wanted to work with the 11 players that worked so well with him in the past in the same compo and formation. In the other hand, Guardiola choose a more reactive approach, looking to counter how Chelsea would play rather than fielding his strongest starting 11.
City wanted to dominate possession and attempted to move the ball throught the lines. And to find Mahrez or Sterling between the lines between the centerbacks and the wingbacks. Chelsea looked to hit Man City with very quick transitions and counter attacks. They would try to feed the front 3 in the pockets of space either side of the centerbacks. Also Chelsea didn't look to press to high. And their compact shape made extremly difficult for City to play between the lines. In the other hand,, City took a more agressive approach when they didn't have the ball, playing with a high line and pressing the centerbacks as soon as possible.
With the wingbacks and Werner in front, it formed a square for Chelsea covering the whole pitch and making it difficult for City to defend against. And City had a lot of outlets as soon as they won the ball. Kanté moved into an area to create overloads. In the semi final of the FA Cup the same 2021 year, Fernandinho as a cdm would not allow him to turn and pick out any vertical pass. But with Gundogan in he was caught out as he likes to press higher on the pitch. Stones tried to close him down in this UCL final when Chelsea's goal was scored. Werner did a good run to drag Diaz out to open the center of the pitch for Kai Havertz to run into. This was poor from ZInchenko but the ball from Mount was worldclass. The tactical changes saw Guardiola in the second half replacing De Bruyne who went injured because of a collision with Rudiger, by Gabriel Jesus, a surprising change since most people expected Sergio Aguero. A cdm was introduced in the 65th minute but for Man City it was too late. The compact 5 of the back shape with Havertz and Mout dropping deep either side of Jorginho and Kanté, making impossible for City to create any chance. The formation for City moved more into a 4 1 3 2 in the final half hour of the match. James and CHilwell were pocketing Sterling and Mahrez. It would result in hopeless crosses in the box with Jesus and Aguero being outnumbered in 3 v 2.
Tuchel's tactics at Chelsea.
Tuchel brought consistency and slight twiks as well. His line up were either a 3 4 2, either a 3 4 1 2. He had players he would consistently start while only the wide attackers would rotate often with Havertz, Zieg and Hudson coming to replace Mount and Werner when needed. Also the right wingback position with Reece James and H Odoi rotating. Across the 2 formations, the build up are quite similar. Tuchel liked to keep possession of the ball. It started from the goalkepper who had a lot of options with the wide centerbacks spreasing wide, allowing the wingbacks to push up. It made it harder for opponents to press as Chelsea had 5 players deep, 3 centerbacks and 2 central miedfielder. And of course the gk, being either Mendy either Kepa. CHelsea passed the first phase relativly unchallenged since a man to man press made them vulnerable deeper. Higher up in the build up, Chelsea often maintained a 3 2 shape which gave them many options. Azpilicueta and Rudiger both as wide centerbacks had the responsability to carry the ball into the miedfield third to pass the first line of pressure and open up more passing options. If the opponent pressed with a front 3, in 4 3 3 in particular, Chelsea would often use the wide regions to their advantage with a wingback dropping deeper while the inside forward would occupy the wide regions left by the wingbacks. Alternativly, the forwards could drop into the wide regions instead. A double pivot made of Jorginho and Kovacic or Kanté had been crucial for their system. They were comfortable with the ball, creating options to receive the ball between the lines and often able to combine into tigh spaces to bypass their markers. Jorginho tended to be the deepest of the 2, acting like a metronome, looking to rotate the ball around the pitch.
So Kovacic was given more responsability and freedom at progressing the ball. Some teams would often go man to man against Chelsea's double pivots. Kovacic took advantage of this, using his dribbling ability to get pass his man. So Chelsea had a man advantage higher up. Mout is also capable of dropping deep to give numerical advantages in the miedfield when needed. He has been effective at doing this, picking the ball and play it to the runners and forwards ahead of him. So we coudl see Chelsea creating sides overloads to create spaces. Due to the pivots being trapped so closely, it often involved both of them moving wide, sometimes on the left, dragging the opposite miedfielder across with Mount dropping into these spaces created in the miedfield to receive helped by the winger ahead of him or occasionally by the wingback. We also saw sometimes 2 inside forwards dropping deep almost in the miedfield so the shape often looked like a box. which often made the opposition's miedfield to decide between pressing high and pressure the pivot which allow mens to be between the lines. Or dropping deeper and giving Jorginho and Kovacic more spaces Higher on the pitch, Chelsea used wide combinations between the forwards and the wingbacks. Down the left, Alonso was one of the best in the world in his position while Werner would try to get behind the defender or to be slightly deeper to get the ball, dragging the fullback infield, allowing the wingback to make his run out wide. Werner did that more often than being in the box to finish off, which could translate a lack of confidence.
Chelsea's attacking structure meant that they sometimes had a 5 v 4 advantage. And Chelsea had been brillant on the right side too. If the fullback choosed to pick Chelsea's right wingback, then Mount could often receive the ball in the half space. And once the fulllback close him down, he find the wingback in a great position to get a cross. In 4 3 1 2, Azpilicueta push even higher to find the width. Mount and an inside forward combined with one often dropping deep, creating space in the backline for the other to attack. In 3 4 1 2, when defending, Abraham and Werner could press the centerbacks while Mout stay deeper to cut off a center option, forcing the opposition to play outwide. Then, Chelsea's wingback could push higher to apply the pressure quickly. It was facilitated by the back 3, as they could shift to a back 4 rapidly to ensure that the opposition in not free to use these spaces. Similarly, when opponent build with 3, Mount could push up into the first line of pressure alongside the 2 others to maintain the man to man press with Jorginho and Kovacic pushing higher up in these phases to cover the central options. As they only had a double pivot, this press could be broken if the opposition had 3 mens here. It was often the trigger for Chelsea to drop into a more stable shape, a 5 4 1 with the inside forwards moving wider to prevent overloads. They then slow down the opponent and make it harder for them to create opportunities. And with 3 centerbacks, they can defend the box well. It's worth noticing that by the end of 2020/2021 season, It was Kanté who came to replace Kovacic in that midfield. And he did a very great job here. And at the end of the day, Tuchel managed to win the UCL with Chelsea in 2021 just one year after reaching the final with PSG and loosing it barely, prooving he was definitly an elite manager.
UCL final 2021 tactics.
In this final, Chelsea stick to their 3 4 2 1 with Kanté and Jorginho being the center miedfielders. But Guardiola made a lot of changes that surprised everyone. Walker, Diaz, Stones and Zinchenko were the defenders as expected. But the miedfield was more surprising with Guardiola starting Gundogan as the holding miedfielder with Bernardo Silva and Phil Foden respectivly on the right and left. No cdm. No Rodri or Fernandinho. The front 3 having Sterling in the left, De Bruyne in front and Mahrez also caught a lot of people off guard. The essential idea was to have 6 offensive minded players who could pass and be fluid in their positionning with the wingers cutting inside, De Bruyne as a false 9 and allowing both Silva and Foden to attack the backline to pressure Chelsea's back 3. But City lost valuable protection in front of the back 4 by having Gundogan as a holding miedfielder. During the first hald, Chelsea was able to exploit it a lot of times. The main idea of having Sterling in the left despite him being out of form was for him to find pockets of spaces between Chelsea"'s right wingback and Chelsea's right center back. And Gundogan was forced into a more defensive role even throught he had been excellent in a more offensive minded position. With Kanté dominating the miedfield for Chelsea, Foden became lost in here. Tuchel wanted to work with the 11 players that worked so well with him in the past in the same compo and formation. In the other hand, Guardiola choose a more reactive approach, looking to counter how Chelsea would play rather than fielding his strongest starting 11.
City wanted to dominate possession and attempted to move the ball throught the lines. And to find Mahrez or Sterling between the lines between the centerbacks and the wingbacks. Chelsea looked to hit Man City with very quick transitions and counter attacks. They would try to feed the front 3 in the pockets of space either side of the centerbacks. Also Chelsea didn't look to press to high. And their compact shape made extremly difficult for City to play between the lines. In the other hand,, City took a more agressive approach when they didn't have the ball, playing with a high line and pressing the centerbacks as soon as possible.
With the wingbacks and Werner in front, it formed a square for Chelsea covering the whole pitch and making it difficult for City to defend against. And City had a lot of outlets as soon as they won the ball. Kanté moved into an area to create overloads. In the semi final of the FA Cup the same 2021 year, Fernandinho as a cdm would not allow him to turn and pick out any vertical pass. But with Gundogan in he was caught out as he likes to press higher on the pitch. Stones tried to close him down in this UCL final when Chelsea's goal was scored. Werner did a good run to drag Diaz out to open the center of the pitch for Kai Havertz to run into. This was poor from ZInchenko but the ball from Mount was worldclass. The tactical changes saw Guardiola in the second half replacing De Bruyne who went injured because of a collision with Rudiger, by Gabriel Jesus, a surprising change since most people expected Sergio Aguero. A cdm was introduced in the 65th minute but for Man City it was too late. The compact 5 of the back shape with Havertz and Mout dropping deep either side of Jorginho and Kanté, making impossible for City to create any chance. The formation for City moved more into a 4 1 3 2 in the final half hour of the match. James and CHilwell were pocketing Sterling and Mahrez. It would result in hopeless crosses in the box with Jesus and Aguero being outnumbered in 3 v 2.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
Back then in 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right midfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central midfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the midfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit.
Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide midfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player.
They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whenever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack.
When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming midfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide midfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide midfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was balanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.
Back then in 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right midfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central midfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the midfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit.
Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide midfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player.
They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whenever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack.
When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming midfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide midfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide midfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was balanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.
Remigrez!!!
Louis auguste je t'ai à l'œil
200 pages
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
Back then in 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right midfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central midfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the midfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit.
Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide midfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player.
They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whenever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack.
When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming midfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide midfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide midfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was balanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.
Back then in 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right midfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central midfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the midfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit.
Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide midfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player.
They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whenever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack.
When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming midfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide midfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide midfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was balanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.
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