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The 4 1 4 1 formation is often used by teams that like building from the back, which mean that the goalkepper must have great ball distribution ability. A great example of that is Neuer who allow his team to play in a high line since as a sweeper keeper he would be ready to close down any space made by the strikers and help the team to maintain control of the pitch. The 2 centerbacks need to have the ability to play under pressure and provide key passes forward and breaking the pressing lines. The idela combo would ahve one player capable ot carrying the ball forward while the other has a more versatile passing range, playing longer balls from deep but also providing more defensive cover. The centerbacks Carvalho and John Terry under José Mourinho set the record of conceding only 15 goals in the 2004 2005 season. Defensivly, the fullbacks will be tasked to cover the opposition's wingers. On the attack they will be required to push up to add width, creating overloads outwide and delivering the ball into the box. Ideally they will play on the side with their main foot. Some modern systems like Guardiola's one means that fullbacks can drift inside more frequently adding miedfield support and creating more passing angles. One holding miedfielder is one of the most crucial if not the most crucial position in this formation. He will be drifting side to side to help the team move the ball out of tight spaces. He will need to be great at progressing the ball but also have a strong physical presence to stop any run behind the miedfield line. Compared to similar lines up such as the 4 3 3, the holding miedfielder in a 4 1 4 1 does have a slightly more defensive mentality. Philipp Lahm executed this position to perfection.
He was also the focal point during the build up. The 2 more advanced center miedfielders need creativity and understanding with teamates as they need to join the attack and drop deep to help in the build up consistently during the whole match. They will rotate with the wingers or help to create overloads out wide. They must be technically gifted players while the wingers are usually the quickest players of the line up. The ideal line up would have the inverted wingers on both flanks. meaning they are more prone to dridft inside and freeing up the flanks for the fullbacks to stretch the backline. But having the wingers stretching the backline can also be benefical as it benefits the center miedfielders to attack. The wingers need to be good dribblers and excell in 1 v 1 situations. They must deliver balls into the box or making runs onto the back post. Finally the lone striker will sometimes be used as the focal point in front and will need to have excellent hold up play with the ability of laying out the ball for the center miedfielders of the wingers. The ideal striker here would be a false 9 vacating into the spaces in front of the backline and creating spaces for the players to attack ahead of him. Francesco Totti is a good example of that. This 4 1 4 1 formation is versatile allowing to have a lot of cover on the pitch from side to side meaning there will always be a passing line options available. When defending it can shift into either a 5 4 1 either a 4 5 1.
When attacking it could shift into a 3 4 3 if the holding miedfielder drop between the 2 centerbacks and the fullbacks are pushing up. Or if the wingers stay high and out wide, it can shift into a 4 3 3 formation. The presence of a lone striker mena that a long play from gk into the stirker is not ideal as the front 4 would need to push up to provide help and that means that if the team looses the ball, it can create a gap between the meidfield line and the defensive line. However if used in the right way to bypass a heavy press it can be quickly deadly and create counter attacks. If played against a 4 3 3 formation, it will be more difficult to outnumber the center. However it can quickly get the upper hand on the flanks given the fullbacks wingers combo. The wingers would need to start wide to pin the opposition's fullbacks and prevent them to adding to the press. This means fullbacks usually have space to receive the ball. However the team need to be patient in moving the ball to them. This is because if the team pass the ball directly into t fulback, the opposition can quickly read this and close off a back pass and forward option meaning the team is trapped on the flank. Realistically they would want to move the ball to the fullback indirectly throught the center to force the opposition to move closer to the center, givint the fullbacks more spaces and giving him time to push up past the winger to receive. To do this the holding miedfield will usually be shadow mark by the stirker so having one of the center mieds dropping either side of the striker
If the opposition plays as 4 4 2 it's much harder to gain an advantage on the flanks. However there is an extra player available on the pitch. The difficulty with this formation is the initial 2 v 2 with the centerbacks and the 2 strikers. So a goalkepper with the ability to play with his feet is crucial to help his team finding spaces. In this scenario, the fullbacks are not as useful during the build up. In the other hand, the holding meidfielder will be important by droppingdeep between the centerbacks to help creating a 3 v 2. If the holding miedfielder is pressed then one of the 2 others center meids will be free and will have space ahead of him to attack the backline.
4231 formation.
Guardiola and Klopp both used the 4 3 3 respectively for Barcelona and Liverpool because it's considered as one of the most stable and best defensive formation. PSG, Man City, Liverpool and Barcelona also prooved that this formation could be very lethal. Goalkepper need to participate to the build up and be able to pick a pass when under the pressure of the opposition. The centerbacks must also be excellent ball players able to move the ball up to the miedfield or pick a piass in this miedfield. They will also need to play long balls for the wingers or strikers in front if the opposite defense is not set up properly. The fullbacks will support both attack and defense throughout the whole match. When it comes to the miedfield, it can vary with a flat form, a triangle with 2 defensive miedfielders and 1 offensive miedfielder or 1 defensive miedfielder and 2 offensive miedfielders. All the 3 miedfielders need to have excellent passing precision to pick players between the lines. They need to support the defense between the build up and pick out the forwards during the attack. The cdm shield the back line 4. The controller is seen often as a box to box miedfielder. He sets the tempo of the game. The creator finally link up the miedfield with the forwards above him creating the most chances of the team. Finally in front the wingers need to be good dribblers and excell in 1 v 1 situations. They need to have egreat understanding with the striker but also the fullbacks either cutting inside to give space to the fullback either staying wide and allowing for the overlap. The striker can either be a 9 and act often like a target man to score or pass to the wingers or miedfielders. Either it can be a false 9 like in the case of Messi in Barcelona. Something to keep in mind is interchangability.
For this formation to work, it requires teamates constantly cover other teamates runs. For example if the fullback pushes up the cdm can shift outwide to cover any defensive hole. If the winger move inside, the center attacking miedfielder can move out to the wing to stretch the opposition. Constant moves and position changes are what make this formation effective. This formation tends also to create more passing lane directly in the central area of the field. If 2 strikers are pressing the 2 centrebacks, either the cdm can drop between them, either a fullback sit further back to beat the press. Either the goalkepper can be used as a centreback even if it's more risky. The winger can drop deep and drag a defender to free space for a miedfielder to come in. It allows the 9 to play deeper for either the other miedfield either for the other winger cutting inside.
The 4 1 4 1 formation is often used by teams that like building from the back, which mean that the goalkepper must have great ball distribution ability. A great example of that is Neuer who allow his team to play in a high line since as a sweeper keeper he would be ready to close down any space made by the strikers and help the team to maintain control of the pitch. The 2 centerbacks need to have the ability to play under pressure and provide key passes forward and breaking the pressing lines. The idela combo would ahve one player capable ot carrying the ball forward while the other has a more versatile passing range, playing longer balls from deep but also providing more defensive cover. The centerbacks Carvalho and John Terry under José Mourinho set the record of conceding only 15 goals in the 2004 2005 season. Defensivly, the fullbacks will be tasked to cover the opposition's wingers. On the attack they will be required to push up to add width, creating overloads outwide and delivering the ball into the box. Ideally they will play on the side with their main foot. Some modern systems like Guardiola's one means that fullbacks can drift inside more frequently adding miedfield support and creating more passing angles. One holding miedfielder is one of the most crucial if not the most crucial position in this formation. He will be drifting side to side to help the team move the ball out of tight spaces. He will need to be great at progressing the ball but also have a strong physical presence to stop any run behind the miedfield line. Compared to similar lines up such as the 4 3 3, the holding miedfielder in a 4 1 4 1 does have a slightly more defensive mentality. Philipp Lahm executed this position to perfection.
He was also the focal point during the build up. The 2 more advanced center miedfielders need creativity and understanding with teamates as they need to join the attack and drop deep to help in the build up consistently during the whole match. They will rotate with the wingers or help to create overloads out wide. They must be technically gifted players while the wingers are usually the quickest players of the line up. The ideal line up would have the inverted wingers on both flanks. meaning they are more prone to dridft inside and freeing up the flanks for the fullbacks to stretch the backline. But having the wingers stretching the backline can also be benefical as it benefits the center miedfielders to attack. The wingers need to be good dribblers and excell in 1 v 1 situations. They must deliver balls into the box or making runs onto the back post. Finally the lone striker will sometimes be used as the focal point in front and will need to have excellent hold up play with the ability of laying out the ball for the center miedfielders of the wingers. The ideal striker here would be a false 9 vacating into the spaces in front of the backline and creating spaces for the players to attack ahead of him. Francesco Totti is a good example of that. This 4 1 4 1 formation is versatile allowing to have a lot of cover on the pitch from side to side meaning there will always be a passing line options available. When defending it can shift into either a 5 4 1 either a 4 5 1.
When attacking it could shift into a 3 4 3 if the holding miedfielder drop between the 2 centerbacks and the fullbacks are pushing up. Or if the wingers stay high and out wide, it can shift into a 4 3 3 formation. The presence of a lone striker mena that a long play from gk into the stirker is not ideal as the front 4 would need to push up to provide help and that means that if the team looses the ball, it can create a gap between the meidfield line and the defensive line. However if used in the right way to bypass a heavy press it can be quickly deadly and create counter attacks. If played against a 4 3 3 formation, it will be more difficult to outnumber the center. However it can quickly get the upper hand on the flanks given the fullbacks wingers combo. The wingers would need to start wide to pin the opposition's fullbacks and prevent them to adding to the press. This means fullbacks usually have space to receive the ball. However the team need to be patient in moving the ball to them. This is because if the team pass the ball directly into t fulback, the opposition can quickly read this and close off a back pass and forward option meaning the team is trapped on the flank. Realistically they would want to move the ball to the fullback indirectly throught the center to force the opposition to move closer to the center, givint the fullbacks more spaces and giving him time to push up past the winger to receive. To do this the holding miedfield will usually be shadow mark by the stirker so having one of the center mieds dropping either side of the striker
If the opposition plays as 4 4 2 it's much harder to gain an advantage on the flanks. However there is an extra player available on the pitch. The difficulty with this formation is the initial 2 v 2 with the centerbacks and the 2 strikers. So a goalkepper with the ability to play with his feet is crucial to help his team finding spaces. In this scenario, the fullbacks are not as useful during the build up. In the other hand, the holding meidfielder will be important by droppingdeep between the centerbacks to help creating a 3 v 2. If the holding miedfielder is pressed then one of the 2 others center meids will be free and will have space ahead of him to attack the backline.
4231 formation.
Guardiola and Klopp both used the 4 3 3 respectively for Barcelona and Liverpool because it's considered as one of the most stable and best defensive formation. PSG, Man City, Liverpool and Barcelona also prooved that this formation could be very lethal. Goalkepper need to participate to the build up and be able to pick a pass when under the pressure of the opposition. The centerbacks must also be excellent ball players able to move the ball up to the miedfield or pick a piass in this miedfield. They will also need to play long balls for the wingers or strikers in front if the opposite defense is not set up properly. The fullbacks will support both attack and defense throughout the whole match. When it comes to the miedfield, it can vary with a flat form, a triangle with 2 defensive miedfielders and 1 offensive miedfielder or 1 defensive miedfielder and 2 offensive miedfielders. All the 3 miedfielders need to have excellent passing precision to pick players between the lines. They need to support the defense between the build up and pick out the forwards during the attack. The cdm shield the back line 4. The controller is seen often as a box to box miedfielder. He sets the tempo of the game. The creator finally link up the miedfield with the forwards above him creating the most chances of the team. Finally in front the wingers need to be good dribblers and excell in 1 v 1 situations. They need to have egreat understanding with the striker but also the fullbacks either cutting inside to give space to the fullback either staying wide and allowing for the overlap. The striker can either be a 9 and act often like a target man to score or pass to the wingers or miedfielders. Either it can be a false 9 like in the case of Messi in Barcelona. Something to keep in mind is interchangability.
For this formation to work, it requires teamates constantly cover other teamates runs. For example if the fullback pushes up the cdm can shift outwide to cover any defensive hole. If the winger move inside, the center attacking miedfielder can move out to the wing to stretch the opposition. Constant moves and position changes are what make this formation effective. This formation tends also to create more passing lane directly in the central area of the field. If 2 strikers are pressing the 2 centrebacks, either the cdm can drop between them, either a fullback sit further back to beat the press. Either the goalkepper can be used as a centreback even if it's more risky. The winger can drop deep and drag a defender to free space for a miedfielder to come in. It allows the 9 to play deeper for either the other miedfield either for the other winger cutting inside.
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How Napoli won the Serie A in 2023.
Napoli won Serie A in 2022 2023 season. Spalletti has a typical starting XI often lining up in 4 3 3. But Elmas, Ndombele, Simeone, and Raspadoni as subs should be not underestimated. Napoli averaged an almost 60% possession during this season. They look to build with short passes but against a avery agressive pressing team, Osimhen can act as a target men for long passes. Osemhen has enough speed and physicality to either run behind the defenders either running down the channels. Either opposition press high and Napoli play over them, either sit deep and they will be more than happy to beat them on the ground. Lobotka is mostly the deepest pivot with the responsability to begin the play if the opposition is agressive Anguissa tend to be the man who can drop deeper along the central pivot Zielinski is then the most offensive miedfielder. But during emergency situations, he is capable to drop deep as well. Napoli can use opposition's press to open spaces. Rui and Di Lorenzo, the fullbacks, both have the ability to either begin deep to be outlet options, or push high up to provide the width. But Mario Rui is often the deepest of the 2, forming a pseudo back 3 and drawing in the opposition's wingers. Kvara could stay high, menacing opposition's defense. But he could as well receive the ball deep. and draw the fullback higher. Then the dynamism of Napoli's miedfield come into the play as they can now run into the spaces vacated to get the ball into wider regions. If a centerback came across to cover then Osimehn would be 1 v 1 against the remaining centerback and then he would use his pace and physicality to cause problems.
Min Jae and Rrahmani had a key role with Min Jae standing out with his ability to whistand press and break the lines when it's required. If all the miedfielder's options are occupied, he can then he can move and carry the ball high up the pitch forcing the opposition to confront him and opening up more opportunities. The miedfield can be a dedicated 2 1 form where Zielinski is the most attacking of the 3. But Spalletti prefered them to be a 1 2 as it exploit better Anguissa's box to box ability. Labotka as the deepest men can be reliant on to retain possession,being enough press resistant to receive the ball in tigh regions. Even thought he has the ability to spread long balls, he tended to play short, allowing Napoli to maintain possession. The 3 others are more adventurous and Anguissa's ability ball to feet means that he can pick the ball in deeper regions then try to make his team going higher. He too can receive in these tight spaces and look to create for others. But for creativity, Zielinski is the one charged with most of that task with the most progressive passes and progressive passes received in his team. He likes to drive throught the defense and then try a bit riskier passes compared to the rest of the miedfield. He also doesn't hesitate to have a long shoot. But the sides are still the keys for Napoli in this season with Kvara holding the right side and Politano or Lozano holding the left side. Both Anguissa and Zielinski shift wide to help their wingers, forming triangles with their fullbacks, often creating overloads. They can also make runs into the half spaces to disrupt to opposition's shape. These interactions are particularly important in the right handside with the attacking Di Lorenzo quickly joining. At times we see Lozano or Politano drifting, allowing the fullback even more out wide and trying to create a central overload. Osihmen is also a threat into the center.
His incredible blindside movement and his excellent jump mean that he is a constant aerial threat. He scored more headed goals than anyone in Serie A. Kvara is on the left side unpredictable and his dribbles were effective not only thanks to his technical ability but also because they didn't know what would be their final goal. Cut infield to have a shoot? Crossing to the backpost for Osimhen? Attacking the touchline then cross for Osimhen? If the fullback stay deep, he can make his cross but if he stays close, Zielinsky can enter into action. More importantly, Kvara could dodge the defenders to attack the box. The combinations between Kvara and Osemhen had been the most prolific in this season But Napoli is not only about attacking. They had the best defense of Serie A. They had one of the most intense press on the league. They were very effective both at immediate counterpress and at a more structural and organized press. Here Osimhen would press a centerback. Depending on which one, either Zielinski or Anguissa would join to form a 4 4 2. The wingers are pressing the fullbacks and the rest of the team coming across. Lobtoka is still the deepest miedfielder with the most defensive responsabilities. Especially with 3 miedfielders formations he is patrolling behind both Anguissa and Zielinski to provide a good defensive cover. But defending in 4 4 2 means that the 2 central miedfielders can be outnumbered. Althought both centerbacks prefer to remain passive, Kim Min Jae can jump the lines to make a proactive tackle, preparing his team for the counterattack. Into their own third, Napoli dropped into a more compact 4 3 3 shape.
Inzaghi's tactics at Inter Milan.
Inzaghi's Inter Milan is all about his team being flexible both in and out of possession. Against Athlético in first leg, they were sitting in mid block, defending their penalty area Inter's 5 3 2 while defending was designed to be shifted immediatly into a man to man press. Barella would step to press the left center back. Çalhanoğlu had a double job because while he was pressing Koke he also had to worry about Griezmann behind him, who was doing a lot od dropping into these central areas. But when he was caught with that pressure and Griezmann was free, the center back, De Vrij, recognized this situation and would apply pressure to stop Griezmann turning. This kind of defensive awareness was happening all over the pitch. Sometimes the center backs can't follow since they have to track the center forward. It's worth noticing about how comfortable these players are at picking diferent positions in the pitch. Sometimes when De Vrij is applying pressure in front, rather than coming back, he see that the forwards are applying pressure in 1 v 1. So when the ball fall back to the right center back, Pavard, he is showing for the ball in space. It turns out that running center backs forward are a major theme of 2023/2023 season.
During build up, when the central miedfielders are deep, it frees space and to get into the space in the wide in the left, sometimes Di Marco drift inside so Bastoni, the left center back, pushes all the way up to a left wing position to exploit that space. As a result, Di Marco has among the highest expected assists among any players in the Serie A, while Bastoni is an important playmaker for his team, averaging as many chances or assists created than a fullback would do. Seeing Bastoni and Pavard running into their half spaces is not any diferent from an inverted fullback doing the same thing. They do it to open a passing line to a winger. To break compact blocks, when you try to pin your most creative miedfielders against the opposition's defenders, they tend to see less the ball compared to the deep miedfielders and defenders. So reversing the roles to a degree is quite interesting.
How Napoli won the Serie A in 2023.
Napoli won Serie A in 2022 2023 season. Spalletti has a typical starting XI often lining up in 4 3 3. But Elmas, Ndombele, Simeone, and Raspadoni as subs should be not underestimated. Napoli averaged an almost 60% possession during this season. They look to build with short passes but against a avery agressive pressing team, Osimhen can act as a target men for long passes. Osemhen has enough speed and physicality to either run behind the defenders either running down the channels. Either opposition press high and Napoli play over them, either sit deep and they will be more than happy to beat them on the ground. Lobotka is mostly the deepest pivot with the responsability to begin the play if the opposition is agressive Anguissa tend to be the man who can drop deeper along the central pivot Zielinski is then the most offensive miedfielder. But during emergency situations, he is capable to drop deep as well. Napoli can use opposition's press to open spaces. Rui and Di Lorenzo, the fullbacks, both have the ability to either begin deep to be outlet options, or push high up to provide the width. But Mario Rui is often the deepest of the 2, forming a pseudo back 3 and drawing in the opposition's wingers. Kvara could stay high, menacing opposition's defense. But he could as well receive the ball deep. and draw the fullback higher. Then the dynamism of Napoli's miedfield come into the play as they can now run into the spaces vacated to get the ball into wider regions. If a centerback came across to cover then Osimehn would be 1 v 1 against the remaining centerback and then he would use his pace and physicality to cause problems.
Min Jae and Rrahmani had a key role with Min Jae standing out with his ability to whistand press and break the lines when it's required. If all the miedfielder's options are occupied, he can then he can move and carry the ball high up the pitch forcing the opposition to confront him and opening up more opportunities. The miedfield can be a dedicated 2 1 form where Zielinski is the most attacking of the 3. But Spalletti prefered them to be a 1 2 as it exploit better Anguissa's box to box ability. Labotka as the deepest men can be reliant on to retain possession,being enough press resistant to receive the ball in tigh regions. Even thought he has the ability to spread long balls, he tended to play short, allowing Napoli to maintain possession. The 3 others are more adventurous and Anguissa's ability ball to feet means that he can pick the ball in deeper regions then try to make his team going higher. He too can receive in these tight spaces and look to create for others. But for creativity, Zielinski is the one charged with most of that task with the most progressive passes and progressive passes received in his team. He likes to drive throught the defense and then try a bit riskier passes compared to the rest of the miedfield. He also doesn't hesitate to have a long shoot. But the sides are still the keys for Napoli in this season with Kvara holding the right side and Politano or Lozano holding the left side. Both Anguissa and Zielinski shift wide to help their wingers, forming triangles with their fullbacks, often creating overloads. They can also make runs into the half spaces to disrupt to opposition's shape. These interactions are particularly important in the right handside with the attacking Di Lorenzo quickly joining. At times we see Lozano or Politano drifting, allowing the fullback even more out wide and trying to create a central overload. Osihmen is also a threat into the center.
His incredible blindside movement and his excellent jump mean that he is a constant aerial threat. He scored more headed goals than anyone in Serie A. Kvara is on the left side unpredictable and his dribbles were effective not only thanks to his technical ability but also because they didn't know what would be their final goal. Cut infield to have a shoot? Crossing to the backpost for Osimhen? Attacking the touchline then cross for Osimhen? If the fullback stay deep, he can make his cross but if he stays close, Zielinsky can enter into action. More importantly, Kvara could dodge the defenders to attack the box. The combinations between Kvara and Osemhen had been the most prolific in this season But Napoli is not only about attacking. They had the best defense of Serie A. They had one of the most intense press on the league. They were very effective both at immediate counterpress and at a more structural and organized press. Here Osimhen would press a centerback. Depending on which one, either Zielinski or Anguissa would join to form a 4 4 2. The wingers are pressing the fullbacks and the rest of the team coming across. Lobtoka is still the deepest miedfielder with the most defensive responsabilities. Especially with 3 miedfielders formations he is patrolling behind both Anguissa and Zielinski to provide a good defensive cover. But defending in 4 4 2 means that the 2 central miedfielders can be outnumbered. Althought both centerbacks prefer to remain passive, Kim Min Jae can jump the lines to make a proactive tackle, preparing his team for the counterattack. Into their own third, Napoli dropped into a more compact 4 3 3 shape.
Inzaghi's tactics at Inter Milan.
Inzaghi's Inter Milan is all about his team being flexible both in and out of possession. Against Athlético in first leg, they were sitting in mid block, defending their penalty area Inter's 5 3 2 while defending was designed to be shifted immediatly into a man to man press. Barella would step to press the left center back. Çalhanoğlu had a double job because while he was pressing Koke he also had to worry about Griezmann behind him, who was doing a lot od dropping into these central areas. But when he was caught with that pressure and Griezmann was free, the center back, De Vrij, recognized this situation and would apply pressure to stop Griezmann turning. This kind of defensive awareness was happening all over the pitch. Sometimes the center backs can't follow since they have to track the center forward. It's worth noticing about how comfortable these players are at picking diferent positions in the pitch. Sometimes when De Vrij is applying pressure in front, rather than coming back, he see that the forwards are applying pressure in 1 v 1. So when the ball fall back to the right center back, Pavard, he is showing for the ball in space. It turns out that running center backs forward are a major theme of 2023/2023 season.
During build up, when the central miedfielders are deep, it frees space and to get into the space in the wide in the left, sometimes Di Marco drift inside so Bastoni, the left center back, pushes all the way up to a left wing position to exploit that space. As a result, Di Marco has among the highest expected assists among any players in the Serie A, while Bastoni is an important playmaker for his team, averaging as many chances or assists created than a fullback would do. Seeing Bastoni and Pavard running into their half spaces is not any diferent from an inverted fullback doing the same thing. They do it to open a passing line to a winger. To break compact blocks, when you try to pin your most creative miedfielders against the opposition's defenders, they tend to see less the ball compared to the deep miedfielders and defenders. So reversing the roles to a degree is quite interesting.
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Number 8 is a football team's heart. The number 8 is in essence a central midfielder. And the role demands that the player both contributes to the attacking and defensive side, across the entire area between and sometimes into the 2 penalty boxes. A good 8 need to have a very good stamina, have a good spatial awareness so he can be able to win the ball and pass it effectively. He needs not only to be able to score and create goals but also prevent them. They must also possess the tactical awareness to anticipate the flow of the game and to know where on the pitch they are needed. It may be the most important position on the pitch.
The Mezzala were the 8 and the 10 back then, the players who sat behind the forwards in the M W formation. By essence the mezzala is a number 8, someone who joins the attack. It doesn't help that the term is interchangeable with interno, someone who plays inside, and incursore, someone making an incursion in the final third or opposition penalty area. Some see the mezzala as a central player who drifts wide, and purists might point to the flanking midfielders of the midfield 3. A confusion of its origins complicates the term. Plus its specific uses to describe a position and its broader use to describe a role. In a more straightforward way we can see the mezzala as a player who gets up to support the attack but does so largely by drifting into the half spaces from where they can prompt passing moves typically linking with inside forwards of forwards who drops off, before pushing up at times to get into the box. Generally they will form the flanks of a midfield 3 but it's as much about the cover and stability afforded by such system players who push on as it's an inherent quality of the position. Such flanking players could also be more destructive players. These are known as medianos, like Gattuso and Ambrosini who flanked Pirlo in the famous AC Milan team. However in a system not using them to protect a deep lying playmaker, these players will often drift to link with the fullbacks and wide forwards to create passing triangles as they seek to to create an overload to progress the ball. A second flanking midfielder and more defensively minded deeper midfielder can act as cover for when the mezzala pushes forwards.
They can also create overlaps themselve or create an overload in half spaces especially if playing with inverted wingers. A good example of this was Angel Di Maria was played as a left midfielder behind Cristiano Ronaldo under Carlo Ancelotti's Real Madrid. Ronaldo would cut inside to create a goal threat while Di Maria would either move into the wide spaces to overlap or attack from a deeper position in the half space behind Ronaldo. Balance is the key. That's why some teams have a midfielder acting as a mezzala, a player who is more a shuttling box to box midfielder and then a deeper player who either screens or create plays from quarter back positions. Chelsea's midfield under Conte then Tuchel with Jorginho, Kanté and Kovacic were a good example of that. Also France's slightly lop sided 4 2 3 1 in the 2018 World Cup saw Blaide Matuidi as a shuttling player nominally positionned as a left inside forward, Pau Lpogba as a mezzala, and Kanté screening. Also in Serie A we had the example of Milinkovic Savic at Lazio. Luis Alberto was arguably a mezzla too, getting between the lines to create altought not advancing forwards as much as Milinkovic Savic who ran more often into the half spaces to create and into the opposition's box as an additionnal forward by times. Both took on defnesive duties as well, helping to screen the deep midfielder Lucas Leiva. Piotr Zielinski of Napoli also played as a mezzala on the left but also sometimes right handside of the midfield 3, getting forward to support the attacks, keeping possession in wide areas and half spaces and having a great turn of pace to get forward after he worked the overload out wide. Aaron Ramsey from Juventus, Matias Vecino for Inter Milan, Mario Pasalic for Atalanta and Gaetano Castrovili for Florentina were also great examples ofr mezzalas. They could be described also as 8. The mezzla is a position and a role. It's creative industrious and multi faced.
Maradona, Riquelme, Zidane and Kaka are some of the most finest examples of talented number 10. This role is both one of a playmaker, connecting the midfield and the attack, basically either operating between the middle and attacking lie or in the hole. With defensive responsabilities, pressing, becoming more and more important in modern football, the traditionnal number 10 who could have little to no defensive responsability to focus mainly on his attacking ability, began to disappear. That's why it became antiquated. The modern attacking midfielders has now their share of defensive work to do. However it seems like it's slowly regaining in popularity. And it's mainly due to the fact that fullbacks tend to become more agressive, more athletics. It worth noting that the number 10's role in attack remains unchanged as he has to drop into positions to receive the ball and then use it to create chances through combinations of passing and dribbling, imagination and quick thinking and decision making.
Advantages of using a back 3 formation is obvious. In cases of crosses, there are potentially more bodies to contest an aerial ball for example. And the wingbacks can also quickly be 2 v 1 against the opposition's wingers if the wide midfielder tracks to his side to help him in the 3 5 2 formation in particular. A reason why some weaker formations can also choose these kind of formations is that they excpect to have the ball less than their opponents and need to protect against that disparity. Additionnally the most likely way they can excpect to create chances is on the counter attack. So by sitting back and blocking space, then attacking with wingbacks, and a couple of forwards, they maximize their defensive output and exploit an opponent in a vulnerable attacking shape. Some others managers just want to play like this, not necessarly because their team is not as strong, but because it's more suited to their tactics and / or players. Belgium was for a long time ranked number 1 in fifa's ranking. Yet they used for a long time this back 3 system, mostly a 3 4 3 under Roberto Martinez. One of the reasons was that in order to play the sort of possession based, high press, attacking game he wants to, it's essential to ensure there is defensive balance or at least a safety net to guard against the counter attack. Playing on a 3 4 3 means that not only do they benefit from the same advantages as weaker sides is being far harder to break down and score against when out of possession, but because they are so good in attacking situations that they could enjoy the best of both worlds.
Belgium had central defenders like Vertonghen, Kompany, Alderweireld and Denayer comfortable on the ball who could play passes out from the back or carry it into the midfield to help create overloads. The wingbacks can get higher up the pitch froma higher starting position than the fullbacks requiring less defensive cover from midfielders which helps to gain control of opposition territory. One negative is that playing an extra center back means losing a more creative player higher up the pitch but in tentative, cagey international games, the more defensively solid teams have something of an advantage, like Greece in 2004 or Portugal in 2016 euros. For these teams, it only took 1 goal to win goals and for these kind of teams that was precisely what they wer elooking for. But a back 3 doesn't necesssarly means that the team is defensive. Johan Cruyff's Netherlands had a back 3 and still perfected total football back in 1974. And Manchester City under Pep Guardiola won the treble in 2023 using a back 3 in their 3 2 4 1 formation. Transitions to back 4 to a back 3 is also commonly used in Premiere League and in Italy with generally a fullback tucking in while the other advances. Some managers use them for the build up mostly and some otehrs to help less strong ides to defend in greater numbers to frustrate their opponents. It's easier to destroy than create and for some teams their best chance to win is by stopping and blocking the opposition, hoping the few opportunities they will get will result into goals.
Thomas Muller came in Bayern in 2009 when it was under the management of Van Gaal who recognized Muller's abilities so he gave him a key role in Bayern's team. It's not easy to identify why Muller is considered as that good. After all he is not particularly fast, strong, isn't a very good dribbler and his goal are not very flashy most of the time. He doesn't the traits that most of the attacking players usually have. However like a chess player, he is thinking ahead of his opponentss. He makes his living from being in the right place at the right time which requies excellent anticipation, intelligent movements and spatial awareness. A ramdeuter doesn't take a specific position but is rather rfree to roam around the pitch. He occupies different areas depending on the situations. Also their efficacity relies more on mental and tactical strenghts which are less visible to the human eye than extraordinary pace, physicality or technical qualities. Muller's most valuable asset is his ability to identify and exploit space in and around the final third. Dele Alli and Jose Callejon also acted as a Raumdeuter at times, playing a small role during the build up, focusing more on adding value in the final third, also preferring to operate between the lines and attack the vertical channels between opposing defenders, making them difficult to mark and they are also masters in the art of creating space through deception.
Number 8 is a football team's heart. The number 8 is in essence a central midfielder. And the role demands that the player both contributes to the attacking and defensive side, across the entire area between and sometimes into the 2 penalty boxes. A good 8 need to have a very good stamina, have a good spatial awareness so he can be able to win the ball and pass it effectively. He needs not only to be able to score and create goals but also prevent them. They must also possess the tactical awareness to anticipate the flow of the game and to know where on the pitch they are needed. It may be the most important position on the pitch.
The Mezzala were the 8 and the 10 back then, the players who sat behind the forwards in the M W formation. By essence the mezzala is a number 8, someone who joins the attack. It doesn't help that the term is interchangeable with interno, someone who plays inside, and incursore, someone making an incursion in the final third or opposition penalty area. Some see the mezzala as a central player who drifts wide, and purists might point to the flanking midfielders of the midfield 3. A confusion of its origins complicates the term. Plus its specific uses to describe a position and its broader use to describe a role. In a more straightforward way we can see the mezzala as a player who gets up to support the attack but does so largely by drifting into the half spaces from where they can prompt passing moves typically linking with inside forwards of forwards who drops off, before pushing up at times to get into the box. Generally they will form the flanks of a midfield 3 but it's as much about the cover and stability afforded by such system players who push on as it's an inherent quality of the position. Such flanking players could also be more destructive players. These are known as medianos, like Gattuso and Ambrosini who flanked Pirlo in the famous AC Milan team. However in a system not using them to protect a deep lying playmaker, these players will often drift to link with the fullbacks and wide forwards to create passing triangles as they seek to to create an overload to progress the ball. A second flanking midfielder and more defensively minded deeper midfielder can act as cover for when the mezzala pushes forwards.
They can also create overlaps themselve or create an overload in half spaces especially if playing with inverted wingers. A good example of this was Angel Di Maria was played as a left midfielder behind Cristiano Ronaldo under Carlo Ancelotti's Real Madrid. Ronaldo would cut inside to create a goal threat while Di Maria would either move into the wide spaces to overlap or attack from a deeper position in the half space behind Ronaldo. Balance is the key. That's why some teams have a midfielder acting as a mezzala, a player who is more a shuttling box to box midfielder and then a deeper player who either screens or create plays from quarter back positions. Chelsea's midfield under Conte then Tuchel with Jorginho, Kanté and Kovacic were a good example of that. Also France's slightly lop sided 4 2 3 1 in the 2018 World Cup saw Blaide Matuidi as a shuttling player nominally positionned as a left inside forward, Pau Lpogba as a mezzala, and Kanté screening. Also in Serie A we had the example of Milinkovic Savic at Lazio. Luis Alberto was arguably a mezzla too, getting between the lines to create altought not advancing forwards as much as Milinkovic Savic who ran more often into the half spaces to create and into the opposition's box as an additionnal forward by times. Both took on defnesive duties as well, helping to screen the deep midfielder Lucas Leiva. Piotr Zielinski of Napoli also played as a mezzala on the left but also sometimes right handside of the midfield 3, getting forward to support the attacks, keeping possession in wide areas and half spaces and having a great turn of pace to get forward after he worked the overload out wide. Aaron Ramsey from Juventus, Matias Vecino for Inter Milan, Mario Pasalic for Atalanta and Gaetano Castrovili for Florentina were also great examples ofr mezzalas. They could be described also as 8. The mezzla is a position and a role. It's creative industrious and multi faced.
Maradona, Riquelme, Zidane and Kaka are some of the most finest examples of talented number 10. This role is both one of a playmaker, connecting the midfield and the attack, basically either operating between the middle and attacking lie or in the hole. With defensive responsabilities, pressing, becoming more and more important in modern football, the traditionnal number 10 who could have little to no defensive responsability to focus mainly on his attacking ability, began to disappear. That's why it became antiquated. The modern attacking midfielders has now their share of defensive work to do. However it seems like it's slowly regaining in popularity. And it's mainly due to the fact that fullbacks tend to become more agressive, more athletics. It worth noting that the number 10's role in attack remains unchanged as he has to drop into positions to receive the ball and then use it to create chances through combinations of passing and dribbling, imagination and quick thinking and decision making.
Advantages of using a back 3 formation is obvious. In cases of crosses, there are potentially more bodies to contest an aerial ball for example. And the wingbacks can also quickly be 2 v 1 against the opposition's wingers if the wide midfielder tracks to his side to help him in the 3 5 2 formation in particular. A reason why some weaker formations can also choose these kind of formations is that they excpect to have the ball less than their opponents and need to protect against that disparity. Additionnally the most likely way they can excpect to create chances is on the counter attack. So by sitting back and blocking space, then attacking with wingbacks, and a couple of forwards, they maximize their defensive output and exploit an opponent in a vulnerable attacking shape. Some others managers just want to play like this, not necessarly because their team is not as strong, but because it's more suited to their tactics and / or players. Belgium was for a long time ranked number 1 in fifa's ranking. Yet they used for a long time this back 3 system, mostly a 3 4 3 under Roberto Martinez. One of the reasons was that in order to play the sort of possession based, high press, attacking game he wants to, it's essential to ensure there is defensive balance or at least a safety net to guard against the counter attack. Playing on a 3 4 3 means that not only do they benefit from the same advantages as weaker sides is being far harder to break down and score against when out of possession, but because they are so good in attacking situations that they could enjoy the best of both worlds.
Belgium had central defenders like Vertonghen, Kompany, Alderweireld and Denayer comfortable on the ball who could play passes out from the back or carry it into the midfield to help create overloads. The wingbacks can get higher up the pitch froma higher starting position than the fullbacks requiring less defensive cover from midfielders which helps to gain control of opposition territory. One negative is that playing an extra center back means losing a more creative player higher up the pitch but in tentative, cagey international games, the more defensively solid teams have something of an advantage, like Greece in 2004 or Portugal in 2016 euros. For these teams, it only took 1 goal to win goals and for these kind of teams that was precisely what they wer elooking for. But a back 3 doesn't necesssarly means that the team is defensive. Johan Cruyff's Netherlands had a back 3 and still perfected total football back in 1974. And Manchester City under Pep Guardiola won the treble in 2023 using a back 3 in their 3 2 4 1 formation. Transitions to back 4 to a back 3 is also commonly used in Premiere League and in Italy with generally a fullback tucking in while the other advances. Some managers use them for the build up mostly and some otehrs to help less strong ides to defend in greater numbers to frustrate their opponents. It's easier to destroy than create and for some teams their best chance to win is by stopping and blocking the opposition, hoping the few opportunities they will get will result into goals.
Thomas Muller came in Bayern in 2009 when it was under the management of Van Gaal who recognized Muller's abilities so he gave him a key role in Bayern's team. It's not easy to identify why Muller is considered as that good. After all he is not particularly fast, strong, isn't a very good dribbler and his goal are not very flashy most of the time. He doesn't the traits that most of the attacking players usually have. However like a chess player, he is thinking ahead of his opponentss. He makes his living from being in the right place at the right time which requies excellent anticipation, intelligent movements and spatial awareness. A ramdeuter doesn't take a specific position but is rather rfree to roam around the pitch. He occupies different areas depending on the situations. Also their efficacity relies more on mental and tactical strenghts which are less visible to the human eye than extraordinary pace, physicality or technical qualities. Muller's most valuable asset is his ability to identify and exploit space in and around the final third. Dele Alli and Jose Callejon also acted as a Raumdeuter at times, playing a small role during the build up, focusing more on adding value in the final third, also preferring to operate between the lines and attack the vertical channels between opposing defenders, making them difficult to mark and they are also masters in the art of creating space through deception.
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After 3 successfull seasons at Real Madrid, Makélélé comes to Chelsea in 2003. Here he redefined a position and an approach to playing it. To the point that his name became the synonymous to the function. His role consisted of being the deepest midfielder of the midfield tiro in generally a 4 3 3. While it's main purpose is defensive, the role has to fill an attacking purpose as well. Makélélé was a converted winger playing in a more offensive position at Nantes club. He was competent and quick. Then with Celta Vigo and Real Madrid, he played both with defensive and attacking responsabilities, playing generally in a midfield 2. Him and his partner would organize incursions forwards with oen covering and the other advancing. It fostered a positionnal discipline especially at Real Madrid where his work consistented mostly of protecting and feeding the balls to the talented attacking players of the Galacticos. At Chelsea, Makélélé was even more focused on defense, mostly due to a tactical shift being by Mourinho in 2004. While Makélélé already played as the deepest midifelder under the previous manager Claudio Raneri during his first season at Chelsea, in a 4 4 2 alongside Frank Lampard, so basically at the basis of the midfield diamond, Mourinho introduced the 4 3 3. Then Makélélé became the anchor behind 2 more attacking minded midfielders. 4 3 3 had been a predominant tactical set up in Europe's main leagues as it's advantages over the 4 4 2 was pretty obvious. Makélélé could sit between the defense and the midfield line, making him free if the 2 opposite midfielders picked up their opposite mens. If one pushed forward to take Makélélé then one of the other 2 was free. And if a forward made it 3 v 3, a fullback was free to push up. This facilitated transitions from defense to attack. Opposition found it difficult to stiffle a move forwards without adjusting systems to form either a 4 3 3 either a 4 4 1 1 where the attacking midfielder could mark Makélélé.
But in return it reduced its own attacking possibilities. The Makélélé role was not only about screening his defense or to cover for a fullback pushing high. It's a transition role between the defense and the midfield. He acted as a fulcrum avoiding punts forwards. Instead of bypassing the midfield with long balls or try to find midfielders who were man marked a player between the lines could take the ball, shileld it and turn it to the players forwardIf the player having this role was technically gifted and physically strong like it was the case for Makélélé then he could even drag opposition's midfielders out of position when they would try to close down, creating more space. Crucially, the role wouldn't have make the same impact without the 4 3 3 because ina 4 4 2 a player playign the same role would leave his midfield partner isolated when he dropped deeper either by letting him 2 v 1 either by forcing the wide players to tuck in. It works in a strict 4 2 3 1 with offensive fullbacks. THis role is both positional and functionnal. He must not only sit in front of his back line shielding central areas but also covering the flanks. It requires discipline, tactical intelligence awareness of his teammates movements : win the ball or receive it quickly without risk, trying to find teammate in space.
The Regista is one of the 2 most creative roles theorized by the theoricians of Italian football. The other is the trequartista and he plays in the hole behind the strikers. But the Regista is just equally important at least. The deep lying playmaker made his appearance already back when in the old 2 3 5 formation with a player capable ot making passes to the advancing wingers. Charles Roberts who won the Premiere League with Manchester United in 1908 and 1922 was known for his ability to play the ball long into the attacking players of his team. Vittorio Pozzo who managed the Italian national team and won 2 World Cups, admired his creativity from a deep position and he used Luisito Monti in a similar way. He has a screening role in his 2 3 2 3as a centro mediano. He was tasked with marking the deep lying forward but also to turn defenses into attacks with his long passing. In the 1950's, sides like Hungrary began to use this role as well. Nandor Hidegkuti was the example for that role. As Hungrary used inside forwards, defenses began deploying screening midfielders to track the forwards. This prevented the creativity of the centre half role. The Spanish Luis Suarez also played for Inter Milan under Helenio Herrera in this role, sitting in front of the back 4. He could carry the ball forward but was often content to play as a quaterback. The evolution of tactics with 2 4 2 4 and 4 4 2 tended to make the deep lying playmaker redundant. The creativity came from the driving box to box midfielders or from the wingers. Or overlapping fullbacks or from the number 10. However it's worth noticing that Brazil in 1970 used Gerson as a Regista alongside the combative Clodaldo. The athleticism compansated for the natural overloads who tended to occur when a central midfielder axis employs a Regista. When 3 5 2 and 4 1 3 2 were introduced, it created the screen of 2 defensive midfielders behind who a Regista could sit like Andrea Pirlo with AC Milan.
Cruyff's tactics at Barcelona.
Cruyff came in Barcelona in 1988 when it was in debt and coming out of a crisis. Attendance numbers were dwindling. But Cryff brought success back in Barcelona. Cruyff was miles ahead of his peers tactically. Cruyff played in a 4 3 3 for the majority of his career. But he adapted this because he wanted a diamond in his midfield due to the angles that it created. A more conventionnal formation would have been a 4 1 2 1 2. But Cruyff believed it sacrificed too much width. He believed that his midfielders moving in his wide regions would result in a collapse of the diamond. As most of formations played with a front 2 he believed that a back 4 was not necessary. So he moved a defender into the midfield. All of this while having your wingers being wide.
However even the back 3 was not a flat traditionnal back 3. With Koeman often sitting deeper as a libero meaning that the team had now 2 diamonds. The 2 defenders alongside him were mobile and had to cover the width of the pitch. Ferrer and Sergi were naturally fullbacks rather than center backs. Of course when building up the priority was to maintain possession. And the keeper often looked to roll out to Koeman who was capable of finding outstanding passing angles when passing short for his teammates who looked to make the pitch big. Either that either hitting accurate long balls into the wingers. Having a back 3 allows to outnumber the front 2, allowing them to play out. If one of the forwards was pressing Koeman, the wide center backs could progress the ball themselveswhilst the defensive midfielder, often Guardiola, could drop into the back line in order to cover, inn the way of total football. Koeman himself could dribble out and be the primary playmaker with Pep covering again. It's worth noticing that at times, Cruyff used inverted fullbacks. In this case Cruyff lined up in a more traditionnal 4 3 3. In this new system, Ferrer and Sergi were happy to push alongside Guardiola into the midfield. As for Guardiola, he was the metronome of the team around which everyone functionned His vertical role was more limited, often moving horizontal to pick up and spread the ball. Ahead of him the wide central midfielders allowed great movements within the team as they had great fluidity and were important in manipulating the opposition from the half spaces. Eusebio had the most dynamic runs as he liked to run behind the front line, providing breaking movements behind the forwards at the right moments But when Guardiola needed assistance, he was more likely to drop as a second pivot
And he had a good passing ability. Laudrup could play often the wide left central midfielder and he was one of the best playmaker in the world during his time. He was capable of spreading the play as well as make through passes for one of the forwards to finish. The midfield at the tip of the diamond was often Bakero. He was acting more as a second striker, pushing up when necessary but also capable ot playing as a midfielder for the overload. But often, as the center forward had freedom of movement, when he dropped they would have opposing movements to hopefully create temporary spaces behind or in front of the opposition's back line. While the wingers typically stayed wide during the build up in order to stretch out the opposition and create more spaces for those in the centre, when the ball moved higher up the pitch, they came alive, looking to cut inside more. Begeristein and Stoichkov were the usual wingers under Cruyff's Barcelona. The front players functionned as an unit, wide central midfielders clogging the half spaces so the opponents could tuck in then isolate the wingers 1 v 1 against the fullbacks. But if the wingers made the central runs eerly, the wide central midfielders could push to make up the width. Even the centre forward could look to move up into the flank. The attacking midfielder could also drop to provide a wall pass tfor an advancing midfielder.
After 3 successfull seasons at Real Madrid, Makélélé comes to Chelsea in 2003. Here he redefined a position and an approach to playing it. To the point that his name became the synonymous to the function. His role consisted of being the deepest midfielder of the midfield tiro in generally a 4 3 3. While it's main purpose is defensive, the role has to fill an attacking purpose as well. Makélélé was a converted winger playing in a more offensive position at Nantes club. He was competent and quick. Then with Celta Vigo and Real Madrid, he played both with defensive and attacking responsabilities, playing generally in a midfield 2. Him and his partner would organize incursions forwards with oen covering and the other advancing. It fostered a positionnal discipline especially at Real Madrid where his work consistented mostly of protecting and feeding the balls to the talented attacking players of the Galacticos. At Chelsea, Makélélé was even more focused on defense, mostly due to a tactical shift being by Mourinho in 2004. While Makélélé already played as the deepest midifelder under the previous manager Claudio Raneri during his first season at Chelsea, in a 4 4 2 alongside Frank Lampard, so basically at the basis of the midfield diamond, Mourinho introduced the 4 3 3. Then Makélélé became the anchor behind 2 more attacking minded midfielders. 4 3 3 had been a predominant tactical set up in Europe's main leagues as it's advantages over the 4 4 2 was pretty obvious. Makélélé could sit between the defense and the midfield line, making him free if the 2 opposite midfielders picked up their opposite mens. If one pushed forward to take Makélélé then one of the other 2 was free. And if a forward made it 3 v 3, a fullback was free to push up. This facilitated transitions from defense to attack. Opposition found it difficult to stiffle a move forwards without adjusting systems to form either a 4 3 3 either a 4 4 1 1 where the attacking midfielder could mark Makélélé.
But in return it reduced its own attacking possibilities. The Makélélé role was not only about screening his defense or to cover for a fullback pushing high. It's a transition role between the defense and the midfield. He acted as a fulcrum avoiding punts forwards. Instead of bypassing the midfield with long balls or try to find midfielders who were man marked a player between the lines could take the ball, shileld it and turn it to the players forwardIf the player having this role was technically gifted and physically strong like it was the case for Makélélé then he could even drag opposition's midfielders out of position when they would try to close down, creating more space. Crucially, the role wouldn't have make the same impact without the 4 3 3 because ina 4 4 2 a player playign the same role would leave his midfield partner isolated when he dropped deeper either by letting him 2 v 1 either by forcing the wide players to tuck in. It works in a strict 4 2 3 1 with offensive fullbacks. THis role is both positional and functionnal. He must not only sit in front of his back line shielding central areas but also covering the flanks. It requires discipline, tactical intelligence awareness of his teammates movements : win the ball or receive it quickly without risk, trying to find teammate in space.
The Regista is one of the 2 most creative roles theorized by the theoricians of Italian football. The other is the trequartista and he plays in the hole behind the strikers. But the Regista is just equally important at least. The deep lying playmaker made his appearance already back when in the old 2 3 5 formation with a player capable ot making passes to the advancing wingers. Charles Roberts who won the Premiere League with Manchester United in 1908 and 1922 was known for his ability to play the ball long into the attacking players of his team. Vittorio Pozzo who managed the Italian national team and won 2 World Cups, admired his creativity from a deep position and he used Luisito Monti in a similar way. He has a screening role in his 2 3 2 3as a centro mediano. He was tasked with marking the deep lying forward but also to turn defenses into attacks with his long passing. In the 1950's, sides like Hungrary began to use this role as well. Nandor Hidegkuti was the example for that role. As Hungrary used inside forwards, defenses began deploying screening midfielders to track the forwards. This prevented the creativity of the centre half role. The Spanish Luis Suarez also played for Inter Milan under Helenio Herrera in this role, sitting in front of the back 4. He could carry the ball forward but was often content to play as a quaterback. The evolution of tactics with 2 4 2 4 and 4 4 2 tended to make the deep lying playmaker redundant. The creativity came from the driving box to box midfielders or from the wingers. Or overlapping fullbacks or from the number 10. However it's worth noticing that Brazil in 1970 used Gerson as a Regista alongside the combative Clodaldo. The athleticism compansated for the natural overloads who tended to occur when a central midfielder axis employs a Regista. When 3 5 2 and 4 1 3 2 were introduced, it created the screen of 2 defensive midfielders behind who a Regista could sit like Andrea Pirlo with AC Milan.
Cruyff's tactics at Barcelona.
Cruyff came in Barcelona in 1988 when it was in debt and coming out of a crisis. Attendance numbers were dwindling. But Cryff brought success back in Barcelona. Cruyff was miles ahead of his peers tactically. Cruyff played in a 4 3 3 for the majority of his career. But he adapted this because he wanted a diamond in his midfield due to the angles that it created. A more conventionnal formation would have been a 4 1 2 1 2. But Cruyff believed it sacrificed too much width. He believed that his midfielders moving in his wide regions would result in a collapse of the diamond. As most of formations played with a front 2 he believed that a back 4 was not necessary. So he moved a defender into the midfield. All of this while having your wingers being wide.
However even the back 3 was not a flat traditionnal back 3. With Koeman often sitting deeper as a libero meaning that the team had now 2 diamonds. The 2 defenders alongside him were mobile and had to cover the width of the pitch. Ferrer and Sergi were naturally fullbacks rather than center backs. Of course when building up the priority was to maintain possession. And the keeper often looked to roll out to Koeman who was capable of finding outstanding passing angles when passing short for his teammates who looked to make the pitch big. Either that either hitting accurate long balls into the wingers. Having a back 3 allows to outnumber the front 2, allowing them to play out. If one of the forwards was pressing Koeman, the wide center backs could progress the ball themselveswhilst the defensive midfielder, often Guardiola, could drop into the back line in order to cover, inn the way of total football. Koeman himself could dribble out and be the primary playmaker with Pep covering again. It's worth noticing that at times, Cruyff used inverted fullbacks. In this case Cruyff lined up in a more traditionnal 4 3 3. In this new system, Ferrer and Sergi were happy to push alongside Guardiola into the midfield. As for Guardiola, he was the metronome of the team around which everyone functionned His vertical role was more limited, often moving horizontal to pick up and spread the ball. Ahead of him the wide central midfielders allowed great movements within the team as they had great fluidity and were important in manipulating the opposition from the half spaces. Eusebio had the most dynamic runs as he liked to run behind the front line, providing breaking movements behind the forwards at the right moments But when Guardiola needed assistance, he was more likely to drop as a second pivot
And he had a good passing ability. Laudrup could play often the wide left central midfielder and he was one of the best playmaker in the world during his time. He was capable of spreading the play as well as make through passes for one of the forwards to finish. The midfield at the tip of the diamond was often Bakero. He was acting more as a second striker, pushing up when necessary but also capable ot playing as a midfielder for the overload. But often, as the center forward had freedom of movement, when he dropped they would have opposing movements to hopefully create temporary spaces behind or in front of the opposition's back line. While the wingers typically stayed wide during the build up in order to stretch out the opposition and create more spaces for those in the centre, when the ball moved higher up the pitch, they came alive, looking to cut inside more. Begeristein and Stoichkov were the usual wingers under Cruyff's Barcelona. The front players functionned as an unit, wide central midfielders clogging the half spaces so the opponents could tuck in then isolate the wingers 1 v 1 against the fullbacks. But if the wingers made the central runs eerly, the wide central midfielders could push to make up the width. Even the centre forward could look to move up into the flank. The attacking midfielder could also drop to provide a wall pass tfor an advancing midfielder.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
Haxball premier en septembre 2024 UFEG.
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Haxball premier en septembre 2024 UFEG.
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https://image.noelshack.c[...]ran-2024-11-01-105752.pngJ'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
Flight was scheduled from Charles de Gaulle airport, near Paris, to JFJ international airport near New York. 100 passengers and 6 cabin crew + 3 pilots Concorde was one of the beautiful aircraft, trully a feat of engineering. Concorde first flew on the 2nd of March 1969 and during its more than 30 years tenure, it never suffered a fatal accident. They had fantastic delta wings. Reason engineers used this is that a delta wing work well both in the subsonic, transonic and supersonic speed ranges. The issue of delta wing is that in order to provide enough lift for takeoff and landing you need to have both a very high speed and also a quite high angle of attack. Boeing 737 for example generally take off at a speed of between 140 and 150 knots. Concorde needed on the other hand abotu 200 knots. Those types of speed put enormous stress over the tires. Concorde used over 30 years 57 tire bursts. 12 of those caused structural issues as pieces of tires. In 6 cases the wing tanks had been penetrated Most serious incident happened in 1979 when Concorde took off from Washington. Entire pieces of tires penetrated the lwoer part of the wing and one of the wing tanks, causing a massive fuel leak, also bringing damage to the hydrualic system, making it impossible to retract the gear. After that recommandations were made over strenghtening, the types of tires used and protection of the hydraulic system in the landing gear. There was also some evaluations about the risk of fire. But investigation teams felt that the amount of fuel that could escape from a fuel leak caused by tire debris was relatively small and that risk of fire was very small as well.
Concorde had complicated fuel system consisting of 13 tanks, 12 of which housed by the wings and the body of the aircraft and the 13th tank is situated towards the very back of the body. That tank is used as a trim tank wher efuel ca transfer fuel into or out of depending where they wanted the center of gravity. which is important especially during take off. The engines on the Concorde were 4 Olympus twin spool turbo jet engine situated towards the back of the delta wing, outside and slightly behind the main landing gear. They had variable air intakes in order to be able to fly in supersonic flight and they had secondary air intakes on the lower side slightly behind the main intakes. All 4 engines were equipped also with full reheat or afterburner capability, giving aircraft a further 18% of thrust during the takeoff. Flight departed on July 25th 2000. This Concorde had an issue with one of its thrust reversers.
Flight was scheduled from Charles de Gaulle airport, near Paris, to JFJ international airport near New York. 100 passengers and 6 cabin crew + 3 pilots Concorde was one of the beautiful aircraft, trully a feat of engineering. Concorde first flew on the 2nd of March 1969 and during its more than 30 years tenure, it never suffered a fatal accident. They had fantastic delta wings. Reason engineers used this is that a delta wing work well both in the subsonic, transonic and supersonic speed ranges. The issue of delta wing is that in order to provide enough lift for takeoff and landing you need to have both a very high speed and also a quite high angle of attack. Boeing 737 for example generally take off at a speed of between 140 and 150 knots. Concorde needed on the other hand abotu 200 knots. Those types of speed put enormous stress over the tires. Concorde used over 30 years 57 tire bursts. 12 of those caused structural issues as pieces of tires. In 6 cases the wing tanks had been penetrated Most serious incident happened in 1979 when Concorde took off from Washington. Entire pieces of tires penetrated the lwoer part of the wing and one of the wing tanks, causing a massive fuel leak, also bringing damage to the hydrualic system, making it impossible to retract the gear. After that recommandations were made over strenghtening, the types of tires used and protection of the hydraulic system in the landing gear. There was also some evaluations about the risk of fire. But investigation teams felt that the amount of fuel that could escape from a fuel leak caused by tire debris was relatively small and that risk of fire was very small as well.
Concorde had complicated fuel system consisting of 13 tanks, 12 of which housed by the wings and the body of the aircraft and the 13th tank is situated towards the very back of the body. That tank is used as a trim tank wher efuel ca transfer fuel into or out of depending where they wanted the center of gravity. which is important especially during take off. The engines on the Concorde were 4 Olympus twin spool turbo jet engine situated towards the back of the delta wing, outside and slightly behind the main landing gear. They had variable air intakes in order to be able to fly in supersonic flight and they had secondary air intakes on the lower side slightly behind the main intakes. All 4 engines were equipped also with full reheat or afterburner capability, giving aircraft a further 18% of thrust during the takeoff. Flight departed on July 25th 2000. This Concorde had an issue with one of its thrust reversers.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
19 SECONDS from Collision | Easyjet 6074
On September 15th, 2006, an EasyJet Airbus A319 en route from Alicante in Spain to Bristol in the UK, suffered a dramatic failure over North-West France. The pilots of the aircraft were effectively flying blind, as they tried to understand what had gone wrong. The captain was 42 years old and despite amassing 9 000 hours of flying time, he had only 400 hours on Airbus aircraft. Most of his experience had been biult up on the Boeing 737. First officer was newer to flying than captain with 3 000 hours of total experience but just a small portion on Airbus aircraft as wel, with 500 hours in his case. They would face an emergency above the french countryside. Before flight, the pilots swapped over with the crew who had flown the plane in. Captain of that flight told them about a problem identical with one of the aircraft's electrical generators. This generator was powered by the left engine and it provided electricity to a whole host of systems on board the plane. For the flight to Bristol it would have to be turned off. Problem was not deemed serious enough to hold the plane up at Alicante. However the plane had another electrical generator fed by the right hand engine. Besides it it could raw power from the auxiliary power unit or APU, which is a small engine in the tail of the plane. Pilots needed to keep the APU running for the entire journey as a precaution to provide an added layer of protection. 8 000 kg of fuel for the flight. Everything during the flight went okay until the pilots suddently heared a loud clunk. Suddently, all the captain's instruments went blank. The master warning alarm sounded as autopilot disconnected. Captain handed control over to first officer whose instruments were still working. Computerized projections normally keeping the plane safe were not working so he had to do it manually now, a hand on the side stick and the other on the thrust levers. Plane was 10 kilometers above Earth and had almost the speed of sound.
Captain assuemd the APU had either shot down or his generator had failed. The captain saw that the radio panel had gone completely blank. None of its lights were on and with no frequency displayed in the windows. Impossible to alert traffic control without radio. Captain followed the checklist which appeared on the Ecam one ( electronic centralized aircraft monitor ). It allows pilots to monitor all aspects of the plane's operation. Appearing on this list was one step that could restore power ot the aircraft It required the captain to switch the access feed to the alternate position. This would allow the plane to draw electricity from a different source Just before that item on the list, there was an item saying that the fualt light in the associated push button should be illuminated. For some reason it was off. Maybe the computer didn't detect there was a fault and therefore wasn't illuminating the fault light. It could also be that there was in fact no fault. However it was contradicted by the massive failure of the aircraft systems. It could be that the fault light like most other lights on the overhead panel simply had no pwoer supply. Captain had a decision to make. Either press this switch not knowing whether there was in fact default or not. At the end he decided that he didn't have much of a choice. He pressed the switch and waited but nothing happened. Light on push button remained on lit. No power was restored to the aircraft. Normally on airbus and boeing aircrafts when these buttons are pushed, they don't move but rather click then return to their original position. Only indication that button had been pressed is the caption light inside the button who illuminates. In this position where no power to the lights, these designs made it impossible to know the position of these switches. Pilots were kinda flying blind now. Captain thought that maybe the lights were off but the radio was working.
He keyed the microphone, trying to transmit a message using vhf1, his main radio set. No response so he tried using the second radio set vhf2 but no response again. He switched to international emergency frequence 121,5 megahertz and declared a mayday. He tried this frequency on both radio sets and still heard nothing in return. His first officer tried to use his radios but he didn't hear anything either. On cabin passengers didn't know what happened. Only sign that something might be bizarre were the fact that the no smoking sign on the left hand side of aircraft turned off and that the reading lights on this site also turned off. Beneath the plane, a Brest area control center was concerned. Flight suddently disappeared from radar screen. Immediatly the controllers called the pilots on radio but no response. Controller asked another easyjet pilot if he could get through his colleague by using the company's frequency. No success either. Last time plane had been seen on radar it was heading northwest at 32 000 feet of altitude. But to its north an America Airlines jet heads east to west flying at 32 000 feet of altitude as well. They were about to cross paths and they menaced to collide in a minute. Controller got hold of American Airlines flight, asking if they could see the Easyjet on a t cas display. T cas stands for traffic collision avoidance system. An onboard systems used by pilots as a last line of defense against mid air collisions. If the system detects that a collision is imminent, it says : traffic. And it issues an instruction to either climb or descend. But for t cas to work, both planes involve need to have it turned on. Because of electric failure on Easyjet flight, this system was without power. Crew of American Airlines scanned their displays but they saw nothing. Controller faced dilemma. Should he instruct American Airlines jet to change its altitude or is it better to keep it where it is?
He eventually instructed the American Airlines flight to descend from 32 000 to 31 000 feet. But just then the controller who had been handling the flight stepped away from its workstation, handing control to his colleague. American Airlines flight didn't begin to descend yet and crew was still looking for the jet on t cas or out of the windows. The new controller instructed them to descend. Then the American Airlines pilot spotted the plane out of their windscreen, passing just overhead. The 2 planes came within 19 seconds of collision. Back in the Easyjet, the pilots knew none of this. Controller was worried about possible hijack scenario while the pilots worried that the controller would think they had been hijacked. If fighter jet comes to intercept them, h ow to communicate? Captain continued the actions ilsted on the ecam. On of the last items involves switching from the number 1 transponder system to the number 2 transponder system. Transponder is what tells air traffic control the plane's position. Captain did this and all of sudden, displays came back to life; But that didn't guaranteed that the plane transmitted a signal. Digits reappeared but no other light on the panel were lit. Target was reappearing on tower control's radars finally. But still no answer upon calling the flight. The squak code is the identifying code that ari traffic control assigns to the flight as its outset so it can be distinguised from other aircraftsunder radar screens.Code had been set to 5376 but given the emergency, the pilots needed to update it. There are 3 emergency codes used in aviation, each of which used to signal a different kind of emergency. 7500 is the code for hijacking, 7600 is the code for radio failure and 7700 is the code for general emergency. Pilots decided that given the gravity of their situation, the radio failure code didn't cover well the severety of what happened. So the captain puts 7700 into the transponder in the panel and pressed IDENT.
Control tower received it. Next action ecom told was old trick book. : turn generator 1 off and then on again. He did this but no response. Without caption lights workin,g the captain couldn't be sure what position the switch was actually in. Only way to find out if APU or APU generator stopped working was by shutting down the APU and then starting it up again. Instruments still didn't come back to life. Problem wasn't the APU. They were out of options. Captain called the lead fighter tenant up to the cockpit, telling her that there was an emergency and that she would need to prepare the passengers for an emergency landing. For the first time, passengers knew what was going on. Now should the pilots continue to what was their original destination or should they divert somewhere closer? Given gravity of situation and the possibility that it could get worse at any moment, the second option seemed safer. But if they changed their course it could be interpretated by fighter jets as hostile actions. Bristol airport had one of the shortest runway of any international airport in the UK. In other aircraft systems like the spoilers flaps or thrust reversers stopped working as well. Would the plane go off the end of the runway on landing?
19 SECONDS from Collision | Easyjet 6074
On September 15th, 2006, an EasyJet Airbus A319 en route from Alicante in Spain to Bristol in the UK, suffered a dramatic failure over North-West France. The pilots of the aircraft were effectively flying blind, as they tried to understand what had gone wrong. The captain was 42 years old and despite amassing 9 000 hours of flying time, he had only 400 hours on Airbus aircraft. Most of his experience had been biult up on the Boeing 737. First officer was newer to flying than captain with 3 000 hours of total experience but just a small portion on Airbus aircraft as wel, with 500 hours in his case. They would face an emergency above the french countryside. Before flight, the pilots swapped over with the crew who had flown the plane in. Captain of that flight told them about a problem identical with one of the aircraft's electrical generators. This generator was powered by the left engine and it provided electricity to a whole host of systems on board the plane. For the flight to Bristol it would have to be turned off. Problem was not deemed serious enough to hold the plane up at Alicante. However the plane had another electrical generator fed by the right hand engine. Besides it it could raw power from the auxiliary power unit or APU, which is a small engine in the tail of the plane. Pilots needed to keep the APU running for the entire journey as a precaution to provide an added layer of protection. 8 000 kg of fuel for the flight. Everything during the flight went okay until the pilots suddently heared a loud clunk. Suddently, all the captain's instruments went blank. The master warning alarm sounded as autopilot disconnected. Captain handed control over to first officer whose instruments were still working. Computerized projections normally keeping the plane safe were not working so he had to do it manually now, a hand on the side stick and the other on the thrust levers. Plane was 10 kilometers above Earth and had almost the speed of sound.
Captain assuemd the APU had either shot down or his generator had failed. The captain saw that the radio panel had gone completely blank. None of its lights were on and with no frequency displayed in the windows. Impossible to alert traffic control without radio. Captain followed the checklist which appeared on the Ecam one ( electronic centralized aircraft monitor ). It allows pilots to monitor all aspects of the plane's operation. Appearing on this list was one step that could restore power ot the aircraft It required the captain to switch the access feed to the alternate position. This would allow the plane to draw electricity from a different source Just before that item on the list, there was an item saying that the fualt light in the associated push button should be illuminated. For some reason it was off. Maybe the computer didn't detect there was a fault and therefore wasn't illuminating the fault light. It could also be that there was in fact no fault. However it was contradicted by the massive failure of the aircraft systems. It could be that the fault light like most other lights on the overhead panel simply had no pwoer supply. Captain had a decision to make. Either press this switch not knowing whether there was in fact default or not. At the end he decided that he didn't have much of a choice. He pressed the switch and waited but nothing happened. Light on push button remained on lit. No power was restored to the aircraft. Normally on airbus and boeing aircrafts when these buttons are pushed, they don't move but rather click then return to their original position. Only indication that button had been pressed is the caption light inside the button who illuminates. In this position where no power to the lights, these designs made it impossible to know the position of these switches. Pilots were kinda flying blind now. Captain thought that maybe the lights were off but the radio was working.
He keyed the microphone, trying to transmit a message using vhf1, his main radio set. No response so he tried using the second radio set vhf2 but no response again. He switched to international emergency frequence 121,5 megahertz and declared a mayday. He tried this frequency on both radio sets and still heard nothing in return. His first officer tried to use his radios but he didn't hear anything either. On cabin passengers didn't know what happened. Only sign that something might be bizarre were the fact that the no smoking sign on the left hand side of aircraft turned off and that the reading lights on this site also turned off. Beneath the plane, a Brest area control center was concerned. Flight suddently disappeared from radar screen. Immediatly the controllers called the pilots on radio but no response. Controller asked another easyjet pilot if he could get through his colleague by using the company's frequency. No success either. Last time plane had been seen on radar it was heading northwest at 32 000 feet of altitude. But to its north an America Airlines jet heads east to west flying at 32 000 feet of altitude as well. They were about to cross paths and they menaced to collide in a minute. Controller got hold of American Airlines flight, asking if they could see the Easyjet on a t cas display. T cas stands for traffic collision avoidance system. An onboard systems used by pilots as a last line of defense against mid air collisions. If the system detects that a collision is imminent, it says : traffic. And it issues an instruction to either climb or descend. But for t cas to work, both planes involve need to have it turned on. Because of electric failure on Easyjet flight, this system was without power. Crew of American Airlines scanned their displays but they saw nothing. Controller faced dilemma. Should he instruct American Airlines jet to change its altitude or is it better to keep it where it is?
He eventually instructed the American Airlines flight to descend from 32 000 to 31 000 feet. But just then the controller who had been handling the flight stepped away from its workstation, handing control to his colleague. American Airlines flight didn't begin to descend yet and crew was still looking for the jet on t cas or out of the windows. The new controller instructed them to descend. Then the American Airlines pilot spotted the plane out of their windscreen, passing just overhead. The 2 planes came within 19 seconds of collision. Back in the Easyjet, the pilots knew none of this. Controller was worried about possible hijack scenario while the pilots worried that the controller would think they had been hijacked. If fighter jet comes to intercept them, h ow to communicate? Captain continued the actions ilsted on the ecam. On of the last items involves switching from the number 1 transponder system to the number 2 transponder system. Transponder is what tells air traffic control the plane's position. Captain did this and all of sudden, displays came back to life; But that didn't guaranteed that the plane transmitted a signal. Digits reappeared but no other light on the panel were lit. Target was reappearing on tower control's radars finally. But still no answer upon calling the flight. The squak code is the identifying code that ari traffic control assigns to the flight as its outset so it can be distinguised from other aircraftsunder radar screens.Code had been set to 5376 but given the emergency, the pilots needed to update it. There are 3 emergency codes used in aviation, each of which used to signal a different kind of emergency. 7500 is the code for hijacking, 7600 is the code for radio failure and 7700 is the code for general emergency. Pilots decided that given the gravity of their situation, the radio failure code didn't cover well the severety of what happened. So the captain puts 7700 into the transponder in the panel and pressed IDENT.
Control tower received it. Next action ecom told was old trick book. : turn generator 1 off and then on again. He did this but no response. Without caption lights workin,g the captain couldn't be sure what position the switch was actually in. Only way to find out if APU or APU generator stopped working was by shutting down the APU and then starting it up again. Instruments still didn't come back to life. Problem wasn't the APU. They were out of options. Captain called the lead fighter tenant up to the cockpit, telling her that there was an emergency and that she would need to prepare the passengers for an emergency landing. For the first time, passengers knew what was going on. Now should the pilots continue to what was their original destination or should they divert somewhere closer? Given gravity of situation and the possibility that it could get worse at any moment, the second option seemed safer. But if they changed their course it could be interpretated by fighter jets as hostile actions. Bristol airport had one of the shortest runway of any international airport in the UK. In other aircraft systems like the spoilers flaps or thrust reversers stopped working as well. Would the plane go off the end of the runway on landing?
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
This plane RAN OUT of FUEL in the middle of the OCEAN!!
In the dead of the night, halfway over the Atlantic ocean, an Airbus A330 carrying 306 passengers and crew suddenly runs out of fuel. The lights go out, the oxygen masks drop, and the noise of the engines is replaced with an eerie silence. In pitch darkness, the giant aircraft begins drifting down towards the ocean below. The pilots are stunned, and begin trying to glide the aircraft as far as possible. The flight attendants prepare the passengers for an emergency ditching in the ocean - something which is likely be a death sentence for all on board.
This is a living nightmare, but incredibly - it never had to happen in the first place. Many accounts of this incident focus on its technical aspects, but that is only half of the story. The truth is that at bottom, this is a fascinating story about human psychology. It’s a story about how people make decisions under pressure, when faced with ambiguous information. This is the story of Air Transat flight 236. It happened on August 23, 2001. 293 passengers and 13 crew on board at Toronto's Pearson airport in Canada. They were bound for Lisbon, Portugal. a 7 hours flight. The Airbus A330 was a state of the art aircraft with banks of computers feeding informations to pilots from hundreds of on board sensors. Since its introduction 7 years reviously, it cemented itself as one of the safest aircraft. The aircraft here was just 2 years old. Robert Piché is the captain, 46 years with over 16 000 flight hours at that point. He had an experience on a wide variety of aircrafts flying both land and seaplanes in the climbs ofr northern Canada. He had unusual history for an airline pilot. Before being hired by Air Transat, he served 16 months of a 5 years jail sentence after being caught smuggling marijuana into the USA in a small plane.
Piché was joined in the cockpit by 28 years old first officer Dirk DeJager who had almost 5 000 flight hours, 400 of them being on the A330. While having less experience, he flew too a wide variety of aircraft before training to fly the Airbus with their transat a year previously. Both pilots had spotless trainins and performance records with the airline. 48 metric tons of fuel are loaded for the atlantic crossing. At 9 pm they took off. They climbed to a cruising altitude of 39 000 feet. All was well on board for the first hours. They xere expected to reach Lisbon in the early morning. Pilots duty mainly consisted of checking the fuel quantity against the flight plan providing position reports to traffic control as there is no radar over the ocean, and monitoring the aircraft system. For first 4 hours all was routine. But after 5 am, when the flight passed halfway ocean, the pilots got an unusual reading. Engine number 2, the one on the right hand side of the plane. Their onboard computers were advicing them that the oil pressure in the engine was high, that the oil quantity was low and that oil temperature was low. The pilots never saw this combination of warnings before. Normally over the course of a flight, engine oil temperatures rise, they don't fall. Pilots searched through their flight crew operating manual, or FCOM ( Flight Crew Operating Manual ). They wanted to see if they could find any explanation fo the unusual readings. But there was nothing in any of the manuals explaining this combination of indications.
They radioed Air Transat's maintainance control center in Mirabelle, Québec back in Canada. They relayed the the unusual indications to the dispatcher who said he would look into it. Pilots continued to monitor the engine indications. 30 minutes later, an advisory message appeared on the ECAM, the center display in the cockpit. Pilots brought up the fuel page on the ECAM and saw that there was a fuel imbalance between the tanks in the left wing and those in the right wing. Fuel imbalance is unusual but generally it's not cause for alarm. To fix it, pilots opened the cross feed valve which allowed fuel to flow from the left wing tank into the right wing tank. However, barely 10 minutes after the pilots had done this, the instruments indicated that the total fuel on board had dropped below the level required ro reach Lisbon. They were halfway across the ocean and they couldn't make it to Europe. Their only option in the Atlantic was an airport in the Azores islands, a small stirng of Portuguese islands in the middle of the Atlantic. They set course for Elijah's airport on the island of tercera and notified Santa Maria air traffic control that they were diverting due to a fuel shortage. At this point the plane had 7 tons of fuel on board. It's just 6% of the total A330's total fuel capacity and it was still falling much faster than usual. If the fueling readings were true, the cruise situation was dire and the rapid loss of fuel shown in the instruments was entirely consistent with there being a massive fuel leak. But the pilots doubted there was a fuel leak. Nothing happened in the flight that would cause fuel to suddently leak from the aircraft. No bangs, noises, severe turbulences, no lightning strike, nothing. The fuel consumption for the first hour had been entirely normal. It was weird to see the plane losing so many fuel during the calmest portion of the flight. Captain asked flight attendants if there was any fluid trailing back from the wings or engines.
They found nothing. Finally, the rate of fuel loss was so great, literally a metric ton of fuel every 5 minutes that is seemed impossibly high. Both pilots concluded that the fuel readings were erroneous These leaks on passengers aircrafts had been so rare that neither pilot had been trained on how to identify and deal with them at any stage of their training. There is a checklist for the event of a few leak however Other than this, pilots were not primed to frame the problems they were seeing in terms of a fuel leak. On top of this they already more or less concluded that the indications they received about the engine oil were likely in error. In a complicated aircraft like this one, bad data generated by faulty sensors is far from an unheard of occurrence. So when the pilots saw that the fuel indications showed frankly unbelievably low levels of fuel, they assumed that these indications were erroneous too. The truth is that both pilots were right to think that both the engine oil indications and the few level indication were related. However the common factor explaining both of them was not a computer glitch but rather a massive fuel leak on the right hand engine. Inside engine number 2, a vibrating hydraulic pipe rubbed through the outer casing of a fuel pipe, rupturing it and causing fuel to come spewing out into the engine at a terryfying rate. This was the source of both engine oil indication and low fuel indication. Psychological phenomenon known as confirmation bias played a role here with the crew's initial mental model of their situation being that the engine oil indication were results of faulty sensors. When building a mental model, people tend to act like lawyers rather than scientists. They look for evidence which bolsters their case rather than evidence which might disconfirm it. New evidence suggested a few leak such as the fuel imbalance and rapid fuel loss indications. Pilotes negleted taking a step back and re evaluating their first hypothesis.
This plane RAN OUT of FUEL in the middle of the OCEAN!!
In the dead of the night, halfway over the Atlantic ocean, an Airbus A330 carrying 306 passengers and crew suddenly runs out of fuel. The lights go out, the oxygen masks drop, and the noise of the engines is replaced with an eerie silence. In pitch darkness, the giant aircraft begins drifting down towards the ocean below. The pilots are stunned, and begin trying to glide the aircraft as far as possible. The flight attendants prepare the passengers for an emergency ditching in the ocean - something which is likely be a death sentence for all on board.
This is a living nightmare, but incredibly - it never had to happen in the first place. Many accounts of this incident focus on its technical aspects, but that is only half of the story. The truth is that at bottom, this is a fascinating story about human psychology. It’s a story about how people make decisions under pressure, when faced with ambiguous information. This is the story of Air Transat flight 236. It happened on August 23, 2001. 293 passengers and 13 crew on board at Toronto's Pearson airport in Canada. They were bound for Lisbon, Portugal. a 7 hours flight. The Airbus A330 was a state of the art aircraft with banks of computers feeding informations to pilots from hundreds of on board sensors. Since its introduction 7 years reviously, it cemented itself as one of the safest aircraft. The aircraft here was just 2 years old. Robert Piché is the captain, 46 years with over 16 000 flight hours at that point. He had an experience on a wide variety of aircrafts flying both land and seaplanes in the climbs ofr northern Canada. He had unusual history for an airline pilot. Before being hired by Air Transat, he served 16 months of a 5 years jail sentence after being caught smuggling marijuana into the USA in a small plane.
Piché was joined in the cockpit by 28 years old first officer Dirk DeJager who had almost 5 000 flight hours, 400 of them being on the A330. While having less experience, he flew too a wide variety of aircraft before training to fly the Airbus with their transat a year previously. Both pilots had spotless trainins and performance records with the airline. 48 metric tons of fuel are loaded for the atlantic crossing. At 9 pm they took off. They climbed to a cruising altitude of 39 000 feet. All was well on board for the first hours. They xere expected to reach Lisbon in the early morning. Pilots duty mainly consisted of checking the fuel quantity against the flight plan providing position reports to traffic control as there is no radar over the ocean, and monitoring the aircraft system. For first 4 hours all was routine. But after 5 am, when the flight passed halfway ocean, the pilots got an unusual reading. Engine number 2, the one on the right hand side of the plane. Their onboard computers were advicing them that the oil pressure in the engine was high, that the oil quantity was low and that oil temperature was low. The pilots never saw this combination of warnings before. Normally over the course of a flight, engine oil temperatures rise, they don't fall. Pilots searched through their flight crew operating manual, or FCOM ( Flight Crew Operating Manual ). They wanted to see if they could find any explanation fo the unusual readings. But there was nothing in any of the manuals explaining this combination of indications.
They radioed Air Transat's maintainance control center in Mirabelle, Québec back in Canada. They relayed the the unusual indications to the dispatcher who said he would look into it. Pilots continued to monitor the engine indications. 30 minutes later, an advisory message appeared on the ECAM, the center display in the cockpit. Pilots brought up the fuel page on the ECAM and saw that there was a fuel imbalance between the tanks in the left wing and those in the right wing. Fuel imbalance is unusual but generally it's not cause for alarm. To fix it, pilots opened the cross feed valve which allowed fuel to flow from the left wing tank into the right wing tank. However, barely 10 minutes after the pilots had done this, the instruments indicated that the total fuel on board had dropped below the level required ro reach Lisbon. They were halfway across the ocean and they couldn't make it to Europe. Their only option in the Atlantic was an airport in the Azores islands, a small stirng of Portuguese islands in the middle of the Atlantic. They set course for Elijah's airport on the island of tercera and notified Santa Maria air traffic control that they were diverting due to a fuel shortage. At this point the plane had 7 tons of fuel on board. It's just 6% of the total A330's total fuel capacity and it was still falling much faster than usual. If the fueling readings were true, the cruise situation was dire and the rapid loss of fuel shown in the instruments was entirely consistent with there being a massive fuel leak. But the pilots doubted there was a fuel leak. Nothing happened in the flight that would cause fuel to suddently leak from the aircraft. No bangs, noises, severe turbulences, no lightning strike, nothing. The fuel consumption for the first hour had been entirely normal. It was weird to see the plane losing so many fuel during the calmest portion of the flight. Captain asked flight attendants if there was any fluid trailing back from the wings or engines.
They found nothing. Finally, the rate of fuel loss was so great, literally a metric ton of fuel every 5 minutes that is seemed impossibly high. Both pilots concluded that the fuel readings were erroneous These leaks on passengers aircrafts had been so rare that neither pilot had been trained on how to identify and deal with them at any stage of their training. There is a checklist for the event of a few leak however Other than this, pilots were not primed to frame the problems they were seeing in terms of a fuel leak. On top of this they already more or less concluded that the indications they received about the engine oil were likely in error. In a complicated aircraft like this one, bad data generated by faulty sensors is far from an unheard of occurrence. So when the pilots saw that the fuel indications showed frankly unbelievably low levels of fuel, they assumed that these indications were erroneous too. The truth is that both pilots were right to think that both the engine oil indications and the few level indication were related. However the common factor explaining both of them was not a computer glitch but rather a massive fuel leak on the right hand engine. Inside engine number 2, a vibrating hydraulic pipe rubbed through the outer casing of a fuel pipe, rupturing it and causing fuel to come spewing out into the engine at a terryfying rate. This was the source of both engine oil indication and low fuel indication. Psychological phenomenon known as confirmation bias played a role here with the crew's initial mental model of their situation being that the engine oil indication were results of faulty sensors. When building a mental model, people tend to act like lawyers rather than scientists. They look for evidence which bolsters their case rather than evidence which might disconfirm it. New evidence suggested a few leak such as the fuel imbalance and rapid fuel loss indications. Pilotes negleted taking a step back and re evaluating their first hypothesis.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
Under conditions of stress and high workload this phenomenon is especially powerful. Pilots were so busy taking maintainance control, carrying out checklists and coordinating diversion with the cabin crew control that they had little opportunity to re evalute their understanding of the situation. Despite having been feed fuel from the left tank to the right tank, previously, the imbalance between the 2 tanks remained and aircraft was still rapidly losing fuel. Yet pilots couldn't believe there was a fuel leak. Despite the high level of aotumation there was no warning to indicate there was a fuel leak. The only way they could determine this was by monitoring the rate of fuel loss in each tank. In case there was a leak in the right wing, the pilots turned the right wing fuel pumps on and the left wing fuel pumps off. To reverse the direction of the cross feed so that fuel from the right wing tank was now used to feed both engines. Crew then contacted Air Transat's maintainance control center again, telling them of the inexplicably low fuel indications. At this point the plane had just 4,8 tons of fuel on board rather than the 17 tons it should have had. During the conversation, fuel quantity continued to drop. Pilots considered carrying out the fuel leak procedure but the captain ultimatly decided against it because the procedure required the pilots to descend to 20 000 feet. The captain figured out that if there was indeed a fuel leak, descending would be a bad idea as running out of fuel at their current high altitude of 39 000 feet was better than running out of fuel at 20 000 feet Psychologically the decision can be explained by framing bias. In decisions where risks are involved, people tend to frames their options in term of gains and losses. The captain in this case had to choose between a sure loss which was descending to 20 000 versus a loss which was less probable but more disastrous which was staying at 39 000 feet and failing to diagnose a fuel leak.
In these situations, people tend to choose the latter riskier choice. Reasoning goes that it's better to have a terrible thing to happen than definitly have a moderately bad thing to happen. Minutes later, the right engine flamed out. Captain began applying maximum thrust on the left engine and began descending. Plane could still fly with one engine but not at 39 000 feet. At this point the crew has 600 kg of fuel left and they were 240 kilometers from the airport. First officer declared an emergency to air traffic control. 13 minutes later, 120 km from the airport, the left hand engine flames out. Plane turns into a glider. Loss of both engines meant the plane was now without electrical power. A fan known as ram air turbine deployed automatically underneath the aircraft's fuselage. Spinning in the wind it generated a small amout of electrical power which was used to supply the captain's instruments as well as other critical systems. Captain had to stretch the glide as far as possible to make it to the airport. At night with no way to see the water and the big swells of Atlantic ocean, ditching the plane into the water was a death sentence. With 100 kilometers to go in the middle of the night, it was not an easy task. The plane descended at 2 000 feet per minute. At 30 000 feet it meant that the plane would be down in 15 minutes. Without engine to feed air into the cabin, it was beginning to depressurize. Oxygen mass dropped and passengers scrambled to put them on in time. Captain had experience doing engine out landing in smaller aircraft but this time it was nothing like he faced before. For A330 like other passenger jet, engines don't only power the airplane forward, they are also a source of electrical and hydraulic power. Loss of both engines caused important systems to stop. The plane 2 of its 3 hydraulic systems. These powered the stabilized on the tail, making it harder for the captain to control the pitch of the plane.
Aircraft also lost most of its wing spoilers, the nose wheel steering and the thrust reversers on the engines. It was harder to control in the air. Even if it maanged to get on the runway, it was harder to steer and to stop. To keep the aircraft aloft as long as possible, the captain flew the descent at a speed between the recommended glide speed and the stall warning speed. If he was too high on altitude at the approach, he could descend faster to lose speed no problem. But if he ended up too low, no way to get that altitude back. .There were more constraints Piché had to deal with. He had to keep his speed above 140 knots or the ram air turbine would stop generating electricity. At the same time he couldn't go faster than 200 knots or the landing gear wouldn't extend. Because he was gliding, the only way to control airspeed was by pitching the nose up or down. Behind the passengers prepared for a ditching into ocean with the fligh attendants instructing them on how to adopt the brace position. As the minutes ticked on, the cabin was deathly silent. His attempts to keep the aircraft worked too well. Now he was too high approaching the airport. He would have to descend steeply which would increase the airspeed to the point of making landing impossible. He began a 360 degrees turn to lose altitude. During the first turn, first officer lowered the gear and extended the slats at the front of the wings, providing extra lift allowing the aircraft to fly more slowly without producing too much drag. After 2 tens minutes the captain brought the wing level as the runway came back into view. He was still high but not high enough to make another 360 degrees turn. So he carried out a serie of S turns banking the aircraft hard to the left then hired to the right in an attempt to put more distance between himself and the runway. First officer monitored the plane's airspeed as the captain prepared the final approach.
Without flaps they had to keep a higher airspeed than normal, about 200 knots rather than the usual 150 knots. It was the only chance to bring the plane down on the runway. 8 out of the 12 tires burst and the plane bounces before slamming down. Without engine spoilers and engine reverse thrust, it wasn't slowing down. On top of this, the anti skid system was inoperative so when the captain slammed on the brakes, the wheels locked up. The aircraft was skidding down the runway to the rim. It eventually skidded to a stop, with all 306 people on board safe. After evacuation order, all passengers escaped the plane within 90 seconds. Fires started in the left main gear wheels but they were promptly extinguished by the firefighters. Crew carried out the longest glide of a passenger aircraft in history of aviation without any loss of life. Questions were raised about how pilots ended up running out of fuel. Had the pilots carried out any of the fuel leak procedures when they initiated the diversion to lages whether it was engine fuel leak procedure, wing fuel leak procedure, or fuel leak not located procedure, they would have land with at least 3,8 metric tons of fuel on board. However, framing bias, confirmation bias and lack of fuel loss warnings plus the fact that in the A330 software, pilots never carried out these procedures, or received any training by the transact. As for original fuel leak, investigators found out that maintenance had been carried out on number 2 engine shortly before the accident. A technician replaced a part of the engine with a part that was meant for another aircraft, leading to a hydraulic line making contact with a fuel tube. As hydraulic line vibrated and pressed against fuel tube, it ruptured it, causing massive fuel leak. Superior airmanship award was gave to both captain and first officer by airline pilots association for executing a dead stick landing on an Airbus A330.
Under conditions of stress and high workload this phenomenon is especially powerful. Pilots were so busy taking maintainance control, carrying out checklists and coordinating diversion with the cabin crew control that they had little opportunity to re evalute their understanding of the situation. Despite having been feed fuel from the left tank to the right tank, previously, the imbalance between the 2 tanks remained and aircraft was still rapidly losing fuel. Yet pilots couldn't believe there was a fuel leak. Despite the high level of aotumation there was no warning to indicate there was a fuel leak. The only way they could determine this was by monitoring the rate of fuel loss in each tank. In case there was a leak in the right wing, the pilots turned the right wing fuel pumps on and the left wing fuel pumps off. To reverse the direction of the cross feed so that fuel from the right wing tank was now used to feed both engines. Crew then contacted Air Transat's maintainance control center again, telling them of the inexplicably low fuel indications. At this point the plane had just 4,8 tons of fuel on board rather than the 17 tons it should have had. During the conversation, fuel quantity continued to drop. Pilots considered carrying out the fuel leak procedure but the captain ultimatly decided against it because the procedure required the pilots to descend to 20 000 feet. The captain figured out that if there was indeed a fuel leak, descending would be a bad idea as running out of fuel at their current high altitude of 39 000 feet was better than running out of fuel at 20 000 feet Psychologically the decision can be explained by framing bias. In decisions where risks are involved, people tend to frames their options in term of gains and losses. The captain in this case had to choose between a sure loss which was descending to 20 000 versus a loss which was less probable but more disastrous which was staying at 39 000 feet and failing to diagnose a fuel leak.
In these situations, people tend to choose the latter riskier choice. Reasoning goes that it's better to have a terrible thing to happen than definitly have a moderately bad thing to happen. Minutes later, the right engine flamed out. Captain began applying maximum thrust on the left engine and began descending. Plane could still fly with one engine but not at 39 000 feet. At this point the crew has 600 kg of fuel left and they were 240 kilometers from the airport. First officer declared an emergency to air traffic control. 13 minutes later, 120 km from the airport, the left hand engine flames out. Plane turns into a glider. Loss of both engines meant the plane was now without electrical power. A fan known as ram air turbine deployed automatically underneath the aircraft's fuselage. Spinning in the wind it generated a small amout of electrical power which was used to supply the captain's instruments as well as other critical systems. Captain had to stretch the glide as far as possible to make it to the airport. At night with no way to see the water and the big swells of Atlantic ocean, ditching the plane into the water was a death sentence. With 100 kilometers to go in the middle of the night, it was not an easy task. The plane descended at 2 000 feet per minute. At 30 000 feet it meant that the plane would be down in 15 minutes. Without engine to feed air into the cabin, it was beginning to depressurize. Oxygen mass dropped and passengers scrambled to put them on in time. Captain had experience doing engine out landing in smaller aircraft but this time it was nothing like he faced before. For A330 like other passenger jet, engines don't only power the airplane forward, they are also a source of electrical and hydraulic power. Loss of both engines caused important systems to stop. The plane 2 of its 3 hydraulic systems. These powered the stabilized on the tail, making it harder for the captain to control the pitch of the plane.
Aircraft also lost most of its wing spoilers, the nose wheel steering and the thrust reversers on the engines. It was harder to control in the air. Even if it maanged to get on the runway, it was harder to steer and to stop. To keep the aircraft aloft as long as possible, the captain flew the descent at a speed between the recommended glide speed and the stall warning speed. If he was too high on altitude at the approach, he could descend faster to lose speed no problem. But if he ended up too low, no way to get that altitude back. .There were more constraints Piché had to deal with. He had to keep his speed above 140 knots or the ram air turbine would stop generating electricity. At the same time he couldn't go faster than 200 knots or the landing gear wouldn't extend. Because he was gliding, the only way to control airspeed was by pitching the nose up or down. Behind the passengers prepared for a ditching into ocean with the fligh attendants instructing them on how to adopt the brace position. As the minutes ticked on, the cabin was deathly silent. His attempts to keep the aircraft worked too well. Now he was too high approaching the airport. He would have to descend steeply which would increase the airspeed to the point of making landing impossible. He began a 360 degrees turn to lose altitude. During the first turn, first officer lowered the gear and extended the slats at the front of the wings, providing extra lift allowing the aircraft to fly more slowly without producing too much drag. After 2 tens minutes the captain brought the wing level as the runway came back into view. He was still high but not high enough to make another 360 degrees turn. So he carried out a serie of S turns banking the aircraft hard to the left then hired to the right in an attempt to put more distance between himself and the runway. First officer monitored the plane's airspeed as the captain prepared the final approach.
Without flaps they had to keep a higher airspeed than normal, about 200 knots rather than the usual 150 knots. It was the only chance to bring the plane down on the runway. 8 out of the 12 tires burst and the plane bounces before slamming down. Without engine spoilers and engine reverse thrust, it wasn't slowing down. On top of this, the anti skid system was inoperative so when the captain slammed on the brakes, the wheels locked up. The aircraft was skidding down the runway to the rim. It eventually skidded to a stop, with all 306 people on board safe. After evacuation order, all passengers escaped the plane within 90 seconds. Fires started in the left main gear wheels but they were promptly extinguished by the firefighters. Crew carried out the longest glide of a passenger aircraft in history of aviation without any loss of life. Questions were raised about how pilots ended up running out of fuel. Had the pilots carried out any of the fuel leak procedures when they initiated the diversion to lages whether it was engine fuel leak procedure, wing fuel leak procedure, or fuel leak not located procedure, they would have land with at least 3,8 metric tons of fuel on board. However, framing bias, confirmation bias and lack of fuel loss warnings plus the fact that in the A330 software, pilots never carried out these procedures, or received any training by the transact. As for original fuel leak, investigators found out that maintenance had been carried out on number 2 engine shortly before the accident. A technician replaced a part of the engine with a part that was meant for another aircraft, leading to a hydraulic line making contact with a fuel tube. As hydraulic line vibrated and pressed against fuel tube, it ruptured it, causing massive fuel leak. Superior airmanship award was gave to both captain and first officer by airline pilots association for executing a dead stick landing on an Airbus A330.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
HOW did this plane FALL APART after takeoff?! | United 811
This Boeing 747 can carry 350 passengers. Oxygen masks dropped but nobody could use them, not even the pilots. In the cabin, 9 passengers are missing. On the night of February 24th, 1989, 337 embarked on United Airlines flight 811. Plus 18 crew members. It was at Honolulu international airport, Hawaii.
They were heading to Auckland, New Zealand, a 9 hours journey. It was a Boeing 747 - 100. This plane is almost 20 years old, being delivered in United Airlines in 1970. Its engines weren't as fuel efficient as the more modern aircraft of the time. Its cockpit had old fashioned analog dials displays and it wa manned by a crew of 3 : captain, first officer and flight engineer. This aging aircraft had a fatal flaw that would spark disaster. Captain David Croning, 59 years old, was one of the most experienced captains of the company. He had been in the airline since 1954. He accumulated 28 000 hours of flight hours over his career in a wide variety of aircrafts, both military and civilian. He was approachign mandatory retirement which was at the age of 60. In fact this flight was scheduled to be his second last flight of his career. Gregory Slader, 48 years old, was the first officer. With 14 500 flight hours, he was also highly experienced. Both flied together for 20 years. This night would be their greatest challenge. Sitting behind the pilots, the mecanician, Randal Mark Thomas, 46 years old who had about 20 000 flight hours. He would be the first to find the true nature of the emergency. In fact there would be multiple critical emergencies that would force them to throw away standard procedures and checklists and rely on their experience to make life and death decisions. The plane was close to its maximum allowable takeoff weight of 320 000 kg. At 1 : 52 am, the captain brings the plane into th e air. On this night over the Pacific, thunderstorms flanked the aircraft and as it clcimbed, pilots deviated to the left storm, keeping an eye on the weather radar and out the windscreen. Captain's decision to keep the passenger seatbelt sign on would be a consequential decision. 17 minutes after takeoff, at 22 000 feet, a loud thump shook the plane and half a second later, all hell broke loose.
It was a deafening explosion followed by a rapid decompression. Anything not tied down or strapped in was sucked out of the hole that opened in the aircraft's side. The lockable bombing happened 2 months earlier and everybody on board assumed a bomb went off. At 7 kilometers over the ocean, there was not enough oxygen for humans to remain conscious for more than a few minutes. So captain dived the plane into a more breathable altitude. Oxygen masks were not working. Explosion cut off their oxygen supply. Pilots needed to put the plane down to 10 000 feet quickly. During the dive the aircraft also ebgan a left hand turn back towards Honolulu all while trying to keep the aircraft away from thunderstorms. Engine 3 was vibrating violently and not producing any thrust. So pilots shut it down before declaring an emergency mayday to air traffic control. The checklist for an explosive decompression requires the pilots to lower tohe landing gear during the emergency descent as this helps to stop the aircraft from getting too fast. But the crew suspected that given the explosion the aircraft's structural integrity had been significantly compromised. They worried that lowering the landing gear would put stress on the airplane that it may not be able to bear. Meanwhile the passengers and flight attendants were aware of the nature of the emergency since the hole was here with a massive section on the right hand side of the plane that was blown off. The explosive decompression that followed sucked out rows of seating and internal aircraft components, and with them, 9 passengers. Terrified passengers near were looking out into the pitch black sky. They only coul dhear the engines and the howl or air pushing past the plane. One flight attendant was clinging onto his seat for dear life and was hanging partially outside the aircraft. Her fellow crew members pulled her back inside but she has been severely injured.
Meanwhile the flight attendants began to run to fetch their portable oxygen bottles and trying to attach the face masks to them. Many had difficulties to do this and began to feel light headed as the initial effects of hypoxia set in. In the cockpit the situation was no less dire and their problems just began. After shutting down engine number 3, they noticed that engine number 4, the outboard engine on the right hand side was also damaged. The flight was over 100 kilometers from Honolulu at this point. If the engine 4 failed, the changes of making it back to Honolulu would be significantly diminished. Problem was compounded by the fact that the aircraft weighted over 300 tons. Even maximum thrust on the 2 functioning engines was not enough to generate the speed needed to keep the aircraft aloft. As a result the plane kept descending towards the ocean. It was breathable altitude but now it was too heavy to maintain altitude with only 2 functioning engines. Crew could have to go back to Honolulu was to dump fuel, making the aircraft lighter which would slow the rate of the descent. If they were lucky they might stretch their descent all the way to Honolulu. Seconds later, engine number 4 caught fire. Massive tendrils of flames extended out behind the shuttering engine. The crew had no choice but shut it down as well. It looked at that point that they may have to ditch their aircraft into the Pacific ocean. At night with no reliable way to judge their height above the water, an attempted ditching would leave few if any survivors. Both functioning engines were on the left hand side of the aircraft. The plane began to veer to the right. The captain had to stomp on the left rudder to keep the aircraft flying in a straight line. This took considerable force and the deflection of the rudder into the slipstream created drag which made the plane drop even faster towards the ocean.
The 2 remaining engines were running at takeoff thrust, a setting they should only be left by for 4 minutes at most. Any longer would risk damaging them. Yet the cruise options were limited. If they reduced the engine thrust to spare the engines, the aircraft would lose speed and descend even faster towards the ocean 5 000 pounds of fuel were being dumped per minute meanwhile. Adymetric thrust meant that the aircraft started to drift. In the cabin, the danger was if the hole opened up further, it could rip the plane apart. To the pilots the main danger was the distance between the aircraft and Honolulu. The aircraft was quivering and shuddering because of the aerodynamic disturbance caused by the hole in the fuselage. Descending into the spiral staircase to the lwoer deck of the 747, the flight engineer that stunned by the slight that met him. The hole was big enough to drive a semi truck through. Beyond it, nothing but dark empty sky and battered wing with 2 rattling jet engines. Sprinting back tot he cockpit he told that it looked like a bomb had gone off. Flight engineer told the captain that given the damage, he shouldn't fly faster than 250 knots as this would risk putting the aircraft structure under too much stress whih may tear it apart. At the same time the first officer told the captian to not go below 240 knots as the aircraft may become hard to control below that speed. This left very little margin of error as the captain had to keep his aircraft flying within a 10 knot speed window on 2 engines all of that while trying to maintain altitude and navigate back to Honolulu in the dark. Engines were not the only part of the plane damaged. During the explosion, debris got ejected from the fuselage and impacted the leading edge of the right wing as well as the horizontal stabilized and even the vertical stabilizer in the tail plane.
HOW did this plane FALL APART after takeoff?! | United 811
This Boeing 747 can carry 350 passengers. Oxygen masks dropped but nobody could use them, not even the pilots. In the cabin, 9 passengers are missing. On the night of February 24th, 1989, 337 embarked on United Airlines flight 811. Plus 18 crew members. It was at Honolulu international airport, Hawaii.
They were heading to Auckland, New Zealand, a 9 hours journey. It was a Boeing 747 - 100. This plane is almost 20 years old, being delivered in United Airlines in 1970. Its engines weren't as fuel efficient as the more modern aircraft of the time. Its cockpit had old fashioned analog dials displays and it wa manned by a crew of 3 : captain, first officer and flight engineer. This aging aircraft had a fatal flaw that would spark disaster. Captain David Croning, 59 years old, was one of the most experienced captains of the company. He had been in the airline since 1954. He accumulated 28 000 hours of flight hours over his career in a wide variety of aircrafts, both military and civilian. He was approachign mandatory retirement which was at the age of 60. In fact this flight was scheduled to be his second last flight of his career. Gregory Slader, 48 years old, was the first officer. With 14 500 flight hours, he was also highly experienced. Both flied together for 20 years. This night would be their greatest challenge. Sitting behind the pilots, the mecanician, Randal Mark Thomas, 46 years old who had about 20 000 flight hours. He would be the first to find the true nature of the emergency. In fact there would be multiple critical emergencies that would force them to throw away standard procedures and checklists and rely on their experience to make life and death decisions. The plane was close to its maximum allowable takeoff weight of 320 000 kg. At 1 : 52 am, the captain brings the plane into th e air. On this night over the Pacific, thunderstorms flanked the aircraft and as it clcimbed, pilots deviated to the left storm, keeping an eye on the weather radar and out the windscreen. Captain's decision to keep the passenger seatbelt sign on would be a consequential decision. 17 minutes after takeoff, at 22 000 feet, a loud thump shook the plane and half a second later, all hell broke loose.
It was a deafening explosion followed by a rapid decompression. Anything not tied down or strapped in was sucked out of the hole that opened in the aircraft's side. The lockable bombing happened 2 months earlier and everybody on board assumed a bomb went off. At 7 kilometers over the ocean, there was not enough oxygen for humans to remain conscious for more than a few minutes. So captain dived the plane into a more breathable altitude. Oxygen masks were not working. Explosion cut off their oxygen supply. Pilots needed to put the plane down to 10 000 feet quickly. During the dive the aircraft also ebgan a left hand turn back towards Honolulu all while trying to keep the aircraft away from thunderstorms. Engine 3 was vibrating violently and not producing any thrust. So pilots shut it down before declaring an emergency mayday to air traffic control. The checklist for an explosive decompression requires the pilots to lower tohe landing gear during the emergency descent as this helps to stop the aircraft from getting too fast. But the crew suspected that given the explosion the aircraft's structural integrity had been significantly compromised. They worried that lowering the landing gear would put stress on the airplane that it may not be able to bear. Meanwhile the passengers and flight attendants were aware of the nature of the emergency since the hole was here with a massive section on the right hand side of the plane that was blown off. The explosive decompression that followed sucked out rows of seating and internal aircraft components, and with them, 9 passengers. Terrified passengers near were looking out into the pitch black sky. They only coul dhear the engines and the howl or air pushing past the plane. One flight attendant was clinging onto his seat for dear life and was hanging partially outside the aircraft. Her fellow crew members pulled her back inside but she has been severely injured.
Meanwhile the flight attendants began to run to fetch their portable oxygen bottles and trying to attach the face masks to them. Many had difficulties to do this and began to feel light headed as the initial effects of hypoxia set in. In the cockpit the situation was no less dire and their problems just began. After shutting down engine number 3, they noticed that engine number 4, the outboard engine on the right hand side was also damaged. The flight was over 100 kilometers from Honolulu at this point. If the engine 4 failed, the changes of making it back to Honolulu would be significantly diminished. Problem was compounded by the fact that the aircraft weighted over 300 tons. Even maximum thrust on the 2 functioning engines was not enough to generate the speed needed to keep the aircraft aloft. As a result the plane kept descending towards the ocean. It was breathable altitude but now it was too heavy to maintain altitude with only 2 functioning engines. Crew could have to go back to Honolulu was to dump fuel, making the aircraft lighter which would slow the rate of the descent. If they were lucky they might stretch their descent all the way to Honolulu. Seconds later, engine number 4 caught fire. Massive tendrils of flames extended out behind the shuttering engine. The crew had no choice but shut it down as well. It looked at that point that they may have to ditch their aircraft into the Pacific ocean. At night with no reliable way to judge their height above the water, an attempted ditching would leave few if any survivors. Both functioning engines were on the left hand side of the aircraft. The plane began to veer to the right. The captain had to stomp on the left rudder to keep the aircraft flying in a straight line. This took considerable force and the deflection of the rudder into the slipstream created drag which made the plane drop even faster towards the ocean.
The 2 remaining engines were running at takeoff thrust, a setting they should only be left by for 4 minutes at most. Any longer would risk damaging them. Yet the cruise options were limited. If they reduced the engine thrust to spare the engines, the aircraft would lose speed and descend even faster towards the ocean 5 000 pounds of fuel were being dumped per minute meanwhile. Adymetric thrust meant that the aircraft started to drift. In the cabin, the danger was if the hole opened up further, it could rip the plane apart. To the pilots the main danger was the distance between the aircraft and Honolulu. The aircraft was quivering and shuddering because of the aerodynamic disturbance caused by the hole in the fuselage. Descending into the spiral staircase to the lwoer deck of the 747, the flight engineer that stunned by the slight that met him. The hole was big enough to drive a semi truck through. Beyond it, nothing but dark empty sky and battered wing with 2 rattling jet engines. Sprinting back tot he cockpit he told that it looked like a bomb had gone off. Flight engineer told the captain that given the damage, he shouldn't fly faster than 250 knots as this would risk putting the aircraft structure under too much stress whih may tear it apart. At the same time the first officer told the captian to not go below 240 knots as the aircraft may become hard to control below that speed. This left very little margin of error as the captain had to keep his aircraft flying within a 10 knot speed window on 2 engines all of that while trying to maintain altitude and navigate back to Honolulu in the dark. Engines were not the only part of the plane damaged. During the explosion, debris got ejected from the fuselage and impacted the leading edge of the right wing as well as the horizontal stabilized and even the vertical stabilizer in the tail plane.
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Crucially, the leading edge flaps on the wing were dented and punctured. These flaps allowed the plane to fly at slower speeds during approach and landing. Witout flaps the plane would have to land at at a much higher speed than normal. There was also a possibility of the aircraft to pull apart on the runway it it touched down at this speed, especially considering the damage. Now the pilots feared that the landing gear was damaged by the explosion. Controller cleared them to go down 6 000 feet byt now they had gone below this, approaching 4 000 feet. However by this point, their descent had slowed. They might make it to the airport. To reduce the likehood that it would go off the end of landing, the captain wanted the longest runway possible. It was runway 8 left. Even at full power, the aircraft speed was beginning to drop. Air traffic control gave them radar vectors to line them up with the runway. The crew tuned their navigation radios to the ILS frequency for runway 8 left, the longest runway of the airport. An ILS approach would allow them to use their instruments to accuratly determine whether they were on the correct path to the runway even if clouds or rain obscured their view. At 17 miles from the runway, the crew began experimenting with the flaps. If they could extend them it could be life saving. Captain did it cautiously, extending them 1 increment at a time. The first officer monitored the flat position indicator and saw what he was hoping not to see. He saw what is known as a split flap. The flaps on the outer edge of one wing had remained in the retracted position while on the other wing, they had extended. The purpose of flaps is to create lift which is the force that pulls the aircraft up. If one wing produces more lift than the other, that wing rises by itself and the plane tips over on its side.
The pilot knew when they got this split flap indication that if they extended the flaps anymore, they risked having the aircraft spiral uncontrollably. Second officer Thomas consulted the landing speed chart and told Cronin that the landing speed for flaps at 5 degrees was 190 knots, well above the typical landing of about 150 knots. The first officer persuaded the captain that it would be worth trying for 10 degrees of flap as this would reduce their landing speed. They tried this and it worked. The plane was controllable and they were able to fly slightly slower. Captain began then a right hand turn to line the massive aircraft with the runway.The pilots watched intensely as the landing gear slowly extended and locked into place as confirmed by the green indicator lights. It was a massive relief but the real test was still ahead of them. The cabin crew had been told to evacuate after the landing. The plane's engineer confirmed that the plane's hydraulic systems were all in good condition. It was a relief as it meant that the brakes were likely working as normal. However they would only be able to use the reverse thrust on the engines on the left hand side of the plane which would increase their stopping distance. The captain monitored the plane's arrival towards the runway while the first officer monitored the instruments closely and provided the captain with airspeed and altitude information. The aircraft landed correctly, the landing gear held and the plane eventually stopped before the end of the runway. Evacuation order was given. The 328 passengers evacuated the aircraft in just 45 seconds. 25 minutes had lapsed since the explosive decompression. The 9 passengers sucked out of the plane were never found. The investigators who examined the aircraft ruled the bomb theory off. They found that the incident was one of the many just waiting to happen. They determined that the aircraft has been mishandled by ground crews while at the gate.
Careless operation of the forward cargo door by groud crew at Honolulu damaged its locking mechanism. This meant that the door never properly had been closed. As the plane began to pressurize in flight, it blew open, taking a huge section of the fuselage with it. Kevin and Susan Campbell were not happy with the national transportation investigation so they began their own. Kevin Campbell had a background in mechanical engineering. and he spent months pouring through thousands of pages of documentation about the 747's cargo doors. They found a disturbing trent. It turned out that Boeing had received dozens of complains of 747 cargo doors opening uncommanded as far back as 1975. In fact, 2 years before the United 811 incident, a Pan Am 747 had had its cargo door unlatched shortly after takeoff from London. In that case 2 hooks on the door frame were the only things keeping the door from swinging open. It appeared that was led to this was not mishanding by ground crew but faulty electrical wiring in the door's locking mechanism. When this wiring short circuited, the door would begin opening by itself. This was a serious design flaw in the Boeing 747. Almost 2 years after the crash, when an extensive search operation had located the missing cargo door and dredged it up from the bottom of the ocean, the Campbells were vindicated. There was indeed a fault with the electrical systme which controlled the locking mechanism of the door. On flight 811 this system experienced a shor tcircuit which led to the cargo door unlatching mid flight. NTSB had no choice but accepting the Campbell's conclusions. Faulty wiring and deficiencies in the cargo's door design and not groud human error caused the accident. NTSB recommended that all 747 - 100 in service have their cargo door locking mechanisms replaced with new redesign locks which couldn't prey to the same electrical mafunction.
Crucially, the leading edge flaps on the wing were dented and punctured. These flaps allowed the plane to fly at slower speeds during approach and landing. Witout flaps the plane would have to land at at a much higher speed than normal. There was also a possibility of the aircraft to pull apart on the runway it it touched down at this speed, especially considering the damage. Now the pilots feared that the landing gear was damaged by the explosion. Controller cleared them to go down 6 000 feet byt now they had gone below this, approaching 4 000 feet. However by this point, their descent had slowed. They might make it to the airport. To reduce the likehood that it would go off the end of landing, the captain wanted the longest runway possible. It was runway 8 left. Even at full power, the aircraft speed was beginning to drop. Air traffic control gave them radar vectors to line them up with the runway. The crew tuned their navigation radios to the ILS frequency for runway 8 left, the longest runway of the airport. An ILS approach would allow them to use their instruments to accuratly determine whether they were on the correct path to the runway even if clouds or rain obscured their view. At 17 miles from the runway, the crew began experimenting with the flaps. If they could extend them it could be life saving. Captain did it cautiously, extending them 1 increment at a time. The first officer monitored the flat position indicator and saw what he was hoping not to see. He saw what is known as a split flap. The flaps on the outer edge of one wing had remained in the retracted position while on the other wing, they had extended. The purpose of flaps is to create lift which is the force that pulls the aircraft up. If one wing produces more lift than the other, that wing rises by itself and the plane tips over on its side.
The pilot knew when they got this split flap indication that if they extended the flaps anymore, they risked having the aircraft spiral uncontrollably. Second officer Thomas consulted the landing speed chart and told Cronin that the landing speed for flaps at 5 degrees was 190 knots, well above the typical landing of about 150 knots. The first officer persuaded the captain that it would be worth trying for 10 degrees of flap as this would reduce their landing speed. They tried this and it worked. The plane was controllable and they were able to fly slightly slower. Captain began then a right hand turn to line the massive aircraft with the runway.The pilots watched intensely as the landing gear slowly extended and locked into place as confirmed by the green indicator lights. It was a massive relief but the real test was still ahead of them. The cabin crew had been told to evacuate after the landing. The plane's engineer confirmed that the plane's hydraulic systems were all in good condition. It was a relief as it meant that the brakes were likely working as normal. However they would only be able to use the reverse thrust on the engines on the left hand side of the plane which would increase their stopping distance. The captain monitored the plane's arrival towards the runway while the first officer monitored the instruments closely and provided the captain with airspeed and altitude information. The aircraft landed correctly, the landing gear held and the plane eventually stopped before the end of the runway. Evacuation order was given. The 328 passengers evacuated the aircraft in just 45 seconds. 25 minutes had lapsed since the explosive decompression. The 9 passengers sucked out of the plane were never found. The investigators who examined the aircraft ruled the bomb theory off. They found that the incident was one of the many just waiting to happen. They determined that the aircraft has been mishandled by ground crews while at the gate.
Careless operation of the forward cargo door by groud crew at Honolulu damaged its locking mechanism. This meant that the door never properly had been closed. As the plane began to pressurize in flight, it blew open, taking a huge section of the fuselage with it. Kevin and Susan Campbell were not happy with the national transportation investigation so they began their own. Kevin Campbell had a background in mechanical engineering. and he spent months pouring through thousands of pages of documentation about the 747's cargo doors. They found a disturbing trent. It turned out that Boeing had received dozens of complains of 747 cargo doors opening uncommanded as far back as 1975. In fact, 2 years before the United 811 incident, a Pan Am 747 had had its cargo door unlatched shortly after takeoff from London. In that case 2 hooks on the door frame were the only things keeping the door from swinging open. It appeared that was led to this was not mishanding by ground crew but faulty electrical wiring in the door's locking mechanism. When this wiring short circuited, the door would begin opening by itself. This was a serious design flaw in the Boeing 747. Almost 2 years after the crash, when an extensive search operation had located the missing cargo door and dredged it up from the bottom of the ocean, the Campbells were vindicated. There was indeed a fault with the electrical systme which controlled the locking mechanism of the door. On flight 811 this system experienced a shor tcircuit which led to the cargo door unlatching mid flight. NTSB had no choice but accepting the Campbell's conclusions. Faulty wiring and deficiencies in the cargo's door design and not groud human error caused the accident. NTSB recommended that all 747 - 100 in service have their cargo door locking mechanisms replaced with new redesign locks which couldn't prey to the same electrical mafunction.
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Crashing SECONDS after Takeoff?! Singapore 006
Singapore Airlines flight 6. October 31st, 2000, it's Hallowen night in Taipei. Typhoon Zang Zan was approaching and its outter reaches were beginning to batter the airport with winds as high as 100 kilometers per hour. A Boeing 747 operated by Singapore Airlines, 159 passengers from 20 coutries settled. Most of them were from the US and Taiwan. 77 of them boarded the aircraft hours earlier in Singapore while the other 82 had just boarded in Taipei with the flight crew. The flight crew consisted of 3 rested pilots who arrived in Taipei 24 hours previosuly. The captain, Foong Chee Kong, was 41 years old, a Malaysian national who had over 11 000 flight hours. Colleagues descriebd him as one of the best pilots of Singapore Airlines. Only nick is his record is that 13 years previously, he had done a bit of noise departure out of Zurich in Switzerland and received a letter from the airline asking him to stick more rididly to the noise abatement procedure. The first officer was the 36 years old Latyff Cyrano, less experienced by the captain with 2 500 flight hours, 500 of them in the 747. He was described as disciplined and not hesitant to speak out if he saw safety issues on a flight. Another first officer was sitting behind the captain, Kheng Leng, 38 years old who would act as a relief pilot here, taking over for the other first officer at times. He would have no specific duties up until this point other than keeping an eye on what the pilots are doing. He was mature, disciplined with good flying skills and had the potential to become a captain in due course. It's worth pointing out that Singapore Airlines had an excellent safety record. Its crews were well trained. In its 28 years of operation, it never had a fatal accident. But here instead of the 12 hours long awaited travel, the aircraft would never make it off the ground. Weather is poor and it's getting worse as the typhoon is approaching.
As the captain taxied out, he emphasized that he needed to do things slowly and methodically. The first officer's duty as the plane sedately run out of the runway was to work through the checklists and assist the captain in preparing the aircraft for takeoff. He sets the flaps to 20 degrees and the captain confirmed the takeoff speeds. The plane would lift off at a speed of 156 knots or about 290 kilometers per hour. The wind itself on this night was ghosting to one third of the takeoff speed of the plane, abotu 100 kilometers per hour. As the 2 pilots carried out their duties, the relief pilot listened to the ATIS who stands for Automatic Terminal Information Service. This is the service provided at all major airports which pilots can tune into to find out the latest weather at the airport. It was a daunting weather report on the verge of being too much to take off. There was less than 500 meters of visibility with winds reaching 100 km per hour of speed. The visibility was still slightly within safe limits. While the taxi route was straightforward, the pilots needed to be a bit more careful. it had been more than 3 years since any of them had taken off from the runway. They were much more familiar with runway RW 06 at the south end of the airport. So when the flight neared to the West Cross taxi way, captain confirmed to his colleagues that this turn was the one he needed to make. The relief position easily see from his position behind the pilots both of their primary flight displays He could see winds were so strong that they were being picked up by the pitotubes on the fuselage of the plane and then represented as changes in airspeed on the pilot's airspeed tapes. With the wind hitting the aircraft from the right hand side, the captain's instrument and the first officers instruments were showing different reading of airspeed. It was a peculiarity more than anything else indicative. of the sheer strenght of the wind on this night.
As the pilots peered out their windscreens through the rain, they heard some good news over the radio : the runway visual range which is the distance the pilots can see along the runway, had gone up from 200 meters earlier to 450 meters. It looked like they could indeed take off. The captain still cautious was taxiing at 9 knots or 17 kilometers per hour. But what if they took off and then needed to go back to the airport because of a potential problem, only for it to have closed due to the weather worsening they departed? Previously they agreed that if this happened, they could go to Hong Kong or Koohsiung instead. But both have now been closed as the typhoon made its way north. So their only option was now Taipei and the pilots hoped it would remain a viable option. After reaching the end of West Cross taxiway, captain twisted the tiller counterclockwise on the 747, lumbered left onto taxiway November Papa ( NP ). The white stripes, know as the piano keys, signify the start of a runway. When you are converting a runway into a taxiway, you are supposed to change all of the marking and lighting so that they are suitable for a taxiway. But at Taipei this hadn't happened. So when they approached the end of the taxiway November Papa, they began to fall prey for a serie of psychological and systemic errors. Take off was cleared by the contorl tower. During the pre take off checklist, the captain peered through the blackness of the windscreen, carefully following the green lights as they beckoned him onto the runway. Air trafic control didn't have enough visibility to see the plane and also didn't have ground radar to see its position. If he had he would have seen that Flight 6 was not lining up with Runway 05 left as he instructed them to do but rather on the Runway 05 right. The captain was following the green taxiway lights which were far closer together in the turn that on the straight path leading up to runway 05.
In fact there were only 4 lights in the 200 meter long section of taxiway connecting runway 05 right and left. Legally there should have been 16 lights and as if that wasn't bad enough, one of those 4 lights wasn't working and another one was unacceptably dim. There was little to tell the captain that to his left there was another runway lying in the darkness. As the plane lumbered into position, the first officer commanted that the PVD had not unshuttered the PVD or power visual display. It's a device installed on the glare shield of some aircraft whose purpose is to give pilots a visual indication of whether they are drifting off the runway centerline during low visibility takeoffs. There was a shutter in front of it most of the time but when the aircraft detected that it was lining up on the runway, it unshottered revealing the barber pole like PVD It struck the pilots that as odd that this had stage shuttered after they lined up on the runway. The reason it had was that they tuned their navigation to the frequency for the runway they were supposed to line up. On Runway 05 left, they were over 200 meters from that runway sitting on what was becoming a taxiway. Pilots knew that Runway 05 right was being turned into a taxiway but in the darkness, and lured by the green lights, they didn't question whether they were in the correct place. What's more, as they sat poised in the threshold bright green centerline lights extended into darkness. The fact that these lights were green instead of white like normal runway lights should have given the pilots the clue that they were on a taxiway. The lights have been green for the runway's entire history because it was originally a taxiway. Ironically if the visibility was worse, the pilots would have been safer. That's why the PVD didn't matter because they could see the runway at 500 meters anyway. So the captain put the windscreen wipers on high switched on the landing lights and pushed the engines to take off thrust.
The engines roared and the aircraft accelerated. Within seconds the aircraft reached 150 kilometers per hour. But when they were about to reach the takeoff speed, in the middle of the runway, bulldozers, excavators, 2 rollers and rows of concrete barriers. At 280 kilometers per hour, the 747 smashed through the concrete barricades and tore through the construction vehicles. Part of the left wing was ripped off along with 3 of the aircraft's engines sending the plane swerving to the left. The fuel tanks ruptured o. A huge fireball ignited, enveloping the plane which split into 3 pieces and then began tumbling down the runway. Airport fire service was dispatched by the tower control immediatly. Within 3 minutes, 400 responders rushed to the scene. Out 179 people on board, 96 survived including the 3 pilots. It was the first and onyl fatal accident in Singapore Airlines history. And the first fatal accident to ever involve a Boeing 747 - 400. After the crash, investigators found that pilots were misled by the lighting on runway, especially considering that their home base was Singapore where controllers changed the color of the taxiway lightning in front of the pilots to guide them to the runway, instructing them to follow the green. So on flight 6, despite the pilot's caution about the weather when navigating to the runway, they reverted to their usual routine of simply following the green lighting to the runway. It didn't help that the closed runway still had its runway markings and bright centerline lights despite despite not being in use. That meant that when the pilots turned on that way they subconsciously ignored all information telling them that they were not where they were supposed to be. The unshuttered PVD, the off center ILS deviation scale and the green centerline lighting.
Crashing SECONDS after Takeoff?! Singapore 006
Singapore Airlines flight 6. October 31st, 2000, it's Hallowen night in Taipei. Typhoon Zang Zan was approaching and its outter reaches were beginning to batter the airport with winds as high as 100 kilometers per hour. A Boeing 747 operated by Singapore Airlines, 159 passengers from 20 coutries settled. Most of them were from the US and Taiwan. 77 of them boarded the aircraft hours earlier in Singapore while the other 82 had just boarded in Taipei with the flight crew. The flight crew consisted of 3 rested pilots who arrived in Taipei 24 hours previosuly. The captain, Foong Chee Kong, was 41 years old, a Malaysian national who had over 11 000 flight hours. Colleagues descriebd him as one of the best pilots of Singapore Airlines. Only nick is his record is that 13 years previously, he had done a bit of noise departure out of Zurich in Switzerland and received a letter from the airline asking him to stick more rididly to the noise abatement procedure. The first officer was the 36 years old Latyff Cyrano, less experienced by the captain with 2 500 flight hours, 500 of them in the 747. He was described as disciplined and not hesitant to speak out if he saw safety issues on a flight. Another first officer was sitting behind the captain, Kheng Leng, 38 years old who would act as a relief pilot here, taking over for the other first officer at times. He would have no specific duties up until this point other than keeping an eye on what the pilots are doing. He was mature, disciplined with good flying skills and had the potential to become a captain in due course. It's worth pointing out that Singapore Airlines had an excellent safety record. Its crews were well trained. In its 28 years of operation, it never had a fatal accident. But here instead of the 12 hours long awaited travel, the aircraft would never make it off the ground. Weather is poor and it's getting worse as the typhoon is approaching.
As the captain taxied out, he emphasized that he needed to do things slowly and methodically. The first officer's duty as the plane sedately run out of the runway was to work through the checklists and assist the captain in preparing the aircraft for takeoff. He sets the flaps to 20 degrees and the captain confirmed the takeoff speeds. The plane would lift off at a speed of 156 knots or about 290 kilometers per hour. The wind itself on this night was ghosting to one third of the takeoff speed of the plane, abotu 100 kilometers per hour. As the 2 pilots carried out their duties, the relief pilot listened to the ATIS who stands for Automatic Terminal Information Service. This is the service provided at all major airports which pilots can tune into to find out the latest weather at the airport. It was a daunting weather report on the verge of being too much to take off. There was less than 500 meters of visibility with winds reaching 100 km per hour of speed. The visibility was still slightly within safe limits. While the taxi route was straightforward, the pilots needed to be a bit more careful. it had been more than 3 years since any of them had taken off from the runway. They were much more familiar with runway RW 06 at the south end of the airport. So when the flight neared to the West Cross taxi way, captain confirmed to his colleagues that this turn was the one he needed to make. The relief position easily see from his position behind the pilots both of their primary flight displays He could see winds were so strong that they were being picked up by the pitotubes on the fuselage of the plane and then represented as changes in airspeed on the pilot's airspeed tapes. With the wind hitting the aircraft from the right hand side, the captain's instrument and the first officers instruments were showing different reading of airspeed. It was a peculiarity more than anything else indicative. of the sheer strenght of the wind on this night.
As the pilots peered out their windscreens through the rain, they heard some good news over the radio : the runway visual range which is the distance the pilots can see along the runway, had gone up from 200 meters earlier to 450 meters. It looked like they could indeed take off. The captain still cautious was taxiing at 9 knots or 17 kilometers per hour. But what if they took off and then needed to go back to the airport because of a potential problem, only for it to have closed due to the weather worsening they departed? Previously they agreed that if this happened, they could go to Hong Kong or Koohsiung instead. But both have now been closed as the typhoon made its way north. So their only option was now Taipei and the pilots hoped it would remain a viable option. After reaching the end of West Cross taxiway, captain twisted the tiller counterclockwise on the 747, lumbered left onto taxiway November Papa ( NP ). The white stripes, know as the piano keys, signify the start of a runway. When you are converting a runway into a taxiway, you are supposed to change all of the marking and lighting so that they are suitable for a taxiway. But at Taipei this hadn't happened. So when they approached the end of the taxiway November Papa, they began to fall prey for a serie of psychological and systemic errors. Take off was cleared by the contorl tower. During the pre take off checklist, the captain peered through the blackness of the windscreen, carefully following the green lights as they beckoned him onto the runway. Air trafic control didn't have enough visibility to see the plane and also didn't have ground radar to see its position. If he had he would have seen that Flight 6 was not lining up with Runway 05 left as he instructed them to do but rather on the Runway 05 right. The captain was following the green taxiway lights which were far closer together in the turn that on the straight path leading up to runway 05.
In fact there were only 4 lights in the 200 meter long section of taxiway connecting runway 05 right and left. Legally there should have been 16 lights and as if that wasn't bad enough, one of those 4 lights wasn't working and another one was unacceptably dim. There was little to tell the captain that to his left there was another runway lying in the darkness. As the plane lumbered into position, the first officer commanted that the PVD had not unshuttered the PVD or power visual display. It's a device installed on the glare shield of some aircraft whose purpose is to give pilots a visual indication of whether they are drifting off the runway centerline during low visibility takeoffs. There was a shutter in front of it most of the time but when the aircraft detected that it was lining up on the runway, it unshottered revealing the barber pole like PVD It struck the pilots that as odd that this had stage shuttered after they lined up on the runway. The reason it had was that they tuned their navigation to the frequency for the runway they were supposed to line up. On Runway 05 left, they were over 200 meters from that runway sitting on what was becoming a taxiway. Pilots knew that Runway 05 right was being turned into a taxiway but in the darkness, and lured by the green lights, they didn't question whether they were in the correct place. What's more, as they sat poised in the threshold bright green centerline lights extended into darkness. The fact that these lights were green instead of white like normal runway lights should have given the pilots the clue that they were on a taxiway. The lights have been green for the runway's entire history because it was originally a taxiway. Ironically if the visibility was worse, the pilots would have been safer. That's why the PVD didn't matter because they could see the runway at 500 meters anyway. So the captain put the windscreen wipers on high switched on the landing lights and pushed the engines to take off thrust.
The engines roared and the aircraft accelerated. Within seconds the aircraft reached 150 kilometers per hour. But when they were about to reach the takeoff speed, in the middle of the runway, bulldozers, excavators, 2 rollers and rows of concrete barriers. At 280 kilometers per hour, the 747 smashed through the concrete barricades and tore through the construction vehicles. Part of the left wing was ripped off along with 3 of the aircraft's engines sending the plane swerving to the left. The fuel tanks ruptured o. A huge fireball ignited, enveloping the plane which split into 3 pieces and then began tumbling down the runway. Airport fire service was dispatched by the tower control immediatly. Within 3 minutes, 400 responders rushed to the scene. Out 179 people on board, 96 survived including the 3 pilots. It was the first and onyl fatal accident in Singapore Airlines history. And the first fatal accident to ever involve a Boeing 747 - 400. After the crash, investigators found that pilots were misled by the lighting on runway, especially considering that their home base was Singapore where controllers changed the color of the taxiway lightning in front of the pilots to guide them to the runway, instructing them to follow the green. So on flight 6, despite the pilot's caution about the weather when navigating to the runway, they reverted to their usual routine of simply following the green lighting to the runway. It didn't help that the closed runway still had its runway markings and bright centerline lights despite despite not being in use. That meant that when the pilots turned on that way they subconsciously ignored all information telling them that they were not where they were supposed to be. The unshuttered PVD, the off center ILS deviation scale and the green centerline lighting.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!