J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE! 
This plane RAN OUT of FUEL in the middle of the OCEAN!!
In the dead of the night, halfway over the Atlantic ocean, an Airbus A330 carrying 306 passengers and crew suddenly runs out of fuel. The lights go out, the oxygen masks drop, and the noise of the engines is replaced with an eerie silence. In pitch darkness, the giant aircraft begins drifting down towards the ocean below. The pilots are stunned, and begin trying to glide the aircraft as far as possible. The flight attendants prepare the passengers for an emergency ditching in the ocean - something which is likely be a death sentence for all on board.
This is a living nightmare, but incredibly - it never had to happen in the first place. Many accounts of this incident focus on its technical aspects, but that is only half of the story. The truth is that at bottom, this is a fascinating story about human psychology. It’s a story about how people make decisions under pressure, when faced with ambiguous information. This is the story of Air Transat flight 236. It happened on August 23, 2001. 293 passengers and 13 crew on board at Toronto's Pearson airport in Canada. They were bound for Lisbon, Portugal. a 7 hours flight. The Airbus A330 was a state of the art aircraft with banks of computers feeding informations to pilots from hundreds of on board sensors. Since its introduction 7 years reviously, it cemented itself as one of the safest aircraft. The aircraft here was just 2 years old. Robert Piché is the captain, 46 years with over 16 000 flight hours at that point. He had an experience on a wide variety of aircrafts flying both land and seaplanes in the climbs ofr northern Canada. He had unusual history for an airline pilot. Before being hired by Air Transat, he served 16 months of a 5 years jail sentence after being caught smuggling marijuana into the USA in a small plane.
Piché was joined in the cockpit by 28 years old first officer Dirk DeJager who had almost 5 000 flight hours, 400 of them being on the A330. While having less experience, he flew too a wide variety of aircraft before training to fly the Airbus with their transat a year previously. Both pilots had spotless trainins and performance records with the airline. 48 metric tons of fuel are loaded for the atlantic crossing. At 9 pm they took off. They climbed to a cruising altitude of 39 000 feet. All was well on board for the first hours. They xere expected to reach Lisbon in the early morning. Pilots duty mainly consisted of checking the fuel quantity against the flight plan providing position reports to traffic control as there is no radar over the ocean, and monitoring the aircraft system. For first 4 hours all was routine. But after 5 am, when the flight passed halfway ocean, the pilots got an unusual reading. Engine number 2, the one on the right hand side of the plane. Their onboard computers were advicing them that the oil pressure in the engine was high, that the oil quantity was low and that oil temperature was low. The pilots never saw this combination of warnings before. Normally over the course of a flight, engine oil temperatures rise, they don't fall. Pilots searched through their flight crew operating manual, or FCOM ( Flight Crew Operating Manual ). They wanted to see if they could find any explanation fo the unusual readings. But there was nothing in any of the manuals explaining this combination of indications.
They radioed Air Transat's maintainance control center in Mirabelle, Québec back in Canada. They relayed the the unusual indications to the dispatcher who said he would look into it. Pilots continued to monitor the engine indications. 30 minutes later, an advisory message appeared on the ECAM, the center display in the cockpit. Pilots brought up the fuel page on the ECAM and saw that there was a fuel imbalance between the tanks in the left wing and those in the right wing. Fuel imbalance is unusual but generally it's not cause for alarm. To fix it, pilots opened the cross feed valve which allowed fuel to flow from the left wing tank into the right wing tank. However, barely 10 minutes after the pilots had done this, the instruments indicated that the total fuel on board had dropped below the level required ro reach Lisbon. They were halfway across the ocean and they couldn't make it to Europe. Their only option in the Atlantic was an airport in the Azores islands, a small stirng of Portuguese islands in the middle of the Atlantic. They set course for Elijah's airport on the island of tercera and notified Santa Maria air traffic control that they were diverting due to a fuel shortage. At this point the plane had 7 tons of fuel on board. It's just 6% of the total A330's total fuel capacity and it was still falling much faster than usual. If the fueling readings were true, the cruise situation was dire and the rapid loss of fuel shown in the instruments was entirely consistent with there being a massive fuel leak. But the pilots doubted there was a fuel leak. Nothing happened in the flight that would cause fuel to suddently leak from the aircraft. No bangs, noises, severe turbulences, no lightning strike, nothing. The fuel consumption for the first hour had been entirely normal. It was weird to see the plane losing so many fuel during the calmest portion of the flight. Captain asked flight attendants if there was any fluid trailing back from the wings or engines.
They found nothing. Finally, the rate of fuel loss was so great, literally a metric ton of fuel every 5 minutes that is seemed impossibly high. Both pilots concluded that the fuel readings were erroneous These leaks on passengers aircrafts had been so rare that neither pilot had been trained on how to identify and deal with them at any stage of their training. There is a checklist for the event of a few leak however Other than this, pilots were not primed to frame the problems they were seeing in terms of a fuel leak. On top of this they already more or less concluded that the indications they received about the engine oil were likely in error. In a complicated aircraft like this one, bad data generated by faulty sensors is far from an unheard of occurrence. So when the pilots saw that the fuel indications showed frankly unbelievably low levels of fuel, they assumed that these indications were erroneous too. The truth is that both pilots were right to think that both the engine oil indications and the few level indication were related. However the common factor explaining both of them was not a computer glitch but rather a massive fuel leak on the right hand engine. Inside engine number 2, a vibrating hydraulic pipe rubbed through the outer casing of a fuel pipe, rupturing it and causing fuel to come spewing out into the engine at a terryfying rate. This was the source of both engine oil indication and low fuel indication. Psychological phenomenon known as confirmation bias played a role here with the crew's initial mental model of their situation being that the engine oil indication were results of faulty sensors. When building a mental model, people tend to act like lawyers rather than scientists. They look for evidence which bolsters their case rather than evidence which might disconfirm it. New evidence suggested a few leak such as the fuel imbalance and rapid fuel loss indications. Pilotes negleted taking a step back and re evaluating their first hypothesis.
This plane RAN OUT of FUEL in the middle of the OCEAN!!
In the dead of the night, halfway over the Atlantic ocean, an Airbus A330 carrying 306 passengers and crew suddenly runs out of fuel. The lights go out, the oxygen masks drop, and the noise of the engines is replaced with an eerie silence. In pitch darkness, the giant aircraft begins drifting down towards the ocean below. The pilots are stunned, and begin trying to glide the aircraft as far as possible. The flight attendants prepare the passengers for an emergency ditching in the ocean - something which is likely be a death sentence for all on board.
This is a living nightmare, but incredibly - it never had to happen in the first place. Many accounts of this incident focus on its technical aspects, but that is only half of the story. The truth is that at bottom, this is a fascinating story about human psychology. It’s a story about how people make decisions under pressure, when faced with ambiguous information. This is the story of Air Transat flight 236. It happened on August 23, 2001. 293 passengers and 13 crew on board at Toronto's Pearson airport in Canada. They were bound for Lisbon, Portugal. a 7 hours flight. The Airbus A330 was a state of the art aircraft with banks of computers feeding informations to pilots from hundreds of on board sensors. Since its introduction 7 years reviously, it cemented itself as one of the safest aircraft. The aircraft here was just 2 years old. Robert Piché is the captain, 46 years with over 16 000 flight hours at that point. He had an experience on a wide variety of aircrafts flying both land and seaplanes in the climbs ofr northern Canada. He had unusual history for an airline pilot. Before being hired by Air Transat, he served 16 months of a 5 years jail sentence after being caught smuggling marijuana into the USA in a small plane.
Piché was joined in the cockpit by 28 years old first officer Dirk DeJager who had almost 5 000 flight hours, 400 of them being on the A330. While having less experience, he flew too a wide variety of aircraft before training to fly the Airbus with their transat a year previously. Both pilots had spotless trainins and performance records with the airline. 48 metric tons of fuel are loaded for the atlantic crossing. At 9 pm they took off. They climbed to a cruising altitude of 39 000 feet. All was well on board for the first hours. They xere expected to reach Lisbon in the early morning. Pilots duty mainly consisted of checking the fuel quantity against the flight plan providing position reports to traffic control as there is no radar over the ocean, and monitoring the aircraft system. For first 4 hours all was routine. But after 5 am, when the flight passed halfway ocean, the pilots got an unusual reading. Engine number 2, the one on the right hand side of the plane. Their onboard computers were advicing them that the oil pressure in the engine was high, that the oil quantity was low and that oil temperature was low. The pilots never saw this combination of warnings before. Normally over the course of a flight, engine oil temperatures rise, they don't fall. Pilots searched through their flight crew operating manual, or FCOM ( Flight Crew Operating Manual ). They wanted to see if they could find any explanation fo the unusual readings. But there was nothing in any of the manuals explaining this combination of indications.
They radioed Air Transat's maintainance control center in Mirabelle, Québec back in Canada. They relayed the the unusual indications to the dispatcher who said he would look into it. Pilots continued to monitor the engine indications. 30 minutes later, an advisory message appeared on the ECAM, the center display in the cockpit. Pilots brought up the fuel page on the ECAM and saw that there was a fuel imbalance between the tanks in the left wing and those in the right wing. Fuel imbalance is unusual but generally it's not cause for alarm. To fix it, pilots opened the cross feed valve which allowed fuel to flow from the left wing tank into the right wing tank. However, barely 10 minutes after the pilots had done this, the instruments indicated that the total fuel on board had dropped below the level required ro reach Lisbon. They were halfway across the ocean and they couldn't make it to Europe. Their only option in the Atlantic was an airport in the Azores islands, a small stirng of Portuguese islands in the middle of the Atlantic. They set course for Elijah's airport on the island of tercera and notified Santa Maria air traffic control that they were diverting due to a fuel shortage. At this point the plane had 7 tons of fuel on board. It's just 6% of the total A330's total fuel capacity and it was still falling much faster than usual. If the fueling readings were true, the cruise situation was dire and the rapid loss of fuel shown in the instruments was entirely consistent with there being a massive fuel leak. But the pilots doubted there was a fuel leak. Nothing happened in the flight that would cause fuel to suddently leak from the aircraft. No bangs, noises, severe turbulences, no lightning strike, nothing. The fuel consumption for the first hour had been entirely normal. It was weird to see the plane losing so many fuel during the calmest portion of the flight. Captain asked flight attendants if there was any fluid trailing back from the wings or engines.
They found nothing. Finally, the rate of fuel loss was so great, literally a metric ton of fuel every 5 minutes that is seemed impossibly high. Both pilots concluded that the fuel readings were erroneous These leaks on passengers aircrafts had been so rare that neither pilot had been trained on how to identify and deal with them at any stage of their training. There is a checklist for the event of a few leak however Other than this, pilots were not primed to frame the problems they were seeing in terms of a fuel leak. On top of this they already more or less concluded that the indications they received about the engine oil were likely in error. In a complicated aircraft like this one, bad data generated by faulty sensors is far from an unheard of occurrence. So when the pilots saw that the fuel indications showed frankly unbelievably low levels of fuel, they assumed that these indications were erroneous too. The truth is that both pilots were right to think that both the engine oil indications and the few level indication were related. However the common factor explaining both of them was not a computer glitch but rather a massive fuel leak on the right hand engine. Inside engine number 2, a vibrating hydraulic pipe rubbed through the outer casing of a fuel pipe, rupturing it and causing fuel to come spewing out into the engine at a terryfying rate. This was the source of both engine oil indication and low fuel indication. Psychological phenomenon known as confirmation bias played a role here with the crew's initial mental model of their situation being that the engine oil indication were results of faulty sensors. When building a mental model, people tend to act like lawyers rather than scientists. They look for evidence which bolsters their case rather than evidence which might disconfirm it. New evidence suggested a few leak such as the fuel imbalance and rapid fuel loss indications. Pilotes negleted taking a step back and re evaluating their first hypothesis.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
Under conditions of stress and high workload this phenomenon is especially powerful. Pilots were so busy taking maintainance control, carrying out checklists and coordinating diversion with the cabin crew control that they had little opportunity to re evalute their understanding of the situation. Despite having been feed fuel from the left tank to the right tank, previously, the imbalance between the 2 tanks remained and aircraft was still rapidly losing fuel. Yet pilots couldn't believe there was a fuel leak. Despite the high level of aotumation there was no warning to indicate there was a fuel leak. The only way they could determine this was by monitoring the rate of fuel loss in each tank. In case there was a leak in the right wing, the pilots turned the right wing fuel pumps on and the left wing fuel pumps off. To reverse the direction of the cross feed so that fuel from the right wing tank was now used to feed both engines. Crew then contacted Air Transat's maintainance control center again, telling them of the inexplicably low fuel indications. At this point the plane had just 4,8 tons of fuel on board rather than the 17 tons it should have had. During the conversation, fuel quantity continued to drop. Pilots considered carrying out the fuel leak procedure but the captain ultimatly decided against it because the procedure required the pilots to descend to 20 000 feet. The captain figured out that if there was indeed a fuel leak, descending would be a bad idea as running out of fuel at their current high altitude of 39 000 feet was better than running out of fuel at 20 000 feet Psychologically the decision can be explained by framing bias. In decisions where risks are involved, people tend to frames their options in term of gains and losses. The captain in this case had to choose between a sure loss which was descending to 20 000 versus a loss which was less probable but more disastrous which was staying at 39 000 feet and failing to diagnose a fuel leak.
In these situations, people tend to choose the latter riskier choice. Reasoning goes that it's better to have a terrible thing to happen than definitly have a moderately bad thing to happen. Minutes later, the right engine flamed out. Captain began applying maximum thrust on the left engine and began descending. Plane could still fly with one engine but not at 39 000 feet. At this point the crew has 600 kg of fuel left and they were 240 kilometers from the airport. First officer declared an emergency to air traffic control. 13 minutes later, 120 km from the airport, the left hand engine flames out. Plane turns into a glider. Loss of both engines meant the plane was now without electrical power. A fan known as ram air turbine deployed automatically underneath the aircraft's fuselage. Spinning in the wind it generated a small amout of electrical power which was used to supply the captain's instruments as well as other critical systems. Captain had to stretch the glide as far as possible to make it to the airport. At night with no way to see the water and the big swells of Atlantic ocean, ditching the plane into the water was a death sentence. With 100 kilometers to go in the middle of the night, it was not an easy task. The plane descended at 2 000 feet per minute. At 30 000 feet it meant that the plane would be down in 15 minutes. Without engine to feed air into the cabin, it was beginning to depressurize. Oxygen mass dropped and passengers scrambled to put them on in time. Captain had experience doing engine out landing in smaller aircraft but this time it was nothing like he faced before. For A330 like other passenger jet, engines don't only power the airplane forward, they are also a source of electrical and hydraulic power. Loss of both engines caused important systems to stop. The plane 2 of its 3 hydraulic systems. These powered the stabilized on the tail, making it harder for the captain to control the pitch of the plane.
Aircraft also lost most of its wing spoilers, the nose wheel steering and the thrust reversers on the engines. It was harder to control in the air. Even if it maanged to get on the runway, it was harder to steer and to stop. To keep the aircraft aloft as long as possible, the captain flew the descent at a speed between the recommended glide speed and the stall warning speed. If he was too high on altitude at the approach, he could descend faster to lose speed no problem. But if he ended up too low, no way to get that altitude back. .There were more constraints Piché had to deal with. He had to keep his speed above 140 knots or the ram air turbine would stop generating electricity. At the same time he couldn't go faster than 200 knots or the landing gear wouldn't extend. Because he was gliding, the only way to control airspeed was by pitching the nose up or down. Behind the passengers prepared for a ditching into ocean with the fligh attendants instructing them on how to adopt the brace position. As the minutes ticked on, the cabin was deathly silent. His attempts to keep the aircraft worked too well. Now he was too high approaching the airport. He would have to descend steeply which would increase the airspeed to the point of making landing impossible. He began a 360 degrees turn to lose altitude. During the first turn, first officer lowered the gear and extended the slats at the front of the wings, providing extra lift allowing the aircraft to fly more slowly without producing too much drag. After 2 tens minutes the captain brought the wing level as the runway came back into view. He was still high but not high enough to make another 360 degrees turn. So he carried out a serie of S turns banking the aircraft hard to the left then hired to the right in an attempt to put more distance between himself and the runway. First officer monitored the plane's airspeed as the captain prepared the final approach.
Without flaps they had to keep a higher airspeed than normal, about 200 knots rather than the usual 150 knots. It was the only chance to bring the plane down on the runway. 8 out of the 12 tires burst and the plane bounces before slamming down. Without engine spoilers and engine reverse thrust, it wasn't slowing down. On top of this, the anti skid system was inoperative so when the captain slammed on the brakes, the wheels locked up. The aircraft was skidding down the runway to the rim. It eventually skidded to a stop, with all 306 people on board safe. After evacuation order, all passengers escaped the plane within 90 seconds. Fires started in the left main gear wheels but they were promptly extinguished by the firefighters. Crew carried out the longest glide of a passenger aircraft in history of aviation without any loss of life. Questions were raised about how pilots ended up running out of fuel. Had the pilots carried out any of the fuel leak procedures when they initiated the diversion to lages whether it was engine fuel leak procedure, wing fuel leak procedure, or fuel leak not located procedure, they would have land with at least 3,8 metric tons of fuel on board. However, framing bias, confirmation bias and lack of fuel loss warnings plus the fact that in the A330 software, pilots never carried out these procedures, or received any training by the transact. As for original fuel leak, investigators found out that maintenance had been carried out on number 2 engine shortly before the accident. A technician replaced a part of the engine with a part that was meant for another aircraft, leading to a hydraulic line making contact with a fuel tube. As hydraulic line vibrated and pressed against fuel tube, it ruptured it, causing massive fuel leak. Superior airmanship award was gave to both captain and first officer by airline pilots association for executing a dead stick landing on an Airbus A330.
Under conditions of stress and high workload this phenomenon is especially powerful. Pilots were so busy taking maintainance control, carrying out checklists and coordinating diversion with the cabin crew control that they had little opportunity to re evalute their understanding of the situation. Despite having been feed fuel from the left tank to the right tank, previously, the imbalance between the 2 tanks remained and aircraft was still rapidly losing fuel. Yet pilots couldn't believe there was a fuel leak. Despite the high level of aotumation there was no warning to indicate there was a fuel leak. The only way they could determine this was by monitoring the rate of fuel loss in each tank. In case there was a leak in the right wing, the pilots turned the right wing fuel pumps on and the left wing fuel pumps off. To reverse the direction of the cross feed so that fuel from the right wing tank was now used to feed both engines. Crew then contacted Air Transat's maintainance control center again, telling them of the inexplicably low fuel indications. At this point the plane had just 4,8 tons of fuel on board rather than the 17 tons it should have had. During the conversation, fuel quantity continued to drop. Pilots considered carrying out the fuel leak procedure but the captain ultimatly decided against it because the procedure required the pilots to descend to 20 000 feet. The captain figured out that if there was indeed a fuel leak, descending would be a bad idea as running out of fuel at their current high altitude of 39 000 feet was better than running out of fuel at 20 000 feet Psychologically the decision can be explained by framing bias. In decisions where risks are involved, people tend to frames their options in term of gains and losses. The captain in this case had to choose between a sure loss which was descending to 20 000 versus a loss which was less probable but more disastrous which was staying at 39 000 feet and failing to diagnose a fuel leak.
In these situations, people tend to choose the latter riskier choice. Reasoning goes that it's better to have a terrible thing to happen than definitly have a moderately bad thing to happen. Minutes later, the right engine flamed out. Captain began applying maximum thrust on the left engine and began descending. Plane could still fly with one engine but not at 39 000 feet. At this point the crew has 600 kg of fuel left and they were 240 kilometers from the airport. First officer declared an emergency to air traffic control. 13 minutes later, 120 km from the airport, the left hand engine flames out. Plane turns into a glider. Loss of both engines meant the plane was now without electrical power. A fan known as ram air turbine deployed automatically underneath the aircraft's fuselage. Spinning in the wind it generated a small amout of electrical power which was used to supply the captain's instruments as well as other critical systems. Captain had to stretch the glide as far as possible to make it to the airport. At night with no way to see the water and the big swells of Atlantic ocean, ditching the plane into the water was a death sentence. With 100 kilometers to go in the middle of the night, it was not an easy task. The plane descended at 2 000 feet per minute. At 30 000 feet it meant that the plane would be down in 15 minutes. Without engine to feed air into the cabin, it was beginning to depressurize. Oxygen mass dropped and passengers scrambled to put them on in time. Captain had experience doing engine out landing in smaller aircraft but this time it was nothing like he faced before. For A330 like other passenger jet, engines don't only power the airplane forward, they are also a source of electrical and hydraulic power. Loss of both engines caused important systems to stop. The plane 2 of its 3 hydraulic systems. These powered the stabilized on the tail, making it harder for the captain to control the pitch of the plane.
Aircraft also lost most of its wing spoilers, the nose wheel steering and the thrust reversers on the engines. It was harder to control in the air. Even if it maanged to get on the runway, it was harder to steer and to stop. To keep the aircraft aloft as long as possible, the captain flew the descent at a speed between the recommended glide speed and the stall warning speed. If he was too high on altitude at the approach, he could descend faster to lose speed no problem. But if he ended up too low, no way to get that altitude back. .There were more constraints Piché had to deal with. He had to keep his speed above 140 knots or the ram air turbine would stop generating electricity. At the same time he couldn't go faster than 200 knots or the landing gear wouldn't extend. Because he was gliding, the only way to control airspeed was by pitching the nose up or down. Behind the passengers prepared for a ditching into ocean with the fligh attendants instructing them on how to adopt the brace position. As the minutes ticked on, the cabin was deathly silent. His attempts to keep the aircraft worked too well. Now he was too high approaching the airport. He would have to descend steeply which would increase the airspeed to the point of making landing impossible. He began a 360 degrees turn to lose altitude. During the first turn, first officer lowered the gear and extended the slats at the front of the wings, providing extra lift allowing the aircraft to fly more slowly without producing too much drag. After 2 tens minutes the captain brought the wing level as the runway came back into view. He was still high but not high enough to make another 360 degrees turn. So he carried out a serie of S turns banking the aircraft hard to the left then hired to the right in an attempt to put more distance between himself and the runway. First officer monitored the plane's airspeed as the captain prepared the final approach.
Without flaps they had to keep a higher airspeed than normal, about 200 knots rather than the usual 150 knots. It was the only chance to bring the plane down on the runway. 8 out of the 12 tires burst and the plane bounces before slamming down. Without engine spoilers and engine reverse thrust, it wasn't slowing down. On top of this, the anti skid system was inoperative so when the captain slammed on the brakes, the wheels locked up. The aircraft was skidding down the runway to the rim. It eventually skidded to a stop, with all 306 people on board safe. After evacuation order, all passengers escaped the plane within 90 seconds. Fires started in the left main gear wheels but they were promptly extinguished by the firefighters. Crew carried out the longest glide of a passenger aircraft in history of aviation without any loss of life. Questions were raised about how pilots ended up running out of fuel. Had the pilots carried out any of the fuel leak procedures when they initiated the diversion to lages whether it was engine fuel leak procedure, wing fuel leak procedure, or fuel leak not located procedure, they would have land with at least 3,8 metric tons of fuel on board. However, framing bias, confirmation bias and lack of fuel loss warnings plus the fact that in the A330 software, pilots never carried out these procedures, or received any training by the transact. As for original fuel leak, investigators found out that maintenance had been carried out on number 2 engine shortly before the accident. A technician replaced a part of the engine with a part that was meant for another aircraft, leading to a hydraulic line making contact with a fuel tube. As hydraulic line vibrated and pressed against fuel tube, it ruptured it, causing massive fuel leak. Superior airmanship award was gave to both captain and first officer by airline pilots association for executing a dead stick landing on an Airbus A330.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
HOW did this plane FALL APART after takeoff?! | United 811
This Boeing 747 can carry 350 passengers. Oxygen masks dropped but nobody could use them, not even the pilots. In the cabin, 9 passengers are missing. On the night of February 24th, 1989, 337 embarked on United Airlines flight 811. Plus 18 crew members. It was at Honolulu international airport, Hawaii.
They were heading to Auckland, New Zealand, a 9 hours journey. It was a Boeing 747 - 100. This plane is almost 20 years old, being delivered in United Airlines in 1970. Its engines weren't as fuel efficient as the more modern aircraft of the time. Its cockpit had old fashioned analog dials displays and it wa manned by a crew of 3 : captain, first officer and flight engineer. This aging aircraft had a fatal flaw that would spark disaster. Captain David Croning, 59 years old, was one of the most experienced captains of the company. He had been in the airline since 1954. He accumulated 28 000 hours of flight hours over his career in a wide variety of aircrafts, both military and civilian. He was approachign mandatory retirement which was at the age of 60. In fact this flight was scheduled to be his second last flight of his career. Gregory Slader, 48 years old, was the first officer. With 14 500 flight hours, he was also highly experienced. Both flied together for 20 years. This night would be their greatest challenge. Sitting behind the pilots, the mecanician, Randal Mark Thomas, 46 years old who had about 20 000 flight hours. He would be the first to find the true nature of the emergency. In fact there would be multiple critical emergencies that would force them to throw away standard procedures and checklists and rely on their experience to make life and death decisions. The plane was close to its maximum allowable takeoff weight of 320 000 kg. At 1 : 52 am, the captain brings the plane into th e air. On this night over the Pacific, thunderstorms flanked the aircraft and as it clcimbed, pilots deviated to the left storm, keeping an eye on the weather radar and out the windscreen. Captain's decision to keep the passenger seatbelt sign on would be a consequential decision. 17 minutes after takeoff, at 22 000 feet, a loud thump shook the plane and half a second later, all hell broke loose.
It was a deafening explosion followed by a rapid decompression. Anything not tied down or strapped in was sucked out of the hole that opened in the aircraft's side. The lockable bombing happened 2 months earlier and everybody on board assumed a bomb went off. At 7 kilometers over the ocean, there was not enough oxygen for humans to remain conscious for more than a few minutes. So captain dived the plane into a more breathable altitude. Oxygen masks were not working. Explosion cut off their oxygen supply. Pilots needed to put the plane down to 10 000 feet quickly. During the dive the aircraft also ebgan a left hand turn back towards Honolulu all while trying to keep the aircraft away from thunderstorms. Engine 3 was vibrating violently and not producing any thrust. So pilots shut it down before declaring an emergency mayday to air traffic control. The checklist for an explosive decompression requires the pilots to lower tohe landing gear during the emergency descent as this helps to stop the aircraft from getting too fast. But the crew suspected that given the explosion the aircraft's structural integrity had been significantly compromised. They worried that lowering the landing gear would put stress on the airplane that it may not be able to bear. Meanwhile the passengers and flight attendants were aware of the nature of the emergency since the hole was here with a massive section on the right hand side of the plane that was blown off. The explosive decompression that followed sucked out rows of seating and internal aircraft components, and with them, 9 passengers. Terrified passengers near were looking out into the pitch black sky. They only coul dhear the engines and the howl or air pushing past the plane. One flight attendant was clinging onto his seat for dear life and was hanging partially outside the aircraft. Her fellow crew members pulled her back inside but she has been severely injured.
Meanwhile the flight attendants began to run to fetch their portable oxygen bottles and trying to attach the face masks to them. Many had difficulties to do this and began to feel light headed as the initial effects of hypoxia set in. In the cockpit the situation was no less dire and their problems just began. After shutting down engine number 3, they noticed that engine number 4, the outboard engine on the right hand side was also damaged. The flight was over 100 kilometers from Honolulu at this point. If the engine 4 failed, the changes of making it back to Honolulu would be significantly diminished. Problem was compounded by the fact that the aircraft weighted over 300 tons. Even maximum thrust on the 2 functioning engines was not enough to generate the speed needed to keep the aircraft aloft. As a result the plane kept descending towards the ocean. It was breathable altitude but now it was too heavy to maintain altitude with only 2 functioning engines. Crew could have to go back to Honolulu was to dump fuel, making the aircraft lighter which would slow the rate of the descent. If they were lucky they might stretch their descent all the way to Honolulu. Seconds later, engine number 4 caught fire. Massive tendrils of flames extended out behind the shuttering engine. The crew had no choice but shut it down as well. It looked at that point that they may have to ditch their aircraft into the Pacific ocean. At night with no reliable way to judge their height above the water, an attempted ditching would leave few if any survivors. Both functioning engines were on the left hand side of the aircraft. The plane began to veer to the right. The captain had to stomp on the left rudder to keep the aircraft flying in a straight line. This took considerable force and the deflection of the rudder into the slipstream created drag which made the plane drop even faster towards the ocean.
The 2 remaining engines were running at takeoff thrust, a setting they should only be left by for 4 minutes at most. Any longer would risk damaging them. Yet the cruise options were limited. If they reduced the engine thrust to spare the engines, the aircraft would lose speed and descend even faster towards the ocean 5 000 pounds of fuel were being dumped per minute meanwhile. Adymetric thrust meant that the aircraft started to drift. In the cabin, the danger was if the hole opened up further, it could rip the plane apart. To the pilots the main danger was the distance between the aircraft and Honolulu. The aircraft was quivering and shuddering because of the aerodynamic disturbance caused by the hole in the fuselage. Descending into the spiral staircase to the lwoer deck of the 747, the flight engineer that stunned by the slight that met him. The hole was big enough to drive a semi truck through. Beyond it, nothing but dark empty sky and battered wing with 2 rattling jet engines. Sprinting back tot he cockpit he told that it looked like a bomb had gone off. Flight engineer told the captain that given the damage, he shouldn't fly faster than 250 knots as this would risk putting the aircraft structure under too much stress whih may tear it apart. At the same time the first officer told the captian to not go below 240 knots as the aircraft may become hard to control below that speed. This left very little margin of error as the captain had to keep his aircraft flying within a 10 knot speed window on 2 engines all of that while trying to maintain altitude and navigate back to Honolulu in the dark. Engines were not the only part of the plane damaged. During the explosion, debris got ejected from the fuselage and impacted the leading edge of the right wing as well as the horizontal stabilized and even the vertical stabilizer in the tail plane.
HOW did this plane FALL APART after takeoff?! | United 811
This Boeing 747 can carry 350 passengers. Oxygen masks dropped but nobody could use them, not even the pilots. In the cabin, 9 passengers are missing. On the night of February 24th, 1989, 337 embarked on United Airlines flight 811. Plus 18 crew members. It was at Honolulu international airport, Hawaii.
They were heading to Auckland, New Zealand, a 9 hours journey. It was a Boeing 747 - 100. This plane is almost 20 years old, being delivered in United Airlines in 1970. Its engines weren't as fuel efficient as the more modern aircraft of the time. Its cockpit had old fashioned analog dials displays and it wa manned by a crew of 3 : captain, first officer and flight engineer. This aging aircraft had a fatal flaw that would spark disaster. Captain David Croning, 59 years old, was one of the most experienced captains of the company. He had been in the airline since 1954. He accumulated 28 000 hours of flight hours over his career in a wide variety of aircrafts, both military and civilian. He was approachign mandatory retirement which was at the age of 60. In fact this flight was scheduled to be his second last flight of his career. Gregory Slader, 48 years old, was the first officer. With 14 500 flight hours, he was also highly experienced. Both flied together for 20 years. This night would be their greatest challenge. Sitting behind the pilots, the mecanician, Randal Mark Thomas, 46 years old who had about 20 000 flight hours. He would be the first to find the true nature of the emergency. In fact there would be multiple critical emergencies that would force them to throw away standard procedures and checklists and rely on their experience to make life and death decisions. The plane was close to its maximum allowable takeoff weight of 320 000 kg. At 1 : 52 am, the captain brings the plane into th e air. On this night over the Pacific, thunderstorms flanked the aircraft and as it clcimbed, pilots deviated to the left storm, keeping an eye on the weather radar and out the windscreen. Captain's decision to keep the passenger seatbelt sign on would be a consequential decision. 17 minutes after takeoff, at 22 000 feet, a loud thump shook the plane and half a second later, all hell broke loose.
It was a deafening explosion followed by a rapid decompression. Anything not tied down or strapped in was sucked out of the hole that opened in the aircraft's side. The lockable bombing happened 2 months earlier and everybody on board assumed a bomb went off. At 7 kilometers over the ocean, there was not enough oxygen for humans to remain conscious for more than a few minutes. So captain dived the plane into a more breathable altitude. Oxygen masks were not working. Explosion cut off their oxygen supply. Pilots needed to put the plane down to 10 000 feet quickly. During the dive the aircraft also ebgan a left hand turn back towards Honolulu all while trying to keep the aircraft away from thunderstorms. Engine 3 was vibrating violently and not producing any thrust. So pilots shut it down before declaring an emergency mayday to air traffic control. The checklist for an explosive decompression requires the pilots to lower tohe landing gear during the emergency descent as this helps to stop the aircraft from getting too fast. But the crew suspected that given the explosion the aircraft's structural integrity had been significantly compromised. They worried that lowering the landing gear would put stress on the airplane that it may not be able to bear. Meanwhile the passengers and flight attendants were aware of the nature of the emergency since the hole was here with a massive section on the right hand side of the plane that was blown off. The explosive decompression that followed sucked out rows of seating and internal aircraft components, and with them, 9 passengers. Terrified passengers near were looking out into the pitch black sky. They only coul dhear the engines and the howl or air pushing past the plane. One flight attendant was clinging onto his seat for dear life and was hanging partially outside the aircraft. Her fellow crew members pulled her back inside but she has been severely injured.
Meanwhile the flight attendants began to run to fetch their portable oxygen bottles and trying to attach the face masks to them. Many had difficulties to do this and began to feel light headed as the initial effects of hypoxia set in. In the cockpit the situation was no less dire and their problems just began. After shutting down engine number 3, they noticed that engine number 4, the outboard engine on the right hand side was also damaged. The flight was over 100 kilometers from Honolulu at this point. If the engine 4 failed, the changes of making it back to Honolulu would be significantly diminished. Problem was compounded by the fact that the aircraft weighted over 300 tons. Even maximum thrust on the 2 functioning engines was not enough to generate the speed needed to keep the aircraft aloft. As a result the plane kept descending towards the ocean. It was breathable altitude but now it was too heavy to maintain altitude with only 2 functioning engines. Crew could have to go back to Honolulu was to dump fuel, making the aircraft lighter which would slow the rate of the descent. If they were lucky they might stretch their descent all the way to Honolulu. Seconds later, engine number 4 caught fire. Massive tendrils of flames extended out behind the shuttering engine. The crew had no choice but shut it down as well. It looked at that point that they may have to ditch their aircraft into the Pacific ocean. At night with no reliable way to judge their height above the water, an attempted ditching would leave few if any survivors. Both functioning engines were on the left hand side of the aircraft. The plane began to veer to the right. The captain had to stomp on the left rudder to keep the aircraft flying in a straight line. This took considerable force and the deflection of the rudder into the slipstream created drag which made the plane drop even faster towards the ocean.
The 2 remaining engines were running at takeoff thrust, a setting they should only be left by for 4 minutes at most. Any longer would risk damaging them. Yet the cruise options were limited. If they reduced the engine thrust to spare the engines, the aircraft would lose speed and descend even faster towards the ocean 5 000 pounds of fuel were being dumped per minute meanwhile. Adymetric thrust meant that the aircraft started to drift. In the cabin, the danger was if the hole opened up further, it could rip the plane apart. To the pilots the main danger was the distance between the aircraft and Honolulu. The aircraft was quivering and shuddering because of the aerodynamic disturbance caused by the hole in the fuselage. Descending into the spiral staircase to the lwoer deck of the 747, the flight engineer that stunned by the slight that met him. The hole was big enough to drive a semi truck through. Beyond it, nothing but dark empty sky and battered wing with 2 rattling jet engines. Sprinting back tot he cockpit he told that it looked like a bomb had gone off. Flight engineer told the captain that given the damage, he shouldn't fly faster than 250 knots as this would risk putting the aircraft structure under too much stress whih may tear it apart. At the same time the first officer told the captian to not go below 240 knots as the aircraft may become hard to control below that speed. This left very little margin of error as the captain had to keep his aircraft flying within a 10 knot speed window on 2 engines all of that while trying to maintain altitude and navigate back to Honolulu in the dark. Engines were not the only part of the plane damaged. During the explosion, debris got ejected from the fuselage and impacted the leading edge of the right wing as well as the horizontal stabilized and even the vertical stabilizer in the tail plane.
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Crucially, the leading edge flaps on the wing were dented and punctured. These flaps allowed the plane to fly at slower speeds during approach and landing. Witout flaps the plane would have to land at at a much higher speed than normal. There was also a possibility of the aircraft to pull apart on the runway it it touched down at this speed, especially considering the damage. Now the pilots feared that the landing gear was damaged by the explosion. Controller cleared them to go down 6 000 feet byt now they had gone below this, approaching 4 000 feet. However by this point, their descent had slowed. They might make it to the airport. To reduce the likehood that it would go off the end of landing, the captain wanted the longest runway possible. It was runway 8 left. Even at full power, the aircraft speed was beginning to drop. Air traffic control gave them radar vectors to line them up with the runway. The crew tuned their navigation radios to the ILS frequency for runway 8 left, the longest runway of the airport. An ILS approach would allow them to use their instruments to accuratly determine whether they were on the correct path to the runway even if clouds or rain obscured their view. At 17 miles from the runway, the crew began experimenting with the flaps. If they could extend them it could be life saving. Captain did it cautiously, extending them 1 increment at a time. The first officer monitored the flat position indicator and saw what he was hoping not to see. He saw what is known as a split flap. The flaps on the outer edge of one wing had remained in the retracted position while on the other wing, they had extended. The purpose of flaps is to create lift which is the force that pulls the aircraft up. If one wing produces more lift than the other, that wing rises by itself and the plane tips over on its side.
The pilot knew when they got this split flap indication that if they extended the flaps anymore, they risked having the aircraft spiral uncontrollably. Second officer Thomas consulted the landing speed chart and told Cronin that the landing speed for flaps at 5 degrees was 190 knots, well above the typical landing of about 150 knots. The first officer persuaded the captain that it would be worth trying for 10 degrees of flap as this would reduce their landing speed. They tried this and it worked. The plane was controllable and they were able to fly slightly slower. Captain began then a right hand turn to line the massive aircraft with the runway.The pilots watched intensely as the landing gear slowly extended and locked into place as confirmed by the green indicator lights. It was a massive relief but the real test was still ahead of them. The cabin crew had been told to evacuate after the landing. The plane's engineer confirmed that the plane's hydraulic systems were all in good condition. It was a relief as it meant that the brakes were likely working as normal. However they would only be able to use the reverse thrust on the engines on the left hand side of the plane which would increase their stopping distance. The captain monitored the plane's arrival towards the runway while the first officer monitored the instruments closely and provided the captain with airspeed and altitude information. The aircraft landed correctly, the landing gear held and the plane eventually stopped before the end of the runway. Evacuation order was given. The 328 passengers evacuated the aircraft in just 45 seconds. 25 minutes had lapsed since the explosive decompression. The 9 passengers sucked out of the plane were never found. The investigators who examined the aircraft ruled the bomb theory off. They found that the incident was one of the many just waiting to happen. They determined that the aircraft has been mishandled by ground crews while at the gate.
Careless operation of the forward cargo door by groud crew at Honolulu damaged its locking mechanism. This meant that the door never properly had been closed. As the plane began to pressurize in flight, it blew open, taking a huge section of the fuselage with it. Kevin and Susan Campbell were not happy with the national transportation investigation so they began their own. Kevin Campbell had a background in mechanical engineering. and he spent months pouring through thousands of pages of documentation about the 747's cargo doors. They found a disturbing trent. It turned out that Boeing had received dozens of complains of 747 cargo doors opening uncommanded as far back as 1975. In fact, 2 years before the United 811 incident, a Pan Am 747 had had its cargo door unlatched shortly after takeoff from London. In that case 2 hooks on the door frame were the only things keeping the door from swinging open. It appeared that was led to this was not mishanding by ground crew but faulty electrical wiring in the door's locking mechanism. When this wiring short circuited, the door would begin opening by itself. This was a serious design flaw in the Boeing 747. Almost 2 years after the crash, when an extensive search operation had located the missing cargo door and dredged it up from the bottom of the ocean, the Campbells were vindicated. There was indeed a fault with the electrical systme which controlled the locking mechanism of the door. On flight 811 this system experienced a shor tcircuit which led to the cargo door unlatching mid flight. NTSB had no choice but accepting the Campbell's conclusions. Faulty wiring and deficiencies in the cargo's door design and not groud human error caused the accident. NTSB recommended that all 747 - 100 in service have their cargo door locking mechanisms replaced with new redesign locks which couldn't prey to the same electrical mafunction.
Crucially, the leading edge flaps on the wing were dented and punctured. These flaps allowed the plane to fly at slower speeds during approach and landing. Witout flaps the plane would have to land at at a much higher speed than normal. There was also a possibility of the aircraft to pull apart on the runway it it touched down at this speed, especially considering the damage. Now the pilots feared that the landing gear was damaged by the explosion. Controller cleared them to go down 6 000 feet byt now they had gone below this, approaching 4 000 feet. However by this point, their descent had slowed. They might make it to the airport. To reduce the likehood that it would go off the end of landing, the captain wanted the longest runway possible. It was runway 8 left. Even at full power, the aircraft speed was beginning to drop. Air traffic control gave them radar vectors to line them up with the runway. The crew tuned their navigation radios to the ILS frequency for runway 8 left, the longest runway of the airport. An ILS approach would allow them to use their instruments to accuratly determine whether they were on the correct path to the runway even if clouds or rain obscured their view. At 17 miles from the runway, the crew began experimenting with the flaps. If they could extend them it could be life saving. Captain did it cautiously, extending them 1 increment at a time. The first officer monitored the flat position indicator and saw what he was hoping not to see. He saw what is known as a split flap. The flaps on the outer edge of one wing had remained in the retracted position while on the other wing, they had extended. The purpose of flaps is to create lift which is the force that pulls the aircraft up. If one wing produces more lift than the other, that wing rises by itself and the plane tips over on its side.
The pilot knew when they got this split flap indication that if they extended the flaps anymore, they risked having the aircraft spiral uncontrollably. Second officer Thomas consulted the landing speed chart and told Cronin that the landing speed for flaps at 5 degrees was 190 knots, well above the typical landing of about 150 knots. The first officer persuaded the captain that it would be worth trying for 10 degrees of flap as this would reduce their landing speed. They tried this and it worked. The plane was controllable and they were able to fly slightly slower. Captain began then a right hand turn to line the massive aircraft with the runway.The pilots watched intensely as the landing gear slowly extended and locked into place as confirmed by the green indicator lights. It was a massive relief but the real test was still ahead of them. The cabin crew had been told to evacuate after the landing. The plane's engineer confirmed that the plane's hydraulic systems were all in good condition. It was a relief as it meant that the brakes were likely working as normal. However they would only be able to use the reverse thrust on the engines on the left hand side of the plane which would increase their stopping distance. The captain monitored the plane's arrival towards the runway while the first officer monitored the instruments closely and provided the captain with airspeed and altitude information. The aircraft landed correctly, the landing gear held and the plane eventually stopped before the end of the runway. Evacuation order was given. The 328 passengers evacuated the aircraft in just 45 seconds. 25 minutes had lapsed since the explosive decompression. The 9 passengers sucked out of the plane were never found. The investigators who examined the aircraft ruled the bomb theory off. They found that the incident was one of the many just waiting to happen. They determined that the aircraft has been mishandled by ground crews while at the gate.
Careless operation of the forward cargo door by groud crew at Honolulu damaged its locking mechanism. This meant that the door never properly had been closed. As the plane began to pressurize in flight, it blew open, taking a huge section of the fuselage with it. Kevin and Susan Campbell were not happy with the national transportation investigation so they began their own. Kevin Campbell had a background in mechanical engineering. and he spent months pouring through thousands of pages of documentation about the 747's cargo doors. They found a disturbing trent. It turned out that Boeing had received dozens of complains of 747 cargo doors opening uncommanded as far back as 1975. In fact, 2 years before the United 811 incident, a Pan Am 747 had had its cargo door unlatched shortly after takeoff from London. In that case 2 hooks on the door frame were the only things keeping the door from swinging open. It appeared that was led to this was not mishanding by ground crew but faulty electrical wiring in the door's locking mechanism. When this wiring short circuited, the door would begin opening by itself. This was a serious design flaw in the Boeing 747. Almost 2 years after the crash, when an extensive search operation had located the missing cargo door and dredged it up from the bottom of the ocean, the Campbells were vindicated. There was indeed a fault with the electrical systme which controlled the locking mechanism of the door. On flight 811 this system experienced a shor tcircuit which led to the cargo door unlatching mid flight. NTSB had no choice but accepting the Campbell's conclusions. Faulty wiring and deficiencies in the cargo's door design and not groud human error caused the accident. NTSB recommended that all 747 - 100 in service have their cargo door locking mechanisms replaced with new redesign locks which couldn't prey to the same electrical mafunction.
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Crashing SECONDS after Takeoff?! Singapore 006
Singapore Airlines flight 6. October 31st, 2000, it's Hallowen night in Taipei. Typhoon Zang Zan was approaching and its outter reaches were beginning to batter the airport with winds as high as 100 kilometers per hour. A Boeing 747 operated by Singapore Airlines, 159 passengers from 20 coutries settled. Most of them were from the US and Taiwan. 77 of them boarded the aircraft hours earlier in Singapore while the other 82 had just boarded in Taipei with the flight crew. The flight crew consisted of 3 rested pilots who arrived in Taipei 24 hours previosuly. The captain, Foong Chee Kong, was 41 years old, a Malaysian national who had over 11 000 flight hours. Colleagues descriebd him as one of the best pilots of Singapore Airlines. Only nick is his record is that 13 years previously, he had done a bit of noise departure out of Zurich in Switzerland and received a letter from the airline asking him to stick more rididly to the noise abatement procedure. The first officer was the 36 years old Latyff Cyrano, less experienced by the captain with 2 500 flight hours, 500 of them in the 747. He was described as disciplined and not hesitant to speak out if he saw safety issues on a flight. Another first officer was sitting behind the captain, Kheng Leng, 38 years old who would act as a relief pilot here, taking over for the other first officer at times. He would have no specific duties up until this point other than keeping an eye on what the pilots are doing. He was mature, disciplined with good flying skills and had the potential to become a captain in due course. It's worth pointing out that Singapore Airlines had an excellent safety record. Its crews were well trained. In its 28 years of operation, it never had a fatal accident. But here instead of the 12 hours long awaited travel, the aircraft would never make it off the ground. Weather is poor and it's getting worse as the typhoon is approaching.
As the captain taxied out, he emphasized that he needed to do things slowly and methodically. The first officer's duty as the plane sedately run out of the runway was to work through the checklists and assist the captain in preparing the aircraft for takeoff. He sets the flaps to 20 degrees and the captain confirmed the takeoff speeds. The plane would lift off at a speed of 156 knots or about 290 kilometers per hour. The wind itself on this night was ghosting to one third of the takeoff speed of the plane, abotu 100 kilometers per hour. As the 2 pilots carried out their duties, the relief pilot listened to the ATIS who stands for Automatic Terminal Information Service. This is the service provided at all major airports which pilots can tune into to find out the latest weather at the airport. It was a daunting weather report on the verge of being too much to take off. There was less than 500 meters of visibility with winds reaching 100 km per hour of speed. The visibility was still slightly within safe limits. While the taxi route was straightforward, the pilots needed to be a bit more careful. it had been more than 3 years since any of them had taken off from the runway. They were much more familiar with runway RW 06 at the south end of the airport. So when the flight neared to the West Cross taxi way, captain confirmed to his colleagues that this turn was the one he needed to make. The relief position easily see from his position behind the pilots both of their primary flight displays He could see winds were so strong that they were being picked up by the pitotubes on the fuselage of the plane and then represented as changes in airspeed on the pilot's airspeed tapes. With the wind hitting the aircraft from the right hand side, the captain's instrument and the first officers instruments were showing different reading of airspeed. It was a peculiarity more than anything else indicative. of the sheer strenght of the wind on this night.
As the pilots peered out their windscreens through the rain, they heard some good news over the radio : the runway visual range which is the distance the pilots can see along the runway, had gone up from 200 meters earlier to 450 meters. It looked like they could indeed take off. The captain still cautious was taxiing at 9 knots or 17 kilometers per hour. But what if they took off and then needed to go back to the airport because of a potential problem, only for it to have closed due to the weather worsening they departed? Previously they agreed that if this happened, they could go to Hong Kong or Koohsiung instead. But both have now been closed as the typhoon made its way north. So their only option was now Taipei and the pilots hoped it would remain a viable option. After reaching the end of West Cross taxiway, captain twisted the tiller counterclockwise on the 747, lumbered left onto taxiway November Papa ( NP ). The white stripes, know as the piano keys, signify the start of a runway. When you are converting a runway into a taxiway, you are supposed to change all of the marking and lighting so that they are suitable for a taxiway. But at Taipei this hadn't happened. So when they approached the end of the taxiway November Papa, they began to fall prey for a serie of psychological and systemic errors. Take off was cleared by the contorl tower. During the pre take off checklist, the captain peered through the blackness of the windscreen, carefully following the green lights as they beckoned him onto the runway. Air trafic control didn't have enough visibility to see the plane and also didn't have ground radar to see its position. If he had he would have seen that Flight 6 was not lining up with Runway 05 left as he instructed them to do but rather on the Runway 05 right. The captain was following the green taxiway lights which were far closer together in the turn that on the straight path leading up to runway 05.
In fact there were only 4 lights in the 200 meter long section of taxiway connecting runway 05 right and left. Legally there should have been 16 lights and as if that wasn't bad enough, one of those 4 lights wasn't working and another one was unacceptably dim. There was little to tell the captain that to his left there was another runway lying in the darkness. As the plane lumbered into position, the first officer commanted that the PVD had not unshuttered the PVD or power visual display. It's a device installed on the glare shield of some aircraft whose purpose is to give pilots a visual indication of whether they are drifting off the runway centerline during low visibility takeoffs. There was a shutter in front of it most of the time but when the aircraft detected that it was lining up on the runway, it unshottered revealing the barber pole like PVD It struck the pilots that as odd that this had stage shuttered after they lined up on the runway. The reason it had was that they tuned their navigation to the frequency for the runway they were supposed to line up. On Runway 05 left, they were over 200 meters from that runway sitting on what was becoming a taxiway. Pilots knew that Runway 05 right was being turned into a taxiway but in the darkness, and lured by the green lights, they didn't question whether they were in the correct place. What's more, as they sat poised in the threshold bright green centerline lights extended into darkness. The fact that these lights were green instead of white like normal runway lights should have given the pilots the clue that they were on a taxiway. The lights have been green for the runway's entire history because it was originally a taxiway. Ironically if the visibility was worse, the pilots would have been safer. That's why the PVD didn't matter because they could see the runway at 500 meters anyway. So the captain put the windscreen wipers on high switched on the landing lights and pushed the engines to take off thrust.
The engines roared and the aircraft accelerated. Within seconds the aircraft reached 150 kilometers per hour. But when they were about to reach the takeoff speed, in the middle of the runway, bulldozers, excavators, 2 rollers and rows of concrete barriers. At 280 kilometers per hour, the 747 smashed through the concrete barricades and tore through the construction vehicles. Part of the left wing was ripped off along with 3 of the aircraft's engines sending the plane swerving to the left. The fuel tanks ruptured o. A huge fireball ignited, enveloping the plane which split into 3 pieces and then began tumbling down the runway. Airport fire service was dispatched by the tower control immediatly. Within 3 minutes, 400 responders rushed to the scene. Out 179 people on board, 96 survived including the 3 pilots. It was the first and onyl fatal accident in Singapore Airlines history. And the first fatal accident to ever involve a Boeing 747 - 400. After the crash, investigators found that pilots were misled by the lighting on runway, especially considering that their home base was Singapore where controllers changed the color of the taxiway lightning in front of the pilots to guide them to the runway, instructing them to follow the green. So on flight 6, despite the pilot's caution about the weather when navigating to the runway, they reverted to their usual routine of simply following the green lighting to the runway. It didn't help that the closed runway still had its runway markings and bright centerline lights despite despite not being in use. That meant that when the pilots turned on that way they subconsciously ignored all information telling them that they were not where they were supposed to be. The unshuttered PVD, the off center ILS deviation scale and the green centerline lighting.
Crashing SECONDS after Takeoff?! Singapore 006
Singapore Airlines flight 6. October 31st, 2000, it's Hallowen night in Taipei. Typhoon Zang Zan was approaching and its outter reaches were beginning to batter the airport with winds as high as 100 kilometers per hour. A Boeing 747 operated by Singapore Airlines, 159 passengers from 20 coutries settled. Most of them were from the US and Taiwan. 77 of them boarded the aircraft hours earlier in Singapore while the other 82 had just boarded in Taipei with the flight crew. The flight crew consisted of 3 rested pilots who arrived in Taipei 24 hours previosuly. The captain, Foong Chee Kong, was 41 years old, a Malaysian national who had over 11 000 flight hours. Colleagues descriebd him as one of the best pilots of Singapore Airlines. Only nick is his record is that 13 years previously, he had done a bit of noise departure out of Zurich in Switzerland and received a letter from the airline asking him to stick more rididly to the noise abatement procedure. The first officer was the 36 years old Latyff Cyrano, less experienced by the captain with 2 500 flight hours, 500 of them in the 747. He was described as disciplined and not hesitant to speak out if he saw safety issues on a flight. Another first officer was sitting behind the captain, Kheng Leng, 38 years old who would act as a relief pilot here, taking over for the other first officer at times. He would have no specific duties up until this point other than keeping an eye on what the pilots are doing. He was mature, disciplined with good flying skills and had the potential to become a captain in due course. It's worth pointing out that Singapore Airlines had an excellent safety record. Its crews were well trained. In its 28 years of operation, it never had a fatal accident. But here instead of the 12 hours long awaited travel, the aircraft would never make it off the ground. Weather is poor and it's getting worse as the typhoon is approaching.
As the captain taxied out, he emphasized that he needed to do things slowly and methodically. The first officer's duty as the plane sedately run out of the runway was to work through the checklists and assist the captain in preparing the aircraft for takeoff. He sets the flaps to 20 degrees and the captain confirmed the takeoff speeds. The plane would lift off at a speed of 156 knots or about 290 kilometers per hour. The wind itself on this night was ghosting to one third of the takeoff speed of the plane, abotu 100 kilometers per hour. As the 2 pilots carried out their duties, the relief pilot listened to the ATIS who stands for Automatic Terminal Information Service. This is the service provided at all major airports which pilots can tune into to find out the latest weather at the airport. It was a daunting weather report on the verge of being too much to take off. There was less than 500 meters of visibility with winds reaching 100 km per hour of speed. The visibility was still slightly within safe limits. While the taxi route was straightforward, the pilots needed to be a bit more careful. it had been more than 3 years since any of them had taken off from the runway. They were much more familiar with runway RW 06 at the south end of the airport. So when the flight neared to the West Cross taxi way, captain confirmed to his colleagues that this turn was the one he needed to make. The relief position easily see from his position behind the pilots both of their primary flight displays He could see winds were so strong that they were being picked up by the pitotubes on the fuselage of the plane and then represented as changes in airspeed on the pilot's airspeed tapes. With the wind hitting the aircraft from the right hand side, the captain's instrument and the first officers instruments were showing different reading of airspeed. It was a peculiarity more than anything else indicative. of the sheer strenght of the wind on this night.
As the pilots peered out their windscreens through the rain, they heard some good news over the radio : the runway visual range which is the distance the pilots can see along the runway, had gone up from 200 meters earlier to 450 meters. It looked like they could indeed take off. The captain still cautious was taxiing at 9 knots or 17 kilometers per hour. But what if they took off and then needed to go back to the airport because of a potential problem, only for it to have closed due to the weather worsening they departed? Previously they agreed that if this happened, they could go to Hong Kong or Koohsiung instead. But both have now been closed as the typhoon made its way north. So their only option was now Taipei and the pilots hoped it would remain a viable option. After reaching the end of West Cross taxiway, captain twisted the tiller counterclockwise on the 747, lumbered left onto taxiway November Papa ( NP ). The white stripes, know as the piano keys, signify the start of a runway. When you are converting a runway into a taxiway, you are supposed to change all of the marking and lighting so that they are suitable for a taxiway. But at Taipei this hadn't happened. So when they approached the end of the taxiway November Papa, they began to fall prey for a serie of psychological and systemic errors. Take off was cleared by the contorl tower. During the pre take off checklist, the captain peered through the blackness of the windscreen, carefully following the green lights as they beckoned him onto the runway. Air trafic control didn't have enough visibility to see the plane and also didn't have ground radar to see its position. If he had he would have seen that Flight 6 was not lining up with Runway 05 left as he instructed them to do but rather on the Runway 05 right. The captain was following the green taxiway lights which were far closer together in the turn that on the straight path leading up to runway 05.
In fact there were only 4 lights in the 200 meter long section of taxiway connecting runway 05 right and left. Legally there should have been 16 lights and as if that wasn't bad enough, one of those 4 lights wasn't working and another one was unacceptably dim. There was little to tell the captain that to his left there was another runway lying in the darkness. As the plane lumbered into position, the first officer commanted that the PVD had not unshuttered the PVD or power visual display. It's a device installed on the glare shield of some aircraft whose purpose is to give pilots a visual indication of whether they are drifting off the runway centerline during low visibility takeoffs. There was a shutter in front of it most of the time but when the aircraft detected that it was lining up on the runway, it unshottered revealing the barber pole like PVD It struck the pilots that as odd that this had stage shuttered after they lined up on the runway. The reason it had was that they tuned their navigation to the frequency for the runway they were supposed to line up. On Runway 05 left, they were over 200 meters from that runway sitting on what was becoming a taxiway. Pilots knew that Runway 05 right was being turned into a taxiway but in the darkness, and lured by the green lights, they didn't question whether they were in the correct place. What's more, as they sat poised in the threshold bright green centerline lights extended into darkness. The fact that these lights were green instead of white like normal runway lights should have given the pilots the clue that they were on a taxiway. The lights have been green for the runway's entire history because it was originally a taxiway. Ironically if the visibility was worse, the pilots would have been safer. That's why the PVD didn't matter because they could see the runway at 500 meters anyway. So the captain put the windscreen wipers on high switched on the landing lights and pushed the engines to take off thrust.
The engines roared and the aircraft accelerated. Within seconds the aircraft reached 150 kilometers per hour. But when they were about to reach the takeoff speed, in the middle of the runway, bulldozers, excavators, 2 rollers and rows of concrete barriers. At 280 kilometers per hour, the 747 smashed through the concrete barricades and tore through the construction vehicles. Part of the left wing was ripped off along with 3 of the aircraft's engines sending the plane swerving to the left. The fuel tanks ruptured o. A huge fireball ignited, enveloping the plane which split into 3 pieces and then began tumbling down the runway. Airport fire service was dispatched by the tower control immediatly. Within 3 minutes, 400 responders rushed to the scene. Out 179 people on board, 96 survived including the 3 pilots. It was the first and onyl fatal accident in Singapore Airlines history. And the first fatal accident to ever involve a Boeing 747 - 400. After the crash, investigators found that pilots were misled by the lighting on runway, especially considering that their home base was Singapore where controllers changed the color of the taxiway lightning in front of the pilots to guide them to the runway, instructing them to follow the green. So on flight 6, despite the pilot's caution about the weather when navigating to the runway, they reverted to their usual routine of simply following the green lighting to the runway. It didn't help that the closed runway still had its runway markings and bright centerline lights despite despite not being in use. That meant that when the pilots turned on that way they subconsciously ignored all information telling them that they were not where they were supposed to be. The unshuttered PVD, the off center ILS deviation scale and the green centerline lighting.
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How Nottingham Forest Dominate Without the Ball
Nottingham Forrest this season have their own identity. Unlike others elite teams from Premiere League, they don't press high, don't build from the back and they don't even score that much. They start matches in a 4 2 3 1. They tend to keep a similar shape when out of possession. Nottingham Forest also ranks bottom of the league when it comes to passes per defensive action which highlights how many passes they let the opposition have before they win the ball back. There is a few games in which they tried to win theb all in these areas. So the true defensive phase starts closer to midfield in a mid bloc structure. It's where the majority of the game is, with the opposition holding the ball near the halfway line. Forrest players are ready to pounce as soon as they move slightly further forward. Firstly when Forest are in this position, Nuno is not too concerned about getting his players to close down the player in possession starting the move. Rather their objective is to not give this player any option to pass the ball. It's a subtle part of the game but it instantly slows down the opposition's attack as the player with the ball takes his time to move the ball forward. Wood, the striker, won't immediatly close down the ball carrier but will curve his run to block either a pass centrally or the other center back while the wingers and midfielders closely follow the movements of the players in the midfield. It makes it easier to understand by dividing the press into 3 specific lines with the front 4 trying to shadow mark the options in the center.
The 2 holding midfielders will protect the defensive line and close off any player that receives the ball in this area while the defensive line will shift and stay compact to prevent anything to go through the middle. To cut off the pass, usually the wingers and the attacking midfielder will stand in front of the opposite players while both the holding midfielders and the defenders will closely mark any player between the lines and ensure they can't turn around. It can be tricky as it often gives the ball carrier a false sense of security if he is free to push forward into the midfield. If the ball goes past the front 4, they are not rushing back to get behind and are quite happy to leave area in between them and the front 4 as they can rely on their agressive back line and holding midfielders to intercept any pass. Then they have many players to attack forward. Their first goal against the Wolves intheir 3 0 win is a perfect example of that. Forest currently ranks second in the league for interceptions behind Man United. And a lot of This is down to tricking the opposition into playing these balls into the midfield, regaining possession and pushing forward. However if Forest loses the track of any player in the midfield, then they have space to push forward and attack the defensive line. Because of the space left on the edge of the box, allowing the opposition to make a lot of crosses it does mean that Nottingham Forest tends to concede a lof of shots. In term of shotss conceded this season they are ranked currently 14th. But their expected goal ( ExG ) is second in the league. And this highlights a crucial point to this team. It's that they force the opposition to take their shots from hard to convert positions.
Against Liverpool, Murillo and Milenkovic were defending well against the crosses and Liverpool made a lot of long range shots. Despite this they can concede from crosses by times and the goal vs Liverpool came from a corner. They also sometimes concede from long shoots from the edge of the box. That doesn't mean they won't track any players left in the midfield and if the opposition commit a lot of players to the attack. To close off the center of the pitch, Forest will at times drop into a 5 4 1 in defense. But crucially at least 1 player, most of the times the center forward, will always stay ahead of the line of the ball high on the defensive line and ready to receive an outballfrom the defense. Generally, whichever flank the opposition is moving down, the winger on that side will drop backto help the fullback. But the opposite winger will stay slightly further up the pitch, ready to receive the ball if they regain possession. It has several advantages. Firstly it forces the opposition to have more players to defend. Secondly it creates more gaps in the space between the box and the halfway line to receive the layoff from Wood. Once they gain the ball back and start their counter attack, there is not a lot of things that the opposition can do.
But their main weapon is long balls with Matz Sels going long 80% of the time. So from goalkick the whole team push up closer to midfield. Wood comes over to the left and Elanga moves to a more central position. The target is almost always Chris Wood who is phenomenal in this area and can almost always win the header. From here, there is 2 solutions : either flick it to Hudson Odoi or Elanga running forward or or look to the layoff Gibbs White, Anderson or Yates. Even if they don't immediatly win the header, the amount of players in this position means they can eventually win the ball and look to play it forward instantly. Once they win the ball back outnumbering the opponent on the second ball, a few passes against Liverpool was enough to put Wood in a good situation, resulting into a goal. Even when they simply use it to regain possession, they can create situations. Elanga can be close to Wood which leave more space for Aina to overlap in the right, meaning the 2 wingers can play in closer proximity. You can often see them combining on their left side of the pitch. Gibbs White is free to rotate from his number 10 position, often dropping deep and connecting with his teammates. It's comon to see him dropping into the defense before looking for balls forward into the attackers. Their opening goal against Everton came from this situation. Because of these rotations it also allows players like Anderson to play these line breaking passes forward. As Gibbs moves away from his starting position, the wingers can drop deep to receive the ball with players running ahead of them to finish off the move.
Why Simeone's 4-4-2 is Unlike Anything Else
Athlético Madrid brings this season key players like Alvarez, Gallagher and Sorloth. It gives Simeone incredible squad depth that was holding them back in previous seasons. Athlético prooved they could adapt to any opponent, forming either a very defensive shape, either an attacking shape that will gives opposition's defensive line a hard time. There isn't a single structure Athlético is relying on. We need so to look for some patterns instead of specific rotations. From goalkick the center backs are close to Oblak wtih the fullbacks deep, wide and forming a connected back 4 This build up invites the opposition to press high up the pitch, leaving spaces in behind the spaces. It's comon in build up to keep the ball as central as possibles as there is a possibility to be trapped on the flank while playing out wide. But Athlético actively encourages the opposition to move over and Athlético will always move the ball out wide, more than most of the teams as it creates this central space that they often look to move into, either with the midfielder shifting over, or the strikers or wingers dropping deep. Essentially going tut wide to then go more centrally. The reason space is often vacant is also down to the rotations of both midfielders, Barrios and De Paul. They quickly stagger their positions with Barrios acting as the only holding midfielder in the center and De Paul adding numbers to the attack and pushing forward. Barrios dictates the build up more frequently while De Paul is more effective in the final third with more goal contributions and as the team's chances creator. These slightly more vertical rotations in the center unlock many differents rotations that Athlético Madrid will use. For example while De Paul push further up on the right, the left handside channel can be occupied by Gallagher, Griezmann or Alvarez. It can results in big clusters of players on one side of the pitch.
How Nottingham Forest Dominate Without the Ball
Nottingham Forrest this season have their own identity. Unlike others elite teams from Premiere League, they don't press high, don't build from the back and they don't even score that much. They start matches in a 4 2 3 1. They tend to keep a similar shape when out of possession. Nottingham Forest also ranks bottom of the league when it comes to passes per defensive action which highlights how many passes they let the opposition have before they win the ball back. There is a few games in which they tried to win theb all in these areas. So the true defensive phase starts closer to midfield in a mid bloc structure. It's where the majority of the game is, with the opposition holding the ball near the halfway line. Forrest players are ready to pounce as soon as they move slightly further forward. Firstly when Forest are in this position, Nuno is not too concerned about getting his players to close down the player in possession starting the move. Rather their objective is to not give this player any option to pass the ball. It's a subtle part of the game but it instantly slows down the opposition's attack as the player with the ball takes his time to move the ball forward. Wood, the striker, won't immediatly close down the ball carrier but will curve his run to block either a pass centrally or the other center back while the wingers and midfielders closely follow the movements of the players in the midfield. It makes it easier to understand by dividing the press into 3 specific lines with the front 4 trying to shadow mark the options in the center.
The 2 holding midfielders will protect the defensive line and close off any player that receives the ball in this area while the defensive line will shift and stay compact to prevent anything to go through the middle. To cut off the pass, usually the wingers and the attacking midfielder will stand in front of the opposite players while both the holding midfielders and the defenders will closely mark any player between the lines and ensure they can't turn around. It can be tricky as it often gives the ball carrier a false sense of security if he is free to push forward into the midfield. If the ball goes past the front 4, they are not rushing back to get behind and are quite happy to leave area in between them and the front 4 as they can rely on their agressive back line and holding midfielders to intercept any pass. Then they have many players to attack forward. Their first goal against the Wolves intheir 3 0 win is a perfect example of that. Forest currently ranks second in the league for interceptions behind Man United. And a lot of This is down to tricking the opposition into playing these balls into the midfield, regaining possession and pushing forward. However if Forest loses the track of any player in the midfield, then they have space to push forward and attack the defensive line. Because of the space left on the edge of the box, allowing the opposition to make a lot of crosses it does mean that Nottingham Forest tends to concede a lof of shots. In term of shotss conceded this season they are ranked currently 14th. But their expected goal ( ExG ) is second in the league. And this highlights a crucial point to this team. It's that they force the opposition to take their shots from hard to convert positions.
Against Liverpool, Murillo and Milenkovic were defending well against the crosses and Liverpool made a lot of long range shots. Despite this they can concede from crosses by times and the goal vs Liverpool came from a corner. They also sometimes concede from long shoots from the edge of the box. That doesn't mean they won't track any players left in the midfield and if the opposition commit a lot of players to the attack. To close off the center of the pitch, Forest will at times drop into a 5 4 1 in defense. But crucially at least 1 player, most of the times the center forward, will always stay ahead of the line of the ball high on the defensive line and ready to receive an outballfrom the defense. Generally, whichever flank the opposition is moving down, the winger on that side will drop backto help the fullback. But the opposite winger will stay slightly further up the pitch, ready to receive the ball if they regain possession. It has several advantages. Firstly it forces the opposition to have more players to defend. Secondly it creates more gaps in the space between the box and the halfway line to receive the layoff from Wood. Once they gain the ball back and start their counter attack, there is not a lot of things that the opposition can do.
But their main weapon is long balls with Matz Sels going long 80% of the time. So from goalkick the whole team push up closer to midfield. Wood comes over to the left and Elanga moves to a more central position. The target is almost always Chris Wood who is phenomenal in this area and can almost always win the header. From here, there is 2 solutions : either flick it to Hudson Odoi or Elanga running forward or or look to the layoff Gibbs White, Anderson or Yates. Even if they don't immediatly win the header, the amount of players in this position means they can eventually win the ball and look to play it forward instantly. Once they win the ball back outnumbering the opponent on the second ball, a few passes against Liverpool was enough to put Wood in a good situation, resulting into a goal. Even when they simply use it to regain possession, they can create situations. Elanga can be close to Wood which leave more space for Aina to overlap in the right, meaning the 2 wingers can play in closer proximity. You can often see them combining on their left side of the pitch. Gibbs White is free to rotate from his number 10 position, often dropping deep and connecting with his teammates. It's comon to see him dropping into the defense before looking for balls forward into the attackers. Their opening goal against Everton came from this situation. Because of these rotations it also allows players like Anderson to play these line breaking passes forward. As Gibbs moves away from his starting position, the wingers can drop deep to receive the ball with players running ahead of them to finish off the move.
Why Simeone's 4-4-2 is Unlike Anything Else
Athlético Madrid brings this season key players like Alvarez, Gallagher and Sorloth. It gives Simeone incredible squad depth that was holding them back in previous seasons. Athlético prooved they could adapt to any opponent, forming either a very defensive shape, either an attacking shape that will gives opposition's defensive line a hard time. There isn't a single structure Athlético is relying on. We need so to look for some patterns instead of specific rotations. From goalkick the center backs are close to Oblak wtih the fullbacks deep, wide and forming a connected back 4 This build up invites the opposition to press high up the pitch, leaving spaces in behind the spaces. It's comon in build up to keep the ball as central as possibles as there is a possibility to be trapped on the flank while playing out wide. But Athlético actively encourages the opposition to move over and Athlético will always move the ball out wide, more than most of the teams as it creates this central space that they often look to move into, either with the midfielder shifting over, or the strikers or wingers dropping deep. Essentially going tut wide to then go more centrally. The reason space is often vacant is also down to the rotations of both midfielders, Barrios and De Paul. They quickly stagger their positions with Barrios acting as the only holding midfielder in the center and De Paul adding numbers to the attack and pushing forward. Barrios dictates the build up more frequently while De Paul is more effective in the final third with more goal contributions and as the team's chances creator. These slightly more vertical rotations in the center unlock many differents rotations that Athlético Madrid will use. For example while De Paul push further up on the right, the left handside channel can be occupied by Gallagher, Griezmann or Alvarez. It can results in big clusters of players on one side of the pitch.
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These rotations in the center means Athlético can create big groups of players in the flank and get a lot of players forward to attack. Next poitn is second balls. Athlético may lose the ball ofte, they tend to loose it in areas where they know that they can win it back instantly. It's comon to see the opposition close off any central passes, meaning the only option is the ball over the top. Because they have a lot of players rotating and picking up pocket of spaces, even if they don't win aerial duels, they will frequently pick up the loose ball. Unlike Barcelona, Athlético is not a team that is all about possession or controlling the tempo of the game. If the moment is here, they will go long to the strikers or wingers. Third principle about Diego Simeone's Athlético Madrid is that space is more important than shape. The midfielders, strikers and wingers often shift to occupy the vacant spaces, not following a specific sturcture. Griezmann in particular, is enjoyable to watch, showing up everywhere with small connecting passes and finding pocket of spaces. We can stop sometimes Griezmann standing behind the defensive line in an offside position during build up. It may seem counter intuitive with Athlético having one man less during build up, Griezmannn uses his position to make vertical runs to add support and ensure the opposition cannot track him. He will drop frequently with others players attacking forward . If Athlético breaks forward frequently, he will use the defensive line's momentum to his advantage. In the final third, Athlético wants to create the majority of their chances through cutbacks and throughballs. Getting the fullbacks forward is the key to this. To do so, De Paul or Barrios will often drift out wide to form a back 3. The fullbacks will then overlap or underlap into the half spaces, looking for passes in this area and then be finished off by runners joining the move.
The fullbacks joining the attack means that Athlético can have a lot of players on the defensive line. Because of these positionnal rotations, any player can end up on the end of the move. It will result with many different types of attacks. It's where Sorloth is coming into action. With him they have a target man coming into the center. For this reaosns, through balls and cutbacks make way for crosses and Athlético looked to get the ball into the box earlier. Winning goal against Getafe shows it well with a deep delivery on the second post and a well placed header back across the goal. It's also worth notivcing that Simeone is a master at making substitutions changing the game with many goals scored so far this season thanks to smart substitutions. In the pressing metrics, it's also worth noticing that Athlético is ranking low, prefering a mid block in 4 4 2 shape. Against the back 3, they agressively push forward to close down the player in possession and the defenders are comfortable breaking the defensive line and move up the pitch. This means however that the midfielders will need to follow their man more closely. And this results into Athlético sinfting into a back 5 shape if needed. It's also common to see them adopting a back 6 as well. This defensive shape means the opposition has no space to move through the middle and will be forced to play out wide and look for crosses into the box. From here, counter attacks can be crucial and their ability to move forward quickly has resulted in some important wins in the season 2024 / 2025. The 2 goals against Barcelone came from these situations, regaining possession deep in their own half before agressively getting numbers forward.
The Tactical Problem Amorim Is Facing at Man United
He try at Man United the same system as the one he made in Sporting : 3 4 3. At Sporting, the players had a horizontal relation score of 0, meaning that the players are more fluid vertically but they are in their fixed position horizontally. To make things worka t Man United like he did at Sporting, there are 3 areas to work on. In Man United's build up shape we see the same rotation that Amorim was using at Sporting with 1 of the 3 center back pushing into the midfield, meaning one of the holding midfield will push further up With 2 players left on the defensive line there is a lot of chance of central progression, and a lot of third man layoffs from the striker with the 2 players between the lines but it's something Man United struggles to exploit consistently. On the other hand Man United also struggle against high effective press teams In situations where they are caught in the flank they don't seem comfortable rotating the ball consistently and waiting for the right gap to open. If they move on left flank for example they seem adamant on moving the ball on that flank and trying to play it forward consistently rather than building their attacks more slowly and moving the ball from flank to flank which is something Amorim did consistently and they would use their goalkepper to their advantage to get the ball into an area where the opposition had to fall back on their mid block or low block structure. When Man United get caught on the left flank against Man City in 2024, Dalot was attempting some dangerous diagonals into the opposite wing, the kind of passes they tell you to not attempt even at low level of football because if you get intercepted, it leaves you completly exposed in the center of the pitch. Man United tries to rush their attack too frequently. They are not patient enough at the back to set up the right structure.
The right structure is a 3 4 2 1. We saw that with Sporting. They were slow in possession, not rushing the ball forward, waiting until all their players are in the good position to start implementing their rotations that they want to use. Eventually Man United will adopt this shape but Amorim struggled to get the same effectiveness from his rotations. Man United players are still a bit too mobile, moving around the pitch a bit too frequently. Sporting under Amorim was a very positionnal team and the players were fixed to their positions. Their rotations were essentially modular. If for example the ball moves over to the left wing then the rotation from the inside forward and the holding midfielder and the striker are more or less the same everytime and it's the same thing if you move over to the right flank.In Man United players are a bit more fluid, and they rotate more. You get Bruno Fernandes picking position outside of his half space position. He wants to drop deep, to get time on the ball but this could be detrimental to Amorim's tactics because in a situation where they move the ball over the left wingback, they need a player in this position to push an attack into the half space. But if Bruno wants time on the ball behind the wingback and and to play over the wingback, wingback will immediatly be met by pressure. Second challenge is the positionning of the wingbacks. At Sporting the wingbacks were almost never on the defensive line. When th ball move to their flank, they drop quite far of the defensive line and this space in behind the fullback is crucial that they want to exploit. It's a space often attacked by the inside forward moving over or attacking on the opposite flank. We don't have the same level of attack into that space at Man United because the wingbacks are playing in quite an advanced position. Especially on the left when the ball moves on Dalot, he is almost always already on the defensive line.
So it's harder to exploit the space in behind the defense because the defensive line had had to push back already to stop these runs from happening so it's harder for them to exploit this space on the wing and they find themselves moving the ball back to attempt another move. This rotation works a bit better on the right flank with Mazraoui and Diallo attacking the space more consistently When wingbacks attacked forward in behind the defensive line, their runs and positionning would start from a much deeper position compared to what is happening at Man United. Even in the final third the space they want to exploit are different from what Amorim was able to implement with Sporting. When they build the attack and find themselves out wide Man United often plays the ball off onto the edge of the box and crossing it into the back post. It's a comon approach in modern game but at Sporting, Amorim made his team create chance often from a big central cluster of players outside the box, not necessarly crossing into the box but play through these players as much as possible. If the wingers are cutting inside then it's more likely that they are going to shoot from this position rather than crossing. If the ball gets laid off onto the edge of the box, they are looking for through balls and passes into the center for the striker or the inside forwards to finish off the move.
Why Fabregas is Europe's Next Big Manager
These rotations in the center means Athlético can create big groups of players in the flank and get a lot of players forward to attack. Next poitn is second balls. Athlético may lose the ball ofte, they tend to loose it in areas where they know that they can win it back instantly. It's comon to see the opposition close off any central passes, meaning the only option is the ball over the top. Because they have a lot of players rotating and picking up pocket of spaces, even if they don't win aerial duels, they will frequently pick up the loose ball. Unlike Barcelona, Athlético is not a team that is all about possession or controlling the tempo of the game. If the moment is here, they will go long to the strikers or wingers. Third principle about Diego Simeone's Athlético Madrid is that space is more important than shape. The midfielders, strikers and wingers often shift to occupy the vacant spaces, not following a specific sturcture. Griezmann in particular, is enjoyable to watch, showing up everywhere with small connecting passes and finding pocket of spaces. We can stop sometimes Griezmann standing behind the defensive line in an offside position during build up. It may seem counter intuitive with Athlético having one man less during build up, Griezmannn uses his position to make vertical runs to add support and ensure the opposition cannot track him. He will drop frequently with others players attacking forward . If Athlético breaks forward frequently, he will use the defensive line's momentum to his advantage. In the final third, Athlético wants to create the majority of their chances through cutbacks and throughballs. Getting the fullbacks forward is the key to this. To do so, De Paul or Barrios will often drift out wide to form a back 3. The fullbacks will then overlap or underlap into the half spaces, looking for passes in this area and then be finished off by runners joining the move.
The fullbacks joining the attack means that Athlético can have a lot of players on the defensive line. Because of these positionnal rotations, any player can end up on the end of the move. It will result with many different types of attacks. It's where Sorloth is coming into action. With him they have a target man coming into the center. For this reaosns, through balls and cutbacks make way for crosses and Athlético looked to get the ball into the box earlier. Winning goal against Getafe shows it well with a deep delivery on the second post and a well placed header back across the goal. It's also worth notivcing that Simeone is a master at making substitutions changing the game with many goals scored so far this season thanks to smart substitutions. In the pressing metrics, it's also worth noticing that Athlético is ranking low, prefering a mid block in 4 4 2 shape. Against the back 3, they agressively push forward to close down the player in possession and the defenders are comfortable breaking the defensive line and move up the pitch. This means however that the midfielders will need to follow their man more closely. And this results into Athlético sinfting into a back 5 shape if needed. It's also common to see them adopting a back 6 as well. This defensive shape means the opposition has no space to move through the middle and will be forced to play out wide and look for crosses into the box. From here, counter attacks can be crucial and their ability to move forward quickly has resulted in some important wins in the season 2024 / 2025. The 2 goals against Barcelone came from these situations, regaining possession deep in their own half before agressively getting numbers forward.
The Tactical Problem Amorim Is Facing at Man United
He try at Man United the same system as the one he made in Sporting : 3 4 3. At Sporting, the players had a horizontal relation score of 0, meaning that the players are more fluid vertically but they are in their fixed position horizontally. To make things worka t Man United like he did at Sporting, there are 3 areas to work on. In Man United's build up shape we see the same rotation that Amorim was using at Sporting with 1 of the 3 center back pushing into the midfield, meaning one of the holding midfield will push further up With 2 players left on the defensive line there is a lot of chance of central progression, and a lot of third man layoffs from the striker with the 2 players between the lines but it's something Man United struggles to exploit consistently. On the other hand Man United also struggle against high effective press teams In situations where they are caught in the flank they don't seem comfortable rotating the ball consistently and waiting for the right gap to open. If they move on left flank for example they seem adamant on moving the ball on that flank and trying to play it forward consistently rather than building their attacks more slowly and moving the ball from flank to flank which is something Amorim did consistently and they would use their goalkepper to their advantage to get the ball into an area where the opposition had to fall back on their mid block or low block structure. When Man United get caught on the left flank against Man City in 2024, Dalot was attempting some dangerous diagonals into the opposite wing, the kind of passes they tell you to not attempt even at low level of football because if you get intercepted, it leaves you completly exposed in the center of the pitch. Man United tries to rush their attack too frequently. They are not patient enough at the back to set up the right structure.
The right structure is a 3 4 2 1. We saw that with Sporting. They were slow in possession, not rushing the ball forward, waiting until all their players are in the good position to start implementing their rotations that they want to use. Eventually Man United will adopt this shape but Amorim struggled to get the same effectiveness from his rotations. Man United players are still a bit too mobile, moving around the pitch a bit too frequently. Sporting under Amorim was a very positionnal team and the players were fixed to their positions. Their rotations were essentially modular. If for example the ball moves over to the left wing then the rotation from the inside forward and the holding midfielder and the striker are more or less the same everytime and it's the same thing if you move over to the right flank.In Man United players are a bit more fluid, and they rotate more. You get Bruno Fernandes picking position outside of his half space position. He wants to drop deep, to get time on the ball but this could be detrimental to Amorim's tactics because in a situation where they move the ball over the left wingback, they need a player in this position to push an attack into the half space. But if Bruno wants time on the ball behind the wingback and and to play over the wingback, wingback will immediatly be met by pressure. Second challenge is the positionning of the wingbacks. At Sporting the wingbacks were almost never on the defensive line. When th ball move to their flank, they drop quite far of the defensive line and this space in behind the fullback is crucial that they want to exploit. It's a space often attacked by the inside forward moving over or attacking on the opposite flank. We don't have the same level of attack into that space at Man United because the wingbacks are playing in quite an advanced position. Especially on the left when the ball moves on Dalot, he is almost always already on the defensive line.
So it's harder to exploit the space in behind the defense because the defensive line had had to push back already to stop these runs from happening so it's harder for them to exploit this space on the wing and they find themselves moving the ball back to attempt another move. This rotation works a bit better on the right flank with Mazraoui and Diallo attacking the space more consistently When wingbacks attacked forward in behind the defensive line, their runs and positionning would start from a much deeper position compared to what is happening at Man United. Even in the final third the space they want to exploit are different from what Amorim was able to implement with Sporting. When they build the attack and find themselves out wide Man United often plays the ball off onto the edge of the box and crossing it into the back post. It's a comon approach in modern game but at Sporting, Amorim made his team create chance often from a big central cluster of players outside the box, not necessarly crossing into the box but play through these players as much as possible. If the wingers are cutting inside then it's more likely that they are going to shoot from this position rather than crossing. If the ball gets laid off onto the edge of the box, they are looking for through balls and passes into the center for the striker or the inside forwards to finish off the move.
Why Fabregas is Europe's Next Big Manager
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Why Fabregas is Europe's Next Big Manager
Cesc Fabregas had the privilege of being coached by some of the best managers of all times. In his first season as manager in Serie A we start seeing how he combined everything he learnt into one system, adopting specific positional rotations, adding fluid and dynamic players to give the team more freedom. Côme FC has ambitions to reach new heights into the league and they choosed Cesc Fabregas for the mission. Fabregas stated that football has become so robotic that it was hard for the players to think outside the box. Fabregas try to give the players the structure to be dangerous and to give the freedom to make their own chooices during the game, leading to different patterns and structures in attack. Como FC is second ranked in the league for the least amung of long goal kicks. That's because they aim to build from the back as much as possible. From the center back position players will usually develop out wide and after a few passes they find themselves on the flank either on the right or on the left. Como lines up with a 4 2 3 1. But we also saw in other matches different systems like 4 3 3 or 4 3 2 1 formation. But the principle remains the same : the third man is crucial during build up. The front 3 starts spead out on the backline. Nico Paz is between the lines and the 2 holding midfielders, Da Cunha and Engelhardt start just outside the box. As the opposition move forward they will wait for the keeper to be closed down. From here one of the 2 holding midfielders drops toward the keeper, opening up a passing channel out wide. As the center back is closed down it frees up gap in which the holding midfielder will move to. Similar principles than De Zerbi. Fabregas doesn't want to do the same thing every time. During build up different shapes can be seen with same principles : vertical rotations and even the striker or attacking midfielder can become an active part of the build up. Nico Paz is the heart of the team both during build up and in final third.
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Brazil 2-0 Argentina | Tactical Analysis |How To Stop Messi|Copa America 2019|(Goals:Firmino, Jesus)
On paper Brazil lined up in a 4 2 3 1 with a back 4 made of Marquinhos, Silva as cb, Sandro and Alves as fullbacks. Arthur, Casemiro and Coutinho were in the midfield. Coutinho and Jesus provided the width and Firminho was forward. On paper Argentina lined up with a 4 3 3 with Foyth and Tagliafico as fullbacks. With Otamendi and Pezzela as center backs. Acuna and De Paul made the midfield with Martinez, Aguero and Messi on top. Often one of Brazil's fullback would tuck in with the other giving the vertical depth by advancing high on the pitch. It would draw Argentinas forwards who would often use their whole front 3 during the press. If the route to the fullbacks were cut off, the double pivots, Artur and Casemiro, had to give passing options more centrally. Argentina's problem with collective press was that Firminho was great at creating vertical depth which would draw Argentina's center backs deep. It often created spaces for the likes of Coutinho between the lines. So Argentina in 2 diferent ways who themselves caused problems. If they pressed high up, they left a gap between the defense and the midfield and Coutinho will be feed up between the lines. But if the midfield dropped deep, Coutinho would drop deeper as well. It would give him time from these positions to look for an incisive pass. Argentina's forwards would often be slow to track back during fast build up. And with Alves and Sandro being highly attacking fullbacks, it would create 2 v 1 or 1 v 1 on the flanks. Argentina tried to correct this by dropping into a 4 4 2. But this would leave them light in the center. So they often choose to guard the center while leaving up the flanks. To sustian pressure, ifi they had the time to do so, Argentina would often drop into a 4 1 4 1. But even when the ball was on the far side, Brazil looked to keep at least on man wide to stretch the opponent. The width Brazil maintained drawed both center backs out of position.
It left Jesus with a free shoot into the box. At the same time, Brazil was controlling the match and never over committed. This was achieved by the center backs and defensive miedfielers in positiosn when they were on the ball. As for Argentina, Tagliafico was comfortable with both defensive and attacking parts. But Foyth is usually center back. So his attacking range was limited. This meant that their attacks had to go thought the center a lot of times exclusively. The ball often went to Paredes. But Argentina's build up looked like often a 2 3 3 2. Brazil alternated between a high press and a deep 4 2 3 1. Because of the lack of width, Argentina would often rely on Messi to drop deep and build up. Scaloni often had Acuna or De Paul dropping into the half spaces in order to draw the attention away from the center to give Messi and Paredes more spaces. But Brazil's double pivots dealt with this as well. They always kept Messi in front of the shield, never allowing him between the lines. If Messi dropped deep, Brazil pushed high and if Messi pushed higher, the team dropped deeper. To get Messi away from the goal, Brazil kept him ahead of both Casemiro and Arthur. Also when Messi dropped deep, the forwards didn't provide a descent passing option for an easy forward pass. When Di Maria came on the left, things kinda improved with him providing the width on the left. As Argentina committed more players forward, Brazil remained dangerous on the break, keeping players high in order for counter attacks. This eventually led to the second Brazil's goal.
Why This New Tactic is Taking Over Football
Structures like 3 2 5 are seen everywhere in football during attacking phases because of its ability to overload a back 4. Positionnal ideology is a reason why terms like half space and inverted fullback became part of football vocabulary. But a new ideology is rising and it's not about managers interested about overacching but rather look to occupy the spaces that the opponent will reveal to you. Guardiola stated that positionnal football was becoming more difficult given the increased rythm over past seasons. And that with amount of games needed to be played, the top teams needed bigger squads to be able to compete. High defensive lines and agressive man oriented pressing systems are increasingly becoming the norm over specific lines of defensive players. It makes a positionnal structure harder to implement because you have less time and space to get the player into the correct position. Looking at the majority of positionnal teams past years, they look to rely on as few players as possible. But as the games increase, you need more players to keep the fresh. So positionnal structure might be difficult to get your team to compete the same rotations if the starting 11 is different every week. So more fluid systems can be more adapted to the players at disposal. New UCL format is a sign about this tactical change. Almost all the top teams moved away from these positionnal mentalities. Even Arsenal and Athletico Madrid who have an history on being reliant on specific offensive and defensive shapes have come a long way from these ideas to the point it's hard to spot a lot of comon patterns when in possession.
That being said, positionnal football has not disappeared and it still can be very effective in modern game. Luis Enrique is currently unbeaten in Ligue 1 with this approach with PSG, building the majority of the attacks with a 3 2 5. Vincent Kompany created a dangerous team with his 2 4 4 offensive shape at Bayern. These 2 ideologies can co exist on the pitch. Whole idea of build up is to use the disadvantage of the extra man with the goalkepper and exploit the space behind the defensive line when the opposition is high. Majority of top teams, regardless of their overarching, look to control the game from the back. Gk is crucial and the back line tend to be spread out to allow an easier circulation of the ball. In the middle, teams in positionnal philosophy tend to have a specific amoutn of players in the center but managers like Slot, Flick or Inzagi alternate between 1 pivot, 2 pivots and sometimes 3 players in the center. It depends on how the opposition is pressing but also what type of attack they look for. For Barcelona if 3 midfieldrs drop to help the build up it can open up bigger gaps betwen the lines for them to exploit with direct balls over the top and with 2 players in the middle they can look for a vertical pass and a third man lay off.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JWqC0CLk8xA Brazil 3-1 Peru | Tactical Analysis | How To Use Inside Forwards | Copa America 2019 Final |
Why Fabregas is Europe's Next Big Manager
Cesc Fabregas had the privilege of being coached by some of the best managers of all times. In his first season as manager in Serie A we start seeing how he combined everything he learnt into one system, adopting specific positional rotations, adding fluid and dynamic players to give the team more freedom. Côme FC has ambitions to reach new heights into the league and they choosed Cesc Fabregas for the mission. Fabregas stated that football has become so robotic that it was hard for the players to think outside the box. Fabregas try to give the players the structure to be dangerous and to give the freedom to make their own chooices during the game, leading to different patterns and structures in attack. Como FC is second ranked in the league for the least amung of long goal kicks. That's because they aim to build from the back as much as possible. From the center back position players will usually develop out wide and after a few passes they find themselves on the flank either on the right or on the left. Como lines up with a 4 2 3 1. But we also saw in other matches different systems like 4 3 3 or 4 3 2 1 formation. But the principle remains the same : the third man is crucial during build up. The front 3 starts spead out on the backline. Nico Paz is between the lines and the 2 holding midfielders, Da Cunha and Engelhardt start just outside the box. As the opposition move forward they will wait for the keeper to be closed down. From here one of the 2 holding midfielders drops toward the keeper, opening up a passing channel out wide. As the center back is closed down it frees up gap in which the holding midfielder will move to. Similar principles than De Zerbi. Fabregas doesn't want to do the same thing every time. During build up different shapes can be seen with same principles : vertical rotations and even the striker or attacking midfielder can become an active part of the build up. Nico Paz is the heart of the team both during build up and in final third.
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Brazil 2-0 Argentina | Tactical Analysis |How To Stop Messi|Copa America 2019|(Goals:Firmino, Jesus)
On paper Brazil lined up in a 4 2 3 1 with a back 4 made of Marquinhos, Silva as cb, Sandro and Alves as fullbacks. Arthur, Casemiro and Coutinho were in the midfield. Coutinho and Jesus provided the width and Firminho was forward. On paper Argentina lined up with a 4 3 3 with Foyth and Tagliafico as fullbacks. With Otamendi and Pezzela as center backs. Acuna and De Paul made the midfield with Martinez, Aguero and Messi on top. Often one of Brazil's fullback would tuck in with the other giving the vertical depth by advancing high on the pitch. It would draw Argentinas forwards who would often use their whole front 3 during the press. If the route to the fullbacks were cut off, the double pivots, Artur and Casemiro, had to give passing options more centrally. Argentina's problem with collective press was that Firminho was great at creating vertical depth which would draw Argentina's center backs deep. It often created spaces for the likes of Coutinho between the lines. So Argentina in 2 diferent ways who themselves caused problems. If they pressed high up, they left a gap between the defense and the midfield and Coutinho will be feed up between the lines. But if the midfield dropped deep, Coutinho would drop deeper as well. It would give him time from these positions to look for an incisive pass. Argentina's forwards would often be slow to track back during fast build up. And with Alves and Sandro being highly attacking fullbacks, it would create 2 v 1 or 1 v 1 on the flanks. Argentina tried to correct this by dropping into a 4 4 2. But this would leave them light in the center. So they often choose to guard the center while leaving up the flanks. To sustian pressure, ifi they had the time to do so, Argentina would often drop into a 4 1 4 1. But even when the ball was on the far side, Brazil looked to keep at least on man wide to stretch the opponent. The width Brazil maintained drawed both center backs out of position.
It left Jesus with a free shoot into the box. At the same time, Brazil was controlling the match and never over committed. This was achieved by the center backs and defensive miedfielers in positiosn when they were on the ball. As for Argentina, Tagliafico was comfortable with both defensive and attacking parts. But Foyth is usually center back. So his attacking range was limited. This meant that their attacks had to go thought the center a lot of times exclusively. The ball often went to Paredes. But Argentina's build up looked like often a 2 3 3 2. Brazil alternated between a high press and a deep 4 2 3 1. Because of the lack of width, Argentina would often rely on Messi to drop deep and build up. Scaloni often had Acuna or De Paul dropping into the half spaces in order to draw the attention away from the center to give Messi and Paredes more spaces. But Brazil's double pivots dealt with this as well. They always kept Messi in front of the shield, never allowing him between the lines. If Messi dropped deep, Brazil pushed high and if Messi pushed higher, the team dropped deeper. To get Messi away from the goal, Brazil kept him ahead of both Casemiro and Arthur. Also when Messi dropped deep, the forwards didn't provide a descent passing option for an easy forward pass. When Di Maria came on the left, things kinda improved with him providing the width on the left. As Argentina committed more players forward, Brazil remained dangerous on the break, keeping players high in order for counter attacks. This eventually led to the second Brazil's goal.
Structures like 3 2 5 are seen everywhere in football during attacking phases because of its ability to overload a back 4. Positionnal ideology is a reason why terms like half space and inverted fullback became part of football vocabulary. But a new ideology is rising and it's not about managers interested about overacching but rather look to occupy the spaces that the opponent will reveal to you. Guardiola stated that positionnal football was becoming more difficult given the increased rythm over past seasons. And that with amount of games needed to be played, the top teams needed bigger squads to be able to compete. High defensive lines and agressive man oriented pressing systems are increasingly becoming the norm over specific lines of defensive players. It makes a positionnal structure harder to implement because you have less time and space to get the player into the correct position. Looking at the majority of positionnal teams past years, they look to rely on as few players as possible. But as the games increase, you need more players to keep the fresh. So positionnal structure might be difficult to get your team to compete the same rotations if the starting 11 is different every week. So more fluid systems can be more adapted to the players at disposal. New UCL format is a sign about this tactical change. Almost all the top teams moved away from these positionnal mentalities. Even Arsenal and Athletico Madrid who have an history on being reliant on specific offensive and defensive shapes have come a long way from these ideas to the point it's hard to spot a lot of comon patterns when in possession.
That being said, positionnal football has not disappeared and it still can be very effective in modern game. Luis Enrique is currently unbeaten in Ligue 1 with this approach with PSG, building the majority of the attacks with a 3 2 5. Vincent Kompany created a dangerous team with his 2 4 4 offensive shape at Bayern. These 2 ideologies can co exist on the pitch. Whole idea of build up is to use the disadvantage of the extra man with the goalkepper and exploit the space behind the defensive line when the opposition is high. Majority of top teams, regardless of their overarching, look to control the game from the back. Gk is crucial and the back line tend to be spread out to allow an easier circulation of the ball. In the middle, teams in positionnal philosophy tend to have a specific amoutn of players in the center but managers like Slot, Flick or Inzagi alternate between 1 pivot, 2 pivots and sometimes 3 players in the center. It depends on how the opposition is pressing but also what type of attack they look for. For Barcelona if 3 midfieldrs drop to help the build up it can open up bigger gaps betwen the lines for them to exploit with direct balls over the top and with 2 players in the middle they can look for a vertical pass and a third man lay off.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
Tactical Analysis : Argentina 3-0 Croatia | Messi Magic Gets it done |
Despite having less the ball than Croatia, Argentina had a clear plan whatever in deep side of the pitch as well as high up. Initially out of possession, Croatia could defend with a single forward even if Modric from midfield could push higher up alongside Rovariv. However one oh his role was stopping the progressive midfield from Argentina. So when Fernandez or Paredes drop deep at times, Modric would be the man tasked with pressing high on the man in order to make it more difficult for Argentina to get ball from deeper to higher. Only difference was that against Brazil when he was picking up Casemiro, only Danilo was left to progress the ball. And Danilo is not that good at progression. With with Paredes and Fernandez Argentina had 2 excellent ball progressers, making it difficult for Modric to stop the play. When Modric was pressing a man, both Fernandez and Paredes were comfortable with dropping deeper to form a back 3 and drawing Modric higher on the pitch. With Argentina would still have a 3 v 2 advantage with the halp of the 2 center backs against Modric and Kramaric. It woud allow not only Molina and Tagliafico to push higher on the pitch, but also as a result, both midfielders De Paul and Mc Allistair would tuck in. With Modric dragged higher up there was a potential 2 v 3 down in favor or Argentina with Kovacic and Krozovic as central midfielders against Paredes, De Paul and McAllistair. When Paredes dropped betwee, the center backs, Fernandez would take his place. So Croatia started to defend in a more conversative way with Modric dropping back along the midfielders. But with Modric applying less pressure on him, Fernandez would push into the midfield with Otamendi and Romero taking care of the progression against Kramaric.
Croatia was aware about Argentina often attacking with 5 mens in previous matches so to avoid being outnumbered, we could see Pasalic dropping deeper to make a men to men situation, which mean that even if Argentina overloaded one side of the pitch and forced the defense shifting across, there would never be the free man on the far side. It was coupled by Croatia moving narrow with Perisic tucking in. So the center was well protected. So rather than McAllistair and Messi pushing too high, both operated as more traditionnal midfielders for most part of the match. That meant that with a man advantage into the midfield, space could be found spaces especially with Alavrez being a threat in front with his pace and runs, to push the back line deeper. Messi ended up with the most passes and dribbles in this match. At times when Messi was in these half spaces zones, Gvardiola was agressive on him This could leave spaces where runners like Molina or Alvarez could take advantage of. However it's worth noting that all 3 Argentina's goals were not really coming from Argentina's tactical masterclass but rather from pure quality and brillance of players like Alvarez and Messi. Messi wasn't pressing a lot fo Croatia could get out from the goalkick pretty easily. Even in deeper zones, Argentina maintained their 4 4 2 shape. Brozovic could drop between the center backs if needed. But for the most part, Brozovic dropping deep wasn't needed as a back 2 was enough. Croatia looked to push their fullbacks very high to allow their wingers to tuck in; We saw it especially against Brazil. To create a 5 v 5, Mc Allistair could drop for a few times into the back line.
With Kovacic, Modric and Brozovic, Croatia had 3 outstanding deep midfielders, allowing them to keep possession at 60% during the match. All 3 tended to move into one side of the pitch to take advantages of the wide regions. We often saw it on the left handside of the pitch, allowing Susa to push high and Perisic to move infield. But Croatia's problem is that their midfield was not that good at creating chances. They were good instead at progressing the ball and keeping possession. Keeping the 3 midfielders deep was a tactical chooice by Dalic so at times it was difficult to find a player between the lines. At times when Perisic came in front, it would Kramaric who would drop in. But he is not an attacking midfielder. This was made worse by the fact that their shape meant that the fullbacks were the ones in 1 v 1 situations. And neither of them were particulary good at passing their man the ball at their feet. And the rare moments they did a cross, Kramaric being the progressive player at times made it difficult. Add that with tha aerial dominance of Otamendi and Romero. Sosa was replaced by Orsic who would start wide then tuck in with Petkovic replacing Kramaric looking to pin back the center backs. Perisic would be the one at left back position and now he would be in 1 v 1 situations, where he was better at than Sosa. However it iwas too late and not enough.
Argentina 1-0 Brazil Analysis |How Argentina won the Copa America|
Argentina step on a 4 4 2 shape. Brazil in the other hand sticked with the same formation that got them into the final with the 4 3 3. When Argentina had the ball, the Brazilian forwards were tasked to press them. Brazil sometimes committed even 4 players high on the pitch However there were periods on the game where Brazil wasn't able to press as high on the pitch. When it happened Argentina's right back tucked in allowing Argentina to keep possession in a 3 2 system. Paredes and De Paul were operating as a double pivot in the midfield while the 3 defenders provided the base behind them, allowing Acuna as a left back to play much higher. We also saw Lo Celso coming infield from the left so he could receive the ball and make the turn. In these areas, he was often joined by Messi would would be seen drifting from his position upfront in order to get more touches on the ball in deeper areas. Messi did that during a good part of his carrer. However he struggled to have a bigger impact on his match than what he probably expected. Making runs forward in these advanced areas of the pitch is Acuna's strenght when operating as a fullback both for club and country even if Brazil did a relativly good job at limiting his threat into the final third; On the right handside of the pitch, the danger came from a winger rather from a fullback. Di Maria would start wide before making runs inside with his strong left foot. We saw Di Maria providing the width quite a lot. But the biggest impact of course came from central areas as he chipped the ball over Ederson to score the only goal of the match after Sandro's mistake in defense. While Brazil had the ball in their own third we sometimes saw Argentina looking to put them under pressure. So we saw both center backs splitting to play alongside the keeper.
However up the pitch Brazil looked to build in slighty diferent way from Argentina by using their center 2 3 shape to progress the ball. Just like Argentina however, Brazil's left back played much higher. Lodi looked so to play higher on the pitch. But Argentina managed the situation well. Lodi providing the width meant that both Neymar and Richarlison were able to play extremly narrow with Neymar dropping deep to receive the ball before running at the opposition's backline. Paqueta was then given the license to play as rthe most advanced player of the midfield 3, making runs into the final third in order to support the attack. Another reason Brazil struggled that much in the right handside was Danilo not making that many runs in front, meaning that Argentina could often double team up on him and limit Everton's impact.
Tactical Analysis : Argentina 3-0 Croatia | Messi Magic Gets it done |
Despite having less the ball than Croatia, Argentina had a clear plan whatever in deep side of the pitch as well as high up. Initially out of possession, Croatia could defend with a single forward even if Modric from midfield could push higher up alongside Rovariv. However one oh his role was stopping the progressive midfield from Argentina. So when Fernandez or Paredes drop deep at times, Modric would be the man tasked with pressing high on the man in order to make it more difficult for Argentina to get ball from deeper to higher. Only difference was that against Brazil when he was picking up Casemiro, only Danilo was left to progress the ball. And Danilo is not that good at progression. With with Paredes and Fernandez Argentina had 2 excellent ball progressers, making it difficult for Modric to stop the play. When Modric was pressing a man, both Fernandez and Paredes were comfortable with dropping deeper to form a back 3 and drawing Modric higher on the pitch. With Argentina would still have a 3 v 2 advantage with the halp of the 2 center backs against Modric and Kramaric. It woud allow not only Molina and Tagliafico to push higher on the pitch, but also as a result, both midfielders De Paul and Mc Allistair would tuck in. With Modric dragged higher up there was a potential 2 v 3 down in favor or Argentina with Kovacic and Krozovic as central midfielders against Paredes, De Paul and McAllistair. When Paredes dropped betwee, the center backs, Fernandez would take his place. So Croatia started to defend in a more conversative way with Modric dropping back along the midfielders. But with Modric applying less pressure on him, Fernandez would push into the midfield with Otamendi and Romero taking care of the progression against Kramaric.
Croatia was aware about Argentina often attacking with 5 mens in previous matches so to avoid being outnumbered, we could see Pasalic dropping deeper to make a men to men situation, which mean that even if Argentina overloaded one side of the pitch and forced the defense shifting across, there would never be the free man on the far side. It was coupled by Croatia moving narrow with Perisic tucking in. So the center was well protected. So rather than McAllistair and Messi pushing too high, both operated as more traditionnal midfielders for most part of the match. That meant that with a man advantage into the midfield, space could be found spaces especially with Alavrez being a threat in front with his pace and runs, to push the back line deeper. Messi ended up with the most passes and dribbles in this match. At times when Messi was in these half spaces zones, Gvardiola was agressive on him This could leave spaces where runners like Molina or Alvarez could take advantage of. However it's worth noting that all 3 Argentina's goals were not really coming from Argentina's tactical masterclass but rather from pure quality and brillance of players like Alvarez and Messi. Messi wasn't pressing a lot fo Croatia could get out from the goalkick pretty easily. Even in deeper zones, Argentina maintained their 4 4 2 shape. Brozovic could drop between the center backs if needed. But for the most part, Brozovic dropping deep wasn't needed as a back 2 was enough. Croatia looked to push their fullbacks very high to allow their wingers to tuck in; We saw it especially against Brazil. To create a 5 v 5, Mc Allistair could drop for a few times into the back line.
With Kovacic, Modric and Brozovic, Croatia had 3 outstanding deep midfielders, allowing them to keep possession at 60% during the match. All 3 tended to move into one side of the pitch to take advantages of the wide regions. We often saw it on the left handside of the pitch, allowing Susa to push high and Perisic to move infield. But Croatia's problem is that their midfield was not that good at creating chances. They were good instead at progressing the ball and keeping possession. Keeping the 3 midfielders deep was a tactical chooice by Dalic so at times it was difficult to find a player between the lines. At times when Perisic came in front, it would Kramaric who would drop in. But he is not an attacking midfielder. This was made worse by the fact that their shape meant that the fullbacks were the ones in 1 v 1 situations. And neither of them were particulary good at passing their man the ball at their feet. And the rare moments they did a cross, Kramaric being the progressive player at times made it difficult. Add that with tha aerial dominance of Otamendi and Romero. Sosa was replaced by Orsic who would start wide then tuck in with Petkovic replacing Kramaric looking to pin back the center backs. Perisic would be the one at left back position and now he would be in 1 v 1 situations, where he was better at than Sosa. However it iwas too late and not enough.
Argentina 1-0 Brazil Analysis |How Argentina won the Copa America|
Argentina step on a 4 4 2 shape. Brazil in the other hand sticked with the same formation that got them into the final with the 4 3 3. When Argentina had the ball, the Brazilian forwards were tasked to press them. Brazil sometimes committed even 4 players high on the pitch However there were periods on the game where Brazil wasn't able to press as high on the pitch. When it happened Argentina's right back tucked in allowing Argentina to keep possession in a 3 2 system. Paredes and De Paul were operating as a double pivot in the midfield while the 3 defenders provided the base behind them, allowing Acuna as a left back to play much higher. We also saw Lo Celso coming infield from the left so he could receive the ball and make the turn. In these areas, he was often joined by Messi would would be seen drifting from his position upfront in order to get more touches on the ball in deeper areas. Messi did that during a good part of his carrer. However he struggled to have a bigger impact on his match than what he probably expected. Making runs forward in these advanced areas of the pitch is Acuna's strenght when operating as a fullback both for club and country even if Brazil did a relativly good job at limiting his threat into the final third; On the right handside of the pitch, the danger came from a winger rather from a fullback. Di Maria would start wide before making runs inside with his strong left foot. We saw Di Maria providing the width quite a lot. But the biggest impact of course came from central areas as he chipped the ball over Ederson to score the only goal of the match after Sandro's mistake in defense. While Brazil had the ball in their own third we sometimes saw Argentina looking to put them under pressure. So we saw both center backs splitting to play alongside the keeper.
However up the pitch Brazil looked to build in slighty diferent way from Argentina by using their center 2 3 shape to progress the ball. Just like Argentina however, Brazil's left back played much higher. Lodi looked so to play higher on the pitch. But Argentina managed the situation well. Lodi providing the width meant that both Neymar and Richarlison were able to play extremly narrow with Neymar dropping deep to receive the ball before running at the opposition's backline. Paqueta was then given the license to play as rthe most advanced player of the midfield 3, making runs into the final third in order to support the attack. Another reason Brazil struggled that much in the right handside was Danilo not making that many runs in front, meaning that Argentina could often double team up on him and limit Everton's impact.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
Tactical Analysis Champions League Final|Liverpool 2-0 Tottenham|Goals:Salah, Origi| How to Press
Liverpool lined up in their classic 4 3 3 with Matic and Van Dijk as center backs with Robertson and Alexander Arnold as respectively left back and right back. Fabinho was in the holding midfielder role with Hederson and Wijnaldum alongside him either side. Finally, Salah, Mané and Firminho was in the attack. Tottenham lined up with a 4 2 3 1 with Alderweireild and Vertonghen as both center backs with Rose and Trippier either side. Sissoko and WInks were the double pivots. Finally, behind Harry Kane who was the forward, Ali, Eriksson and Son. Liverpool scoring early affected the way they played. They decided to hold their shape and to play convervatively. Building from deep Liverpool usually used a single pivot in conjunction with the center backs. However in the final third they choosed to play with a double pivot of Fabinho and Henderson. Wijnaldum would in the same time give the depth by pushing highe rup. The double pivot mean that Tottenham needed to commit more players in the press. Spurs wanted to defend in a 4 2 3 1. By by pressing high, Spurs would often use their entire front 4. However Alisson being good on the ball meant that even with Kane pressing, he would pass the ball into the center back or a midfielder which would often allow Liverpool to progress the ball forward into thegap left in the pressing rooms. After progressing the ball into the midfield line up, since Spurs had to keep a relativly high line since they were chasing the score, Liverpool knew they could use the pace of Salah and Mané over the top to free up the space which was a comon tactic was for Firminho to drop deep into the midfield.
If a center back followed him then spaces would be open for Salah or Mané or even occasionally, Henderson. But if the center backs stayed deep, both Salah and Mané would drift wider and with Firminho occupying a midfield, it would give spaces to others Liverpool's midfielders to try and find the pass over the top. Mané would try to run behind Trippier and Slaha behind Rose. This tactic becameeven more pronounced with Origi coming in when Spurs had to become even more offensive. Liverpool could try long balls to the forward. But another tactic used was the left handside overload. Spurs initially wanted to play the ball from the back as much as possible. Vertonghen and Abderweireld. Winks could drop to receive the ball off them. But when Liverpool presssed high as well, Sissoko would drop to try and receive the ball. But it was a trap set by Liverpool as Henderson would wait him to have the ball before pressing him immediatly as he was the less technically gifted midfielder. This forced Tottenham to play long with Matic and Van Dijk dominating in the air.. But Pochettino adapted to this in second half as he kept Trippier and Rose both very high. So if the ball was in one side of the pitch, the opposition's fullback would be free as MAné was ensure to either press the center back, either press Trippier. Spurs could then switch the ball quickly to progress the ball forward. But Liverpool's press was sometimes very effective as they waited the center back to receive the ball centrally before closing them down from the sides to cut off the wide passes. So Pochetinno kept his front 4 high between the lines of Liverpool's high pressing midfield and the defense.
It meant Liverpool's fullbacks had to defend extremely narrow and Rose and Trippier could push even higher to be found with quick passes or a switch. In second half, Tottenham also foud some ways centrally with longb alls being played for Kane with Ali trying to get behind Alexander Arnold. But at the same tme, Eriksson and Son would be ready for any second ball. But if Spurs needed groud passes, they changed their approaches, using more first time passes because as the Liverpool's midfield would come into the press, they will be able to play around it. Since Spurs kept mens between the lines, they would be able to use combinations plays. However Matic and Van Dijk kept their distances close, meaning that Spurs couldn't penetrate and instead would play in front of the defense. They barely made 2 long shoots, all sotpped by Alisson. Liverpool always had numbers in the box, allowing them to not concede from crosses thanks to their narrow defense.
Tactical Analysis|Liverpool 4-0 Barcelona| Goals (Wijnaldum, Origi)|3rd Man Runs| Liverpool Comeback
The high press isolating Messi and Suarez high up the pitch was a major factor. Valverde attempted to use a similar tactic to the first leg by bringing on semedo but Liverpool overwhelmed them with the 3rd man runs.
Busquets not dropping in line with the centrebacks aided Liverpool's press which was a strange choice by Valverde. As for lines up, Origi and Shaquiri tool the places of Salah and Firminho who were both injured. Miefield had Henderson, Milner and Fabinho. Defense had VDD, Matic, TAA and Robertson. Roberto, Alba, Piqué and Langlet were the defenders for Barcelona. Vidal, Busquets and Rakkitic for the midfield. The front 3 was composed of Messi, Coutinho and Suarez. During build up for Liverpool, both fullbacks would push high ahead of center backs with Fabinho dropping to receive the ball off them. Miler and Henderson positionned themselves slightly higher on the pitch. Here Barcelona defended in their usual 4 4 2. Henderson and Miler woudl force Busquets and Rakitic to stay deeper on the pitch. This would leave the front 3 isolated, not being able to press effectively against 3 mens as Coutinho and Vidal were picking the wide players. Liverpool's front 3 stayed infield meaning that Barcelona's fullbacks would tuck in to defend against them, which would often leave spaces for Robertson or Trent for a direct switch and then a cross was attempted. If they couldn't make a direct switch, they would either side overload and then switch. Milner would often pick up the left handside channel alongside one of the forwards and fullback, which would draw Barcelona across before a quick switch. Another factor in Liverpool's efficiency was the miedfield runners. The central midfielders were granted freedom by Klopp to break forward during play, especially in the attacking transitions.
As the forwards tucked in and the midfielders came forward, it gave them the central overloads in several situations. This meant that cross were good options for Liverpool. Their major ploys of wide play and switching combined with the midfield runners led to most of their goals. In the first goal Henderson ran forward in the anticipation of a ball from Mané. He breaks into the box, has a shoot but Origi finishes it off. For the second goal, Trent cross from out wide. Wijnaldum runs from the midfield for the goal. For the third goal, Mané occupied a Barcelona'ss defender, allowing Shaqiri to cross and again, the midfielder's run is not picked up, allowing him to score. In the first leg, Busquets would drop between the centerbacks during Barcelona's build ups. It meant that for an effective press, Liverpool had to commit more mens, leaving spaces in behind them. But here in the second leg, Barcelone build up with a double pivot and back 3 behind them, with the fullbacks providing the width and passing options. Busquets is ahead of the midfield so Liverpool can press the centerbacks and the goalkepper, forcing them long. Barcelona atttemped 67 long balls in the match, which was more than Liverpool, who attemped 54 long balls. The passes would then be mopped up by Liverpool's centerbacks. In addition, Liverpool's press would often isolate the forwards from the midfield. On several occasions, Messi pick up the ball and Suarez makes a run. Fabinho is able to track back and make the tackle, while the centerbacks could handle Suarez's runs. In the first half however, Barceloan found sucess in the left handside as Trent went high and the front 3 didn't track back. Coutinho and Alba found spaces in the left hand channel they were able to generate a couple of chances from this region.
But at the end of the day, Klopp's use of ht ewide plays combined with the midfield's runners was enough to get him and Liverpool to the UCL final and eventually the final fin in that final.
Tactical Analysis Champions League Final|Liverpool 2-0 Tottenham|Goals:Salah, Origi| How to Press
Liverpool lined up in their classic 4 3 3 with Matic and Van Dijk as center backs with Robertson and Alexander Arnold as respectively left back and right back. Fabinho was in the holding midfielder role with Hederson and Wijnaldum alongside him either side. Finally, Salah, Mané and Firminho was in the attack. Tottenham lined up with a 4 2 3 1 with Alderweireild and Vertonghen as both center backs with Rose and Trippier either side. Sissoko and WInks were the double pivots. Finally, behind Harry Kane who was the forward, Ali, Eriksson and Son. Liverpool scoring early affected the way they played. They decided to hold their shape and to play convervatively. Building from deep Liverpool usually used a single pivot in conjunction with the center backs. However in the final third they choosed to play with a double pivot of Fabinho and Henderson. Wijnaldum would in the same time give the depth by pushing highe rup. The double pivot mean that Tottenham needed to commit more players in the press. Spurs wanted to defend in a 4 2 3 1. By by pressing high, Spurs would often use their entire front 4. However Alisson being good on the ball meant that even with Kane pressing, he would pass the ball into the center back or a midfielder which would often allow Liverpool to progress the ball forward into thegap left in the pressing rooms. After progressing the ball into the midfield line up, since Spurs had to keep a relativly high line since they were chasing the score, Liverpool knew they could use the pace of Salah and Mané over the top to free up the space which was a comon tactic was for Firminho to drop deep into the midfield.
If a center back followed him then spaces would be open for Salah or Mané or even occasionally, Henderson. But if the center backs stayed deep, both Salah and Mané would drift wider and with Firminho occupying a midfield, it would give spaces to others Liverpool's midfielders to try and find the pass over the top. Mané would try to run behind Trippier and Slaha behind Rose. This tactic becameeven more pronounced with Origi coming in when Spurs had to become even more offensive. Liverpool could try long balls to the forward. But another tactic used was the left handside overload. Spurs initially wanted to play the ball from the back as much as possible. Vertonghen and Abderweireld. Winks could drop to receive the ball off them. But when Liverpool presssed high as well, Sissoko would drop to try and receive the ball. But it was a trap set by Liverpool as Henderson would wait him to have the ball before pressing him immediatly as he was the less technically gifted midfielder. This forced Tottenham to play long with Matic and Van Dijk dominating in the air.. But Pochettino adapted to this in second half as he kept Trippier and Rose both very high. So if the ball was in one side of the pitch, the opposition's fullback would be free as MAné was ensure to either press the center back, either press Trippier. Spurs could then switch the ball quickly to progress the ball forward. But Liverpool's press was sometimes very effective as they waited the center back to receive the ball centrally before closing them down from the sides to cut off the wide passes. So Pochetinno kept his front 4 high between the lines of Liverpool's high pressing midfield and the defense.
It meant Liverpool's fullbacks had to defend extremely narrow and Rose and Trippier could push even higher to be found with quick passes or a switch. In second half, Tottenham also foud some ways centrally with longb alls being played for Kane with Ali trying to get behind Alexander Arnold. But at the same tme, Eriksson and Son would be ready for any second ball. But if Spurs needed groud passes, they changed their approaches, using more first time passes because as the Liverpool's midfield would come into the press, they will be able to play around it. Since Spurs kept mens between the lines, they would be able to use combinations plays. However Matic and Van Dijk kept their distances close, meaning that Spurs couldn't penetrate and instead would play in front of the defense. They barely made 2 long shoots, all sotpped by Alisson. Liverpool always had numbers in the box, allowing them to not concede from crosses thanks to their narrow defense.
Tactical Analysis|Liverpool 4-0 Barcelona| Goals (Wijnaldum, Origi)|3rd Man Runs| Liverpool Comeback
The high press isolating Messi and Suarez high up the pitch was a major factor. Valverde attempted to use a similar tactic to the first leg by bringing on semedo but Liverpool overwhelmed them with the 3rd man runs.
Busquets not dropping in line with the centrebacks aided Liverpool's press which was a strange choice by Valverde. As for lines up, Origi and Shaquiri tool the places of Salah and Firminho who were both injured. Miefield had Henderson, Milner and Fabinho. Defense had VDD, Matic, TAA and Robertson. Roberto, Alba, Piqué and Langlet were the defenders for Barcelona. Vidal, Busquets and Rakkitic for the midfield. The front 3 was composed of Messi, Coutinho and Suarez. During build up for Liverpool, both fullbacks would push high ahead of center backs with Fabinho dropping to receive the ball off them. Miler and Henderson positionned themselves slightly higher on the pitch. Here Barcelona defended in their usual 4 4 2. Henderson and Miler woudl force Busquets and Rakitic to stay deeper on the pitch. This would leave the front 3 isolated, not being able to press effectively against 3 mens as Coutinho and Vidal were picking the wide players. Liverpool's front 3 stayed infield meaning that Barcelona's fullbacks would tuck in to defend against them, which would often leave spaces for Robertson or Trent for a direct switch and then a cross was attempted. If they couldn't make a direct switch, they would either side overload and then switch. Milner would often pick up the left handside channel alongside one of the forwards and fullback, which would draw Barcelona across before a quick switch. Another factor in Liverpool's efficiency was the miedfield runners. The central midfielders were granted freedom by Klopp to break forward during play, especially in the attacking transitions.
As the forwards tucked in and the midfielders came forward, it gave them the central overloads in several situations. This meant that cross were good options for Liverpool. Their major ploys of wide play and switching combined with the midfield runners led to most of their goals. In the first goal Henderson ran forward in the anticipation of a ball from Mané. He breaks into the box, has a shoot but Origi finishes it off. For the second goal, Trent cross from out wide. Wijnaldum runs from the midfield for the goal. For the third goal, Mané occupied a Barcelona'ss defender, allowing Shaqiri to cross and again, the midfielder's run is not picked up, allowing him to score. In the first leg, Busquets would drop between the centerbacks during Barcelona's build ups. It meant that for an effective press, Liverpool had to commit more mens, leaving spaces in behind them. But here in the second leg, Barcelone build up with a double pivot and back 3 behind them, with the fullbacks providing the width and passing options. Busquets is ahead of the midfield so Liverpool can press the centerbacks and the goalkepper, forcing them long. Barcelona atttemped 67 long balls in the match, which was more than Liverpool, who attemped 54 long balls. The passes would then be mopped up by Liverpool's centerbacks. In addition, Liverpool's press would often isolate the forwards from the midfield. On several occasions, Messi pick up the ball and Suarez makes a run. Fabinho is able to track back and make the tackle, while the centerbacks could handle Suarez's runs. In the first half however, Barceloan found sucess in the left handside as Trent went high and the front 3 didn't track back. Coutinho and Alba found spaces in the left hand channel they were able to generate a couple of chances from this region.
But at the end of the day, Klopp's use of ht ewide plays combined with the midfield's runners was enough to get him and Liverpool to the UCL final and eventually the final fin in that final.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
Tactical Analysis : Brazil 4-1 South Korea| A Different Level From Brazil |
South Korea were looking to press in a 4 4 2 whatever Brazil was building from the goalick or even in more open plays situations. Because the 2 forwards pressed the centerbacks, the center midfielders had to back up the press in order to make it more difficult for Brazil to find their midfielders. But obvious problem was that they were 3 v 2 down and their extra men was Neymar. Because of the threat of pacy wingers like Vinicius and Raphina, it was difficult for the backline to back up the press. So they tended to sit slightly deeper. This would open spaces for Neymar between the lines. So Neymar is free because South Korea's doubles pivots are more concerned with Brazil's pivots than him. But Danilo during build up liked to operate more centrally alongside Casemiro, like an inverted fullback. This would give the freedom for Paqueto to push forward with Neymar often in the lft handside. With Danilo moving central, the wingers were dragged centrally with him also. The fullback had a problem since if he stayed high on Vinicius, Neymar would be free but if he stayed too narrow, Vinicius could receive the ball and then have a run on the fullback even when he came out. So the defense drifted aisde on the left. So Richarlison also drifted aside. Because of this overload it would be dificult for the backline to shift across. There were massive gaps between the defense and the miedfield and Neymar was dropping into these. Once he is drawing a fullback, Brazil had plenty of players in advanced positions.
Some teams used to deal with this kind of situations with the team not pressing high and instead having their forwards to cover the double pivots, allowing their own pivots to operate in deeper regions, which would allow them to cover more Neymar's movements while Lee could stay deeper to help the fullback in 1 v 2 situations. Higher up, Korea defended in a narrower 4 4 2 with their wingers often tucking in. But it had problems with the ability of Vinicius and Raphina in 1 v 1 situations. When Brazil was playing out wide, the winger could either take his men directly, either look to combine with the men in the half spaces, often being Neymar or Paqueta. For the first goal for example, Vinicius had the time and space to finish it because of Brazil's front 5. Brazil defended in a 4 4 2 mid block at times especially after scoring so early. Korea's fullbacks were quite agressive with Lee tucking in to be the third men, allowing his fullback to overlap. While Swang would hug the touchline, J. Kim could either tuck into the miedfield either also look to overlap wirings at times. So it left large gaps between the defense. When the ball was high, both Neymar and RIcharlisson tended to stay quite up so in the transitions, Brazil could either find their wingers running in behind, either find their forwards for a 1 v 1. Either way it wsa not ideal for South Korea so Brazil was enjoying playing in counter attacking football style. Even when Koreas's fullbacks were ditting deeper, Brazil kept staying agressive with their wingers pushing high on them. And they had the quality advantage in almost every positions to thrive in 1 v 1 situations.
The real problem with Brazil.
In the first 2 games vs Bolivia and Peru, players from European teams struggled to adapt to Diniz's views. It was the case later but in diferent ways against Venezuela and Uruguay where Brazil struggled to break their mid/low defensive blocks. Now Uruguay was more agressive than Venezuela in term of pressing. But Brazil passed their press pretty consistently. It was when Uruguay dropped into their compact mid block that problems appeared. Uruguay had their 4 2 3 1. Against Venezuela Brazil faced a 4 4 1 1 block. Brazil seemed to do some uncertain possessive football, as they were confused with what to do with the ball. On top of that Gabriel insisted on carrying the ball on his feet of his teamates rather than letting the ball do the work. He just close down the angles himself. If Brazil cannot put the ball quickly into the right areas, then it looks like the attack is basically dead before beginning. Neymar was very useful for Brazil's build up as he dropped quite deep to give the centerbacks passing options. He was good at finding the spaces between the lines and acted as a conductor of the game. When Neymar takes wide responsabilitues or comes close to the forward, the miedfield becomes dysfunctionnal. The fact that Casemiro either has to tell him to take the positions either takes the positions himself is showing Guimaraes is sometimes clueless about his role in the team. Just like he has a tendancy to apss and stand still instead of passing and move forwards. Also there are not enough forwards movements across the games; Of course Neymar and Casemiro missing the copa américa 2024 isn't going to help them.
.
Tactical Analysis : Brazil 4-1 South Korea| A Different Level From Brazil |
South Korea were looking to press in a 4 4 2 whatever Brazil was building from the goalick or even in more open plays situations. Because the 2 forwards pressed the centerbacks, the center midfielders had to back up the press in order to make it more difficult for Brazil to find their midfielders. But obvious problem was that they were 3 v 2 down and their extra men was Neymar. Because of the threat of pacy wingers like Vinicius and Raphina, it was difficult for the backline to back up the press. So they tended to sit slightly deeper. This would open spaces for Neymar between the lines. So Neymar is free because South Korea's doubles pivots are more concerned with Brazil's pivots than him. But Danilo during build up liked to operate more centrally alongside Casemiro, like an inverted fullback. This would give the freedom for Paqueto to push forward with Neymar often in the lft handside. With Danilo moving central, the wingers were dragged centrally with him also. The fullback had a problem since if he stayed high on Vinicius, Neymar would be free but if he stayed too narrow, Vinicius could receive the ball and then have a run on the fullback even when he came out. So the defense drifted aisde on the left. So Richarlison also drifted aside. Because of this overload it would be dificult for the backline to shift across. There were massive gaps between the defense and the miedfield and Neymar was dropping into these. Once he is drawing a fullback, Brazil had plenty of players in advanced positions.
Some teams used to deal with this kind of situations with the team not pressing high and instead having their forwards to cover the double pivots, allowing their own pivots to operate in deeper regions, which would allow them to cover more Neymar's movements while Lee could stay deeper to help the fullback in 1 v 2 situations. Higher up, Korea defended in a narrower 4 4 2 with their wingers often tucking in. But it had problems with the ability of Vinicius and Raphina in 1 v 1 situations. When Brazil was playing out wide, the winger could either take his men directly, either look to combine with the men in the half spaces, often being Neymar or Paqueta. For the first goal for example, Vinicius had the time and space to finish it because of Brazil's front 5. Brazil defended in a 4 4 2 mid block at times especially after scoring so early. Korea's fullbacks were quite agressive with Lee tucking in to be the third men, allowing his fullback to overlap. While Swang would hug the touchline, J. Kim could either tuck into the miedfield either also look to overlap wirings at times. So it left large gaps between the defense. When the ball was high, both Neymar and RIcharlisson tended to stay quite up so in the transitions, Brazil could either find their wingers running in behind, either find their forwards for a 1 v 1. Either way it wsa not ideal for South Korea so Brazil was enjoying playing in counter attacking football style. Even when Koreas's fullbacks were ditting deeper, Brazil kept staying agressive with their wingers pushing high on them. And they had the quality advantage in almost every positions to thrive in 1 v 1 situations.
The real problem with Brazil.
In the first 2 games vs Bolivia and Peru, players from European teams struggled to adapt to Diniz's views. It was the case later but in diferent ways against Venezuela and Uruguay where Brazil struggled to break their mid/low defensive blocks. Now Uruguay was more agressive than Venezuela in term of pressing. But Brazil passed their press pretty consistently. It was when Uruguay dropped into their compact mid block that problems appeared. Uruguay had their 4 2 3 1. Against Venezuela Brazil faced a 4 4 1 1 block. Brazil seemed to do some uncertain possessive football, as they were confused with what to do with the ball. On top of that Gabriel insisted on carrying the ball on his feet of his teamates rather than letting the ball do the work. He just close down the angles himself. If Brazil cannot put the ball quickly into the right areas, then it looks like the attack is basically dead before beginning. Neymar was very useful for Brazil's build up as he dropped quite deep to give the centerbacks passing options. He was good at finding the spaces between the lines and acted as a conductor of the game. When Neymar takes wide responsabilitues or comes close to the forward, the miedfield becomes dysfunctionnal. The fact that Casemiro either has to tell him to take the positions either takes the positions himself is showing Guimaraes is sometimes clueless about his role in the team. Just like he has a tendancy to apss and stand still instead of passing and move forwards. Also there are not enough forwards movements across the games; Of course Neymar and Casemiro missing the copa américa 2024 isn't going to help them.
.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
How Gasperini Dominated Europe's Biggest Teams
When defending, there are generally 2 diferent shools of thought, either zonal marking, either man marking. Zonal marking is for the managers thinking that the most dangerous threat is the ball while man marking managers believe that the player is the most dangerous threat. Depending of the situation, the majority of the teams will use a mixture of both. Some teams press man to man during the build up but transition into a zonal marking system from more active build positions. For example Man City under Guardiola used to press men to men from opposition goalkick. But will transition into zonal marking system from more active positions, covering passing lanes and trying to force the opposition the ball into designated areas. But it's uncomon to see man marking the way Atalanta do. Gaspereni's mens will follow their direct opponent relentlessly throughout the 90 minutes. And even as the opposition pushes up, they are not afraid to step up their line to close a player down, often resulting in completly diferents patterns and structures depending on the opposition, with no clear miedfield or defensive lines. In Gasperini's words, they are not waiting for opposition to make a msitake, but they are rather chasing the ball to win it back in a proactive way. Some rules are still followed. For example the wingbacks will usually wait to close their player down, first shutting down the risk of a direct ball in behind, before closing quickly the player down if the opposition moves down their flank. Against Liverpool, in Europa league we saw that Liverpool was given little space in the center. But there were slighty more spaces into the flanks and once Liverpool the decision to move down the left flank, Zappacosta would instantly close down the fullback and put pressure on the ball.
The beauty is that it doesn't matter where they are on the pitch. Atalanta are always looking to push up to win the ball. They don't play the offside trap and there is no clear defensive line. But if a player receives the ball with their back to the goal there is absolutly no way he will be able to turn around. This agressive defensive principles become even more interesting when entering the box and defending crosses. Generally speaking a team will look to get as many players as possible between the ball and the goal. Even man making teams will oftne shift to certain lvels of zonal marking in the box, either ressembling a diagonical line or triangle across the 6 yards bow and covering the most dangerou areas of the goal. But Gasperini still insists that the most dangerous elemnt is the player and not the ball. Rarely Atalanta has a fullback shape to rely on. For example in theri win against Monza we could see no player was left unmarked into the box. Atalanta would end up with extra players in the defense sometimes but they would usually pick up a position they believe will give their team the best chance of stopping a goal. But these playesr rarely adopt a specific structure. But this still has weakness that the opposition can exploit. Since there is no specific structure for Atalanta to fall back on, the opposition can and will drag the players aroud to exploit certain spaces. Whlie each player will need to be disciplined in 1 v 1 situations, all it takes is one player loosing track of his men and suddently, Atalanta can find themselves scrambling to pick up the extra player. And the space in behind the defense is usually the target to aim for. Before their match vs Liverpool, Atalanta foud themselves exposed on the back on multiple occasions usually with direct balls toward the striker to chase.
Coordinated moves forward and backward can leave the defender isolated at the back. A simple mistake can lead Atalanta's defense being exposed but this system can be an excellent starting point of any attack. Gasperini rarely shifted away from back 3 system during his carreer as a manager with the biggest difference being often either a 3 4 1 2 or a 3 4 2 1 with the 3 4 1 2 being the most comon formation the 2023 - 2024 season. Atalanta had become throught the seasons a more direct team, looking to get the ball forward into the attackers as quickly as possible. This season their offensive set of players means they can often rely of combinations to create chances. And will often adopt diferent shapes depending on who is playing, also resulting in a lot of diferent attacks. With Lookman they will usually end up with more players between the lines, allowing them to progress the ball centrally and exploit the space out wide witht he wingbacks before attacking forward himself. While playing with Scamacca, his hold up play is much more effective. And Atalanta will often loook out to play more centrally and directly into the forward, who can knock it down between the lines for Koopmeiners who can then play the other forward in behind. In their semi final clash against Marseille, the chooice of switching to a 3 4 2 1 with Lookman and Deketelare between the lines proved to be extremly beneficial and Atalanta were comfortably able to dominate the space between the lines. Scamacca could be relied on as a target men. who can knock it down between the lines For more structured attacks, their formation mean they are creating triangles either side of the pitch, that allows them to find easy passing combinations ad move the ball forward. either out wide or in the hald spaces. Combine this with the rotation of Koopmeiners with one of the 2 strikers and it creates big overloads on either side of the pitch.
His ability to pass into the box and to make coordinated his runs and attack the box himself proved to be dangerous and the focal point for the majority of Atalanta's attacks. The positionning of the wingback and striker mean that Koopmeiners position is difficult to cover and so he can receive the ball eitehr directly or indirectly in space. Once the ball is in this position, Atalanta's willingness to get forward is evident in all the players. It's very comon to see the wide centerbacks laying the ball off before attacking forward to give an extra option in attack. Scalvini, the right centerback highlights this with his heat map, consisting of pushing forward in the right and overlapping into more advanced positions while providing on average 3 progressive passes per match. The 2 holding miedfielders are also not shy of pushing forward. Ederson consistenyl provided dangerous balls for the striker while Pasalic, previously an attacking miedfielder, has been excellent from deeper positions, disrupting opposition's defenses when they least expect it. In the final third, thanks to runs from diferent players and from diferent positions, Atalanta are not reliant on only one way to create chances. And their goals can come from diferent scenarios, such as crosses from wingbacks, throught balls for the striker to chase, or cutbacks from timed runs into the half spaces, meaning that's impossible to predict how Atalanta are going to score their next goal. It's important to note about the psychological benefits that Gasperini gives to his players, by empowering every individuel there is a reason why he is giving new life to struggling players, whetever it's Ketelare after a disappointing season at Milan or Lookman struggling to make a significant impact for Fulham and for Leicester. Lookman is the guy who scored a hat trick in the Europa League final against unbean Bayer Leverkusen by the way in case someone forgot.
How Gasperini Dominated Europe's Biggest Teams
When defending, there are generally 2 diferent shools of thought, either zonal marking, either man marking. Zonal marking is for the managers thinking that the most dangerous threat is the ball while man marking managers believe that the player is the most dangerous threat. Depending of the situation, the majority of the teams will use a mixture of both. Some teams press man to man during the build up but transition into a zonal marking system from more active build positions. For example Man City under Guardiola used to press men to men from opposition goalkick. But will transition into zonal marking system from more active positions, covering passing lanes and trying to force the opposition the ball into designated areas. But it's uncomon to see man marking the way Atalanta do. Gaspereni's mens will follow their direct opponent relentlessly throughout the 90 minutes. And even as the opposition pushes up, they are not afraid to step up their line to close a player down, often resulting in completly diferents patterns and structures depending on the opposition, with no clear miedfield or defensive lines. In Gasperini's words, they are not waiting for opposition to make a msitake, but they are rather chasing the ball to win it back in a proactive way. Some rules are still followed. For example the wingbacks will usually wait to close their player down, first shutting down the risk of a direct ball in behind, before closing quickly the player down if the opposition moves down their flank. Against Liverpool, in Europa league we saw that Liverpool was given little space in the center. But there were slighty more spaces into the flanks and once Liverpool the decision to move down the left flank, Zappacosta would instantly close down the fullback and put pressure on the ball.
The beauty is that it doesn't matter where they are on the pitch. Atalanta are always looking to push up to win the ball. They don't play the offside trap and there is no clear defensive line. But if a player receives the ball with their back to the goal there is absolutly no way he will be able to turn around. This agressive defensive principles become even more interesting when entering the box and defending crosses. Generally speaking a team will look to get as many players as possible between the ball and the goal. Even man making teams will oftne shift to certain lvels of zonal marking in the box, either ressembling a diagonical line or triangle across the 6 yards bow and covering the most dangerou areas of the goal. But Gasperini still insists that the most dangerous elemnt is the player and not the ball. Rarely Atalanta has a fullback shape to rely on. For example in theri win against Monza we could see no player was left unmarked into the box. Atalanta would end up with extra players in the defense sometimes but they would usually pick up a position they believe will give their team the best chance of stopping a goal. But these playesr rarely adopt a specific structure. But this still has weakness that the opposition can exploit. Since there is no specific structure for Atalanta to fall back on, the opposition can and will drag the players aroud to exploit certain spaces. Whlie each player will need to be disciplined in 1 v 1 situations, all it takes is one player loosing track of his men and suddently, Atalanta can find themselves scrambling to pick up the extra player. And the space in behind the defense is usually the target to aim for. Before their match vs Liverpool, Atalanta foud themselves exposed on the back on multiple occasions usually with direct balls toward the striker to chase.
Coordinated moves forward and backward can leave the defender isolated at the back. A simple mistake can lead Atalanta's defense being exposed but this system can be an excellent starting point of any attack. Gasperini rarely shifted away from back 3 system during his carreer as a manager with the biggest difference being often either a 3 4 1 2 or a 3 4 2 1 with the 3 4 1 2 being the most comon formation the 2023 - 2024 season. Atalanta had become throught the seasons a more direct team, looking to get the ball forward into the attackers as quickly as possible. This season their offensive set of players means they can often rely of combinations to create chances. And will often adopt diferent shapes depending on who is playing, also resulting in a lot of diferent attacks. With Lookman they will usually end up with more players between the lines, allowing them to progress the ball centrally and exploit the space out wide witht he wingbacks before attacking forward himself. While playing with Scamacca, his hold up play is much more effective. And Atalanta will often loook out to play more centrally and directly into the forward, who can knock it down between the lines for Koopmeiners who can then play the other forward in behind. In their semi final clash against Marseille, the chooice of switching to a 3 4 2 1 with Lookman and Deketelare between the lines proved to be extremly beneficial and Atalanta were comfortably able to dominate the space between the lines. Scamacca could be relied on as a target men. who can knock it down between the lines For more structured attacks, their formation mean they are creating triangles either side of the pitch, that allows them to find easy passing combinations ad move the ball forward. either out wide or in the hald spaces. Combine this with the rotation of Koopmeiners with one of the 2 strikers and it creates big overloads on either side of the pitch.
His ability to pass into the box and to make coordinated his runs and attack the box himself proved to be dangerous and the focal point for the majority of Atalanta's attacks. The positionning of the wingback and striker mean that Koopmeiners position is difficult to cover and so he can receive the ball eitehr directly or indirectly in space. Once the ball is in this position, Atalanta's willingness to get forward is evident in all the players. It's very comon to see the wide centerbacks laying the ball off before attacking forward to give an extra option in attack. Scalvini, the right centerback highlights this with his heat map, consisting of pushing forward in the right and overlapping into more advanced positions while providing on average 3 progressive passes per match. The 2 holding miedfielders are also not shy of pushing forward. Ederson consistenyl provided dangerous balls for the striker while Pasalic, previously an attacking miedfielder, has been excellent from deeper positions, disrupting opposition's defenses when they least expect it. In the final third, thanks to runs from diferent players and from diferent positions, Atalanta are not reliant on only one way to create chances. And their goals can come from diferent scenarios, such as crosses from wingbacks, throught balls for the striker to chase, or cutbacks from timed runs into the half spaces, meaning that's impossible to predict how Atalanta are going to score their next goal. It's important to note about the psychological benefits that Gasperini gives to his players, by empowering every individuel there is a reason why he is giving new life to struggling players, whetever it's Ketelare after a disappointing season at Milan or Lookman struggling to make a significant impact for Fulham and for Leicester. Lookman is the guy who scored a hat trick in the Europa League final against unbean Bayer Leverkusen by the way in case someone forgot.
J'EN PROFITE POUR LE REPETER ENCORE UNE FOIS! CE TOPIC EST INADMISSIBLE!
How One Manager Finally BROKE Alonso's Tactics
In the first 15 minutes, Atalanta barely had the ball. Yet they were in control of the game. The 3 center backs had a men advantage meaning that they had a free man, normally a wide center back who could move up the pitch But this match was different. Rather than being passive with his defenders forming a back 5, Gasperini was agressive with his front 3 going man to man. Grimaldo on the left usually looked to push high to attack but the pressure on the center backs was so hard he had to move deeper to be an option. But Atalanta kept suffocating Leverkusen with their wingbacks, Tappacosta and Ruggeri pressing Leverkusen's wingbacks, But one crafty turn by Xhaka or Palacios and they would ahve an immediate numerical advantage. But that moment never came. Atalanta's pressing was perfect. Even if the central miedfielders were receiving the ball, there was no chance of receiving it while facing Atalanta's goal. It would often force them backward. So Leverkusen's pivots had to take more risks, either take a risky turn, or aim to win the ball quickly. But Atalanta's pivots were ready to intercept any passes, allowing to win the ball back and attacking Leverkusen's center backs. With the miedfield cut off and the pressure mouting, Alonso searched for a solution. After the match, Alonso stated that they should have play more long balls. The thing is Leverkusen played long more often, at least wwhen it comes down to the 3 centerbacks. The difference is that it was Atalanta forciing them to do so rather than Leverkusen choosing it. Hincape, Tah and Tapsoba had more long balls playing than average during this season. When Ederson and Koopmeiners went against Leverkusen's pivots, the front 3 threated to make runs in behind Now Frimpong could hold the width and Wirtz drop deeper. Stanisic looked to invert agressivly.
But Atalanta's secret was the trust Gasperini had in his players. This meant that the centerbacks had the freedome to go high in their man to man orientation. Hien, the right wide centerback of Atalanta, was hoding own against Adli Djimsiti would follow Wirtz to shut hum down and the man to man orientation meant that the back 3 would be as loopsided as they were running away from the front 3. It resulted in some gaps being open in central regions. Adli wsa supposed to be the man going in but Stanisic also stepped up on rare occasions here. Frimpong on the other side was perfectly positionned because not only he was isolating the wide centerback Kolasinac but the others forwards created room in the defense. Paired with the vertical spaces created by Atalanta backline meant that he was perfectly positionned to make the run in behind. In possession, Atalanta's wingbacks were more agressive, Zappacosta particularly pushing high. De Ketelare and Lookman could then tigh their shape around Xhaka. When Lookman dropped deep, dragging a centerback, it opened up spaces When being high on the pitch, Atalanta's main focus was trying as many shoots as possible. It was helped by the ball moving wide quickly supported by the attacking wingbacks, which allowed the front 3 to focus on attacking the box high up, rather than making connexions deep. Boniface came on for Leverkusen with Frimpong moving to the wingback position but only on paper, since he still stayed very high. It had the advantage of keeping the front 3 at close proximity, opening up the potential for combinations. The reason why Alonso didn't start with that is Tapsoba would be isolated on the transitions as the right centerback. Bonifca allowed Leverkusen offensive players to push forward as he was not only a target man but also able to link between the miedfield and the attack while holding off Hien, Atalanta's central centerback.
Nagelsmann’s tactics are even crazier than I thought
One of Nageslman's pilar is to always adapt to the opposition. He himself said in an interview that most coaches like to stretch the opposition's miedfield line but that he prefered to pull the defenders apart and create spaces in the final third. When Nageslmann sometimes choose to build up in a 3 1 3 3 against a compact 4 4 2, it's because it allows the attacking line to be much wider with the wingers hugging each touchline. Against a 5 3 2 defensive shape, the opposition's miedfield can stay compact while pressuring the left center back. But the wingback is centered out wide by the winger, isolated in the right back 1 v 1. It created spaces. Nagelsmann said he viewed the game mostly in term of spaces.and manipulate opposition's shape via rigid structures. When he was managing Leipzig,, rather than ball circulation, he wanted to put the ball forward very quickly. This often meant finding central routes in the lines. From that you could see 3 mens combinations. But it has some risks as with the players spread out, a dispossession in the center can be very difficult to counterpress. As a result, center backs could be quickly exposed. So rather having his players being in strict places like it was often the case with him, his players would be a lot closer together, often congregating between the lines.
So when you loose the ball, players are closer to it to counterpress. Nagelsmann came with the concept of relative width. Or variable witdh. The idea is that having both wingers are not hugging the touchline all time, Nagelsmann's wingers will only stay out wide as they need to be. When one winger hug the touchline to stretch the defensive opposition, the opposite winger will often be more narrow. You will often see narrow wingers in transitions situations. Before the ball goes centrally, the winger is often hugging the touchline. However, as soon as the miedfielder receives between the lines, the winger start drifting inside so he can receive the ball closer to the box. Stay wide is only to stretch the defense. The narrower the frontline is, the more players you have to counterpress. At Leipzig and even more at Bayern, you often see both swings as arrow and this block players in the box. So when cross is done, everyone is ready to jump on the rebound, ricochets and of course press if it falls to an opponent. You would end up with waves and waves of crosses and counterpress. So Nagelsmann has gegenpress among his principles with the players proximity and relative width. At Hoffenheim, he was known for his compact 5 3 2 which we of course never saw at Bayern. However one of his principles is also the pressing trap. It happens when he is not trying activly to have the ball back but would rather force the opponent into a position of disadvantage, moving the ball down the line where 5 Hoffenheim players have clustered. When he was in Bayern, although the press was more agressive and happening higher on the pitch, the same principles do remain : angled runs forcing ball down the touchline. So it's about setting pressing traps regardless of defensive shape. But recently, Nageslamnn has been trying to no longer trying to adap to the opponent and trying to manipulate spaces by implementing rigid structures. Width wasn't just relative, but optinonal.
It was often provided by the wide fullbacks who didn't arrive until later in the build up.
Tactical Analysis : Brazil 1-1 Croatia | How Brazil Got Knocked Out |
Biggest mistakes of Brazil vs Croatia.
-Letting Richarlison play with a hamstring injury and only subbing him at the 83 minutes mark
-Replacing Vini with Rodrygo instead of Martinelli (or just let Vini play ffs)
-Replacing Militão instead of Danilo
-And the most unforgiving, unexplicable and mindblowing mistake: Fred.
Imagine having Fabinho on the bench but sticking with Fred instead.
How One Manager Finally BROKE Alonso's Tactics
In the first 15 minutes, Atalanta barely had the ball. Yet they were in control of the game. The 3 center backs had a men advantage meaning that they had a free man, normally a wide center back who could move up the pitch But this match was different. Rather than being passive with his defenders forming a back 5, Gasperini was agressive with his front 3 going man to man. Grimaldo on the left usually looked to push high to attack but the pressure on the center backs was so hard he had to move deeper to be an option. But Atalanta kept suffocating Leverkusen with their wingbacks, Tappacosta and Ruggeri pressing Leverkusen's wingbacks, But one crafty turn by Xhaka or Palacios and they would ahve an immediate numerical advantage. But that moment never came. Atalanta's pressing was perfect. Even if the central miedfielders were receiving the ball, there was no chance of receiving it while facing Atalanta's goal. It would often force them backward. So Leverkusen's pivots had to take more risks, either take a risky turn, or aim to win the ball quickly. But Atalanta's pivots were ready to intercept any passes, allowing to win the ball back and attacking Leverkusen's center backs. With the miedfield cut off and the pressure mouting, Alonso searched for a solution. After the match, Alonso stated that they should have play more long balls. The thing is Leverkusen played long more often, at least wwhen it comes down to the 3 centerbacks. The difference is that it was Atalanta forciing them to do so rather than Leverkusen choosing it. Hincape, Tah and Tapsoba had more long balls playing than average during this season. When Ederson and Koopmeiners went against Leverkusen's pivots, the front 3 threated to make runs in behind Now Frimpong could hold the width and Wirtz drop deeper. Stanisic looked to invert agressivly.
But Atalanta's secret was the trust Gasperini had in his players. This meant that the centerbacks had the freedome to go high in their man to man orientation. Hien, the right wide centerback of Atalanta, was hoding own against Adli Djimsiti would follow Wirtz to shut hum down and the man to man orientation meant that the back 3 would be as loopsided as they were running away from the front 3. It resulted in some gaps being open in central regions. Adli wsa supposed to be the man going in but Stanisic also stepped up on rare occasions here. Frimpong on the other side was perfectly positionned because not only he was isolating the wide centerback Kolasinac but the others forwards created room in the defense. Paired with the vertical spaces created by Atalanta backline meant that he was perfectly positionned to make the run in behind. In possession, Atalanta's wingbacks were more agressive, Zappacosta particularly pushing high. De Ketelare and Lookman could then tigh their shape around Xhaka. When Lookman dropped deep, dragging a centerback, it opened up spaces When being high on the pitch, Atalanta's main focus was trying as many shoots as possible. It was helped by the ball moving wide quickly supported by the attacking wingbacks, which allowed the front 3 to focus on attacking the box high up, rather than making connexions deep. Boniface came on for Leverkusen with Frimpong moving to the wingback position but only on paper, since he still stayed very high. It had the advantage of keeping the front 3 at close proximity, opening up the potential for combinations. The reason why Alonso didn't start with that is Tapsoba would be isolated on the transitions as the right centerback. Bonifca allowed Leverkusen offensive players to push forward as he was not only a target man but also able to link between the miedfield and the attack while holding off Hien, Atalanta's central centerback.
Nagelsmann’s tactics are even crazier than I thought
One of Nageslman's pilar is to always adapt to the opposition. He himself said in an interview that most coaches like to stretch the opposition's miedfield line but that he prefered to pull the defenders apart and create spaces in the final third. When Nageslmann sometimes choose to build up in a 3 1 3 3 against a compact 4 4 2, it's because it allows the attacking line to be much wider with the wingers hugging each touchline. Against a 5 3 2 defensive shape, the opposition's miedfield can stay compact while pressuring the left center back. But the wingback is centered out wide by the winger, isolated in the right back 1 v 1. It created spaces. Nagelsmann said he viewed the game mostly in term of spaces.and manipulate opposition's shape via rigid structures. When he was managing Leipzig,, rather than ball circulation, he wanted to put the ball forward very quickly. This often meant finding central routes in the lines. From that you could see 3 mens combinations. But it has some risks as with the players spread out, a dispossession in the center can be very difficult to counterpress. As a result, center backs could be quickly exposed. So rather having his players being in strict places like it was often the case with him, his players would be a lot closer together, often congregating between the lines.
So when you loose the ball, players are closer to it to counterpress. Nagelsmann came with the concept of relative width. Or variable witdh. The idea is that having both wingers are not hugging the touchline all time, Nagelsmann's wingers will only stay out wide as they need to be. When one winger hug the touchline to stretch the defensive opposition, the opposite winger will often be more narrow. You will often see narrow wingers in transitions situations. Before the ball goes centrally, the winger is often hugging the touchline. However, as soon as the miedfielder receives between the lines, the winger start drifting inside so he can receive the ball closer to the box. Stay wide is only to stretch the defense. The narrower the frontline is, the more players you have to counterpress. At Leipzig and even more at Bayern, you often see both swings as arrow and this block players in the box. So when cross is done, everyone is ready to jump on the rebound, ricochets and of course press if it falls to an opponent. You would end up with waves and waves of crosses and counterpress. So Nagelsmann has gegenpress among his principles with the players proximity and relative width. At Hoffenheim, he was known for his compact 5 3 2 which we of course never saw at Bayern. However one of his principles is also the pressing trap. It happens when he is not trying activly to have the ball back but would rather force the opponent into a position of disadvantage, moving the ball down the line where 5 Hoffenheim players have clustered. When he was in Bayern, although the press was more agressive and happening higher on the pitch, the same principles do remain : angled runs forcing ball down the touchline. So it's about setting pressing traps regardless of defensive shape. But recently, Nageslamnn has been trying to no longer trying to adap to the opponent and trying to manipulate spaces by implementing rigid structures. Width wasn't just relative, but optinonal.
It was often provided by the wide fullbacks who didn't arrive until later in the build up.
Biggest mistakes of Brazil vs Croatia.
-Letting Richarlison play with a hamstring injury and only subbing him at the 83 minutes mark
-Replacing Vini with Rodrygo instead of Martinelli (or just let Vini play ffs)
-Replacing Militão instead of Danilo
-And the most unforgiving, unexplicable and mindblowing mistake: Fred.
Imagine having Fabinho on the bench but sticking with Fred instead.
Aya 200 pages.
Thomas Tuchel's Chelsea Tactics Explained | How Tuchel's Changed Chelsea |
Tuchel's tactics at Chelsea.
Tuchel brought consistency and slight twiks as well. His line up were either a 3 4 2, either a 3 4 1 2. He had players he would consistently start while only the wide attackers would rotate often with Havertz, Zieg and Hudson coming to replace Mount and Werner when needed. Also the right wingback position with Reece James and H Odoi rotating. Across the 2 formations, the build up are quite similar. Tuchel liked to keep possession of the ball. It started from the goalkepper who had a lot of options with the wide centerbacks spreasing wide, allowing the wingbacks to push up. It made it harder for opponents to press as Chelsea had 5 players deep, 3 centerbacks and 2 central miedfielder. And of course the gk, being either Mendy either Kepa. CHelsea passed the first phase relativly unchallenged since a man to man press made them vulnerable deeper. Higher up in the build up, Chelsea often maintained a 3 2 shape which gave them many options. Azpilicueta and Rudiger both as wide centerbacks had the responsability to carry the ball into the miedfield third to pass the first line of pressure and open up more passing options. If the opponent pressed with a front 3, in 4 3 3 in particular, Chelsea would often use the wide regions to their advantage with a wingback dropping deeper while the inside forward would occupy the wide regions left by the wingbacks. Alternativly, the forwards could drop into the wide regions instead. A double pivot made of Jorginho and Kovacic or Kanté had been crucial for their system. They were comfortable with the ball, creating options to receive the ball between the lines and often able to combine into tigh spaces to bypass their markers. Jorginho tended to be the deepest of the 2, acting like a metronome, looking to rotate the ball around the pitch.
So Kovacic was given more responsability and freedom at progressing the ball. Some teams would often go man to man against Chelsea's double pivots. Kovacic took advantage of this, using his dribbling ability to get pass his man. So Chelsea had a man advantage higher up. Mout is also capable of dropping deep to give numerical advantages in the miedfield when needed. He has been effective at doing this, picking the ball and play it to the runners and forwards ahead of him. So we coudl see Chelsea creating sides overloads to create spaces. Due to the pivots being trapped so closely, it often involved both of them moving wide, sometimes on the left, dragging the opposite miedfielder across with Mount dropping into these spaces created in the miedfield to receive helped by the winger ahead of him or occasionally by the wingback. We also saw sometimes 2 inside forwards dropping deep almost in the miedfield so the shape often looked like a box. which often made the opposition's miedfield to decide between pressing high and pressure the pivot which allow mens to be between the lines. Or dropping deeper and giving Jorginho and Kovacic more spaces Higher on the pitch, Chelsea used wide combinations between the forwards and the wingbacks. Down the left, Alonso was one of the best in the world in his position while Werner would try to get behind the defender or to be slightly deeper to get the ball, dragging the fullback infield, allowing the wingback to make his run out wide. Werner did that more often than being in the box to finish off, which could translate a lack of confidence.
Chelsea's attacking structure meant that they sometimes had a 5 v 4 advantage. And Chelsea had been brillant on the right side too. If the fullback choosed to pick Chelsea's right wingback, then Mount could often receive the ball in the half space. And once the fulllback close him down, he find the wingback in a great position to get a cross. In 4 3 1 2, Azpilicueta push even higher to find the width. Mount and an inside forward combined with one often dropping deep, creating space in the backline for the other to attack. In 3 4 1 2, when defending, Abraham and Werner could press the centerbacks while Mout stay deeper to cut off a center option, forcing the opposition to play outwide. Then, Chelsea's wingback could push higher to apply the pressure quickly. It was facilitated by the back 3, as they could shift to a back 4 rapidly to ensure that the opposition in not free to use these spaces. Similarly, when opponent build with 3, Mount could push up into the first line of pressure alongside the 2 others to maintain the man to man press with Jorginho and Kovacic pushing higher up in these phases to cover the central options. As they only had a double pivot, this press could be broken if the opposition had 3 mens here. It was often the trigger for Chelsea to drop into a more stable shape, a 5 4 1 with the inside forwards moving wider to prevent overloads. They then slow down the opponent and make it harder for them to create opportunities. And with 3 centerbacks, they can defend the box well. It's worth noticing that by the end of 2020/2021 season, It was Kanté who came to replace Kovacic in that midfield. And he did a very great job here. And at the end of the day, Tuchel managed to win the UCL with Chelsea in 2021 just one year after reaching the final with PSG and loosing it barely, prooving he was definitly an elite manager.
What Was Pep Thinking? Champions League Final Tactics Explained | Man City Vs Chelsea UCL
UCL final 2021 tactics.
In this final, Chelsea stick to their 3 4 2 1 with Kanté and Jorginho being the center miedfielders. But Guardiola made a lot of changes that surprised everyone. Walker, Diaz, Stones and Zinchenko were the defenders as expected. But the miedfield was more surprising with Guardiola starting Gundogan as the holding miedfielder with Bernardo Silva and Phil Foden respectivly on the right and left. No cdm. No Rodri or Fernandinho. The front 3 having Sterling in the left, De Bruyne in front and Mahrez also caught a lot of people off guard. The essential idea was to have 6 offensive minded players who could pass and be fluid in their positionning with the wingers cutting inside, De Bruyne as a false 9 and allowing both Silva and Foden to attack the backline to pressure Chelsea's back 3. But City lost valuable protection in front of the back 4 by having Gundogan as a holding miedfielder. During the first hald, Chelsea was able to exploit it a lot of times. The main idea of having Sterling in the left despite him being out of form was for him to find pockets of spaces between Chelsea"'s right wingback and Chelsea's right center back. And Gundogan was forced into a more defensive role even throught he had been excellent in a more offensive minded position. With Kanté dominating the miedfield for Chelsea, Foden became lost in here. Tuchel wanted to work with the 11 players that worked so well with him in the past in the same compo and formation. In the other hand, Guardiola choose a more reactive approach, looking to counter how Chelsea would play rather than fielding his strongest starting 11.
City wanted to dominate possession and attempted to move the ball throught the lines. And to find Mahrez or Sterling between the lines between the centerbacks and the wingbacks. Chelsea looked to hit Man City with very quick transitions and counter attacks. They would try to feed the front 3 in the pockets of space either side of the centerbacks. Also Chelsea didn't look to press to high. And their compact shape made extremly difficult for City to play between the lines. In the other hand,, City took a more agressive approach when they didn't have the ball, playing with a high line and pressing the centerbacks as soon as possible.
With the wingbacks and Werner in front, it formed a square for Chelsea covering the whole pitch and making it difficult for City to defend against. And City had a lot of outlets as soon as they won the ball. Kanté moved into an area to create overloads. In the semi final of the FA Cup the same 2021 year, Fernandinho as a cdm would not allow him to turn and pick out any vertical pass. But with Gundogan in he was caught out as he likes to press higher on the pitch. Stones tried to close him down in this UCL final when Chelsea's goal was scored. Werner did a good run to drag Diaz out to open the center of the pitch for Kai Havertz to run into. This was poor from ZInchenko but the ball from Mount was worldclass. The tactical changes saw Guardiola in the second half replacing De Bruyne who went injured because of a collision with Rudiger, by Gabriel Jesus, a surprising change since most people expected Sergio Aguero. A cdm was introduced in the 65th minute but for Man City it was too late. The compact 5 of the back shape with Havertz and Mout dropping deep either side of Jorginho and Kanté, making impossible for City to create any chance. The formation for City moved more into a 4 1 3 2 in the final half hour of the match. James and CHilwell were pocketing Sterling and Mahrez. It would result in hopeless crosses in the box with Jesus and Aguero being outnumbered in 3 v 2.
Thomas Tuchel's Chelsea Tactics Explained | How Tuchel's Changed Chelsea |
Tuchel's tactics at Chelsea.
Tuchel brought consistency and slight twiks as well. His line up were either a 3 4 2, either a 3 4 1 2. He had players he would consistently start while only the wide attackers would rotate often with Havertz, Zieg and Hudson coming to replace Mount and Werner when needed. Also the right wingback position with Reece James and H Odoi rotating. Across the 2 formations, the build up are quite similar. Tuchel liked to keep possession of the ball. It started from the goalkepper who had a lot of options with the wide centerbacks spreasing wide, allowing the wingbacks to push up. It made it harder for opponents to press as Chelsea had 5 players deep, 3 centerbacks and 2 central miedfielder. And of course the gk, being either Mendy either Kepa. CHelsea passed the first phase relativly unchallenged since a man to man press made them vulnerable deeper. Higher up in the build up, Chelsea often maintained a 3 2 shape which gave them many options. Azpilicueta and Rudiger both as wide centerbacks had the responsability to carry the ball into the miedfield third to pass the first line of pressure and open up more passing options. If the opponent pressed with a front 3, in 4 3 3 in particular, Chelsea would often use the wide regions to their advantage with a wingback dropping deeper while the inside forward would occupy the wide regions left by the wingbacks. Alternativly, the forwards could drop into the wide regions instead. A double pivot made of Jorginho and Kovacic or Kanté had been crucial for their system. They were comfortable with the ball, creating options to receive the ball between the lines and often able to combine into tigh spaces to bypass their markers. Jorginho tended to be the deepest of the 2, acting like a metronome, looking to rotate the ball around the pitch.
So Kovacic was given more responsability and freedom at progressing the ball. Some teams would often go man to man against Chelsea's double pivots. Kovacic took advantage of this, using his dribbling ability to get pass his man. So Chelsea had a man advantage higher up. Mout is also capable of dropping deep to give numerical advantages in the miedfield when needed. He has been effective at doing this, picking the ball and play it to the runners and forwards ahead of him. So we coudl see Chelsea creating sides overloads to create spaces. Due to the pivots being trapped so closely, it often involved both of them moving wide, sometimes on the left, dragging the opposite miedfielder across with Mount dropping into these spaces created in the miedfield to receive helped by the winger ahead of him or occasionally by the wingback. We also saw sometimes 2 inside forwards dropping deep almost in the miedfield so the shape often looked like a box. which often made the opposition's miedfield to decide between pressing high and pressure the pivot which allow mens to be between the lines. Or dropping deeper and giving Jorginho and Kovacic more spaces Higher on the pitch, Chelsea used wide combinations between the forwards and the wingbacks. Down the left, Alonso was one of the best in the world in his position while Werner would try to get behind the defender or to be slightly deeper to get the ball, dragging the fullback infield, allowing the wingback to make his run out wide. Werner did that more often than being in the box to finish off, which could translate a lack of confidence.
Chelsea's attacking structure meant that they sometimes had a 5 v 4 advantage. And Chelsea had been brillant on the right side too. If the fullback choosed to pick Chelsea's right wingback, then Mount could often receive the ball in the half space. And once the fulllback close him down, he find the wingback in a great position to get a cross. In 4 3 1 2, Azpilicueta push even higher to find the width. Mount and an inside forward combined with one often dropping deep, creating space in the backline for the other to attack. In 3 4 1 2, when defending, Abraham and Werner could press the centerbacks while Mout stay deeper to cut off a center option, forcing the opposition to play outwide. Then, Chelsea's wingback could push higher to apply the pressure quickly. It was facilitated by the back 3, as they could shift to a back 4 rapidly to ensure that the opposition in not free to use these spaces. Similarly, when opponent build with 3, Mount could push up into the first line of pressure alongside the 2 others to maintain the man to man press with Jorginho and Kovacic pushing higher up in these phases to cover the central options. As they only had a double pivot, this press could be broken if the opposition had 3 mens here. It was often the trigger for Chelsea to drop into a more stable shape, a 5 4 1 with the inside forwards moving wider to prevent overloads. They then slow down the opponent and make it harder for them to create opportunities. And with 3 centerbacks, they can defend the box well. It's worth noticing that by the end of 2020/2021 season, It was Kanté who came to replace Kovacic in that midfield. And he did a very great job here. And at the end of the day, Tuchel managed to win the UCL with Chelsea in 2021 just one year after reaching the final with PSG and loosing it barely, prooving he was definitly an elite manager.
What Was Pep Thinking? Champions League Final Tactics Explained | Man City Vs Chelsea UCL
UCL final 2021 tactics.
In this final, Chelsea stick to their 3 4 2 1 with Kanté and Jorginho being the center miedfielders. But Guardiola made a lot of changes that surprised everyone. Walker, Diaz, Stones and Zinchenko were the defenders as expected. But the miedfield was more surprising with Guardiola starting Gundogan as the holding miedfielder with Bernardo Silva and Phil Foden respectivly on the right and left. No cdm. No Rodri or Fernandinho. The front 3 having Sterling in the left, De Bruyne in front and Mahrez also caught a lot of people off guard. The essential idea was to have 6 offensive minded players who could pass and be fluid in their positionning with the wingers cutting inside, De Bruyne as a false 9 and allowing both Silva and Foden to attack the backline to pressure Chelsea's back 3. But City lost valuable protection in front of the back 4 by having Gundogan as a holding miedfielder. During the first hald, Chelsea was able to exploit it a lot of times. The main idea of having Sterling in the left despite him being out of form was for him to find pockets of spaces between Chelsea"'s right wingback and Chelsea's right center back. And Gundogan was forced into a more defensive role even throught he had been excellent in a more offensive minded position. With Kanté dominating the miedfield for Chelsea, Foden became lost in here. Tuchel wanted to work with the 11 players that worked so well with him in the past in the same compo and formation. In the other hand, Guardiola choose a more reactive approach, looking to counter how Chelsea would play rather than fielding his strongest starting 11.
City wanted to dominate possession and attempted to move the ball throught the lines. And to find Mahrez or Sterling between the lines between the centerbacks and the wingbacks. Chelsea looked to hit Man City with very quick transitions and counter attacks. They would try to feed the front 3 in the pockets of space either side of the centerbacks. Also Chelsea didn't look to press to high. And their compact shape made extremly difficult for City to play between the lines. In the other hand,, City took a more agressive approach when they didn't have the ball, playing with a high line and pressing the centerbacks as soon as possible.
With the wingbacks and Werner in front, it formed a square for Chelsea covering the whole pitch and making it difficult for City to defend against. And City had a lot of outlets as soon as they won the ball. Kanté moved into an area to create overloads. In the semi final of the FA Cup the same 2021 year, Fernandinho as a cdm would not allow him to turn and pick out any vertical pass. But with Gundogan in he was caught out as he likes to press higher on the pitch. Stones tried to close him down in this UCL final when Chelsea's goal was scored. Werner did a good run to drag Diaz out to open the center of the pitch for Kai Havertz to run into. This was poor from ZInchenko but the ball from Mount was worldclass. The tactical changes saw Guardiola in the second half replacing De Bruyne who went injured because of a collision with Rudiger, by Gabriel Jesus, a surprising change since most people expected Sergio Aguero. A cdm was introduced in the 65th minute but for Man City it was too late. The compact 5 of the back shape with Havertz and Mout dropping deep either side of Jorginho and Kanté, making impossible for City to create any chance. The formation for City moved more into a 4 1 3 2 in the final half hour of the match. James and CHilwell were pocketing Sterling and Mahrez. It would result in hopeless crosses in the box with Jesus and Aguero being outnumbered in 3 v 2.
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La Meilleure Tactique de Man United dont Personne ne Parle…
Back then in 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right midfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central midfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the midfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit.
Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide midfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player.
They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whenever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack.
When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming midfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide midfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide midfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was balanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.
La Meilleure Tactique de Man United dont Personne ne Parle…
Back then in 2007 - 2008, Man United displayed their best football, having Tevez, Rooney and Ronaldo as their attacking trio. To the point that only Guardiola's Barcelona stood out as a worthy competitor. If Barcelona didn't exist, Man United would have win 2 more UCL. If they didn't loose FA Cup to Portmsouth, 2007 2008 season would have been their second treble after 1998 1998 season. During this season Sir Alex favored a 4 4 2 formation with Vidic and Ferdinand being center backs. Scholes and Ronaldo would be respectively central and right midfielder. Rooney and Tevez would form the front 2. However it was not typical 4 4 2 as it was more asymetric with opposition having difficult time to read them. You could see the striker dropping deep and passing for a central midfielder takign a striker position for example. Roonay, Ronaldo and Tevez scored 70% of United's goals this season. As soon as they lost the ball they employed a 3 shape pattern. In the front 2 one would drop deeper than the other usually. Upon regaining ball the midfielder would immediatly launch ball into the more advanced forward. He could then pass back to his partner coming from deep, trigerring defenders to move towards him. This then clears up the space for Ronaldo to cut inside. Their positionnal play however was what made them stand out. In every situation Sir Alex aimed for numerical advantage situation during build up. Many teams at that time adopted a 4 4 2 formation with their front 2 marking the center backs. Carrick would often drop between Vidic and Ferdinand to counter this while Ronaldo joins the front 3 and Giggs drifts centrally as number 10. So the formation often looked like a 3 3 1 3. It stretched the opposition vertically which allowed the front 3 to position themselves near the lasrt line of defense. It provided United short options as well as long options to exploit.
Also this formationc reated a numerical superiority almost everywhere on the pitch. The back 3 allowed Man United to bypass the first line of press. When the ball was being played wide, Giggs was playing in the center and then drift into the half space near the ball. This structure helped United to pass throught the first as well as the second line of press. But United didn't only played from the back as opponents didn't dare to send a lot of players forwards in that time, making it difficult for Man United to create spaces at the back and usually were roamed around the half line. So to counter this Sir Alex Ferguson would position 6 players into the attacking half with the wide midfielders moving inside to act as number 10. The fullbacks would push up to take the winger roles. It lead opposition to favor more man marking rather than zonal marking. It opened spaces between them and Man United capitalized on this by playing long balls into these gaps. With the opposition being busy with 1 v 1, It xwas easier for the frontline to use their skills and speed. But when Man United lost the ball rather than pressing directly, they agressivly targeted the potential passing lines and tried to intercept their connexions. If United's first line of press was bypassed, they would drop back into a mid block where they applied theyr successfull system helping them to regain possession which they call 1 + 3 support pattern. When someone loose the ball he is going to press him and then 3 players must shield the ball carrier from the left, right and center. These players act as supportive pressers, aiming to create a diamong shape around the player.
They constantly pressed the opposition this way and won the ball back quickly. When they got the ball into the final third, they would often split the defensive opposition. When attacking, United often transition into a 2 3 5 structure When ball is played to Ferdinand who attempt a diagonal pass to Ronaldo who is out wide for example, the players who are in the half spaces make wide runs. This drags his marker and Ronaldo's markers near the flanks. It cuts the opposition's backline into half. Central players from United then take their , remaining positions inside the box. So a quick cross from Ronaldo could be a disaster for the opponents to contain and result in conceding. They had good crossing tactics with both wide sides of the 5 positionned to stay wide. Among the 3 others players, one would target the near post drawing the attention of both center backs and the goalkepper, while the others 2 were given the freedom to roam according to the spaces created by the first player's movement. It often leds to a 2 v 1 situation over the opposition's fullbacks. It increased their probability to win the ball from crosses and score. But when defending, as they move back into their 4 4 2, every players are instructed to stay within their position. During the opposition's build up, Sir Alex prefered to not engage with high pressing with his forwards. He made a mid or low block inviting his opposition to advance further. One of the reasons for this was to create spaces behind the advancing opposition and hit them on the couter into these spaces whenever they won the ball back, effectively turning defense into attack.
When it comes to the players roles, Van Der Sar was a standard goalkepper who rarely went out to sweep the ball Unlike many goalkeppers today, he was not used a lot in the build up. Ferdinand would be the ball playing defender in the right. With his excellent passing range he could play long balls into the forwards. On the left, Evra acted more as a wingback, pushing higher than Wes Brow, the right back, occupying the spaces left by Giggs or Ronaldo once they invert. Carrick would be a deep lying playmaker, playing often deeper than Scholes and form a temporary back 3 when needed, allowing the fullbacks to take off. He also originated a lot of Man United's counter attacks and was an excellent long passing footballer. Scholes was acting like a roaming midfielder, as a connecter between the lines, interchanging positions with wide midfielders and forwards. While on the right, Ronaldo would act as an inside forward, usually staying higher than a typical wide midfielder. He inverted most of the times and attracted markers toward him, creating spaces for others to take on and score. Rooney acted as a deep lying forward, being a creator, with his ability to drop and drawing defenders out of position facilitating Man United's attacking patterns. While Tevez would play more as an advanced forward because he had the skills and the strenght to loose defenders easily and break the defensive line. Back then there was a surging trend of counter attacking football. So rather than applying control or attacking mindset, most managers used to play with a balanced style which gave them the chance to hit teams on the break while maintaining their structures. Sir Alex liked to stretch his team both vertically and horizontally. He kept a high tempo in order to apply quick transitions while their defensive structure was balanced,, using a 4 4 2 mid block in order to attract the opposition's further. When it comes to final third, Ronaldo and Scholes were given the freedom to take shoots from far. Using their V shape passing, they used also a lot of throught balls during counter attacks. These tactics does not look very applicable today but back then, many managers took inspiration from this and clinched titles in the seasons that followed. Using these concepts with the right kind of players made Man United one of the best team in history of football.
Remigrez!!!
Louis auguste je t'ai à l'œil
