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Tactical Analysis : Argentina 3-3 France | Messi and Mbappe Show Why They're The Best |
Even when Griezmann looked to press Fernandez it would create problems as when Argentina had the ball on the right handside, both Tchouaméni and Rabiot would be dragged across because Argentina had so many numbers on the right handside. That would leave spaces in the midfield, meaning that with quick passes, Argentina could find Mc Allistair bursting forward, which would lead to problems higher up the pitch. Argentina also overloaded the midfield because with the fullbacks being very agressive, Messi could have a free role, acting like an attacking midfielder so Argentina could have a 4 v 2 centrally or if Griezmann came back in time or Rabiot shifted centrally, a 4 v 3. Deschamps responded by bringing on Kolo Muani and Thuram on the pitch. allowing them to alter their defensive shape.Thuram would move to the left while Mbappé would be up centrally. So even if Griezmann was caught high up the pitch, Tchouaméni and Rabiot could act as a dedicated double pivot with Thuram on the left wing. So it became more difficult for Argentina to overload this right hand side and even when they did it would not be both Rabiot and Tchouaméni who would come across but rather one of them. And Griezmann could still drop to form what looked like a 4 5 1. With Molina pushing high, the pace of Mbappé combined with Thuram could be dangerous in counter attacks. Even in possession, France came from barely 40% of possession before the substitution to 50% after the double substitution. When it was possible, France looked to build up with a back 3 as Argentina was defending with a front 2 So Koundé would be the fullback tucking in while Hernandez pushed higher on the left handside. An ideal situation would see Rabiot pushing up high alongside Griezmann but in this final he was more willing to drop as a second pivot alongside Tchouaméni.
One thing that Argentina also did well was to protect the center of the pitch, primarly using the cover shadowss of the 2 forwards although Alvarez was more willing to apply pressure to the 2 center backs. When he applied the pressure, the pivots were willing to back it up. Dembelé also dropped deep to drag his fullback up front and open up spaces for Griezmann to run in behind for either Dembelé to pass to either Koundé to directly find. Argentina dealt with this by using pressure. Alvarez applied pressure on Varane so he couldn't make his difficult progressive passes and having a work horse like Di Maria meant that as soon that the ball was received by Koundé, Di Maria came to press him. When this happened Dembelé dropped deeper and Tagliafico followed him so Dembelé couldn't turn and make the pass. And even when Griezmann attempted these runs in behind, Mc Allistair was disciplined enough to track him. Instead of pressing, Messi's role was to cut off the pass into the central lane. And even if the ball worked this way in, the insane work rate of De Paul was extremely important as he would have to cover across for Messi. whever this was Hernandez or Rabiot looking to make the run in behind. We also initially, when Mbappé didn't have success out wide, Hernandez looking to provide all the width and Mbappé acting as a second forward alongside Giroud. Having an extra man up here would also allow Rabiot to drop alongside Tchouaméni. Especially when the Argentinian pivots were backing up the press of the forwards, Mbappé and Giroud would both look to drop in between the lines to receive the ball. Despite leaving gaps in the defense, the center backs were agressive, following their man. Argentina had to hope that the pressure from the forwards would make the passes into these central gaps too difficult. And it worked. Also Hernandez being very high, Argentina looked to exploit the space left behind him during transitions, especially at the beginning of the second half.
So Deschamps subbed off Hernandez for Camavinga who as a midfielder would tend to be more conservative rather than overlapping. The first thing substitutions brought to France was flexibility. Thuram could remain wide when needed but Mbappé doesn't particulary like being confined as a center forward but instead likes to drift around. So what we could see when France had the ball higher up the pitch was him shfting to the left handside and Thuram taking his place more centrally. That freedom, particulary when Hernandez was still on would allow Mbappé to drift around the pitch as there was a center forward and a man down the left hand side providing the width. Also Kolo Muani being a threat on the right hand side meant that France could effectively attack with a 4 2 4 with the front 4 looking for man to man situations against Argentina's defenders and looking to rotate positions when needed. When the width was bring on by Hernandez or Camavinga, this freed Mbappé even more with him dropping deeper to get on the ball ans really make an impact on the game, which he ended up doing. Another advantage provided was that when the ball went wide, they had now more numbers attacking the box, in addition to the fact that they could go longer with more mens around the ball.
Tactical Analysis : Argentina 3-3 France | Messi and Mbappe Show Why They're The Best |
Even when Griezmann looked to press Fernandez it would create problems as when Argentina had the ball on the right handside, both Tchouaméni and Rabiot would be dragged across because Argentina had so many numbers on the right handside. That would leave spaces in the midfield, meaning that with quick passes, Argentina could find Mc Allistair bursting forward, which would lead to problems higher up the pitch. Argentina also overloaded the midfield because with the fullbacks being very agressive, Messi could have a free role, acting like an attacking midfielder so Argentina could have a 4 v 2 centrally or if Griezmann came back in time or Rabiot shifted centrally, a 4 v 3. Deschamps responded by bringing on Kolo Muani and Thuram on the pitch. allowing them to alter their defensive shape.Thuram would move to the left while Mbappé would be up centrally. So even if Griezmann was caught high up the pitch, Tchouaméni and Rabiot could act as a dedicated double pivot with Thuram on the left wing. So it became more difficult for Argentina to overload this right hand side and even when they did it would not be both Rabiot and Tchouaméni who would come across but rather one of them. And Griezmann could still drop to form what looked like a 4 5 1. With Molina pushing high, the pace of Mbappé combined with Thuram could be dangerous in counter attacks. Even in possession, France came from barely 40% of possession before the substitution to 50% after the double substitution. When it was possible, France looked to build up with a back 3 as Argentina was defending with a front 2 So Koundé would be the fullback tucking in while Hernandez pushed higher on the left handside. An ideal situation would see Rabiot pushing up high alongside Griezmann but in this final he was more willing to drop as a second pivot alongside Tchouaméni.
One thing that Argentina also did well was to protect the center of the pitch, primarly using the cover shadowss of the 2 forwards although Alvarez was more willing to apply pressure to the 2 center backs. When he applied the pressure, the pivots were willing to back it up. Dembelé also dropped deep to drag his fullback up front and open up spaces for Griezmann to run in behind for either Dembelé to pass to either Koundé to directly find. Argentina dealt with this by using pressure. Alvarez applied pressure on Varane so he couldn't make his difficult progressive passes and having a work horse like Di Maria meant that as soon that the ball was received by Koundé, Di Maria came to press him. When this happened Dembelé dropped deeper and Tagliafico followed him so Dembelé couldn't turn and make the pass. And even when Griezmann attempted these runs in behind, Mc Allistair was disciplined enough to track him. Instead of pressing, Messi's role was to cut off the pass into the central lane. And even if the ball worked this way in, the insane work rate of De Paul was extremely important as he would have to cover across for Messi. whever this was Hernandez or Rabiot looking to make the run in behind. We also initially, when Mbappé didn't have success out wide, Hernandez looking to provide all the width and Mbappé acting as a second forward alongside Giroud. Having an extra man up here would also allow Rabiot to drop alongside Tchouaméni. Especially when the Argentinian pivots were backing up the press of the forwards, Mbappé and Giroud would both look to drop in between the lines to receive the ball. Despite leaving gaps in the defense, the center backs were agressive, following their man. Argentina had to hope that the pressure from the forwards would make the passes into these central gaps too difficult. And it worked. Also Hernandez being very high, Argentina looked to exploit the space left behind him during transitions, especially at the beginning of the second half.
So Deschamps subbed off Hernandez for Camavinga who as a midfielder would tend to be more conservative rather than overlapping. The first thing substitutions brought to France was flexibility. Thuram could remain wide when needed but Mbappé doesn't particulary like being confined as a center forward but instead likes to drift around. So what we could see when France had the ball higher up the pitch was him shfting to the left handside and Thuram taking his place more centrally. That freedom, particulary when Hernandez was still on would allow Mbappé to drift around the pitch as there was a center forward and a man down the left hand side providing the width. Also Kolo Muani being a threat on the right hand side meant that France could effectively attack with a 4 2 4 with the front 4 looking for man to man situations against Argentina's defenders and looking to rotate positions when needed. When the width was bring on by Hernandez or Camavinga, this freed Mbappé even more with him dropping deeper to get on the ball ans really make an impact on the game, which he ended up doing. Another advantage provided was that when the ball went wide, they had now more numbers attacking the box, in addition to the fact that they could go longer with more mens around the ball.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Christmas Tree Formation(4-3-2-1) Explained | Football Tactics
4 3 2 1 christmas tree formation.
Major issue of 4 3 2 1 is the lack of natural width. With 3 central midfielders protecting the back 4, and 3 attacking midfielders free to roam around them and one striker in front. So the fullbacks are expected to provide almost all the width and to have the engine to push up and down for the whole match. France for example in the 1998 WC that they ended up winning lined up in 4 3 2 1 with Zidane and Djorkaeff as the 2 attacking midfielders. But this was only possible because they got a 3 mens wall behind them with Didier Deschamps, Emmanuel Petit and Christian Karembeu. It was the fluidity of this system that propelled France to World Cup glory. Aimé Jacquet, the manager back then, gave almost all his players the option to roam forward especially with the fullbacks, Lizarazu and Thuram who provided crucial width with the system. Henry was the striker up front. Overall it was a predominant defensive system with France conceding just 2 goals in 7 games. Jacquet needed a system that would release the attacking artistry of Zinédine Zidane without feeling the effects of his defensive inaptitude. And he got that with the 4 3 2 1.
Another fantastic example of a 4 3 2 1 being excellently applied was the AC Milan team under Carlo Ancelotti. They listed the 2007 UCL with that compo. Maldini and Nesta were the 2 center backs in front of the goalkepper Dida. Jankulovski and Cafu were the fullbacks providing the width In the central midfield 3, Massimo Ambrosini was an intelligent defensively sound player. And Gattuso was a fearsome ball winning midfielder. They both shielded Andrea Pirlo, the deep lying playmaker, aka the Regista. With Gattuso and Ambronisi alongside him, Pirlo had less defensive burden and could focus more on linking up the midfield and the attack with his stunning long passing range. Ahead of them there were Clarence Seedorf and Kaka who were expected to provided width and support the striker and to get into the box to finish off moves. Inzaghi led the line as a lone striker, who was often criticized for his lack of technical skills but was an incredible goal poacher. Again here, fluidity was the key to the success of the 4 3 2 1.
REGISTA | The Midfielder Who Controls The Flow Of The Game
Regista.
First image coming to mind when we talk about the role of a defensive midfielder is a player protecting the entry of the penalty area in front of his defense and whose main role is to disrupt the opposite team's attack. But the cdm doesn't have to be limited to a role of a defender. There is often a role demanded to them that require qualities like defined technic, vision, good decision making, long passes, short passes, and others abilities. This role had become known world wide as the Regista. Regista is an italian term routinely translated into the " director ". This term captures the essence of the player assigned to the role, as one is responsible for orchestrating the team during the game. The best example for tha trole is Andrea Pirlo who seemed to glide across the pitch with his elegant style. First things coming to mind about him are his perfect long passes, his spectacular vision of the game, his ability to dictate the tempo of the match and others things that are often used to describe a classic elite number 10 player. On paper, it was like Pirlo played as a number 6. The AC Milan team that won the 2007 UCL under Carlo Ancelotti won with a 4 3 2 1 formation THeir most technical midfielders were in the first midfield position, and PIrlo was playing in the center of this 3 man second line. However the first time this kind of role was experimented was back in the 1930's when the Italien team under Vittorio Pozzo wanted one of his defenders to take on this role. Instead of using a 3 defenders formation, Pozzo switched to a 2 3 5 formation, moving his central defender to the midfield line and assigning him the role of the team's organizer. It was the true origin of the Regista role.
Outside Pirlo, others players as played the Regista role at a point of their career, like Xabi Alonso, Busquets, Toni Kross and Jorginho. One of their main skills is their precise long passes. If you want a player with exceptionnal passing abilities to showcase their skills with more freedom to execute these long passes, playing them in the Regista role might be a solution. It's a zone with less pressure than the more advanced areas, allowing the Regista to use their game intelligence and more space for their precise passes. For example against a team defending in a 4 4 2, the area of highest pressure is in the area between the 2 lines of 4, where the attacking midfielder is operating. Althought the Regista can advance by times, he usually plays in front of the second opposite's line and behind the front 2. They have more freedom to create advantages according to the opponent's defensive structure. One of the principles of building up from the back is to create a numerical supeiority over the opponent's first line of pressure, meaning that if the opponents is having one player only up front marking the 2 center backs, it's enough. But if there is a front 2, the team need 3 and if the opposition uses 3 players, we keep it 4. The player responsible for reading the opponent's setup and coordinating the build up is the Regista. If the Regista plays in a 4 3 3 formation against a team pressing in a 4 1 3 2 formation, naturally it's 2 center backs against 2 forwards. So the Regista could drop between the center backs to create a numerical superiority during the build up. And it's unlikely the direct marker would follow him and if he did, he would leave a gap that could be exploited.
If at 1 point the opponent changed his structure to have only 1 player up front, the Regista could start playing their first line. The Regista is willing to read the game and manipulate the situation to put themselves into an advantageous position like receiving an uncovered ball where they have the freedom to choose the best course of action. Crucial aspects of a Regista are decision making and technical execution. Receiving the ball facing the game, they might for instance opt for a long pass behind the opponent's defensive line. Or a ground pass into the space between the lines, across to the opposite side or simply a sideways pass. However having a very good Regista won't be as effective if the forwards cannot make movements to break through the opposite defensive lines or exploit spaces behind the opponent's defensive line. If the team lacks cohesive offensive movements from the middle to the front, the Regista will likely be underutilized and might be forced to play safe passes sideways. It's like having Steph Curry in his basket team but not having him able to shoot somehow. Once the offensive role was covered, it's now time to talk about the defensive role of the Regista.
Registas are generally players with a more technical profile and migh not stand out for their physical dueling skills althought that doesn't mean they can't do it. However, via their positionning deeper parts of the pitch, these are players who defend more through positionning, occupying space, focusing on cutting passing lanes for possible interceptions rather than engaging in physical duels. Considering the team's defensive system, it's also important to have midfielder with a strong marking characteristic to accompany the Regista. Going back to the 2007 AC Milan's team, Pirlo was the Regista but he had Gattuso by his side to be the player strong in duels. To sum it up, the role of a Regista in football goes far beyond being a defensive midfielder. He is the director of the team. But of course he needs teammates who can enhance their potential both in defensive and offensive moments. By the way, the player used by Vittorio Pozzo for the Italin team back then in the 1930's decade was Charlue Roberts. Then in the 1950's, Hungrary national team had Nandor Hidegkuti, who was considered more as the first false 9 in history. Also the Brazilian 1970 side used Gerson as a Regista alongside Clodoaldo. The Selecao's athleticism and fluidity tended to compensate for the natural overload that tended to occur when a central midfield axis employs a Regista.
Christmas Tree Formation(4-3-2-1) Explained | Football Tactics
4 3 2 1 christmas tree formation.
Major issue of 4 3 2 1 is the lack of natural width. With 3 central midfielders protecting the back 4, and 3 attacking midfielders free to roam around them and one striker in front. So the fullbacks are expected to provide almost all the width and to have the engine to push up and down for the whole match. France for example in the 1998 WC that they ended up winning lined up in 4 3 2 1 with Zidane and Djorkaeff as the 2 attacking midfielders. But this was only possible because they got a 3 mens wall behind them with Didier Deschamps, Emmanuel Petit and Christian Karembeu. It was the fluidity of this system that propelled France to World Cup glory. Aimé Jacquet, the manager back then, gave almost all his players the option to roam forward especially with the fullbacks, Lizarazu and Thuram who provided crucial width with the system. Henry was the striker up front. Overall it was a predominant defensive system with France conceding just 2 goals in 7 games. Jacquet needed a system that would release the attacking artistry of Zinédine Zidane without feeling the effects of his defensive inaptitude. And he got that with the 4 3 2 1.
Another fantastic example of a 4 3 2 1 being excellently applied was the AC Milan team under Carlo Ancelotti. They listed the 2007 UCL with that compo. Maldini and Nesta were the 2 center backs in front of the goalkepper Dida. Jankulovski and Cafu were the fullbacks providing the width In the central midfield 3, Massimo Ambrosini was an intelligent defensively sound player. And Gattuso was a fearsome ball winning midfielder. They both shielded Andrea Pirlo, the deep lying playmaker, aka the Regista. With Gattuso and Ambronisi alongside him, Pirlo had less defensive burden and could focus more on linking up the midfield and the attack with his stunning long passing range. Ahead of them there were Clarence Seedorf and Kaka who were expected to provided width and support the striker and to get into the box to finish off moves. Inzaghi led the line as a lone striker, who was often criticized for his lack of technical skills but was an incredible goal poacher. Again here, fluidity was the key to the success of the 4 3 2 1.
REGISTA | The Midfielder Who Controls The Flow Of The Game
Regista.
First image coming to mind when we talk about the role of a defensive midfielder is a player protecting the entry of the penalty area in front of his defense and whose main role is to disrupt the opposite team's attack. But the cdm doesn't have to be limited to a role of a defender. There is often a role demanded to them that require qualities like defined technic, vision, good decision making, long passes, short passes, and others abilities. This role had become known world wide as the Regista. Regista is an italian term routinely translated into the " director ". This term captures the essence of the player assigned to the role, as one is responsible for orchestrating the team during the game. The best example for tha trole is Andrea Pirlo who seemed to glide across the pitch with his elegant style. First things coming to mind about him are his perfect long passes, his spectacular vision of the game, his ability to dictate the tempo of the match and others things that are often used to describe a classic elite number 10 player. On paper, it was like Pirlo played as a number 6. The AC Milan team that won the 2007 UCL under Carlo Ancelotti won with a 4 3 2 1 formation THeir most technical midfielders were in the first midfield position, and PIrlo was playing in the center of this 3 man second line. However the first time this kind of role was experimented was back in the 1930's when the Italien team under Vittorio Pozzo wanted one of his defenders to take on this role. Instead of using a 3 defenders formation, Pozzo switched to a 2 3 5 formation, moving his central defender to the midfield line and assigning him the role of the team's organizer. It was the true origin of the Regista role.
Outside Pirlo, others players as played the Regista role at a point of their career, like Xabi Alonso, Busquets, Toni Kross and Jorginho. One of their main skills is their precise long passes. If you want a player with exceptionnal passing abilities to showcase their skills with more freedom to execute these long passes, playing them in the Regista role might be a solution. It's a zone with less pressure than the more advanced areas, allowing the Regista to use their game intelligence and more space for their precise passes. For example against a team defending in a 4 4 2, the area of highest pressure is in the area between the 2 lines of 4, where the attacking midfielder is operating. Althought the Regista can advance by times, he usually plays in front of the second opposite's line and behind the front 2. They have more freedom to create advantages according to the opponent's defensive structure. One of the principles of building up from the back is to create a numerical supeiority over the opponent's first line of pressure, meaning that if the opponents is having one player only up front marking the 2 center backs, it's enough. But if there is a front 2, the team need 3 and if the opposition uses 3 players, we keep it 4. The player responsible for reading the opponent's setup and coordinating the build up is the Regista. If the Regista plays in a 4 3 3 formation against a team pressing in a 4 1 3 2 formation, naturally it's 2 center backs against 2 forwards. So the Regista could drop between the center backs to create a numerical superiority during the build up. And it's unlikely the direct marker would follow him and if he did, he would leave a gap that could be exploited.
If at 1 point the opponent changed his structure to have only 1 player up front, the Regista could start playing their first line. The Regista is willing to read the game and manipulate the situation to put themselves into an advantageous position like receiving an uncovered ball where they have the freedom to choose the best course of action. Crucial aspects of a Regista are decision making and technical execution. Receiving the ball facing the game, they might for instance opt for a long pass behind the opponent's defensive line. Or a ground pass into the space between the lines, across to the opposite side or simply a sideways pass. However having a very good Regista won't be as effective if the forwards cannot make movements to break through the opposite defensive lines or exploit spaces behind the opponent's defensive line. If the team lacks cohesive offensive movements from the middle to the front, the Regista will likely be underutilized and might be forced to play safe passes sideways. It's like having Steph Curry in his basket team but not having him able to shoot somehow. Once the offensive role was covered, it's now time to talk about the defensive role of the Regista.
Registas are generally players with a more technical profile and migh not stand out for their physical dueling skills althought that doesn't mean they can't do it. However, via their positionning deeper parts of the pitch, these are players who defend more through positionning, occupying space, focusing on cutting passing lanes for possible interceptions rather than engaging in physical duels. Considering the team's defensive system, it's also important to have midfielder with a strong marking characteristic to accompany the Regista. Going back to the 2007 AC Milan's team, Pirlo was the Regista but he had Gattuso by his side to be the player strong in duels. To sum it up, the role of a Regista in football goes far beyond being a defensive midfielder. He is the director of the team. But of course he needs teammates who can enhance their potential both in defensive and offensive moments. By the way, the player used by Vittorio Pozzo for the Italin team back then in the 1930's decade was Charlue Roberts. Then in the 1950's, Hungrary national team had Nandor Hidegkuti, who was considered more as the first false 9 in history. Also the Brazilian 1970 side used Gerson as a Regista alongside Clodoaldo. The Selecao's athleticism and fluidity tended to compensate for the natural overload that tended to occur when a central midfield axis employs a Regista.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Back three formations.
Pourquoi les formations Back-Three gagnent en popularité | Tactiques 3-4-3/3-5-2 Why Back-Three Formations Are Increasing in Popularity | 3-4-3/3-5-2 Tactics
3 4 3 formation was introduced in Italy when there were an excess of elite centerbacks. However nowadays, this formation is very often the sign of a very offensive tactic. Tuchel used this with Chelsea and won the UCL with it. Antonio Conte used to dominated the Serie A League with Juventus in a 3 5 2 formation. Inzhagi took Inter Milan in the UCL final with a 3 5 2 formation. Also during the 2020/2021 season, Simeone used a 3 4 3 formation with a back 3. Leipzig during the same season ended in the second place behind Bayern Munich with one of the best defensive record of Europe. Starting in the back 3, the center cb will play the role of a libero often. He can be defined as a ball played sweeper, carrying the ball and helping advancing the ball to start the attack. But he will also be the last line when the opposition are attacking. Before moving to Bayern, Upamecano has been excellent for Leipzig in this position with the most accurate passes per match for a defender in the Bundesliga. He also had the most clearances in the team. The libero will be supported by 2 others center backs which functions will be to cover and worry about long balls behind them when they loose the possession. But they also need to be good ball playing center backs considering they will be more likely than others to receive the ball from the goalkepper. They will have to break the first line of the opposite's offensive pressure. Bastoni in Inter Milan is a good example for this role. In a 3 4 3, the wingbacks will be among the most crucial players here because they will be the ones providing width in the attacks. But they will also create a defensive numerical superiority when out of possession.
They will need to support both attack and defense consistently during the whole match. The center midfielders are the bridge between the defense and the attack. Often in 3 4 3 formations, you will see one more attacking minded midfielder for one deep lying playmaker. Jorginho and Kovacic are a good example of this. It's worth noting that the miedfielders will have a tendency to be more defensive than in others formations like 4 3 3 and they will not be a lot relied to during attacks. In 3 4 3, the wingers are essentials during counter attacks, using their pace to attack the opposition's defense. When on possession, they usually shift in half spaces and act as insider attackers. A false 9 can provide options for the midfielders while a pure 9 or pure striker stay further in the last third. If one of the 3 attackers is dropping along with the midfielders, it can become a 3 5 2. During the build up, the back 3 will ensure the goalkepper has enough passing options with the wide center backs usually dropping on the sides/edges of the box. And the wingbacks pushing high alongside the 2 center midfielders. The goalkepper can send the ball to the wingbacks directly. Each wide center back can create triangle passing options with the wingback and the center miedfielder. If the winger shift out wide, it will create a diamond shape with the 3 others players. WIth many passing options on the wing, the opposition will be force to commit a lot of players to close the spaces. But that often mean that the other flank has a lot of spaces, meaning that rapid switching to the other flank can be very effective. But if the opposition decide to stay wide to cover this, then it's freeing spaces in the center so the striker can drop deep to receive the ball or for the center box to box miedfielder to attack.
In the final third when put on the back foot, the opposition will have to commit a lot of players to cover the spaces and during a complete attack, the formation can often look like a 3 2 5 or a 3 3 4. With a front 5, quick options can be created with the wingback combining either with the winger either with the striker, sometimes even with the midfielder. It can help the team to go behind the defense to receive crosses. Also with 5 players attacking the opposition's defense, the 2 miedfielders can choose to overload to side where the ball is. The team can choose to sacrifice one of the 5 players in front to put one more player in the miedfielder which will mean there will be one more player at the edge of the box throw balls in front of make long shoots. When it comes down to the build up, things are often similar between the 3 4 3 and the 3 5 2 formations. But when coming to the opposition's final third, the difference is being seen more easily. The 3 4 3 will have a tendancy to preserve hisnatural width and stretch the opposition in front. By doing this they can exploit the spaces between the defenders. While the 3 5 2 in the other hand will aim to play more narrow and more direct, sacrificing one part of the width for an extra player in the midfield to help supporting the striker. When out of possession, the front 3 of the 3 4 3 is often asked to pressure the opposition high on the pitch and try to force them to make mistakes near their final third. Also it allows the wingbacks of the 3 4 3 to push up and pin the opposition's fullbacks. It will allows the front 3 to target the passes in the center. However it can also be effective for the teams who prefer to stay back and that only start engaging the press when the opposition is starting entering in the miedfield. By doing this, they often pass into a 5 4 1 while defending.
The midfield must be capable to prevent all passes in the middle of the pitch, eventually forcing the opposition to play out wide where the team will be capable to effectively defend, with a wingback and a wide center covering the half spaces. In the final defensive phase, we can fully see the importance of the libero. The central center back will cover others players and provide extra support if necessary and cover the others players mistakes if someone is out of position and making sure there is no gap in the middle. When defending in a 5 4 1 formation, the lone striker will be the main chance for the counter attacks. With 3 center backs, it will be difficult for the opposition to outnumber them in the box. However the problem of this formation requires the team to perfectly work together and have a very good chem. In a back 3, the team can quickly find itself vulnerable to quick counter attacks. The opposite's wingers can be pushed behind on the wing, and quickly find themselves on 1 v 1 situations against a wide center back. Also having only 2 center miedfielders can expose wide areas of the miedfield The miedfield must shield effectively the back 3. Otherwise it will become vulnerable to balls being played between the lines. FInally the libero will carrying the ball further on the pitch cannot afford to loose the ball while carrying the attack. Because with the wingbacks already pushing up ion the pitch, the central carrying center back loosing ball mean that the team will be put immediatly on the back foot and the otthers defenders will be outnumbered. It can be an excellent counter formation to the 4 3 3 and 4 2 3 1 formations who are among the most comons in football.
Back three formations.
Pourquoi les formations Back-Three gagnent en popularité | Tactiques 3-4-3/3-5-2 Why Back-Three Formations Are Increasing in Popularity | 3-4-3/3-5-2 Tactics
3 4 3 formation was introduced in Italy when there were an excess of elite centerbacks. However nowadays, this formation is very often the sign of a very offensive tactic. Tuchel used this with Chelsea and won the UCL with it. Antonio Conte used to dominated the Serie A League with Juventus in a 3 5 2 formation. Inzhagi took Inter Milan in the UCL final with a 3 5 2 formation. Also during the 2020/2021 season, Simeone used a 3 4 3 formation with a back 3. Leipzig during the same season ended in the second place behind Bayern Munich with one of the best defensive record of Europe. Starting in the back 3, the center cb will play the role of a libero often. He can be defined as a ball played sweeper, carrying the ball and helping advancing the ball to start the attack. But he will also be the last line when the opposition are attacking. Before moving to Bayern, Upamecano has been excellent for Leipzig in this position with the most accurate passes per match for a defender in the Bundesliga. He also had the most clearances in the team. The libero will be supported by 2 others center backs which functions will be to cover and worry about long balls behind them when they loose the possession. But they also need to be good ball playing center backs considering they will be more likely than others to receive the ball from the goalkepper. They will have to break the first line of the opposite's offensive pressure. Bastoni in Inter Milan is a good example for this role. In a 3 4 3, the wingbacks will be among the most crucial players here because they will be the ones providing width in the attacks. But they will also create a defensive numerical superiority when out of possession.
They will need to support both attack and defense consistently during the whole match. The center midfielders are the bridge between the defense and the attack. Often in 3 4 3 formations, you will see one more attacking minded midfielder for one deep lying playmaker. Jorginho and Kovacic are a good example of this. It's worth noting that the miedfielders will have a tendency to be more defensive than in others formations like 4 3 3 and they will not be a lot relied to during attacks. In 3 4 3, the wingers are essentials during counter attacks, using their pace to attack the opposition's defense. When on possession, they usually shift in half spaces and act as insider attackers. A false 9 can provide options for the midfielders while a pure 9 or pure striker stay further in the last third. If one of the 3 attackers is dropping along with the midfielders, it can become a 3 5 2. During the build up, the back 3 will ensure the goalkepper has enough passing options with the wide center backs usually dropping on the sides/edges of the box. And the wingbacks pushing high alongside the 2 center midfielders. The goalkepper can send the ball to the wingbacks directly. Each wide center back can create triangle passing options with the wingback and the center miedfielder. If the winger shift out wide, it will create a diamond shape with the 3 others players. WIth many passing options on the wing, the opposition will be force to commit a lot of players to close the spaces. But that often mean that the other flank has a lot of spaces, meaning that rapid switching to the other flank can be very effective. But if the opposition decide to stay wide to cover this, then it's freeing spaces in the center so the striker can drop deep to receive the ball or for the center box to box miedfielder to attack.
In the final third when put on the back foot, the opposition will have to commit a lot of players to cover the spaces and during a complete attack, the formation can often look like a 3 2 5 or a 3 3 4. With a front 5, quick options can be created with the wingback combining either with the winger either with the striker, sometimes even with the midfielder. It can help the team to go behind the defense to receive crosses. Also with 5 players attacking the opposition's defense, the 2 miedfielders can choose to overload to side where the ball is. The team can choose to sacrifice one of the 5 players in front to put one more player in the miedfielder which will mean there will be one more player at the edge of the box throw balls in front of make long shoots. When it comes down to the build up, things are often similar between the 3 4 3 and the 3 5 2 formations. But when coming to the opposition's final third, the difference is being seen more easily. The 3 4 3 will have a tendancy to preserve hisnatural width and stretch the opposition in front. By doing this they can exploit the spaces between the defenders. While the 3 5 2 in the other hand will aim to play more narrow and more direct, sacrificing one part of the width for an extra player in the midfield to help supporting the striker. When out of possession, the front 3 of the 3 4 3 is often asked to pressure the opposition high on the pitch and try to force them to make mistakes near their final third. Also it allows the wingbacks of the 3 4 3 to push up and pin the opposition's fullbacks. It will allows the front 3 to target the passes in the center. However it can also be effective for the teams who prefer to stay back and that only start engaging the press when the opposition is starting entering in the miedfield. By doing this, they often pass into a 5 4 1 while defending.
The midfield must be capable to prevent all passes in the middle of the pitch, eventually forcing the opposition to play out wide where the team will be capable to effectively defend, with a wingback and a wide center covering the half spaces. In the final defensive phase, we can fully see the importance of the libero. The central center back will cover others players and provide extra support if necessary and cover the others players mistakes if someone is out of position and making sure there is no gap in the middle. When defending in a 5 4 1 formation, the lone striker will be the main chance for the counter attacks. With 3 center backs, it will be difficult for the opposition to outnumber them in the box. However the problem of this formation requires the team to perfectly work together and have a very good chem. In a back 3, the team can quickly find itself vulnerable to quick counter attacks. The opposite's wingers can be pushed behind on the wing, and quickly find themselves on 1 v 1 situations against a wide center back. Also having only 2 center miedfielders can expose wide areas of the miedfield The miedfield must shield effectively the back 3. Otherwise it will become vulnerable to balls being played between the lines. FInally the libero will carrying the ball further on the pitch cannot afford to loose the ball while carrying the attack. Because with the wingbacks already pushing up ion the pitch, the central carrying center back loosing ball mean that the team will be put immediatly on the back foot and the otthers defenders will be outnumbered. It can be an excellent counter formation to the 4 3 3 and 4 2 3 1 formations who are among the most comons in football.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Tactics Explained: Mourinho's Chelsea (2004-2006)
Mourinho's Chelsea is one of the most innovative team ever seen tactically. They got into semi final of UCL but weren't semented into the absolute top clubs of the Premiere League yet until Mourinho came. It took 2 entire seaons for the opposite teams to start knowing how to deal with this because they never seen that before. Chelsea had Cech gk, Terry and Carvalho cb, Gallas and Ferreira fullbacks, Makelele holding midfielder, Essien and Lampard as box to box midfielders, Robben and Duff wingers and finally Dorgba forward. Gudjohnsen could replace Drogba forward as well. To the english teams, using a holding midfielder, Makelele in this pure 6 role, was mindblowing back then. Premiere League was obsessed with 4 4 2 back then whatever it was Man United, Arsenal. They always had 2 center midfielders. It gave teams balance with 2 players in every single positions of the pitch outside gk. During build up, both cb separated a bit wide with both fullbacks pushing slightly further up and Makelele dropping, forming a bow with the 2 cb and the gk. Generally teams had one ball playing center back and the other heading balls out, tackling, and all conventionnal things. Chelsea had 2 ball playing centerbacks. Both cb would be free to carry the ball higher on the pitch when opposition sit deep in their 4 4 2, to help the rest of the team to advance. But when they pressed higher theere were almost always Makelele free in the center. Chelsea had now 2 cb and 3 miedfielders so 5 players centrally. There was always a free men in the center of the miedfield. If teams choosed to defend them in 4 4 1 1 to cover all the 3 miedfielders including Makelele so, they couldn't defend both Terry and Carvalho with only one isolated forward. Even if when defending in 4 4 2, Makele was covered and a wide men was going to defend against the free miedfielder, this left a fullback free and in this Chelsea's system they made also something very innovative with fullbacks.
Before Mourinho came in the Premiere League, fullbacks almost never attacked the way they are attacking nowadays. In Chelsea, fullbacks provided the width to form a front 5. Mostly Chelsea's wingers may have the job of staying close to the touchline and provide crosses, they also often inverted them in the middle of the game. It could be one fullback only going high and make the winger invert with Lampard making a late run to form a front 5. Bridge in the left was a good attacking fullback. Makelele often moved into the spaces the fullback vacated to maintain that regular structure. Chelsea often ended in ridiculous situations where they still had their back 4 with one player, being either Essien or Tiago patrolling these central spaces. Chelsea was still stable, defensive and quite boring by times. But they conceded only 15 goals in one season mostly because they dominated the ball. During the same season they scored between 70 and 75 goals. Also It was difficult to attack against this Chelsea team because Mourinho didn't play with 2 good overlapping fullbacks and 2 inverting wingers. He only played with one at time. Sometimes during a game he woudl change the side in which it's happening. Chelsea could attack either down the middle with numerical superiority, either down the flanks where they could hurt others teams in different ways. Also Cech played sometimes long balls to Drogba. Some would think that against a 4 4 2 with numerical disadvantage it's stupid but it's not. Drogba received critics during his 2 first seasons in Chelsea because he wasn't a prolific goalscorer despite his potential. But Drogba was good at bullying the defenders and creating spaces for his teamates. Theorically even with Lampard's runs, both cb could close down Drogba and Lampard. But Lampard was one of the best of the world for his late timing runs in the box. Also Drogba was capable of attracting both centerbacks often, swapping between which one is marking him.
Les tactiques gagnantes des triples de Jupp Heynckes expliquées | Analyse tactique du Bayern Munich 2012/13 |
From the back, Neuer was one of the best ball playing gk, being a third man in the build up phase if the centerbacks were being pressed, allowing them to play out more easily because of their numerical supeirority. In fact most of the teams weren't doing high press as they knew that as soon as Bayern would pass the first line of pressure, they were men short further back as the men who pressed would be on the wrong side of the ball and were basically inactive defenders. Both cb, Boateng and Dante were comfortable on the ball. On rare occasion when they were under pressure they could play long balls as they had a target men like Mnadzukic who could hold up the play. Those 2 had the most accurate long passes per match in the Bundesliga. But most of the times they went short to the midfielders. In the first phase both Alaba and Lahm as fullbacks made themselves available for short passes. Once received they were superb on the ball, laying the ball into their pivots or their attacking midfielder. Or playing the ball down the line to their winger. More often than most of the teams, Bayern looked to penetrate by the center of the pitch. Schweinsteiger and Javi Martinez were the pivots with Schweinsteiger being sometimes more a box to box and Martinez being purely defensive. Both were excellent on the ball, helping retaining possession in tight areas. If both cb were pressed, Martinez tended to drop between the 2. With Schweinsteiger isolated, Toni Kross who was playing as an attacking midfielder also showed that he was comfortable being in deeper regions as he would show later both for Real Madrid and Germany. But when Muller played instead of Kross, he tended to stay higher up the pitch in these phases. Schweinsteiger was the heart of the team with an average of 74 passes per game. However Bayern's major threats were in the wide regions with Robben and Ribery who were often hugging the touchline.
Bayern used the middle of the pitch as a basis to attack wider regions. Schweinstiger was the player facilitating this with more than 11 long balls attempted and completing 9 on 11 on average. So their wingers could be in 1 v 1 situations and cause damages. When the ball went to Toni Kross instead, Schweinsteiger pushed higher up to create overloads in these high regions. Both weren't hesitating to strikr from range when they had the opportunity. But more comon was the presence of the 2 drawing the opposition more centrally, opening more rooms on the flanks. Kross was excellent at constently switching the play to the wingers to perpetually shift the defenders from side to side and bring their key mens to 1 v 1 with the fullback. Once the ball is wide, the winger come on life. Both were inverted, meaning that they wanted to dribble their opponent and Robben was more likely to attempt his signature cold shoot from these half space regions with 2 dribbles per game and 2,9 shoots with more than half of them coming from outside the box. Ribéry was more creative in this role. When he cut in, he could also have a shoot but also dribble the ball to the forward to finish. He was also comfortable cutting back on his weak foot to attack the byline and cross where Mandzukic who is good in the airs, could look to finish. But the wingers were consisteltly assisted by their fullbacks who were the keys to overlap. Lahm had 11 assists while Alaba had 3. Muller also changed the dynamic of his team as when he played as an attacking midfielder, he combined with Mandzukic who often pulled ouf to the left, which created spaces for Muller who would look to finish.
But his most comon role was on the right wing when Robben was injured. He rarely took on his fullback. Instead he would give it to Lahm who was supported by Kross while Muller made his way into the box. Then Mandzukic and Mullere were the perfect aerial targets while Swhweinsteiger was the box to box midfielder moving in these areas to help flooding the box. As a result, these 3 scored the most headed goals for their team with 7 goals for Mandzukic and 4 goals for Schweinsteiger and Muller. Off the ball Keybckes used a lot of counterpress. Pressing foten started with Mandzukic harassing the centerbacks until they are forced to play long or go wide. Here the winger would press him. The defensive line tended to be higher. And their fullbacks particulary followed their men high. They made the pitch big when they had the ball but off the ball they shifted to one side to cut off options, making the pitch looking smaller when defending. Once winning the ball back there were a lot of players who could take advantage of long balls When defending for long phases, Bayern went into a 4 5 1 with the wingers dropping deep to assist the defenders. High lines helped to facilitate counter attacks. This was made possible because they had a sweeper keeper like Manuel Neuer who was capable of dominating and clearing the ball when it was played into dangerous regions near him. But in UCL, they could switch their tactics and make it a more counter attacking style when it was necessary. The paces of Robben and Ribéry meant that during turnovers, they could take advantages of the space left behind. This combined with the long passing range of the whole backline and midfield meant that the line breaker passing could come from anywhere and then the wingers and the forward were deadly.
Tactics Explained: Mourinho's Chelsea (2004-2006)
Mourinho's Chelsea is one of the most innovative team ever seen tactically. They got into semi final of UCL but weren't semented into the absolute top clubs of the Premiere League yet until Mourinho came. It took 2 entire seaons for the opposite teams to start knowing how to deal with this because they never seen that before. Chelsea had Cech gk, Terry and Carvalho cb, Gallas and Ferreira fullbacks, Makelele holding midfielder, Essien and Lampard as box to box midfielders, Robben and Duff wingers and finally Dorgba forward. Gudjohnsen could replace Drogba forward as well. To the english teams, using a holding midfielder, Makelele in this pure 6 role, was mindblowing back then. Premiere League was obsessed with 4 4 2 back then whatever it was Man United, Arsenal. They always had 2 center midfielders. It gave teams balance with 2 players in every single positions of the pitch outside gk. During build up, both cb separated a bit wide with both fullbacks pushing slightly further up and Makelele dropping, forming a bow with the 2 cb and the gk. Generally teams had one ball playing center back and the other heading balls out, tackling, and all conventionnal things. Chelsea had 2 ball playing centerbacks. Both cb would be free to carry the ball higher on the pitch when opposition sit deep in their 4 4 2, to help the rest of the team to advance. But when they pressed higher theere were almost always Makelele free in the center. Chelsea had now 2 cb and 3 miedfielders so 5 players centrally. There was always a free men in the center of the miedfield. If teams choosed to defend them in 4 4 1 1 to cover all the 3 miedfielders including Makelele so, they couldn't defend both Terry and Carvalho with only one isolated forward. Even if when defending in 4 4 2, Makele was covered and a wide men was going to defend against the free miedfielder, this left a fullback free and in this Chelsea's system they made also something very innovative with fullbacks.
Before Mourinho came in the Premiere League, fullbacks almost never attacked the way they are attacking nowadays. In Chelsea, fullbacks provided the width to form a front 5. Mostly Chelsea's wingers may have the job of staying close to the touchline and provide crosses, they also often inverted them in the middle of the game. It could be one fullback only going high and make the winger invert with Lampard making a late run to form a front 5. Bridge in the left was a good attacking fullback. Makelele often moved into the spaces the fullback vacated to maintain that regular structure. Chelsea often ended in ridiculous situations where they still had their back 4 with one player, being either Essien or Tiago patrolling these central spaces. Chelsea was still stable, defensive and quite boring by times. But they conceded only 15 goals in one season mostly because they dominated the ball. During the same season they scored between 70 and 75 goals. Also It was difficult to attack against this Chelsea team because Mourinho didn't play with 2 good overlapping fullbacks and 2 inverting wingers. He only played with one at time. Sometimes during a game he woudl change the side in which it's happening. Chelsea could attack either down the middle with numerical superiority, either down the flanks where they could hurt others teams in different ways. Also Cech played sometimes long balls to Drogba. Some would think that against a 4 4 2 with numerical disadvantage it's stupid but it's not. Drogba received critics during his 2 first seasons in Chelsea because he wasn't a prolific goalscorer despite his potential. But Drogba was good at bullying the defenders and creating spaces for his teamates. Theorically even with Lampard's runs, both cb could close down Drogba and Lampard. But Lampard was one of the best of the world for his late timing runs in the box. Also Drogba was capable of attracting both centerbacks often, swapping between which one is marking him.
Les tactiques gagnantes des triples de Jupp Heynckes expliquées | Analyse tactique du Bayern Munich 2012/13 |
From the back, Neuer was one of the best ball playing gk, being a third man in the build up phase if the centerbacks were being pressed, allowing them to play out more easily because of their numerical supeirority. In fact most of the teams weren't doing high press as they knew that as soon as Bayern would pass the first line of pressure, they were men short further back as the men who pressed would be on the wrong side of the ball and were basically inactive defenders. Both cb, Boateng and Dante were comfortable on the ball. On rare occasion when they were under pressure they could play long balls as they had a target men like Mnadzukic who could hold up the play. Those 2 had the most accurate long passes per match in the Bundesliga. But most of the times they went short to the midfielders. In the first phase both Alaba and Lahm as fullbacks made themselves available for short passes. Once received they were superb on the ball, laying the ball into their pivots or their attacking midfielder. Or playing the ball down the line to their winger. More often than most of the teams, Bayern looked to penetrate by the center of the pitch. Schweinsteiger and Javi Martinez were the pivots with Schweinsteiger being sometimes more a box to box and Martinez being purely defensive. Both were excellent on the ball, helping retaining possession in tight areas. If both cb were pressed, Martinez tended to drop between the 2. With Schweinsteiger isolated, Toni Kross who was playing as an attacking midfielder also showed that he was comfortable being in deeper regions as he would show later both for Real Madrid and Germany. But when Muller played instead of Kross, he tended to stay higher up the pitch in these phases. Schweinsteiger was the heart of the team with an average of 74 passes per game. However Bayern's major threats were in the wide regions with Robben and Ribery who were often hugging the touchline.
Bayern used the middle of the pitch as a basis to attack wider regions. Schweinstiger was the player facilitating this with more than 11 long balls attempted and completing 9 on 11 on average. So their wingers could be in 1 v 1 situations and cause damages. When the ball went to Toni Kross instead, Schweinsteiger pushed higher up to create overloads in these high regions. Both weren't hesitating to strikr from range when they had the opportunity. But more comon was the presence of the 2 drawing the opposition more centrally, opening more rooms on the flanks. Kross was excellent at constently switching the play to the wingers to perpetually shift the defenders from side to side and bring their key mens to 1 v 1 with the fullback. Once the ball is wide, the winger come on life. Both were inverted, meaning that they wanted to dribble their opponent and Robben was more likely to attempt his signature cold shoot from these half space regions with 2 dribbles per game and 2,9 shoots with more than half of them coming from outside the box. Ribéry was more creative in this role. When he cut in, he could also have a shoot but also dribble the ball to the forward to finish. He was also comfortable cutting back on his weak foot to attack the byline and cross where Mandzukic who is good in the airs, could look to finish. But the wingers were consisteltly assisted by their fullbacks who were the keys to overlap. Lahm had 11 assists while Alaba had 3. Muller also changed the dynamic of his team as when he played as an attacking midfielder, he combined with Mandzukic who often pulled ouf to the left, which created spaces for Muller who would look to finish.
But his most comon role was on the right wing when Robben was injured. He rarely took on his fullback. Instead he would give it to Lahm who was supported by Kross while Muller made his way into the box. Then Mandzukic and Mullere were the perfect aerial targets while Swhweinsteiger was the box to box midfielder moving in these areas to help flooding the box. As a result, these 3 scored the most headed goals for their team with 7 goals for Mandzukic and 4 goals for Schweinsteiger and Muller. Off the ball Keybckes used a lot of counterpress. Pressing foten started with Mandzukic harassing the centerbacks until they are forced to play long or go wide. Here the winger would press him. The defensive line tended to be higher. And their fullbacks particulary followed their men high. They made the pitch big when they had the ball but off the ball they shifted to one side to cut off options, making the pitch looking smaller when defending. Once winning the ball back there were a lot of players who could take advantage of long balls When defending for long phases, Bayern went into a 4 5 1 with the wingers dropping deep to assist the defenders. High lines helped to facilitate counter attacks. This was made possible because they had a sweeper keeper like Manuel Neuer who was capable of dominating and clearing the ball when it was played into dangerous regions near him. But in UCL, they could switch their tactics and make it a more counter attacking style when it was necessary. The paces of Robben and Ribéry meant that during turnovers, they could take advantages of the space left behind. This combined with the long passing range of the whole backline and midfield meant that the line breaker passing could come from anywhere and then the wingers and the forward were deadly.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Bayern Munich's 2020/21 Tactics Explained | How Hansi Flick Has Made Them So Good |
Hansi Flick made veterans like Muller, Neuer and Boateng central in the process to turn Bayern into the best team in the world. Flick also gave Kimmich his preferred defensive midfield role fulltime, completing his transition from right back. We also saw his ability to trust youngsters like Davies, overseeing his transition from a winger prospect who made 14 appearances, most of them as a winger, to becoming one of the best left backs in the world. This was faciliated by the versatility of Alaba, who went from being one of the best left backs of the world to one of the best center backs.It served creating harmony within the squad. In the Bundesliga, his preferred formation looked like a 4 2 3 1. Long balls from Neuer or the center backs were a good option because the presence of Lewandowski or Muller as aerial targets with guys like Gnabry, Sané or Coman as runners. However with 58% of possession, Bayern was still overall a possession oriented team. Bayern being good on build up helped a lot with opposition often choosing to sit deep and compact the spaces in crucial zones. Having 2 centerbacks good under pressure meant that we saw less Kimmich coming to provide the support and instead, stayed higher to provide options between the lines. If Bayern were pressed higher by a front 2, Pavard oftne dropped from a right back to a right center back. And despite being left footed, Sané hugged the right touchline in the first phase, providing the width. This could then possibly draw an opposition's winger higher up, leaving Sané for a potential 1 v 1. Boateng has the responsability to expand the play with longer balls, mostly into the wingers when they start high and wide. Alaba in the other hand played more often the ball slightly into feet, looking to connect with the man near him. However unlike the right where Sané provides the width, Gnabry or Coman both tend to tuck infield with Davies having instead to move higher up the pitch.
This by times left him free to receive from Boateng. Also, Kimmich staying as a pivot instead of dropping into the center back zone allowed Goretzka to push higher up between the lines. If the opponent continued to try and press high, Alaba could play a penetrative and progressive pass into a player between the lines. Alaba had the second highest penetrating passes into the third third despite being deep just behind Kimmich and slightly ahead of Pavard. So if the opposition drops deep to cope with this, this opens up an option for Kimmich who is afforded more spaces. So at times, teams will look to sit on Kimmich who can thn move laterally to the right to open up more spaces as we can see Goretzka dropping deeper to receive and support while Alaba can look to push up higher on the left, particularly if they are dominating possession. None of Goretzka and Kimmich play only as a pivot like Busquets but instead, they were playing with more fluidity with Kimmich having a tendency to stay a bit deeper than Goretzka even though we could see the opposite happening. Then with men often supporting him between the lines, Muller was often able to find some spaces Add to that the fact that Lewandowski had the strenght to hold off a man, and his elusive movements meant that he oftne found spaces without having to hold off a man. By times we saw Lewandowski dropping deeper and because he was such a threat, a center back often tried to stay tight which created the spaces for runners in behind. But Bayern looked mostly to attack in the flanks. Coman on the left was playing like a traditionnal winger, bypassing the line and trying to cross in while combining with Davies. Gnabry in the other hand liked to operate as an inside forward so in this case, Davies had more offensive responsabilities, providing most of the width, and Alaba having to move higher up.
The front 4 showed a lot of fluidity, interchanging regularly. We saw particularly Muller and Sané combining a lot. Pavard tended to stay deeper initially, allowing Sané to have his 1 v 1, meaning that the opposition's winger is caught higher up. When Sané goes infield, his fullback instinctly goes with him while the defensive midfielder doesn't want to stay too far away from here because of Gnabry and Goretzka. So Muller often had momentary spaces down the right, where he could look for the cross. Muller, under Flick, ended up second in term of crosses attempted, ahead of Gnabry and Sané but just behind Coman. We sometimes saw Pavard arrivign late to get across in and one of Bayern's strenght how many numbers they could commit into the box This includes Lewandowski, Muller, Goretzka and the far side winger. This is where we see the main difference between Kimmich and Goretzka as Kimmich prefers to stay deeper to act as the main creative force, looking for crosses from the half spaces of shots from the rebound. As a result, no team attempted more crosses than the Bavarians when Flick was in charge. If the opposition stays in his default shape, there will always be a man free for a header So the central midfielders are naturally dragged deeper into the box, allowing Bayern to counterpress efficiently. No team had lower passes per defensive action than Bayern Munich in the league. This was because there is a large distance now between the midfielders who wins the ball to the forward so Bayern can easily swarn him.But Bayern's weakness was that with both pivots high and one of their fullbacks at least, if the first layer of pressing if broken, the opposition had access to spaces to run into.
Even from a situation like a goalkick, Bayern looked to press high initially pushing up Goretzka alongside Muller to make a 4 1 4 1. As soon the ball went wide, Bayern looked to shut off all options. This involved again pushing the line high up early so they could be vulnerable over the top. And Alaba and Davies pace combined with Neuer as sweeper keeper means they often dealt with this but it was still risky regardless. As a result, their defense was not really excellent. But Bayern's qualities easily made up for it.
How Barcelona Pierced The Atletico Madrid Armour | Atletico Madrid 2-4 Barcelona
As usual Athlético Madrid looked to sit deep and frustrate Barcelona. They lined up in their usual classic 4 4 2 and although the sporadically pressed high the majority of the play took place in Athletico's half. Barcelona had their usual 4 3 3 high line shape with Koundé tucking in from the back while Balde and Yamal were tasked to provide the width for Barca, allowing them to have more numbers centrally to try to create the overload. With Alvarez and Griezmann as the 2 forwards, sitting deep on Barcelona's pivots, if Pedri stayed in his pivot position it would have been easier to cut off passes alongside Casado. So Pedri pushed higher as often as he could instead to try to combine with Olmo and Raphina to overload Athlético's double pivot, De Paul and Barrios who could become man oriented on Pedri and Olmo. While initially Raphina moved infield, Llorente would follow his man. Central overload meant that Balde would have the space and that overload in the middle could translate to men looking to flood the box. But Athlético's defense fended off these crosses. That caused Athlético Madrid troubles was the rotations at Barcelona's left side with Pedri often beginning to drift wide rather than staying central. De Paul who was man oriented would follow him, creating gaps in Athlético Madrid's desired compact shape. Olmo or Lewandowski could then drop here. But often It was Raphina who looked to move even deeper and moving more centrally, causing more issues to Llorente. He had the high and wide Balde to look onto but Llorente also found himself dragged by Raphina creating gaps in the backline for Barcelona runners. Athlético adapted, falling back with a back 5 into a 5 4 1 with Simeone moving to the right wingback defender allowing Llorente to be tighter on Raphina with lessy worry about Balde potentially free out wide.
The 5 4 1 soon morphed into a 5 3 2 defensive shape which gave them better central protection, forcing Barcelona out wide while having the advantage of having both of their forwards higher and ready for the counter. It bought Athléti some defensive success and Barcelona had it difficult to get into the half spaces despite putting numbers in the center. When Barcelona lost the ball they were looking to quickly counter press. This led to Barcelona's best chances of the first half. But it was also their biggest weakness as Athlético constantly looked to hit on the break. Having a high line meant that their oppoennts also had more rooms to exploit. Alvarez in particular found success in playing off the shoulder especially down the left with Koundé joining at times the attack. Barcelona was down 1 0 at the first half but in the second, Hansi Flick made changes that would turn the tide around. Ferran Torres was introduced, creating a shift in their attacking. Ferran moved on the left allowing Raphina to move permanently for the match into an attacking midfield position. At first it seemed redundant to have both Balde and Torres in the left as Athlético could deal with this. But it allowed to give Lamine Yamal more support on the right side as Raphina could move from central region to Yamal's side to provide support. In the first half this supporting role had been played by Koundé who looked to arrive late to overlap or underlap when Barcelona had controlled possession. But now Barcelona was more dangerous because of this change. Combined with Torres attacking instinct to get an extra body on the box when needed. The second goal os the best example for that.
Bayern Munich's 2020/21 Tactics Explained | How Hansi Flick Has Made Them So Good |
Hansi Flick made veterans like Muller, Neuer and Boateng central in the process to turn Bayern into the best team in the world. Flick also gave Kimmich his preferred defensive midfield role fulltime, completing his transition from right back. We also saw his ability to trust youngsters like Davies, overseeing his transition from a winger prospect who made 14 appearances, most of them as a winger, to becoming one of the best left backs in the world. This was faciliated by the versatility of Alaba, who went from being one of the best left backs of the world to one of the best center backs.It served creating harmony within the squad. In the Bundesliga, his preferred formation looked like a 4 2 3 1. Long balls from Neuer or the center backs were a good option because the presence of Lewandowski or Muller as aerial targets with guys like Gnabry, Sané or Coman as runners. However with 58% of possession, Bayern was still overall a possession oriented team. Bayern being good on build up helped a lot with opposition often choosing to sit deep and compact the spaces in crucial zones. Having 2 centerbacks good under pressure meant that we saw less Kimmich coming to provide the support and instead, stayed higher to provide options between the lines. If Bayern were pressed higher by a front 2, Pavard oftne dropped from a right back to a right center back. And despite being left footed, Sané hugged the right touchline in the first phase, providing the width. This could then possibly draw an opposition's winger higher up, leaving Sané for a potential 1 v 1. Boateng has the responsability to expand the play with longer balls, mostly into the wingers when they start high and wide. Alaba in the other hand played more often the ball slightly into feet, looking to connect with the man near him. However unlike the right where Sané provides the width, Gnabry or Coman both tend to tuck infield with Davies having instead to move higher up the pitch.
This by times left him free to receive from Boateng. Also, Kimmich staying as a pivot instead of dropping into the center back zone allowed Goretzka to push higher up between the lines. If the opponent continued to try and press high, Alaba could play a penetrative and progressive pass into a player between the lines. Alaba had the second highest penetrating passes into the third third despite being deep just behind Kimmich and slightly ahead of Pavard. So if the opposition drops deep to cope with this, this opens up an option for Kimmich who is afforded more spaces. So at times, teams will look to sit on Kimmich who can thn move laterally to the right to open up more spaces as we can see Goretzka dropping deeper to receive and support while Alaba can look to push up higher on the left, particularly if they are dominating possession. None of Goretzka and Kimmich play only as a pivot like Busquets but instead, they were playing with more fluidity with Kimmich having a tendency to stay a bit deeper than Goretzka even though we could see the opposite happening. Then with men often supporting him between the lines, Muller was often able to find some spaces Add to that the fact that Lewandowski had the strenght to hold off a man, and his elusive movements meant that he oftne found spaces without having to hold off a man. By times we saw Lewandowski dropping deeper and because he was such a threat, a center back often tried to stay tight which created the spaces for runners in behind. But Bayern looked mostly to attack in the flanks. Coman on the left was playing like a traditionnal winger, bypassing the line and trying to cross in while combining with Davies. Gnabry in the other hand liked to operate as an inside forward so in this case, Davies had more offensive responsabilities, providing most of the width, and Alaba having to move higher up.
The front 4 showed a lot of fluidity, interchanging regularly. We saw particularly Muller and Sané combining a lot. Pavard tended to stay deeper initially, allowing Sané to have his 1 v 1, meaning that the opposition's winger is caught higher up. When Sané goes infield, his fullback instinctly goes with him while the defensive midfielder doesn't want to stay too far away from here because of Gnabry and Goretzka. So Muller often had momentary spaces down the right, where he could look for the cross. Muller, under Flick, ended up second in term of crosses attempted, ahead of Gnabry and Sané but just behind Coman. We sometimes saw Pavard arrivign late to get across in and one of Bayern's strenght how many numbers they could commit into the box This includes Lewandowski, Muller, Goretzka and the far side winger. This is where we see the main difference between Kimmich and Goretzka as Kimmich prefers to stay deeper to act as the main creative force, looking for crosses from the half spaces of shots from the rebound. As a result, no team attempted more crosses than the Bavarians when Flick was in charge. If the opposition stays in his default shape, there will always be a man free for a header So the central midfielders are naturally dragged deeper into the box, allowing Bayern to counterpress efficiently. No team had lower passes per defensive action than Bayern Munich in the league. This was because there is a large distance now between the midfielders who wins the ball to the forward so Bayern can easily swarn him.But Bayern's weakness was that with both pivots high and one of their fullbacks at least, if the first layer of pressing if broken, the opposition had access to spaces to run into.
Even from a situation like a goalkick, Bayern looked to press high initially pushing up Goretzka alongside Muller to make a 4 1 4 1. As soon the ball went wide, Bayern looked to shut off all options. This involved again pushing the line high up early so they could be vulnerable over the top. And Alaba and Davies pace combined with Neuer as sweeper keeper means they often dealt with this but it was still risky regardless. As a result, their defense was not really excellent. But Bayern's qualities easily made up for it.
How Barcelona Pierced The Atletico Madrid Armour | Atletico Madrid 2-4 Barcelona
As usual Athlético Madrid looked to sit deep and frustrate Barcelona. They lined up in their usual classic 4 4 2 and although the sporadically pressed high the majority of the play took place in Athletico's half. Barcelona had their usual 4 3 3 high line shape with Koundé tucking in from the back while Balde and Yamal were tasked to provide the width for Barca, allowing them to have more numbers centrally to try to create the overload. With Alvarez and Griezmann as the 2 forwards, sitting deep on Barcelona's pivots, if Pedri stayed in his pivot position it would have been easier to cut off passes alongside Casado. So Pedri pushed higher as often as he could instead to try to combine with Olmo and Raphina to overload Athlético's double pivot, De Paul and Barrios who could become man oriented on Pedri and Olmo. While initially Raphina moved infield, Llorente would follow his man. Central overload meant that Balde would have the space and that overload in the middle could translate to men looking to flood the box. But Athlético's defense fended off these crosses. That caused Athlético Madrid troubles was the rotations at Barcelona's left side with Pedri often beginning to drift wide rather than staying central. De Paul who was man oriented would follow him, creating gaps in Athlético Madrid's desired compact shape. Olmo or Lewandowski could then drop here. But often It was Raphina who looked to move even deeper and moving more centrally, causing more issues to Llorente. He had the high and wide Balde to look onto but Llorente also found himself dragged by Raphina creating gaps in the backline for Barcelona runners. Athlético adapted, falling back with a back 5 into a 5 4 1 with Simeone moving to the right wingback defender allowing Llorente to be tighter on Raphina with lessy worry about Balde potentially free out wide.
The 5 4 1 soon morphed into a 5 3 2 defensive shape which gave them better central protection, forcing Barcelona out wide while having the advantage of having both of their forwards higher and ready for the counter. It bought Athléti some defensive success and Barcelona had it difficult to get into the half spaces despite putting numbers in the center. When Barcelona lost the ball they were looking to quickly counter press. This led to Barcelona's best chances of the first half. But it was also their biggest weakness as Athlético constantly looked to hit on the break. Having a high line meant that their oppoennts also had more rooms to exploit. Alvarez in particular found success in playing off the shoulder especially down the left with Koundé joining at times the attack. Barcelona was down 1 0 at the first half but in the second, Hansi Flick made changes that would turn the tide around. Ferran Torres was introduced, creating a shift in their attacking. Ferran moved on the left allowing Raphina to move permanently for the match into an attacking midfield position. At first it seemed redundant to have both Balde and Torres in the left as Athlético could deal with this. But it allowed to give Lamine Yamal more support on the right side as Raphina could move from central region to Yamal's side to provide support. In the first half this supporting role had been played by Koundé who looked to arrive late to overlap or underlap when Barcelona had controlled possession. But now Barcelona was more dangerous because of this change. Combined with Torres attacking instinct to get an extra body on the box when needed. The second goal os the best example for that.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
How Barcelona’s NEW Tactic is Breaking Traditions!
Barcelona used to be known for its famous tiki taka and possession style. It turned now into a vertical side thriving on risky passes and intense gegenpressing. The same style that resulted to Bayern defeating Barcelone 8 2 back in 2020. But Hansi Flick's gegenpressing style is adapted to Barcelona's old tradition. Xavi's Barcelone continued the tradition of playing a possession based football with a proper structure and multiple patterns. However with the time many oppositions adapted and can predict rotationnal patterns with the structure. It made Barcelona more predictable and rigid with players unwilling to leave their comfort zoneand surprise the markers. This resulted This resulted in less chances occasions and wasterful ball possession. Flick gave them the freedom to break away from their traditionnal style of play and move closer toward team chemistry and relationnism. It made Barcelona more flexible with movements harder to predict. Flick emphasize at getting into the final third as quick as possible. However with Barcelona's traditionnal tiki take style it needed more patience to break through the opposition's lines which can slow down reaching the attacking area quickly. So Flick adopted a riskier method of build up. Instead of overloading the numbers in the build up, he let almost all his players in the advanced positions. Rather than having his players close to each other, he stretch his players far apart to make the pitch as big as possible. With the traditionnal method of having players close to each other, the opposition focus on one area. By speading the players it maximize the spaces that the opposition need to defend.
Rather than passing sideways or taking many touches in the build up, either pass now should have a purpose of going forward either vertically or diagonically. However the opposition's low block can easily block any direct pass from the back. But it's where Flick is different from Xavi with Barcelona. Instead of advanced players having a specific zone to operate in, they have freedom to randomly move into any position. As a result, rather than focusin on the ball carrier, the opposition's low block constantly try to track and guess the random movements of the forwards. It often leave spaces at the backline.If the opposition is too rigid however and stick into their zonal shape then the positionnal freedom alone may not be enough to create spaces for direct passes. So in these scearios when the ball is with the centerback, isntead of waiting for the front to generate space, he carries the ball forward reaching the second line of defense, creating an unprecedented situation. If the opposition doesn't engage the cb, he can easily break through and engage the backline. In the other hand, sending their second line toward him destabilize their zonal space and create spaces for the others. However when playing against a strong pressing side that uses high line, it can result in a disaster. In such cases, Flick often adapts by splitting the center backs wide and positionning the pivots vertically while the ball sided fullbacks retreats to partner with the pivot. This creates an asymetric 3 2 shape which provides multiple passing angle from the centerbacks. And they use this asymetric shape to pull the opposition's frontline from oneside to the other. It increases the spaces in the opposite line and on the opposite side where the far sided fullback and the number 10 are ready to receive a direct pass.
However, switching to the opposite side can result into loosing possession. So Flick uses his pivots as the key connectors to the attacking half. For example when the cb has the ball he can pass it to the pivot who can quickly pass to the bottom pivot. This movement pulls the oppositon's frontline closer. It then opens space in the wide for the fullback to receive a direct pass as a third man. When Barcelona is into the opposite's half, under Xavi, the formation looked like a 3 2 5 with the wingers hugging the touchline with the 2 box to box midfielders attacking the half spaces. The left back would move as a second pivot. While this shape looks agressive and has all the zones covered, it was quite rigid and predictable. Under Flick, it becomes more flexible. You will often see the wingers inverting to join the cam ( number 10 ) and creating a central overload. You also might see Yamal staying wide with the striker dropping deep. These positions act as a joker role in Flick's system who would constantly roam around to create spaces for vertical spaces. For example when the cb has the ball you might see 2 of these players dropping deep to receive the ball. It forcefully forces the opposition's second line to engage forward which increases the gap with the last line where the third one is ready to drop deep and receive the second touch who can then again pass to the incoming runner. This pull the last line forward as well which create space behind them for the last player to receive the final touch and face the keeper directly. For this style to work you need players intelligent enough and with a sharp vision to make accurate direct passes. It requires mental training just as physical.
With more players operating in the central areas the opposition is forced to narrow down their structure. This creates a large amount of space for wide players like Yamal to receive and use his dribbbling to create opportunities. Whenever Barcelona plays a free kick or take a cross, Flick instructs Yamal to stay out of the crowded areas and position himself around the edge of the box or zone 14. Due to excellent dribbling and shooting skills, Yamal become very dangerous in these zones. However the ball must reach the final third first. Flick relies heavily on both pivots and center backs to deliver line breaking passes at the right moments. At Bayern, Hansi Flick used players like Thiago and Kimmich who were masters at finding spaces and executing direct spaces. However this approach can be a double edged sword for Barcelona. As with 9 or 10 players contributing to the attack as playmakers, there is sometimes a lack of defensive focus, leading to a lack of control. It makes it difficult to restrict counter attacks efficiently. To solve this, Flick has brought the German way of counterpressing at Barcelona.where he is conditionning his players to respond quickly after loosing the ball and use their energy and stamina to win it back rapidly. If even with this the ball is not won, then it creates a huge amount of space at the back for the opposition to exploit. SoSo Hansi Flick relies on his energetic players who can cover large distances quickly to halt counterattacks. As a result you often see the keeper quickly coming out of his box as a sweeper keeper. You sometimes also see wingers ilke Raphina or Yamal dropping deep to stop these counters. However with pressing and running you need more stamina from these players.
So there is a risk of frequent injuries. Flick only has 18 players at disposabl for 2024 so he had to manage the risk and maintain rotations within players to avoid injuries or else this tactic would backfire with no proper players at the right positions. Due to Lewandowski's age he may not be able to constantly press and engage with the opposition's backline. So flick assigns him to a more passive role where he drops deepper to partner with the 10 and cover the opposition's pivots. Meanwhile both younger wingers take on the responsability of pressing the back line. It forms a narrow 4 2 2 2 shape with all central positions marked. It forces the opposition to go wide to the isolated fullback. As it's done, Barcelone quickly deploys their own wideback to apply press on the ball carrier while the rest of the line shifts to cover and tightly mark al ball sided forwards. However if the opposition plays with a back 3 and so plays with attacking fullbacks/wingbacks then they can outnumber Barcelona's fullbacks. In such scenarios Flick abandon his preferred shape and let the stricker move up to maintain an overload against the back line while one of the pivots join the cam. This widens their shape and gives them more coverage in wide areas. However if the opposition manages to bypass the set up and enters into the attacking half, Barcelona quickly switch to a 4 4 2 setup. Instead of trying to stay compact and zonal, Flickasks his players to keep pressing agressively. As soon as the opposition make direct pass it triggers the pressing from behind and force them to return the pass. Then the front line initiate their man press to push them wider.
How Barcelona’s NEW Tactic is Breaking Traditions!
Barcelona used to be known for its famous tiki taka and possession style. It turned now into a vertical side thriving on risky passes and intense gegenpressing. The same style that resulted to Bayern defeating Barcelone 8 2 back in 2020. But Hansi Flick's gegenpressing style is adapted to Barcelona's old tradition. Xavi's Barcelone continued the tradition of playing a possession based football with a proper structure and multiple patterns. However with the time many oppositions adapted and can predict rotationnal patterns with the structure. It made Barcelona more predictable and rigid with players unwilling to leave their comfort zoneand surprise the markers. This resulted This resulted in less chances occasions and wasterful ball possession. Flick gave them the freedom to break away from their traditionnal style of play and move closer toward team chemistry and relationnism. It made Barcelona more flexible with movements harder to predict. Flick emphasize at getting into the final third as quick as possible. However with Barcelona's traditionnal tiki take style it needed more patience to break through the opposition's lines which can slow down reaching the attacking area quickly. So Flick adopted a riskier method of build up. Instead of overloading the numbers in the build up, he let almost all his players in the advanced positions. Rather than having his players close to each other, he stretch his players far apart to make the pitch as big as possible. With the traditionnal method of having players close to each other, the opposition focus on one area. By speading the players it maximize the spaces that the opposition need to defend.
Rather than passing sideways or taking many touches in the build up, either pass now should have a purpose of going forward either vertically or diagonically. However the opposition's low block can easily block any direct pass from the back. But it's where Flick is different from Xavi with Barcelona. Instead of advanced players having a specific zone to operate in, they have freedom to randomly move into any position. As a result, rather than focusin on the ball carrier, the opposition's low block constantly try to track and guess the random movements of the forwards. It often leave spaces at the backline.If the opposition is too rigid however and stick into their zonal shape then the positionnal freedom alone may not be enough to create spaces for direct passes. So in these scearios when the ball is with the centerback, isntead of waiting for the front to generate space, he carries the ball forward reaching the second line of defense, creating an unprecedented situation. If the opposition doesn't engage the cb, he can easily break through and engage the backline. In the other hand, sending their second line toward him destabilize their zonal space and create spaces for the others. However when playing against a strong pressing side that uses high line, it can result in a disaster. In such cases, Flick often adapts by splitting the center backs wide and positionning the pivots vertically while the ball sided fullbacks retreats to partner with the pivot. This creates an asymetric 3 2 shape which provides multiple passing angle from the centerbacks. And they use this asymetric shape to pull the opposition's frontline from oneside to the other. It increases the spaces in the opposite line and on the opposite side where the far sided fullback and the number 10 are ready to receive a direct pass.
However, switching to the opposite side can result into loosing possession. So Flick uses his pivots as the key connectors to the attacking half. For example when the cb has the ball he can pass it to the pivot who can quickly pass to the bottom pivot. This movement pulls the oppositon's frontline closer. It then opens space in the wide for the fullback to receive a direct pass as a third man. When Barcelona is into the opposite's half, under Xavi, the formation looked like a 3 2 5 with the wingers hugging the touchline with the 2 box to box midfielders attacking the half spaces. The left back would move as a second pivot. While this shape looks agressive and has all the zones covered, it was quite rigid and predictable. Under Flick, it becomes more flexible. You will often see the wingers inverting to join the cam ( number 10 ) and creating a central overload. You also might see Yamal staying wide with the striker dropping deep. These positions act as a joker role in Flick's system who would constantly roam around to create spaces for vertical spaces. For example when the cb has the ball you might see 2 of these players dropping deep to receive the ball. It forcefully forces the opposition's second line to engage forward which increases the gap with the last line where the third one is ready to drop deep and receive the second touch who can then again pass to the incoming runner. This pull the last line forward as well which create space behind them for the last player to receive the final touch and face the keeper directly. For this style to work you need players intelligent enough and with a sharp vision to make accurate direct passes. It requires mental training just as physical.
With more players operating in the central areas the opposition is forced to narrow down their structure. This creates a large amount of space for wide players like Yamal to receive and use his dribbbling to create opportunities. Whenever Barcelona plays a free kick or take a cross, Flick instructs Yamal to stay out of the crowded areas and position himself around the edge of the box or zone 14. Due to excellent dribbling and shooting skills, Yamal become very dangerous in these zones. However the ball must reach the final third first. Flick relies heavily on both pivots and center backs to deliver line breaking passes at the right moments. At Bayern, Hansi Flick used players like Thiago and Kimmich who were masters at finding spaces and executing direct spaces. However this approach can be a double edged sword for Barcelona. As with 9 or 10 players contributing to the attack as playmakers, there is sometimes a lack of defensive focus, leading to a lack of control. It makes it difficult to restrict counter attacks efficiently. To solve this, Flick has brought the German way of counterpressing at Barcelona.where he is conditionning his players to respond quickly after loosing the ball and use their energy and stamina to win it back rapidly. If even with this the ball is not won, then it creates a huge amount of space at the back for the opposition to exploit. SoSo Hansi Flick relies on his energetic players who can cover large distances quickly to halt counterattacks. As a result you often see the keeper quickly coming out of his box as a sweeper keeper. You sometimes also see wingers ilke Raphina or Yamal dropping deep to stop these counters. However with pressing and running you need more stamina from these players.
So there is a risk of frequent injuries. Flick only has 18 players at disposabl for 2024 so he had to manage the risk and maintain rotations within players to avoid injuries or else this tactic would backfire with no proper players at the right positions. Due to Lewandowski's age he may not be able to constantly press and engage with the opposition's backline. So flick assigns him to a more passive role where he drops deepper to partner with the 10 and cover the opposition's pivots. Meanwhile both younger wingers take on the responsability of pressing the back line. It forms a narrow 4 2 2 2 shape with all central positions marked. It forces the opposition to go wide to the isolated fullback. As it's done, Barcelone quickly deploys their own wideback to apply press on the ball carrier while the rest of the line shifts to cover and tightly mark al ball sided forwards. However if the opposition plays with a back 3 and so plays with attacking fullbacks/wingbacks then they can outnumber Barcelona's fullbacks. In such scenarios Flick abandon his preferred shape and let the stricker move up to maintain an overload against the back line while one of the pivots join the cam. This widens their shape and gives them more coverage in wide areas. However if the opposition manages to bypass the set up and enters into the attacking half, Barcelona quickly switch to a 4 4 2 setup. Instead of trying to stay compact and zonal, Flickasks his players to keep pressing agressively. As soon as the opposition make direct pass it triggers the pressing from behind and force them to return the pass. Then the front line initiate their man press to push them wider.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
When the opposition tries to advance from the flanks, Hansi Flick uses his wingers to support the fullbacks to create a 2 v 1 and instead of tilting his shape to cover the half spaces, Flick keeps his central players in place and maintain a strong central overlaod against crosses. To cover these gaps you might see one of the front 2 tracking back, often the cam. When the ball is back, Flick prefers high intensity counter attacks where he uses his quick players like Raphina and Yamal to beat the opposition's back line. But the riskier the passes are, the greater the chances of errors are as well. It can leads to silly goals or red cards. Even with 1 less player on the pitch, instead of adding a defender, he still instructs his players to keep attacking and play forward. There is always a risk of conceding from this. Flick plays with a high line to win the ball in the attacking half. However when facing teams who adapt similar vertical principles, they could easily manipulate the Barcelona's high line by using their forwards and target long balls, using the forwards pace. With Barcelona's defense built on mobility they often lack strong defenders. Due to the high positionning of their fullbacks, Barcelona also spaces in the flanks behind them. On the right side, the gap is usually covered by the right pivot. However on the left, due to the advancing movement of the left pivot, Barcelona often struggles to cover the left flank. and has to tilt the back line which weaksn their central coverage against crosses. Barcelona obviously need defenders comfortable with the ball and capable of hitting accurate long rangers. Also he heavily relies on his center back Cubarsi who is just 17 years old like Yamal. Despite his age, Cubarsi possesses all the qualities needed to fit Hansi Flick's energy demanding system.
About the fullbacks, their roles are dependent of the movements from the wingers. On the left, players like Raphina or Torres often operate as false wingers, who starts out wide but usually stay central. This forces Balde to cover the left flank and maintain the width as a wingback. On the right, Yamal prefers to stay near the touchline before cutting inside with the ball. So Koundé typically remains deeper as a fullback to maintain a back 3. But he also advances to support Yamal by making underlapping and overlapping runs. As for the pivots, one would always remain deeper than the other, near the centerbacks, and act like a deep lying playmaker. The other pivot typically functions as a box to box midfielder. who usually operates forward to engageattack but also drops deep when defending. De Jong is the one acting more as a deep lying playmaker here. Most of the direct passes tend to originate from this position. On the left, players like Raphina or Torres often operate as false wingers, who starts out wide but usually stay central. This forces Balde to cover the left flank and maintain the width as a wingback. On the right, Yamal prefers to stay near the touchline before cutting inside with the ball. So Koundé typically remains deeper as a fullback to maintain a back 3. But he also advances to support Yamal by making underlapping and overlapping runs. As for the pivots, one would always remain deeper than the other, near the centerbacks, and act like a deep lying playmaker.
The other pivot typically functions as a box to box midfielder. who usually operates forward to engageattack but also drops deep when defending. De Jong is the one acting more as a deep lying playmaker here. Most of the direct passes tend to originate from this position. The number 10 is similar to a joker role with players like Raphina or Olmo often taking up this role. He would constantly roam randomly and interchange positions with almost all the players. On the right, Yamal use his dribbling qualities to bring goalscoring opportunities. On the left wing, players tend to stay less on the wing and move into spaces you don't expect a winger to be present in. Fianlly upfront similar to his role at Bayern, Lewandowski functions as a versatile complete forward who can drop deep to help to create central overloads and manipulate the opposition's back line, sometimes interchanging with the number 10.
Fabian Hürzeler is the Brighton's manager. It clearly looks like he is not using midfielders at all. He tends to combine both positionnism and relationsim philosophies. His system keep structures of positionnism but he also give certian players the freedome to roam bringing a bit of relationnism as well. Against a high pressing side going man to man, instead of overloading the backline with pivots, Fabian Hürzeler doesn't use them and pushes them further up the pitch to form a front 5. To fill that gap, he gets one of his center back into the pivot role while the goalkepper steps up to fill the vacated spot. This creates a massive 6 5 shape. With no players into the midfield, it forces the opposition's pivots to take a decision : either press the back line to restrict the build up. But then Brighton can play long balls to the front 5 where they have a numerical advantage against the back 4. If they track back to prevent the long balls. then Fabian can easily make build up with 6 v 4 superiority. It also stretchs the opposition's structure in both sides of the pitch. which creates a massive space in the central midfield. So he targets the area to connect both sides. For example when the gk or the cb is in advanced position, the cb who moved into the cdm position usually drops deeper to receive the ball then pass it to the nearest center back. If this movement attracts the opposition's front line toward the back 3, which then frees up the wide fullbacks to invert into the central space, and receive third pass to continue to advance. However when the ball is with the fullback, they will see the advanced pivot dropping deep and then making a forward pass to the advanced center back. These movements pull the opposiiton's deeper markers forward, freeing up the front line to receive the final pass. and gain the numerical superiority against the vulnerable back line.
However if the opposition prioritizes their defense over pressing, it wouldn't work that much so Fabian switches to his plan B approach where one of his advanced pivots drops deep and join the false 6 while the other pivot and the stricker acts like 2 number 10. So instead of maintaining 2 horizontal lines, Hürzeler overloads the midfield to create 2 extra lines. By doing this, it forces the opposition to stretch their structure vertically which allow to create space either by targetting the center backs, either by outnumbering the central spaces with their box midfield. Into the attacking half, the structure looks like either a 3 0 7 either a 3 1 6. Fabian introduced the concept of false 10 who usually stay high up the pitch most of the time. However with almost no midfielders at the center,there is no direct connexion between the back line and the front line. So Fabian often let his middle defenders of the back 3 to advance and act as a false pivot. By having 6 or 7 players joining the front line, Brighton often outnumbers the opposition back line by gaining a + 2 advantage in each area. However even with this overload, if the front line is placed horizontallly, the opposition typically prioritizes protecting the central areas. This reduces the effectiveness of the front overload, forcing them to rely on long crosses or through balls from the wide. To tackle this, Fabian gives both false 10 the freedom to seek relationnism, constantly roaming where the ball is. and help the fornt 5 wherever they need. For example when the wingback faces a 2 v 2 scenario alongside the winger, you will often see the false 10 drifting towards the ball carrier and create a numerical advantage on the wing. If the opposition try to commit more number here, it creates more spaces in central areas or in the opposite side, allowing rest of the front line to make runs between gaps.
This flexibility turns the false 10 into playmakers or forwards who create spaces for their teamates by pulling markers away or move into unexpected places to score. As a result, Marcel Hartel who never score more than 5 goals ina season as a pivot shockingly scored 21 goals and made 16 assists just by playing as a false 10 since Fabian took in charge. With only 3 players at the back it seems at first it's an invitation for the opposition to counter attack. Despite this the club is one of those who conceded the less goals. It's due to their clever counter pressing tactic. When they loose the ball, the 7 attackers are turned into 7 defenders. When the ball is lost the closest player press while the players further out are ready to close all the potential long passes with the players positionned a bit further back are positionned to to cover secondary passing options. If they can't win the ball back even with this, they quickly regroup into a compact defensive shape. The unique thing here is the narrow pentagon formed by the front 3 and the pivots. Reason for this is that whenever the opposition build up from deep, instead of man marking they maintain this shape to block all the central options of the ball carrier. Even if the opposition manages to pass it to the center. the pentagon immediatly presses the receiver from all sides =, forcing them to return the ball. This forces the opposition to go wide with the pivots being given the free role, they quickly move to cover wide passing options rather than staying central. Meanwhile the back line allows the wingback to make man to man agressive press on the ball carrier. It locks down the passing angles from all sides. If the opposition tries to retreat or move back, they quit their horizontal structure and appky an intense men press to push them even further back.
When the opposition tries to advance from the flanks, Hansi Flick uses his wingers to support the fullbacks to create a 2 v 1 and instead of tilting his shape to cover the half spaces, Flick keeps his central players in place and maintain a strong central overlaod against crosses. To cover these gaps you might see one of the front 2 tracking back, often the cam. When the ball is back, Flick prefers high intensity counter attacks where he uses his quick players like Raphina and Yamal to beat the opposition's back line. But the riskier the passes are, the greater the chances of errors are as well. It can leads to silly goals or red cards. Even with 1 less player on the pitch, instead of adding a defender, he still instructs his players to keep attacking and play forward. There is always a risk of conceding from this. Flick plays with a high line to win the ball in the attacking half. However when facing teams who adapt similar vertical principles, they could easily manipulate the Barcelona's high line by using their forwards and target long balls, using the forwards pace. With Barcelona's defense built on mobility they often lack strong defenders. Due to the high positionning of their fullbacks, Barcelona also spaces in the flanks behind them. On the right side, the gap is usually covered by the right pivot. However on the left, due to the advancing movement of the left pivot, Barcelona often struggles to cover the left flank. and has to tilt the back line which weaksn their central coverage against crosses. Barcelona obviously need defenders comfortable with the ball and capable of hitting accurate long rangers. Also he heavily relies on his center back Cubarsi who is just 17 years old like Yamal. Despite his age, Cubarsi possesses all the qualities needed to fit Hansi Flick's energy demanding system.
About the fullbacks, their roles are dependent of the movements from the wingers. On the left, players like Raphina or Torres often operate as false wingers, who starts out wide but usually stay central. This forces Balde to cover the left flank and maintain the width as a wingback. On the right, Yamal prefers to stay near the touchline before cutting inside with the ball. So Koundé typically remains deeper as a fullback to maintain a back 3. But he also advances to support Yamal by making underlapping and overlapping runs. As for the pivots, one would always remain deeper than the other, near the centerbacks, and act like a deep lying playmaker. The other pivot typically functions as a box to box midfielder. who usually operates forward to engageattack but also drops deep when defending. De Jong is the one acting more as a deep lying playmaker here. Most of the direct passes tend to originate from this position. On the left, players like Raphina or Torres often operate as false wingers, who starts out wide but usually stay central. This forces Balde to cover the left flank and maintain the width as a wingback. On the right, Yamal prefers to stay near the touchline before cutting inside with the ball. So Koundé typically remains deeper as a fullback to maintain a back 3. But he also advances to support Yamal by making underlapping and overlapping runs. As for the pivots, one would always remain deeper than the other, near the centerbacks, and act like a deep lying playmaker.
The other pivot typically functions as a box to box midfielder. who usually operates forward to engageattack but also drops deep when defending. De Jong is the one acting more as a deep lying playmaker here. Most of the direct passes tend to originate from this position. The number 10 is similar to a joker role with players like Raphina or Olmo often taking up this role. He would constantly roam randomly and interchange positions with almost all the players. On the right, Yamal use his dribbling qualities to bring goalscoring opportunities. On the left wing, players tend to stay less on the wing and move into spaces you don't expect a winger to be present in. Fianlly upfront similar to his role at Bayern, Lewandowski functions as a versatile complete forward who can drop deep to help to create central overloads and manipulate the opposition's back line, sometimes interchanging with the number 10.
Fabian Hürzeler is the Brighton's manager. It clearly looks like he is not using midfielders at all. He tends to combine both positionnism and relationsim philosophies. His system keep structures of positionnism but he also give certian players the freedome to roam bringing a bit of relationnism as well. Against a high pressing side going man to man, instead of overloading the backline with pivots, Fabian Hürzeler doesn't use them and pushes them further up the pitch to form a front 5. To fill that gap, he gets one of his center back into the pivot role while the goalkepper steps up to fill the vacated spot. This creates a massive 6 5 shape. With no players into the midfield, it forces the opposition's pivots to take a decision : either press the back line to restrict the build up. But then Brighton can play long balls to the front 5 where they have a numerical advantage against the back 4. If they track back to prevent the long balls. then Fabian can easily make build up with 6 v 4 superiority. It also stretchs the opposition's structure in both sides of the pitch. which creates a massive space in the central midfield. So he targets the area to connect both sides. For example when the gk or the cb is in advanced position, the cb who moved into the cdm position usually drops deeper to receive the ball then pass it to the nearest center back. If this movement attracts the opposition's front line toward the back 3, which then frees up the wide fullbacks to invert into the central space, and receive third pass to continue to advance. However when the ball is with the fullback, they will see the advanced pivot dropping deep and then making a forward pass to the advanced center back. These movements pull the opposiiton's deeper markers forward, freeing up the front line to receive the final pass. and gain the numerical superiority against the vulnerable back line.
However if the opposition prioritizes their defense over pressing, it wouldn't work that much so Fabian switches to his plan B approach where one of his advanced pivots drops deep and join the false 6 while the other pivot and the stricker acts like 2 number 10. So instead of maintaining 2 horizontal lines, Hürzeler overloads the midfield to create 2 extra lines. By doing this, it forces the opposition to stretch their structure vertically which allow to create space either by targetting the center backs, either by outnumbering the central spaces with their box midfield. Into the attacking half, the structure looks like either a 3 0 7 either a 3 1 6. Fabian introduced the concept of false 10 who usually stay high up the pitch most of the time. However with almost no midfielders at the center,there is no direct connexion between the back line and the front line. So Fabian often let his middle defenders of the back 3 to advance and act as a false pivot. By having 6 or 7 players joining the front line, Brighton often outnumbers the opposition back line by gaining a + 2 advantage in each area. However even with this overload, if the front line is placed horizontallly, the opposition typically prioritizes protecting the central areas. This reduces the effectiveness of the front overload, forcing them to rely on long crosses or through balls from the wide. To tackle this, Fabian gives both false 10 the freedom to seek relationnism, constantly roaming where the ball is. and help the fornt 5 wherever they need. For example when the wingback faces a 2 v 2 scenario alongside the winger, you will often see the false 10 drifting towards the ball carrier and create a numerical advantage on the wing. If the opposition try to commit more number here, it creates more spaces in central areas or in the opposite side, allowing rest of the front line to make runs between gaps.
This flexibility turns the false 10 into playmakers or forwards who create spaces for their teamates by pulling markers away or move into unexpected places to score. As a result, Marcel Hartel who never score more than 5 goals ina season as a pivot shockingly scored 21 goals and made 16 assists just by playing as a false 10 since Fabian took in charge. With only 3 players at the back it seems at first it's an invitation for the opposition to counter attack. Despite this the club is one of those who conceded the less goals. It's due to their clever counter pressing tactic. When they loose the ball, the 7 attackers are turned into 7 defenders. When the ball is lost the closest player press while the players further out are ready to close all the potential long passes with the players positionned a bit further back are positionned to to cover secondary passing options. If they can't win the ball back even with this, they quickly regroup into a compact defensive shape. The unique thing here is the narrow pentagon formed by the front 3 and the pivots. Reason for this is that whenever the opposition build up from deep, instead of man marking they maintain this shape to block all the central options of the ball carrier. Even if the opposition manages to pass it to the center. the pentagon immediatly presses the receiver from all sides =, forcing them to return the ball. This forces the opposition to go wide with the pivots being given the free role, they quickly move to cover wide passing options rather than staying central. Meanwhile the back line allows the wingback to make man to man agressive press on the ball carrier. It locks down the passing angles from all sides. If the opposition tries to retreat or move back, they quit their horizontal structure and appky an intense men press to push them even further back.
Excellent
Louis auguste je t'ai à l'œil
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Tactical Analysis: Bayern Munich 8-2 Barcelona | Flick’s Complete& Systematic Destruction Of Setien|
Barca wanted to play from the back, starting with Ter Stegen. From the goalkicks the centerbacks would position themselves inside the box while the fullbacks higher up. Bayern, keen to press , had men stationned just outwide the box ready to press, and they pushed their backline extremely high. Bayern could afford to play this very high line due to several factors. Firstly Barcelona didn't have any aerial targets with Suarez only winning only 1 aerial duel. In addition, none of their forwards of wingers are pacy. Couple this with Kimmich, Davies and Alaba all being quick enough to recover, no wonder why they were confident pushing the defensive line high. Bayern's pressing mechanism had variations but one of the most comons was having the extra midfielder willing to push high to cut off the option into Busquets. Bayern used a 4 4 2 press usually with Muller alongside Lewandowski although of course that varied. Once the ball want to one of the centerbacks, Lewandowski often dropped into the midfield onto Busquets to prevent central progression. And crucially, Bayern's wingers were willing to push narrower to potentially press a center back. Lewandowski deep and the wingers pushing narrow meant Bayern kept numbers in the midfield to maintain solidity where Barca have numbers. So if Barca could not work the ball wide into the fullbacks and went back to Ter Stegen, then Lewandowski would press, using his covershadow to keep Busquets marked and onto Ter Stegen and force him into a poor pass, as shown by the 71% pass accuracy by Ter Stegen, compared to Neuer's 88% passing accuracy.
Bayern's press paid off as we saw with Perisic's goal. Even when Barca managed to get pass the press, it was often through the outlets in the wide regions. either from the keeper, or through quick switches after a Bayern men came narrow. Barcelona's 4 4 2 was fluid and often looked like a diamond by times with Messi at the tip and Vidal pushing high almost as a forward. With so many central numbers, Bayern's wingers were often drawn in to defend narrowly, and Bayern didn't get punished for this because Barcelona didn't use traditionnal wingers. So at worst, Bayern would be 1 v 1 in the wide areas. Bayern wanted to deny any space in the central regions. That meant Barcelona's fullbacks were consistently the free mens. This combined with a high line was not really good for Bayern and we saw that in the own goal. We also see this in the second goal where Kimmich was drawn toward Suarez who was in the half space. So Messi finds Alba running behind the line. Perisic doesn't track deep, Kimmich is narrow, as moments earlier he was tracking Suarez. So Alba gets the ball behind the line, leading to Suarez's goal. However it was Semedo who was the main free outlet. Davis tended to tuck in both in high and deeper areas of the pitch, as Messi tended to drift into the right half space zone. And Semedo made hin run and several times, Barcelona found him in dangerous positions. But this area was also Bayern's strenght as if the ball was intercepted here, Semedo was caught high up the pitch, leading to players running into the vacated space. This leds to several Bayern Munich's goals.
With the ball, when Barcelona looked to press high in a 4 4 2, Bayern had at least 2 aerial targets who could combine and try to look for the space in behind the high line, which they managed a few times. Lewandowski and Muller won respectively 4 and 2 aerial duels. When defending, Barcelona used a flat 4 4 2 with Vidal and Young wide. To create numerical advantage against Barcelona's front 2, it was usually Thiago who dropped deep to form the back 3, allowing the fullbacks, Alaba and Davies, to push high up the pitch. Thiago could then switch the ball out wide to the fullback or winger. He attempted 5 long balls and completed all the 5. Allowing the fullbacks so high allowed the wingers to play inside the pitch. So if Goretzka couldn't be the outlet for Thiago, one of the wingers could drop into the midfield to provide an option as well. Having so many men between the lines caused problems for Barcelona. The heat map of the front 4 shows touches across the width of the pitch.This was helped by the fact that aging Messi and Suarez weren't contributing as much as they used too before. So Thiago could often bypass them to join the midfield and increase their overload. But the narrow Bayern's wingers meant they also pinned down Barcelona's wide midfielders deep as they were afraid to leave spaces between the lines. But this also created the problem of having Thiago too long on the ball. Goretzka time and time could be the third running man, knowing that Thiago had little to no pressure from opposition, creating an other passing line. Bayern also used the wide regions expertly. They could do this by drawing Barcelona's fullbacks out of position, often with Alaba moving into the left back position, when Thiago dropped deep, and this created space in b ehind for the run by the fullback. But the main way they did this was through 1 v 1.
This was faciliated by Bayern's narrow wingers and Barcelona's overly narrow midfield, meaning that Kimmich and Alaba were often in 1 v 1. Lewandowski was also very mobile, going by times into the half space for temporarily drawing a fullback, allowing Bayern to move higher up the pitch.Once they were in the wide regions, Bayern was dangerous, mostly by crosses, with Bayern having several numbers attacking the box.
Flick's Barcelona Just HUMILIATED Real Madrid | Tactical Analysis
Real Madrid looked to press in a 4 4 2 with Bellingham and Camavinga on the sides while Valverde and Tchouaméni would remain more as central miedfielders. Barcelona responded to this by playing with a back 3 with Koundé tucking in and Balde affording to be more agressive on the left handside. The way Ancelotti made Vinicius press gave Real Madrid defensive nightmares. Vinicius would press from out to in pretty much in a striaght line. This meant he never kept any Barcelona players in his cover shadow. He never cut out any of the passing lane during his approach so the center back had an easy pass to the miedfield or to Koundé if he wanted. So with 1 pass, Barcelona could easily take out both Vinicius and Mbappé out of the game. Vinicius didn't cover either Koundé either the pivot. Something that can be comon while pressing in a 4 4 2 is having a miedfielder joining the press rather than a winger. This could mean that the front 2 choose to be more passive. Both using their cover shadow to decrease the impact on the 3 v 2 in this region. Or even if a man is pressing they could still keep one of the pivotin their shadow allowing the center to be more protected. But with Vinicius pressing straight, Real Madrid was at disadvantage both at the front line and in the miedfield. Real Madrid tried to counter this disadvantage by playing in a compact 4 4 2 and having both Bellingham and Camavinga so narrow but then that would mean Valverde and Tchouaméni were tasked to press the double pivot much more agressively. Even that was not enough because Koundé could still receive on the outside. Then Camavinga would have to press him, breaking that compact narrow shape. It decreased the gap between the lines that Real Madrid tried to prevent. Being that agressive in the middile while at numerical disadvantage ended up being disastrous for Real Madrid. If a pivot received a pass and passed it to the cam, the cam could run into the back line with plenty of support ahead of him.
Also, Cubarsi's ability to break the lines could find that man in the 10 position. It was made worse by the fact that Lewandowski was never stationar and was wiliing to come deep. If a center back followed him, Lopez had a great movement to make. He was quick to identity the gaps and look to make the most of it. So Real Madrid tried to be more agressive by getting a center back into the 10 earlier and let the other center back handle Lewandowski in 1 v 1. However one trick maneuver or turn and the midfielder would be away from his marker and the opposition can get into extremly dangerous positions. We saw that when Olmo dragged Militao out of his position. Balde could afford to be more agressive on the build up, looking to provide the width and allowing Raphina to move into a 10 position. So Real Madrid had by time 2 number 10 to deal with between the lines. They could technically be 3 v 2 vs Real Madrid's center backs at times. Madrid, just like for their midfield, tried to counter this by playing more narrow, with both Vaazquez and Mendy, the fullbacks, to come more narrow to assist the center backs so when a man pressed, they had more cover. However that left Barcelona's fullbacks with more spaces, especially Balde. That meant that a lot was asked from Bellingham and Vazquez. Bellingham was supposed to be narrow to help the situation into the midfield but also track back while Vazquez had to worry about the secondary 10 while also worrying about Balde out wide. When Koundé pushed up as well, Vinicius tried to take the space behind him. Out of possession, Barcelona used their usual 4 2 4 pressing shape. with the wingers being expected to cover the center backs while Lopez and Lewandowski would cover the pivots. Barcelone was fine with leaving the sides vacated as both Mendy and Vazquez weren't as big of a threat on the ball.
Tactical Analysis: Bayern Munich 8-2 Barcelona | Flick’s Complete& Systematic Destruction Of Setien|
Barca wanted to play from the back, starting with Ter Stegen. From the goalkicks the centerbacks would position themselves inside the box while the fullbacks higher up. Bayern, keen to press , had men stationned just outwide the box ready to press, and they pushed their backline extremely high. Bayern could afford to play this very high line due to several factors. Firstly Barcelona didn't have any aerial targets with Suarez only winning only 1 aerial duel. In addition, none of their forwards of wingers are pacy. Couple this with Kimmich, Davies and Alaba all being quick enough to recover, no wonder why they were confident pushing the defensive line high. Bayern's pressing mechanism had variations but one of the most comons was having the extra midfielder willing to push high to cut off the option into Busquets. Bayern used a 4 4 2 press usually with Muller alongside Lewandowski although of course that varied. Once the ball want to one of the centerbacks, Lewandowski often dropped into the midfield onto Busquets to prevent central progression. And crucially, Bayern's wingers were willing to push narrower to potentially press a center back. Lewandowski deep and the wingers pushing narrow meant Bayern kept numbers in the midfield to maintain solidity where Barca have numbers. So if Barca could not work the ball wide into the fullbacks and went back to Ter Stegen, then Lewandowski would press, using his covershadow to keep Busquets marked and onto Ter Stegen and force him into a poor pass, as shown by the 71% pass accuracy by Ter Stegen, compared to Neuer's 88% passing accuracy.
Bayern's press paid off as we saw with Perisic's goal. Even when Barca managed to get pass the press, it was often through the outlets in the wide regions. either from the keeper, or through quick switches after a Bayern men came narrow. Barcelona's 4 4 2 was fluid and often looked like a diamond by times with Messi at the tip and Vidal pushing high almost as a forward. With so many central numbers, Bayern's wingers were often drawn in to defend narrowly, and Bayern didn't get punished for this because Barcelona didn't use traditionnal wingers. So at worst, Bayern would be 1 v 1 in the wide areas. Bayern wanted to deny any space in the central regions. That meant Barcelona's fullbacks were consistently the free mens. This combined with a high line was not really good for Bayern and we saw that in the own goal. We also see this in the second goal where Kimmich was drawn toward Suarez who was in the half space. So Messi finds Alba running behind the line. Perisic doesn't track deep, Kimmich is narrow, as moments earlier he was tracking Suarez. So Alba gets the ball behind the line, leading to Suarez's goal. However it was Semedo who was the main free outlet. Davis tended to tuck in both in high and deeper areas of the pitch, as Messi tended to drift into the right half space zone. And Semedo made hin run and several times, Barcelona found him in dangerous positions. But this area was also Bayern's strenght as if the ball was intercepted here, Semedo was caught high up the pitch, leading to players running into the vacated space. This leds to several Bayern Munich's goals.
With the ball, when Barcelona looked to press high in a 4 4 2, Bayern had at least 2 aerial targets who could combine and try to look for the space in behind the high line, which they managed a few times. Lewandowski and Muller won respectively 4 and 2 aerial duels. When defending, Barcelona used a flat 4 4 2 with Vidal and Young wide. To create numerical advantage against Barcelona's front 2, it was usually Thiago who dropped deep to form the back 3, allowing the fullbacks, Alaba and Davies, to push high up the pitch. Thiago could then switch the ball out wide to the fullback or winger. He attempted 5 long balls and completed all the 5. Allowing the fullbacks so high allowed the wingers to play inside the pitch. So if Goretzka couldn't be the outlet for Thiago, one of the wingers could drop into the midfield to provide an option as well. Having so many men between the lines caused problems for Barcelona. The heat map of the front 4 shows touches across the width of the pitch.This was helped by the fact that aging Messi and Suarez weren't contributing as much as they used too before. So Thiago could often bypass them to join the midfield and increase their overload. But the narrow Bayern's wingers meant they also pinned down Barcelona's wide midfielders deep as they were afraid to leave spaces between the lines. But this also created the problem of having Thiago too long on the ball. Goretzka time and time could be the third running man, knowing that Thiago had little to no pressure from opposition, creating an other passing line. Bayern also used the wide regions expertly. They could do this by drawing Barcelona's fullbacks out of position, often with Alaba moving into the left back position, when Thiago dropped deep, and this created space in b ehind for the run by the fullback. But the main way they did this was through 1 v 1.
This was faciliated by Bayern's narrow wingers and Barcelona's overly narrow midfield, meaning that Kimmich and Alaba were often in 1 v 1. Lewandowski was also very mobile, going by times into the half space for temporarily drawing a fullback, allowing Bayern to move higher up the pitch.Once they were in the wide regions, Bayern was dangerous, mostly by crosses, with Bayern having several numbers attacking the box.
Flick's Barcelona Just HUMILIATED Real Madrid | Tactical Analysis
Real Madrid looked to press in a 4 4 2 with Bellingham and Camavinga on the sides while Valverde and Tchouaméni would remain more as central miedfielders. Barcelona responded to this by playing with a back 3 with Koundé tucking in and Balde affording to be more agressive on the left handside. The way Ancelotti made Vinicius press gave Real Madrid defensive nightmares. Vinicius would press from out to in pretty much in a striaght line. This meant he never kept any Barcelona players in his cover shadow. He never cut out any of the passing lane during his approach so the center back had an easy pass to the miedfield or to Koundé if he wanted. So with 1 pass, Barcelona could easily take out both Vinicius and Mbappé out of the game. Vinicius didn't cover either Koundé either the pivot. Something that can be comon while pressing in a 4 4 2 is having a miedfielder joining the press rather than a winger. This could mean that the front 2 choose to be more passive. Both using their cover shadow to decrease the impact on the 3 v 2 in this region. Or even if a man is pressing they could still keep one of the pivotin their shadow allowing the center to be more protected. But with Vinicius pressing straight, Real Madrid was at disadvantage both at the front line and in the miedfield. Real Madrid tried to counter this disadvantage by playing in a compact 4 4 2 and having both Bellingham and Camavinga so narrow but then that would mean Valverde and Tchouaméni were tasked to press the double pivot much more agressively. Even that was not enough because Koundé could still receive on the outside. Then Camavinga would have to press him, breaking that compact narrow shape. It decreased the gap between the lines that Real Madrid tried to prevent. Being that agressive in the middile while at numerical disadvantage ended up being disastrous for Real Madrid. If a pivot received a pass and passed it to the cam, the cam could run into the back line with plenty of support ahead of him.
Also, Cubarsi's ability to break the lines could find that man in the 10 position. It was made worse by the fact that Lewandowski was never stationar and was wiliing to come deep. If a center back followed him, Lopez had a great movement to make. He was quick to identity the gaps and look to make the most of it. So Real Madrid tried to be more agressive by getting a center back into the 10 earlier and let the other center back handle Lewandowski in 1 v 1. However one trick maneuver or turn and the midfielder would be away from his marker and the opposition can get into extremly dangerous positions. We saw that when Olmo dragged Militao out of his position. Balde could afford to be more agressive on the build up, looking to provide the width and allowing Raphina to move into a 10 position. So Real Madrid had by time 2 number 10 to deal with between the lines. They could technically be 3 v 2 vs Real Madrid's center backs at times. Madrid, just like for their midfield, tried to counter this by playing more narrow, with both Vaazquez and Mendy, the fullbacks, to come more narrow to assist the center backs so when a man pressed, they had more cover. However that left Barcelona's fullbacks with more spaces, especially Balde. That meant that a lot was asked from Bellingham and Vazquez. Bellingham was supposed to be narrow to help the situation into the midfield but also track back while Vazquez had to worry about the secondary 10 while also worrying about Balde out wide. When Koundé pushed up as well, Vinicius tried to take the space behind him. Out of possession, Barcelona used their usual 4 2 4 pressing shape. with the wingers being expected to cover the center backs while Lopez and Lewandowski would cover the pivots. Barcelone was fine with leaving the sides vacated as both Mendy and Vazquez weren't as big of a threat on the ball.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Guardiola's Barcelona 2010/11 Tactics | Pep Guardiola's Greatest Team? |
How Slot is Already Implementing His Philosophy at Liverpool
During Liverpool's match vs Arsenal in 2024, Arsenal pressed quite high on the pitch. But despite the fact that Liverpool were 3 v 2 with both cb and gk, Liverpool wasn't able to take advantage of that. Fullbacks are not necessarly hugging the touchline as you would expect and used to see from Klopp's Liverpool like with TAA starting out wide then later on the attacking, moving more centrally. They are not as central as how Arteta used Zinchenko on the other side of the pitch. They are not inverting, freeing a midfielder to push forward. They are more in half spaces positionning. If center backs move more wide, they can play the ball directly into the wingers either side into Carvalho or Salah. Secondly the close proximity of players in the center allow Liverpool to circulate possession more easily and then Tsimikas or Bradley received the ball into these positions, they had a number of different options where they could come the ball either centrally either into Jones or ethen down the line into Carvalho or Jota lmoving to the flank. These triangles either side of the box made it difficult for the opposition to choose which kind of press they want to do. Because in Arsenal's case, Odegaard and Jesus would often be caught between these triangles as if Arsenal tried to close them down and go man to man, Liverpool had their own goalkepper to exploit. A lot of times Liverpool would play long balls especially because Elliot was often free in the center. And if a defender stepped on him, Arsenal just had 3 defenders left with the 3 of Liverpool's back line ready to attack. It make it easier for players to rotate between these positions. Tsimikas could for example move out wide and if the oppositio'ns winger follows his movement, It opens up passing line for Carvalho to receive the ball or even Jones into the half spaces.
But it's also possible to rotate in a more central position with Jones pushing forward and Carvalho giving the width on the flanks. Having a lot of players in the center mean that if the ball is lost, the coutner press can quickly be adopted. In the third half, we can see that Jota, Elliot and Jones are often free to rotate into the center.
How Newcastle Completely Dismantled Liverpool in the EFL Final
It was a Newcastle masterclass that allow to expose Liverpool's flaws in defense. Newcastle controlled the game despite having only 34% of possession with their high direct attack consistently overwhelming Liverpool's high line. Newcastle's high press resulted in Liverpool finding space with difficulty. Newcastle won their first trophy since 1955. Eddie's tactics were spot on. Liverpool started in a 4 2 3 1 formation while Newcastle were in their 4 3 3 When Liverpool tried to build from the back, Newcastle switched to a man oriented pressing system. Tino Livramento had an agressive rotation on Quansah pushing all the way forward to close down Liverpool's. But it was also Newcastle's midfield that made life so difficult for Liverpool. While defending in a mid block, Tonali was used as the holy midfielder and during press his agression made him the perfect choice for being used further up the pitch. So he would swtich his position with the midfielder Joe Ellington in the first phase before switching back later on. This gave Grevenbersh, Szoboslai and McAllistair no time to receive the ball as Newcastle's midfielders followed them all over the pitch. Once play shifted to Liverpool's right flank, Newcastle winger Murphy would move inside to cover the midfielder. And Guimaraes had more freedom to add support between the lines. If Liverpool went long into the front 3 any second ball could be reclaimed by Newcastle then they could start their attack. This shape started their way to the second goal at the beginning of the second half. When Liverpool was forced long, Newcastle's defense was more physical and won the majority of the aerial duels. Even when Liverpool passed the press, Newcastle players were determined to quickly get back behind the line of the ball. Newcastle was only starting to get caught on at the end of the match when their press started to be a bit more disjointed and there was more space between defense and midfield.
Once Newcastle shifted to their 4 5 1 defensive shape in their mid block. This shape worked for 2 reasons. Firstly the match up in the midfield and secondly Liverpool's fullbacks were picked up by Murphy and Barnes. In the center there were no space for Liverpool's 2 holding midfielders to push between the lines, resulting in them playing the majority of the time in front of Newcastle's midfielders and circulating possession in this area. Back then during the season, the circulation around the back was mostly done by the center backs and the fullbacks while Liverpool used to be good at getting many players upfront. The front 4 didn't outnumber the defense and if any player rushed forward, they could comfortably be followed by any Newcastle's midfielders The other reason why this 4 5 1 shape worked was the overload out wide. The majority of danger from Liverpool came from their wingers. By Newcastle having their wingers ready to track the fullbacks, It meant Liverpool would not be in 1 v 1 position with the space that led to so many goals in the season. This resulted in a underwhelming game from both Salah and Diaz who weren't able to create any meaningful opportunities. On possession unlike Liverpool, Newcastle didn't look to build in this game and goal kicks were often long balls and even if they played from the back, the defenders generally didn't waste time to try to get the ball into the forwards. This took the plan into something more chaotic and physical, fighting for balls and packing the space between the lines with their agressive midfielders. When a defender goes 50 / 50 in the air it's comon for the other defenders to drop more to reduce the risk of any opponent winning the ball and then flicking in for someone running in behind.
But that left more gap in the midfield and Newcastle was well aware of that.Instead of having their wingers to rush forward and attack instantly they would pick these space between the lines so even if Newcastle didn't win aeriel duel, the ball would bounce aroud and they would have space to receive in this area. The way Newcastle reacted fast to these second balls meant they created a lot of danger from these positions. Even if they didn't for most of time resulted into goal opportunities, it led to a lot of free kicks and corners. And Newcastle scored their first goal from a corner. Jones, Gakpo, Elliot and Nunez entered in the game in an attempt to overturn the situation for Liverpool. Jones gave Liverpool more chances to be dangerous down the middle. But it was Federico Chiesa coming in that allowed Liverpool to score a late goal. But it wasn't enough.
Guardiola's Barcelona 2010/11 Tactics | Pep Guardiola's Greatest Team? |
How Slot is Already Implementing His Philosophy at Liverpool
During Liverpool's match vs Arsenal in 2024, Arsenal pressed quite high on the pitch. But despite the fact that Liverpool were 3 v 2 with both cb and gk, Liverpool wasn't able to take advantage of that. Fullbacks are not necessarly hugging the touchline as you would expect and used to see from Klopp's Liverpool like with TAA starting out wide then later on the attacking, moving more centrally. They are not as central as how Arteta used Zinchenko on the other side of the pitch. They are not inverting, freeing a midfielder to push forward. They are more in half spaces positionning. If center backs move more wide, they can play the ball directly into the wingers either side into Carvalho or Salah. Secondly the close proximity of players in the center allow Liverpool to circulate possession more easily and then Tsimikas or Bradley received the ball into these positions, they had a number of different options where they could come the ball either centrally either into Jones or ethen down the line into Carvalho or Jota lmoving to the flank. These triangles either side of the box made it difficult for the opposition to choose which kind of press they want to do. Because in Arsenal's case, Odegaard and Jesus would often be caught between these triangles as if Arsenal tried to close them down and go man to man, Liverpool had their own goalkepper to exploit. A lot of times Liverpool would play long balls especially because Elliot was often free in the center. And if a defender stepped on him, Arsenal just had 3 defenders left with the 3 of Liverpool's back line ready to attack. It make it easier for players to rotate between these positions. Tsimikas could for example move out wide and if the oppositio'ns winger follows his movement, It opens up passing line for Carvalho to receive the ball or even Jones into the half spaces.
But it's also possible to rotate in a more central position with Jones pushing forward and Carvalho giving the width on the flanks. Having a lot of players in the center mean that if the ball is lost, the coutner press can quickly be adopted. In the third half, we can see that Jota, Elliot and Jones are often free to rotate into the center.
It was a Newcastle masterclass that allow to expose Liverpool's flaws in defense. Newcastle controlled the game despite having only 34% of possession with their high direct attack consistently overwhelming Liverpool's high line. Newcastle's high press resulted in Liverpool finding space with difficulty. Newcastle won their first trophy since 1955. Eddie's tactics were spot on. Liverpool started in a 4 2 3 1 formation while Newcastle were in their 4 3 3 When Liverpool tried to build from the back, Newcastle switched to a man oriented pressing system. Tino Livramento had an agressive rotation on Quansah pushing all the way forward to close down Liverpool's. But it was also Newcastle's midfield that made life so difficult for Liverpool. While defending in a mid block, Tonali was used as the holy midfielder and during press his agression made him the perfect choice for being used further up the pitch. So he would swtich his position with the midfielder Joe Ellington in the first phase before switching back later on. This gave Grevenbersh, Szoboslai and McAllistair no time to receive the ball as Newcastle's midfielders followed them all over the pitch. Once play shifted to Liverpool's right flank, Newcastle winger Murphy would move inside to cover the midfielder. And Guimaraes had more freedom to add support between the lines. If Liverpool went long into the front 3 any second ball could be reclaimed by Newcastle then they could start their attack. This shape started their way to the second goal at the beginning of the second half. When Liverpool was forced long, Newcastle's defense was more physical and won the majority of the aerial duels. Even when Liverpool passed the press, Newcastle players were determined to quickly get back behind the line of the ball. Newcastle was only starting to get caught on at the end of the match when their press started to be a bit more disjointed and there was more space between defense and midfield.
Once Newcastle shifted to their 4 5 1 defensive shape in their mid block. This shape worked for 2 reasons. Firstly the match up in the midfield and secondly Liverpool's fullbacks were picked up by Murphy and Barnes. In the center there were no space for Liverpool's 2 holding midfielders to push between the lines, resulting in them playing the majority of the time in front of Newcastle's midfielders and circulating possession in this area. Back then during the season, the circulation around the back was mostly done by the center backs and the fullbacks while Liverpool used to be good at getting many players upfront. The front 4 didn't outnumber the defense and if any player rushed forward, they could comfortably be followed by any Newcastle's midfielders The other reason why this 4 5 1 shape worked was the overload out wide. The majority of danger from Liverpool came from their wingers. By Newcastle having their wingers ready to track the fullbacks, It meant Liverpool would not be in 1 v 1 position with the space that led to so many goals in the season. This resulted in a underwhelming game from both Salah and Diaz who weren't able to create any meaningful opportunities. On possession unlike Liverpool, Newcastle didn't look to build in this game and goal kicks were often long balls and even if they played from the back, the defenders generally didn't waste time to try to get the ball into the forwards. This took the plan into something more chaotic and physical, fighting for balls and packing the space between the lines with their agressive midfielders. When a defender goes 50 / 50 in the air it's comon for the other defenders to drop more to reduce the risk of any opponent winning the ball and then flicking in for someone running in behind.
But that left more gap in the midfield and Newcastle was well aware of that.Instead of having their wingers to rush forward and attack instantly they would pick these space between the lines so even if Newcastle didn't win aeriel duel, the ball would bounce aroud and they would have space to receive in this area. The way Newcastle reacted fast to these second balls meant they created a lot of danger from these positions. Even if they didn't for most of time resulted into goal opportunities, it led to a lot of free kicks and corners. And Newcastle scored their first goal from a corner. Jones, Gakpo, Elliot and Nunez entered in the game in an attempt to overturn the situation for Liverpool. Jones gave Liverpool more chances to be dangerous down the middle. But it was Federico Chiesa coming in that allowed Liverpool to score a late goal. But it wasn't enough.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Barcelona's NEW Gameplan is Evil
Hansi Flick's approach led Barca to win 3 titles this season; beating Real Madrid in 4 straight Clasicos, humiliating them on several occasions. Flick revitalized the squad. Barcelona is now dominating la liga in a way never seen since Pep Guardiola and Luis Enrique's eras. Even though Xavi gave Barcelona 1 Liga and 1 Supercup, the style didn't really click. Barca suffered 3 defeats in a row against Real Madrid during 2023 / 2024 season. The Supercup final 4 - 1 defeat was particularly painful for them. In 2022 / 2023 season, defeats against Bayern Munich and a draw against Inter Milan eliminated Barcelona in the group stage, forcing them to play the Europa League, which Barcelona couldn't even win, somehow losing to Manchester United. Against Donetsk and Antwerp, there were inexplicable defeats. Childish mistakes, lack of talents and a team that looked made of paper. Then came the defeat in UCL quarter final against PSG in 2024 at Camp Nou. By the end of the season, Barcelona looked broken tactically and mentally, with lack of clear identity, stalled prospects and no real vision for the future. It's when they bring on Hansi Flick who brings a mental, tactical and football revolution. Hansi Flick rebuilt Barcelona in record time. He brought back its competitivity, winning mentality and its pride. They won la Liga, the Supercup and Copa Del Rey, beating all their domestic rivals. Even if they didn't reach the UCL final, barely losing to Inter Milan, they were the top scoring team in the tournament, made epic comebacks delivered unforgettable performances and played attacking football. Even Pep Guardiola praised Hansi Flick's system. It was a change of mentalities, tactics, automations, rythm, intensity and above all, purpose. 4 2 3 1 formation is Flick's basis system. But he gave a level of flexibility and precision only a few could have imagine. In that structure, every player found their ideal role.
And Hansi Flick did all of that while not betraying the club's philosophy. He just reinterpreted it bringing back the essence of Cruyff's positional play. Possession had now a purpose, meaning and edge. It wasn't passing for the ake of passing or keeping the ballin harmless zones. The ball moved with rythm, switchd sides with surgical speed and looked to break lines. It was return to identity but a renewed one. What changed everything was the use of gegenpressing : pressing after losing the ball became a non negotiable principle. And the team turned into a synchronized machine Once they lost the ball, they launched into a fierce recovery mode. it wasn't running around. It was smart, tactically and precise pressure. Thsi high press not only stopped counter attacks but turned recoveries to lethal transitions. The most brillant aspect of this system is the freedom Flick gave to his players. These talents needed room to express themselves so he encouraged constant role interchanges on the pitch. Raphina was no longer for example stuck to the wing because he now operate more as a false attacking midfielder, drifting inside and arriving in the box like a second striker, and unleashing his powerful shots. At the same time, Alejandro Balde, who started as a fullback, morphed into a winger, stretching the left side, pushing higher up the pitch, providing width and depth. These movements were carefully designed mechanisms meant to create numerical superiority and confuse opposing defenses. Barce began attacking through constant rotations, surprise and fluidity. It was positional play with a modern engine. It's now an aggressive animal, dynamic and intelligent. Position was no longer a goal, it was a tool. The team structure was rebuilt to be functional, aggressive and deadly. In early games, the double pivot was formed by Caasdo and Pedri. It was a mix of muscle, control and flair.
Once De Jong returned to full form, double pivot was De Jong and Pedri and the system gained another layer of intelligence. This double pivot didn't just provide defensive balance. It also freed up Pedri to drive transitions and exploit the inner spaces. Another great innovation from Flick was to bring back the number 10 role. And Dani Olmo was crucial in that role, just like Fermin Lopez. Both taking space between the lines with their movements constantly disrupting defensive marks and opening passing lanes. They pierced defenses, forced jewels and pulled center backs out of position. Meanwhile chaos unfolded on the wings with Raphina not being glued to the touchline anymore. He became an inside forward starting from the wing and cutting into central zones. That movement combined with the striker's runs in behind, the second pivot stepping out and Yamal holding width on the right flank. If opponents laid wide, attacking midfielders and inside attacking players exploited the gaps, but close inwards and Yamal would be 1 v 1. Outside Baldé, even Koundé sometimes attacked. More chances, more control and less exposure. By daring to push the defensive line higher, Barcelona was able to attack opponents with overwhelming intensity began defending further up the pitch. That forced rivals to play quicker decisions, to play on the dedge of the offside to run more than usual. Without the ball, Barcelona would press until you suffocated and Real Madrid just like Bayern were completly neutralized by that offside trap.
The backline pushed further up while the opponent's last line dropped deeper. Flick abandonnd Xavi's passive possession game. The touch for the sake of touching died and instead it was a hybrid, everchanging, mutating style. If opponents opened space, Barcelona accelerated and if they needed to slow the match down, they could. And if they needed to kill the game with total control, they could do that too. Barcelona knew how to attack with fury and to manage the tempo with intelligence. But in order to achieve these aggressive and constant stylistic shifts within games, Hansi Flick has to squeeze every tool at his disposal. From 2024 to 2025, the club's finances were still battered from years of mismanagement and Flick knew on day 1 that his success wouldn't depend on who he could sign but rather how he would shape the players he already had. It was about regenerating from within. Cubarsi became essential because of his ability to play from the back with an uncommon composure especially for his age. He had the vision, ability to break lines with his passes and his tactical awareness was on point. Of course when rebuilding on the fly, mistakes were inevitable.
Barcelona's NEW Gameplan is Evil
Hansi Flick's approach led Barca to win 3 titles this season; beating Real Madrid in 4 straight Clasicos, humiliating them on several occasions. Flick revitalized the squad. Barcelona is now dominating la liga in a way never seen since Pep Guardiola and Luis Enrique's eras. Even though Xavi gave Barcelona 1 Liga and 1 Supercup, the style didn't really click. Barca suffered 3 defeats in a row against Real Madrid during 2023 / 2024 season. The Supercup final 4 - 1 defeat was particularly painful for them. In 2022 / 2023 season, defeats against Bayern Munich and a draw against Inter Milan eliminated Barcelona in the group stage, forcing them to play the Europa League, which Barcelona couldn't even win, somehow losing to Manchester United. Against Donetsk and Antwerp, there were inexplicable defeats. Childish mistakes, lack of talents and a team that looked made of paper. Then came the defeat in UCL quarter final against PSG in 2024 at Camp Nou. By the end of the season, Barcelona looked broken tactically and mentally, with lack of clear identity, stalled prospects and no real vision for the future. It's when they bring on Hansi Flick who brings a mental, tactical and football revolution. Hansi Flick rebuilt Barcelona in record time. He brought back its competitivity, winning mentality and its pride. They won la Liga, the Supercup and Copa Del Rey, beating all their domestic rivals. Even if they didn't reach the UCL final, barely losing to Inter Milan, they were the top scoring team in the tournament, made epic comebacks delivered unforgettable performances and played attacking football. Even Pep Guardiola praised Hansi Flick's system. It was a change of mentalities, tactics, automations, rythm, intensity and above all, purpose. 4 2 3 1 formation is Flick's basis system. But he gave a level of flexibility and precision only a few could have imagine. In that structure, every player found their ideal role.
And Hansi Flick did all of that while not betraying the club's philosophy. He just reinterpreted it bringing back the essence of Cruyff's positional play. Possession had now a purpose, meaning and edge. It wasn't passing for the ake of passing or keeping the ballin harmless zones. The ball moved with rythm, switchd sides with surgical speed and looked to break lines. It was return to identity but a renewed one. What changed everything was the use of gegenpressing : pressing after losing the ball became a non negotiable principle. And the team turned into a synchronized machine Once they lost the ball, they launched into a fierce recovery mode. it wasn't running around. It was smart, tactically and precise pressure. Thsi high press not only stopped counter attacks but turned recoveries to lethal transitions. The most brillant aspect of this system is the freedom Flick gave to his players. These talents needed room to express themselves so he encouraged constant role interchanges on the pitch. Raphina was no longer for example stuck to the wing because he now operate more as a false attacking midfielder, drifting inside and arriving in the box like a second striker, and unleashing his powerful shots. At the same time, Alejandro Balde, who started as a fullback, morphed into a winger, stretching the left side, pushing higher up the pitch, providing width and depth. These movements were carefully designed mechanisms meant to create numerical superiority and confuse opposing defenses. Barce began attacking through constant rotations, surprise and fluidity. It was positional play with a modern engine. It's now an aggressive animal, dynamic and intelligent. Position was no longer a goal, it was a tool. The team structure was rebuilt to be functional, aggressive and deadly. In early games, the double pivot was formed by Caasdo and Pedri. It was a mix of muscle, control and flair.
Once De Jong returned to full form, double pivot was De Jong and Pedri and the system gained another layer of intelligence. This double pivot didn't just provide defensive balance. It also freed up Pedri to drive transitions and exploit the inner spaces. Another great innovation from Flick was to bring back the number 10 role. And Dani Olmo was crucial in that role, just like Fermin Lopez. Both taking space between the lines with their movements constantly disrupting defensive marks and opening passing lanes. They pierced defenses, forced jewels and pulled center backs out of position. Meanwhile chaos unfolded on the wings with Raphina not being glued to the touchline anymore. He became an inside forward starting from the wing and cutting into central zones. That movement combined with the striker's runs in behind, the second pivot stepping out and Yamal holding width on the right flank. If opponents laid wide, attacking midfielders and inside attacking players exploited the gaps, but close inwards and Yamal would be 1 v 1. Outside Baldé, even Koundé sometimes attacked. More chances, more control and less exposure. By daring to push the defensive line higher, Barcelona was able to attack opponents with overwhelming intensity began defending further up the pitch. That forced rivals to play quicker decisions, to play on the dedge of the offside to run more than usual. Without the ball, Barcelona would press until you suffocated and Real Madrid just like Bayern were completly neutralized by that offside trap.
The backline pushed further up while the opponent's last line dropped deeper. Flick abandonnd Xavi's passive possession game. The touch for the sake of touching died and instead it was a hybrid, everchanging, mutating style. If opponents opened space, Barcelona accelerated and if they needed to slow the match down, they could. And if they needed to kill the game with total control, they could do that too. Barcelona knew how to attack with fury and to manage the tempo with intelligence. But in order to achieve these aggressive and constant stylistic shifts within games, Hansi Flick has to squeeze every tool at his disposal. From 2024 to 2025, the club's finances were still battered from years of mismanagement and Flick knew on day 1 that his success wouldn't depend on who he could sign but rather how he would shape the players he already had. It was about regenerating from within. Cubarsi became essential because of his ability to play from the back with an uncommon composure especially for his age. He had the vision, ability to break lines with his passes and his tactical awareness was on point. Of course when rebuilding on the fly, mistakes were inevitable.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Kompany's Insane Tactics Are Making Bayern Exciting Again | Bayern Munich Tactical Analysis
Bundesliga is generally a high pressure league when it comes down to pressing systems from the teams. Bayern Munich ahs their center backs spread extremly wide to spread as well and open more potential passing lines. But the gap not only increased the isolation between the center backs but also the isolation of each one of the cb. It means a potential turnover from the opposite press and a counter attack. Kompany wanted to take the risk and also wanted to be very agressive with Neuer who would push up between the center backs so they had a numerical overload in the first line. This way the build up could be more unpredictable. But it's not always that easy to have Neuer this high especially with some teams looking to stop Bayern before they can even get into this situation. With the double pivots covered as well, options become incredibly limited if not non existent. That's why Kompany tried to make the most of Muasiala's intelligence. Musiala can drop deeper than the usual attacking midfielder to create a 3 v 2 and help to play out. If opposit's pivots follow him, they can stop him but they also leave gaps between the lines. That means that Bayern's wingers had the potential to move infield to receive. Kane also drops a lot then play it quickly to the wingers. But Musiala's dribbling qualities meant he could pass the pressure by himself and create himself a lot of space to attack. There is still a plan B if this fails because the centerbacks can spread wider in the build up and there is an opportunity for 1 or 2 fullbacks to support the midfield. It allows Bayern to have their wingers to stay wide with Musiala and Kane staying higher to focus mainly on attacking the opposition's back line. Wingers are also supported by the fullback overlapping on the side or in the half space.
Kane and Musiala would then come across to free space for a long ball diagonically to the other winger on the other side of the pitch or sometimes to the opposite fullback. But the center is where Kompany really wants to show dominance.
How Flick Destroyed The Bayern Machine | Tactical Analysis : Barcelona 4-1 Bayern Munich |
Barcelona's motto was to pressure Bayern. It was supported by Barcelona using an extremely high line. A line so high that the back line often used the halfway line as their reference. But being so agressive with that defensive line meant that the forward player had to be extremely aware and also agressive in their press to prevent Bayern beginning their build up. They used an interesting modified pressing shape with Lewandowski dropping deeper on one of the pivots, either Palhinha or Kimmich. This was supported by the wingers Raphina and Yamal both looking to press from out to in so that the center backs were under pressure as well. One of the advantages of this pressing shape was that. Second was with Lewandowski picking a pivot, the actual Barcelona midfielders had more rooms to pick up their men in a man to man to back up their press. It was meant to have one midfielder spared to pick any player that would drift centrallly. It meant that Barcelone applied high amount of pressure to force Bayern Munich backwards. Barcelone was pressing narrow which in turn made it difficult for Bayern to play in the center of the pitch. So the ball often filtered into the wide regions. It was what Barcelona expected but later on it would also play into Bayern's hands. Having a line that high meant they need to apply pressure consistently on the ball carrier so he wouldn't have an easy long ball to make for a forward to run behind the back line. What happened is that Bayern were rushed to make the pass straight from the back line instead of building up through the midfield. But it often were inaccurates passes.
Kompany seeing Bayern was struggling looked to adjust 2 players, Guerreiro and Kimmich. Kimmich abandonned the defensive midfielder position in the build up because the narrow pressing shape from Barcelona made it almost impossible to find him. So Kimmich either dropped into the back line centrally either into the left to form a back 3 with the center backs. Now Barcelona had a decision to make. If they maintained their pressing shape, Bayern Munich had a 3 v 2 in the build up phase, making Barcelona's press much less effective. Not only that but the spare man would now be Kimmich who is a lot better on the ball than the center backs.
So he would have the ability to find the wingers running in behind the opposite back line. Since Barcelona wanted to maintain an agressive pressing shape, we saw Lopez often being man oriented into Kim with Yamal remaining high. With that Bayern opened in little more room in that compact Barcelona's midfield. The second issue for Barcelona is that if the wingers are narrow and defending high, who would help the fullbacks to defend in those wider regions? Bayern tried to take advantage of that with Guerrero who was flexible and not always sticking to the wide regions. He would often move into the half spaces. We saw instances where letting too much spaces like this almost costed Barcelona to concede. One of the incidents led to a goal from Bayern Munich. To switch fast into the wings from the center, Thomas Muller was crucial. From his attacking midfield position he would often drift and draw the fullback down the right handside.
The hope for Barcelona is that with playing in a high line, the winger would have still a lot of distances to cover after he receives the ball and that Barcelona's back line would have time to recover. And this was true on many occasions. So Guerreiro was pushing high up often into these half spaces so it wasn't the winger who needed to take on his man and look to go to goal by himself and instead he would pass the ball into the half space where Guerreiro was looking to make the agressive run. However, a disadvantage a left footed right back is that he wasn't instantly able to whip in crosses into Harry Kane, meaning that these high positions were slightly less dangerous that it would have been with a right footed right back. Another interesting aspect of the shape is that it made Barcelone very dagenrous in attack with Raphina and Yamal were still high up so when Barcelona won the ball back, they already knew they had dangerous man to hit quick the ball in behind. Yamal assisting Raphina was a great example of that. On possession, Barcelona has been adapting their pressing shape as earlier in the season. Kane was often in deep alongside the attacking midfielder, Muller. Both were covering the double pivots whilst both of the wingers would then push onto the center backs, not unlike Barcelona. But Inaki Pena is great on the ball so he would have the potential to find a fullback with a simple pass over the top. And this was a risk that Kompany wasn't willing to take. So we saw that Gnabry often stayed deeper as a more traditionnal left winger with Kane pressing alongside Olise. And because they couldn't have let a midfielder having that much room, It meant Kimmcih was often dragged high up the pitch.
This shape also created an issue as Balde could receive the ball on the left so when Balde was on the ball, Guerreiro was willing to be much more agressive and back up their press. With Raphina's fine form this season, that would present a huge issue on the flank. But Upamecano would be moving out wide and here is where Bayern Mucnih was often presented with a tricky scenario as with Lewandowski often looking to show for the ball, It would be Kimmich's role to drop into the back line. This meant that Bayern Munich were somewhat using a back 4. The issue with this was that Kimmich had to know when to push up into the miedifeld and when to drop into the back line. This zone was crucial and meant that one wrong move could be quickly taken advantage of by Barcelona. We saw at the beginning Guerriro pressing high and Upamecano being dragged out wide. With Kim pressing Lewandowski, it created a gap in the back line and Kimmcih has dropped to make a 2 v 2. However Kimmich is still tight on his man Lopez even through him and Upamecano switched mens. So Kimmich off unbalanced as Raphina was allowed to have a 1 v 1. Bayern Munich was also less compact between the lines than Barcelona. We often saw Lopez finding rooms, drifting around between the lines. It was made worse by Balde often providing the width on the left hand side, meaning that Raphina could also move infield. And Lopez showed extreme flexibility. When they stayed on the opposite side, there was a potential for the center back to simply pick up the winger. However we often saw Raphina drift around the pitch so that now they foten overloaded one of the half spaces, meaning that the center back now had 2 men to potentially cover. And this caused issues as we saw in the 2 1 goal with Ferman running in behind after Raphina had moved deep on the same side.
Kompany's Insane Tactics Are Making Bayern Exciting Again | Bayern Munich Tactical Analysis
Bundesliga is generally a high pressure league when it comes down to pressing systems from the teams. Bayern Munich ahs their center backs spread extremly wide to spread as well and open more potential passing lines. But the gap not only increased the isolation between the center backs but also the isolation of each one of the cb. It means a potential turnover from the opposite press and a counter attack. Kompany wanted to take the risk and also wanted to be very agressive with Neuer who would push up between the center backs so they had a numerical overload in the first line. This way the build up could be more unpredictable. But it's not always that easy to have Neuer this high especially with some teams looking to stop Bayern before they can even get into this situation. With the double pivots covered as well, options become incredibly limited if not non existent. That's why Kompany tried to make the most of Muasiala's intelligence. Musiala can drop deeper than the usual attacking midfielder to create a 3 v 2 and help to play out. If opposit's pivots follow him, they can stop him but they also leave gaps between the lines. That means that Bayern's wingers had the potential to move infield to receive. Kane also drops a lot then play it quickly to the wingers. But Musiala's dribbling qualities meant he could pass the pressure by himself and create himself a lot of space to attack. There is still a plan B if this fails because the centerbacks can spread wider in the build up and there is an opportunity for 1 or 2 fullbacks to support the midfield. It allows Bayern to have their wingers to stay wide with Musiala and Kane staying higher to focus mainly on attacking the opposition's back line. Wingers are also supported by the fullback overlapping on the side or in the half space.
Kane and Musiala would then come across to free space for a long ball diagonically to the other winger on the other side of the pitch or sometimes to the opposite fullback. But the center is where Kompany really wants to show dominance.
How Flick Destroyed The Bayern Machine | Tactical Analysis : Barcelona 4-1 Bayern Munich |
Barcelona's motto was to pressure Bayern. It was supported by Barcelona using an extremely high line. A line so high that the back line often used the halfway line as their reference. But being so agressive with that defensive line meant that the forward player had to be extremely aware and also agressive in their press to prevent Bayern beginning their build up. They used an interesting modified pressing shape with Lewandowski dropping deeper on one of the pivots, either Palhinha or Kimmich. This was supported by the wingers Raphina and Yamal both looking to press from out to in so that the center backs were under pressure as well. One of the advantages of this pressing shape was that. Second was with Lewandowski picking a pivot, the actual Barcelona midfielders had more rooms to pick up their men in a man to man to back up their press. It was meant to have one midfielder spared to pick any player that would drift centrallly. It meant that Barcelone applied high amount of pressure to force Bayern Munich backwards. Barcelone was pressing narrow which in turn made it difficult for Bayern to play in the center of the pitch. So the ball often filtered into the wide regions. It was what Barcelona expected but later on it would also play into Bayern's hands. Having a line that high meant they need to apply pressure consistently on the ball carrier so he wouldn't have an easy long ball to make for a forward to run behind the back line. What happened is that Bayern were rushed to make the pass straight from the back line instead of building up through the midfield. But it often were inaccurates passes.
Kompany seeing Bayern was struggling looked to adjust 2 players, Guerreiro and Kimmich. Kimmich abandonned the defensive midfielder position in the build up because the narrow pressing shape from Barcelona made it almost impossible to find him. So Kimmich either dropped into the back line centrally either into the left to form a back 3 with the center backs. Now Barcelona had a decision to make. If they maintained their pressing shape, Bayern Munich had a 3 v 2 in the build up phase, making Barcelona's press much less effective. Not only that but the spare man would now be Kimmich who is a lot better on the ball than the center backs.
So he would have the ability to find the wingers running in behind the opposite back line. Since Barcelona wanted to maintain an agressive pressing shape, we saw Lopez often being man oriented into Kim with Yamal remaining high. With that Bayern opened in little more room in that compact Barcelona's midfield. The second issue for Barcelona is that if the wingers are narrow and defending high, who would help the fullbacks to defend in those wider regions? Bayern tried to take advantage of that with Guerrero who was flexible and not always sticking to the wide regions. He would often move into the half spaces. We saw instances where letting too much spaces like this almost costed Barcelona to concede. One of the incidents led to a goal from Bayern Munich. To switch fast into the wings from the center, Thomas Muller was crucial. From his attacking midfield position he would often drift and draw the fullback down the right handside.
The hope for Barcelona is that with playing in a high line, the winger would have still a lot of distances to cover after he receives the ball and that Barcelona's back line would have time to recover. And this was true on many occasions. So Guerreiro was pushing high up often into these half spaces so it wasn't the winger who needed to take on his man and look to go to goal by himself and instead he would pass the ball into the half space where Guerreiro was looking to make the agressive run. However, a disadvantage a left footed right back is that he wasn't instantly able to whip in crosses into Harry Kane, meaning that these high positions were slightly less dangerous that it would have been with a right footed right back. Another interesting aspect of the shape is that it made Barcelone very dagenrous in attack with Raphina and Yamal were still high up so when Barcelona won the ball back, they already knew they had dangerous man to hit quick the ball in behind. Yamal assisting Raphina was a great example of that. On possession, Barcelona has been adapting their pressing shape as earlier in the season. Kane was often in deep alongside the attacking midfielder, Muller. Both were covering the double pivots whilst both of the wingers would then push onto the center backs, not unlike Barcelona. But Inaki Pena is great on the ball so he would have the potential to find a fullback with a simple pass over the top. And this was a risk that Kompany wasn't willing to take. So we saw that Gnabry often stayed deeper as a more traditionnal left winger with Kane pressing alongside Olise. And because they couldn't have let a midfielder having that much room, It meant Kimmcih was often dragged high up the pitch.
This shape also created an issue as Balde could receive the ball on the left so when Balde was on the ball, Guerreiro was willing to be much more agressive and back up their press. With Raphina's fine form this season, that would present a huge issue on the flank. But Upamecano would be moving out wide and here is where Bayern Mucnih was often presented with a tricky scenario as with Lewandowski often looking to show for the ball, It would be Kimmich's role to drop into the back line. This meant that Bayern Munich were somewhat using a back 4. The issue with this was that Kimmich had to know when to push up into the miedifeld and when to drop into the back line. This zone was crucial and meant that one wrong move could be quickly taken advantage of by Barcelona. We saw at the beginning Guerriro pressing high and Upamecano being dragged out wide. With Kim pressing Lewandowski, it created a gap in the back line and Kimmcih has dropped to make a 2 v 2. However Kimmich is still tight on his man Lopez even through him and Upamecano switched mens. So Kimmich off unbalanced as Raphina was allowed to have a 1 v 1. Bayern Munich was also less compact between the lines than Barcelona. We often saw Lopez finding rooms, drifting around between the lines. It was made worse by Balde often providing the width on the left hand side, meaning that Raphina could also move infield. And Lopez showed extreme flexibility. When they stayed on the opposite side, there was a potential for the center back to simply pick up the winger. However we often saw Raphina drift around the pitch so that now they foten overloaded one of the half spaces, meaning that the center back now had 2 men to potentially cover. And this caused issues as we saw in the 2 1 goal with Ferman running in behind after Raphina had moved deep on the same side.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
Why Man City's Problems Are Bigger Than you Think
Some people say that's not really a crisis since we already saw Man City starting strong then have a dip of form in october or november then starting to be good again in december and january before going from february to may with an unbeaten streak and ultimatly clutch the Premiere League titles. Some think It might happen again considering they are still top 2/3 with most of key players returning for the second part of the season. In fact this time the problems are probably more serious. Man City sturggle at the end of the pitch with their lower goals scored and higher goals conceded per mathc since the arrival of Pep Guardiola. Another important factor is that ballon d'or Rodri is out for almost the whole season. Everyone knwo that this guy is so crucial for the team. Their slight dip of form last season was because Rodri was injured.When he plays, Man City has a win percentage of 74% and when he doesn't, it drops to 58%. With not out and out numbers 6, Pep's system loses both balance and control which are the fundamentals of his tactics. Whether it was Busquets, Thiago or Fernandinho, the number 6 was always vital to Pep's philosophy. For XG conceded from counter attack, Man City right now is ranking at the 17th position. The lack of protection in front of the defensive line is a main reason for that. Man City is a tema that wants to suffocate the opposition into their own halffor the vast majority of the game, averaging close to 65% of possession. And a field tilt of 77%. Guardiola may have consistently changed his tactics throughout the years from a 3 2 5, 2 3 5 and more recently a 3 1 6, the fundamentals have remained the same : it's all about controlling the possession and circulating the ball quickly before finding a player in the center.
Their ability to box into the opponent was down firstly to their overarching offensive structure, which includes players in strategic positions. But also because of players like Rodri that could comfortably clsoe down any danger of counter attack, if Man City lost the ball. His ability to quickly push forward and lead an agressive counter press meant that City could nearly always maintain possession high in the pitch, forcing the opposition into giving up the ball quickly. It reusltes in small margin gians for City. They would regain possession more often, meaning more chances and meaning more goals. Rodri's presence not only had an impact on the offensive out put but it also helped the defenders being more comfortable in possession and push forther up the pitch. With Rodri on the pitch, the back line was more comfortable gaining ground and stopping any danger of counter attack. His absence meant that his defense need to be slightly more cautious. And Guardiola's adaptations are more difficult than some might initially thought. Kovacic started as a holding midfielder to give the team more consistency. Defensively speaking Kovacic doesn't have the same ground covering ability than Rodri. Alongside players like Gundogan and Silvahe can be very dangerous sure, the instant they loose the ball, they are also more vulnerable to counter attacks. And opposite teams are finding spaces more easily through the center of the pitch. Look at Bournemouth vs Man City for example. Even against Sporting who defended as a low block, fast transitions caused a lot of issues for the defense. Without Rodri Man City also doesn't have the presence and physicality to win the 50/50 duels. But the issues in defense don't end here. In City's 4 1 4 1 shape in defense, opposition find it easier to find spaces through the center with Kovacic being not as effective as Rodri when it comes to shielding the defense from central passes. The second goal Brighton scored is a perfect example of that.
Why Man City's Problems Are Bigger Than you Think
Some people say that's not really a crisis since we already saw Man City starting strong then have a dip of form in october or november then starting to be good again in december and january before going from february to may with an unbeaten streak and ultimatly clutch the Premiere League titles. Some think It might happen again considering they are still top 2/3 with most of key players returning for the second part of the season. In fact this time the problems are probably more serious. Man City sturggle at the end of the pitch with their lower goals scored and higher goals conceded per mathc since the arrival of Pep Guardiola. Another important factor is that ballon d'or Rodri is out for almost the whole season. Everyone knwo that this guy is so crucial for the team. Their slight dip of form last season was because Rodri was injured.When he plays, Man City has a win percentage of 74% and when he doesn't, it drops to 58%. With not out and out numbers 6, Pep's system loses both balance and control which are the fundamentals of his tactics. Whether it was Busquets, Thiago or Fernandinho, the number 6 was always vital to Pep's philosophy. For XG conceded from counter attack, Man City right now is ranking at the 17th position. The lack of protection in front of the defensive line is a main reason for that. Man City is a tema that wants to suffocate the opposition into their own halffor the vast majority of the game, averaging close to 65% of possession. And a field tilt of 77%. Guardiola may have consistently changed his tactics throughout the years from a 3 2 5, 2 3 5 and more recently a 3 1 6, the fundamentals have remained the same : it's all about controlling the possession and circulating the ball quickly before finding a player in the center.
Their ability to box into the opponent was down firstly to their overarching offensive structure, which includes players in strategic positions. But also because of players like Rodri that could comfortably clsoe down any danger of counter attack, if Man City lost the ball. His ability to quickly push forward and lead an agressive counter press meant that City could nearly always maintain possession high in the pitch, forcing the opposition into giving up the ball quickly. It reusltes in small margin gians for City. They would regain possession more often, meaning more chances and meaning more goals. Rodri's presence not only had an impact on the offensive out put but it also helped the defenders being more comfortable in possession and push forther up the pitch. With Rodri on the pitch, the back line was more comfortable gaining ground and stopping any danger of counter attack. His absence meant that his defense need to be slightly more cautious. And Guardiola's adaptations are more difficult than some might initially thought. Kovacic started as a holding midfielder to give the team more consistency. Defensively speaking Kovacic doesn't have the same ground covering ability than Rodri. Alongside players like Gundogan and Silvahe can be very dangerous sure, the instant they loose the ball, they are also more vulnerable to counter attacks. And opposite teams are finding spaces more easily through the center of the pitch. Look at Bournemouth vs Man City for example. Even against Sporting who defended as a low block, fast transitions caused a lot of issues for the defense. Without Rodri Man City also doesn't have the presence and physicality to win the 50/50 duels. But the issues in defense don't end here. In City's 4 1 4 1 shape in defense, opposition find it easier to find spaces through the center with Kovacic being not as effective as Rodri when it comes to shielding the defense from central passes. The second goal Brighton scored is a perfect example of that.
Je condamne fermement ce topic!
How Mourinho Conquered La Liga | Jose 2011/12 Real Madrid Tactics | Peak Mourinho |
This season is one of the biggest in history of liga with Real Madrid winning la Liga with 100 points. They scored 121 goals, a record still standing. Their goal difference is 89. They also have 50 points away from home still unbeaten. They often would choose a 4 3 3 with Alonso as deep lying playmaker, and the other defensive midfielder Lassana Diarra, who made Real Madrid hard to penetrate throught the center. He was mainly used in the games against tough oppositions in knock out games. Ozil came in place of Diarra, making them more offensive. Their formation was often a 4 2 3 1. Real Madrid had an average of 57% of possession. They mainly played short to one of the 2 centerbacks. But against a team who pressed high, they were comfortable of going long as they had 2 aerial targets, being Ronaldo and either Higuain or Benzema. As one man made the header, the other would run behind often joined by Di Maria with Ozil just behind them. They searched to provoke an attack. Both centerbacks were comfortable on the ball. However, Ramos was the best here. If all passes on the midfield were cut off, he could take the responsability to conduct the ball on the pitch with Pepe covering. Even when these 2 remained deep, Pepe would generally be the deepest to allow Ramos to be slightly higher. Alvaro Arbeloa was the right back, who was more an outlet to relieve pressure when necessary. For the most part he stayed deep, slightly in advanced compared to the centerbacks when it was possible. Marcelo on the left was vital for the attacks. He dribbled alongside the line when needed. He also made more risky passes to break the lines as well as trying diagonal passes to Di Maria who would maintain the width on the right. Even without the ball, he moved higher on the pitch than the right back.
When it comes to facing tohugher teams, Khedira who usually was often acting as an extra player in the box, often making overlaps when the right back stayed deep, was more disciplined. In this case Alonso would be a bit higher to thread long balls to the front 3. A double pivot allowed the front 4 to have more freedom with Ozil often staying centrally and spreading balls to the 3 others of the front line. But he also liked to move more wide to help the winger, often creating overloads. In this case he would often either gain time on the ball, either make a precise pass forward. Di Maria was often hugging the touchline. The rare times the right back was overlapping however, he would have the freedom to tuck inside and look for a key pass. In fact he was second in his team in term of key passes this season, only behind Ozil. He also had good long shoot qualities. However the key man was still Ronaldo. He would rarely attack the wide. Instead he would let Marcelo doing the overlap and position himself into the half spaces. Ronaldo had the most long shoots among all players from la Liga by a large margin, scoring 7 goals from outside the box. This meant that others teams had to tigh their shapes to stop him, often even double teaming against him. This freed more spaces for Ozil in the center and if the entire opposition shifted to the left side, Di Maria was often the free man to receive for a quick switch to the otehr side of the pitch. When Ronaldo left his position, Ozil often came here to look to cross into the dangerous regions into the box. But Ozil would also link up to Marcelo, passing the ball to him, so he could look to provide to Ronaldo or have a regular cross. Real Madrid attempted 22 crosses per game on average during this season. Benzema and Higuain were both hard working. Both were selfless and worked for the team, dropping to link up when necessary or even when Ronaldo needed more spaces in central areas. Both were good at scoring from crosses.
Also or creating spaces for themselves at the edge of the box. Against a weaker opposition, after loosing the ball, Madrid pressed high to win it high on the pitch when it was possible. But when they were easy bypassed, they tended to drop deeper. Madrid's priority was to protect the center of the pitch. Di Maria was a defensive winger, contrasting to Ronaldo who would stay higher up on the pitch pratically as a forward while Ozil being slightly deeper meant that their formation looked like sometimes as a lop sided 4 3 1 2 with an emphasis of closing down the center as they had 2 dominant centerbacks who could deal with crosses. Both Khedira and Alonso tried to have the most of tackles and interceptions in the second defensive line in the center. During counter attacks, both Ramos and Alonso were capable of doing long and precise balls. Often Ozil would drift behind the defensive midfielders into the space, with Ronaldo and the other forward running in behind, freeing space for Ozil while Di Maria would also join the attack. Often in this situation the opposition's fullback is high to take advantage of Ronaldo staying high and Di Maria tucking in. When Ozil was conducting the ball, the forwards were trying to make intelligent runs and Di Maria would often passing the ball for them to finish off the move.
Mourinho at Porto.
Mourinho’s Porto Explained
Mourinho's Porto was solid and organized in defense while less structured and more expressive in attack. It can be characterized as counter attacking but it's largely because the system was so agressive and disrupting that, by winning the ball back with pressing from a compact shape, it almost inevitably allowed space for the forward and attack minded midfielders to break at speed. The team's shape looked like a 43 1 2, or a midfield diamond, depending on how deep were the central midfielder, usually Costinha, sat and screened. Width, always an issue with 4 3 1 2 or with a diamond shape, came from the fullbacks. Nunoe Valente and Paulo Ferreira were used in that role with Valente on the left generally more offensive, mostly because Mourinho wanted his side covered defensively and thus encouraged only one fullback to push really high at a time. The midfield 2, anchored by Costinha usually with Maniche and Pedro Mendes flanking played strictly in concert with each other and with the back 4. They were horizontally and vertically compact, seeking to create a difficult to play through mid block that would won possession back and transition quickly and directly into the attacking trio. The flanking midfielders were also tasked with carrying the ball forwards in transition and when fit, Dmitri Alenichev was a more dynamic midfielder who could be used in a flanking position for this purpose. Porto would play with a high line to facilitate this mid block and would also press astutely althought this lessened during the UCL campaign as Mourinho sought to make FC Porto evne more compact and hard to play through.
Once the ball was won back the 2 main options for transition were the carrying runs of the midfield or long passes from the center back Ricardo Carvalho. The aim was to get the opposition quickly on the back foot, especially if they over committed players to the attack. Once the ball was to the trio up front, it was supported by one of the flanking midfielders and a fullback providing the width and a crossing option. Deco sat behind the 2 strikers as a 10, capable of dribbling, passing through the lines and slide rule through passes especially. He was the creative hub of the team. Helder Postiga and Derlei in the 2002 / 2003 season then Derlei, Carlos Alberto and Benni McCarthy in the 2003 / 2004 season combined direct running of the ball, good positionnal awareness to make most of Deco's creativty or the width created by the fullbacks. Deco assisted 6 times during the victorious UCL. Only Rothen from AS Monaco did as good. There were 2 parts in this team. On one side the organized and systematized back line with the back 4 + Costinha and the flexible, creative and responsive front 5 able to answer to any defensive setup. The influence of Mourinho's periodisation training could be seen again. Aim was to create space for the front 3 by sucking in the opposition, winning the ball and then transitionning directly. It can be seen as functional and coutner attacking but Mourinho was capable of showing sublime passages of attacking football with players like Deco, McCarthy, Alenichev and Maniche Mourinho was one of the first managers going really deep into opposition analysis and making frequently subtle adjustments. to twart expected opposition's game plans. It's seen as a reactive approach.
How Mourinho Conquered La Liga | Jose 2011/12 Real Madrid Tactics | Peak Mourinho |
This season is one of the biggest in history of liga with Real Madrid winning la Liga with 100 points. They scored 121 goals, a record still standing. Their goal difference is 89. They also have 50 points away from home still unbeaten. They often would choose a 4 3 3 with Alonso as deep lying playmaker, and the other defensive midfielder Lassana Diarra, who made Real Madrid hard to penetrate throught the center. He was mainly used in the games against tough oppositions in knock out games. Ozil came in place of Diarra, making them more offensive. Their formation was often a 4 2 3 1. Real Madrid had an average of 57% of possession. They mainly played short to one of the 2 centerbacks. But against a team who pressed high, they were comfortable of going long as they had 2 aerial targets, being Ronaldo and either Higuain or Benzema. As one man made the header, the other would run behind often joined by Di Maria with Ozil just behind them. They searched to provoke an attack. Both centerbacks were comfortable on the ball. However, Ramos was the best here. If all passes on the midfield were cut off, he could take the responsability to conduct the ball on the pitch with Pepe covering. Even when these 2 remained deep, Pepe would generally be the deepest to allow Ramos to be slightly higher. Alvaro Arbeloa was the right back, who was more an outlet to relieve pressure when necessary. For the most part he stayed deep, slightly in advanced compared to the centerbacks when it was possible. Marcelo on the left was vital for the attacks. He dribbled alongside the line when needed. He also made more risky passes to break the lines as well as trying diagonal passes to Di Maria who would maintain the width on the right. Even without the ball, he moved higher on the pitch than the right back.
When it comes to facing tohugher teams, Khedira who usually was often acting as an extra player in the box, often making overlaps when the right back stayed deep, was more disciplined. In this case Alonso would be a bit higher to thread long balls to the front 3. A double pivot allowed the front 4 to have more freedom with Ozil often staying centrally and spreading balls to the 3 others of the front line. But he also liked to move more wide to help the winger, often creating overloads. In this case he would often either gain time on the ball, either make a precise pass forward. Di Maria was often hugging the touchline. The rare times the right back was overlapping however, he would have the freedom to tuck inside and look for a key pass. In fact he was second in his team in term of key passes this season, only behind Ozil. He also had good long shoot qualities. However the key man was still Ronaldo. He would rarely attack the wide. Instead he would let Marcelo doing the overlap and position himself into the half spaces. Ronaldo had the most long shoots among all players from la Liga by a large margin, scoring 7 goals from outside the box. This meant that others teams had to tigh their shapes to stop him, often even double teaming against him. This freed more spaces for Ozil in the center and if the entire opposition shifted to the left side, Di Maria was often the free man to receive for a quick switch to the otehr side of the pitch. When Ronaldo left his position, Ozil often came here to look to cross into the dangerous regions into the box. But Ozil would also link up to Marcelo, passing the ball to him, so he could look to provide to Ronaldo or have a regular cross. Real Madrid attempted 22 crosses per game on average during this season. Benzema and Higuain were both hard working. Both were selfless and worked for the team, dropping to link up when necessary or even when Ronaldo needed more spaces in central areas. Both were good at scoring from crosses.
Also or creating spaces for themselves at the edge of the box. Against a weaker opposition, after loosing the ball, Madrid pressed high to win it high on the pitch when it was possible. But when they were easy bypassed, they tended to drop deeper. Madrid's priority was to protect the center of the pitch. Di Maria was a defensive winger, contrasting to Ronaldo who would stay higher up on the pitch pratically as a forward while Ozil being slightly deeper meant that their formation looked like sometimes as a lop sided 4 3 1 2 with an emphasis of closing down the center as they had 2 dominant centerbacks who could deal with crosses. Both Khedira and Alonso tried to have the most of tackles and interceptions in the second defensive line in the center. During counter attacks, both Ramos and Alonso were capable of doing long and precise balls. Often Ozil would drift behind the defensive midfielders into the space, with Ronaldo and the other forward running in behind, freeing space for Ozil while Di Maria would also join the attack. Often in this situation the opposition's fullback is high to take advantage of Ronaldo staying high and Di Maria tucking in. When Ozil was conducting the ball, the forwards were trying to make intelligent runs and Di Maria would often passing the ball for them to finish off the move.
Mourinho at Porto.
Mourinho’s Porto Explained
Mourinho's Porto was solid and organized in defense while less structured and more expressive in attack. It can be characterized as counter attacking but it's largely because the system was so agressive and disrupting that, by winning the ball back with pressing from a compact shape, it almost inevitably allowed space for the forward and attack minded midfielders to break at speed. The team's shape looked like a 43 1 2, or a midfield diamond, depending on how deep were the central midfielder, usually Costinha, sat and screened. Width, always an issue with 4 3 1 2 or with a diamond shape, came from the fullbacks. Nunoe Valente and Paulo Ferreira were used in that role with Valente on the left generally more offensive, mostly because Mourinho wanted his side covered defensively and thus encouraged only one fullback to push really high at a time. The midfield 2, anchored by Costinha usually with Maniche and Pedro Mendes flanking played strictly in concert with each other and with the back 4. They were horizontally and vertically compact, seeking to create a difficult to play through mid block that would won possession back and transition quickly and directly into the attacking trio. The flanking midfielders were also tasked with carrying the ball forwards in transition and when fit, Dmitri Alenichev was a more dynamic midfielder who could be used in a flanking position for this purpose. Porto would play with a high line to facilitate this mid block and would also press astutely althought this lessened during the UCL campaign as Mourinho sought to make FC Porto evne more compact and hard to play through.
Once the ball was won back the 2 main options for transition were the carrying runs of the midfield or long passes from the center back Ricardo Carvalho. The aim was to get the opposition quickly on the back foot, especially if they over committed players to the attack. Once the ball was to the trio up front, it was supported by one of the flanking midfielders and a fullback providing the width and a crossing option. Deco sat behind the 2 strikers as a 10, capable of dribbling, passing through the lines and slide rule through passes especially. He was the creative hub of the team. Helder Postiga and Derlei in the 2002 / 2003 season then Derlei, Carlos Alberto and Benni McCarthy in the 2003 / 2004 season combined direct running of the ball, good positionnal awareness to make most of Deco's creativty or the width created by the fullbacks. Deco assisted 6 times during the victorious UCL. Only Rothen from AS Monaco did as good. There were 2 parts in this team. On one side the organized and systematized back line with the back 4 + Costinha and the flexible, creative and responsive front 5 able to answer to any defensive setup. The influence of Mourinho's periodisation training could be seen again. Aim was to create space for the front 3 by sucking in the opposition, winning the ball and then transitionning directly. It can be seen as functional and coutner attacking but Mourinho was capable of showing sublime passages of attacking football with players like Deco, McCarthy, Alenichev and Maniche Mourinho was one of the first managers going really deep into opposition analysis and making frequently subtle adjustments. to twart expected opposition's game plans. It's seen as a reactive approach.
Les 4k qui arrivent à mac12
Louis auguste je t'ai à l'œil
Guardiola's Tactical Evolution At Barcelona | How Pep's Tactics Changed At Barcelona |
In his first 2 seasons at Barcelona, some changes happened when Pep Guardiola came. In the 2008 / 2009 season, Barcelona won la Liga, la Copa del Rey and the Champions League. The formation was predominantly a 4 3 3 and it generally had Puyol and Piqué as center backs, Abidal and Alves as fullbacks, Xavi and Iniesta as attacking midfielders while Yaya Touré was the cdm. Henry and Messi then were wingers with Eto'o as centre forward. In the 2009 / 2010 season, Barcelona won la Liga, the Supercopa de Espana, the UEFA Cup and the club world cup being added to their trophy cabinet. With also a 4 3 3 formation. With Keita playing more often in the midfield, Maxwell being added as a left back and finally Pedro and Ibrahimo coming respectively as left winger and center forward. And finally Busquets making his entry as the main cdm of the team. During the build up, both seasons were similar with Valdes looking to find one of the center backs to initiate the play. If the center backs were pressed high by the opposition in wither case they were comfortable splitting on the widtrh of the 18 yards area to make it harder for the opposition to close them down as they would be split across the pitch. The cdm was also a key to this. Busquets during the 2009 / 2010 season became the undeniable first choice. Either way they would drop between the center backs to form a back 3 when it was required when building up to outnumber the opposition's front 2. Due to injuries, Iniesta started only 20 games, and sometimes he made late appearances in second half times. But most of the time Keita was here to replace him. Keita was a bit more defensive than Iniesta so as a result, the more attacking Maxwell started as a left back instead of Abidal to maintain Barcelona's attacking thrust on the left side in which Iniesta often helped when he moved wide.
Then we see some differences. In the 2008 / 2009 season, Messi was happy wide on the right and was more than anything else an inverted winger, often hugging the touchline during the build up play and looking to go for the goal or feed his teammates. Or to provide that incisive movement in the last phase of play with off the ball movement. This meant that Dani Alves was still high attacking but often had Messi ahead of him and could look to combine vertically and overlapping Messi to try to create more space for him wide on the right. Very late on the season, Messi was now occasionally used as a center forward. And Eto'o was selfless and had the traits to play on the right and could move into this region to maintain the balance of the team. It's contrasting with the tactical problem Pep encountered with Ibrahimovic in the following season. Messi who had a taste of playing as a false 9 at the end of prior season now wanted to occupy the central regions. So instead of making his way down the wing then looking to cut in from higher up the pitch he now headed infield much earlier meaning that Barcelona now had more numbers central. This also meant that Dani Alves was no longer performing in support to the right winger. Instead he was the primary provider of the width. With Messi getting more numbers centrally, Xavi could offset the lack of balance on the right side at times. Unlike Eto'o, Ibrahimovic didn't constantly push the opposition back by staying on the defender's shoulder as he liked to be more involved with the ball deeper, something Messi did as well which is why they often didn't thrive that much together. So at the end of the season, Messi started more often as a false 9 while Zlatan Ibrahimovic was out of favor. Pedro moved to the right and Henry was reintroduced to the left hand side.
This meant that in the 2008 / 2009 season, the left winger and the center forward attacked the box consistently but in the next season, that threat was slightly different with the wingers making runs ahead of Messi. Now what about the 2011 / 2012 season, Pep's final season at Barcelona? In this season, Barcelona won the Copa del Rey, the UEFA Super cup, super Copa de Espana and the club world cup. He shifted from the 4 3 3 to a more Cruyffian 3 4 3 diamond which he had played in during his career. This 2011 / 2012 season saw Messi playing as false 9, with Sanchez and Pedro in the wings. Fabregas was at the top of the midfield diamond with Xavi and Inista being the wide midfielders and Keita being the cdm. Abidal and Mascherano were the wide center backs. Finally, Busquets was used as the central center back. Busquets could often move forward with the ball creating a numerical superiority in front of the defense and helping to build the play from back. This formation was primary used against teams that operated with a 2 man frontline and tried to sit deeper against Barcelona. Busquets often slotted to the central position, due to his passing ability and that meant that the central center backs could confidently create passing lines higher up knowing that he could find them with unerring accuracy, allowing them to then bypass the front 2.
With Seydou Keita more limited than Busquets on the ball, either Xavi or Iniesta often dropped alongside him to form a double pivot and help to progress the ball. Using this tactic, Barcelona has several man central and this forced the opposition to contract and narrow their shape. Instead of the fullbacks, Pep Guardiola had the wingers who would then be able to freely receive the ball out wide. In addition, the 4 midfielders meant that the wide central midfielders were keen to move into the half spaces in support when the ball did go wide to generate more attacking options. But the main reason this system was used was the presence of Cesc Fabregas. Pep liked Fabregas ' instinctive attacking ability while still being able to retain possession. Him and Messi formed a strong partnership. When Messi stayed high, Fabregas could drop into the midfield to provide them with an extra passing option. And when Messi dropped deep, they could perform the opposite role. In many ways, Fabregas unlocked Messi, giving him even more freedom to move and create angles where ever he wanted, knowing Fabregas was always here to balance his movements as the perfect soil. This led to Messi's highest goalscoring rate in la liga with 50 goals although with the wingers hugging the touch line, their goal out put suffered as well. Guardiola's peel at Barcelona combined with good transfers peak of Barcelona's academy, no wonder why this team thrived so much.
How Brazil Won The 2002 World Cup | Brazil's Joga Bonito Tactics |
Some think that it's obvious that the team should have win the tournament with the team they have. However Emerson Lia during preparation and qualifying matches, only won 4 on 11 matches. Scaloni then came one year before the WC and Brazil managed to qualify only with 3 points advance. Brazil set a formation for the tournament that generally looked like a 3 4 3 with Marcos gk, Lucio, Edmilson and Roque as the 3 cb, Cafu and Roberto Carlos as the wingbacks. Kleberson and Silva as the central miedfielders and the R trio in front with Ronaldinho, Rivaldo and Ronaldo Nazario. Only variation of this was a 5 3 2 or 3 5 2 where Ronaldinho would be set as an attacking miedfielder while Juninho would play instead of Kleberson as a more defensive minded miedfielder. Marcos often made long balls high up the pitch looking for Ronaldo. Ronaldinho and Rivaldo would come narrower to pick up the second ball. Roque and Lucio, the wide center backs, were more conservatives with the ball, playing risk free passes into Gilberto Silva or Edmilson who was the central center back. Playing with only 2 central miedfielders meant that they could be at times overloaded in the miedfield. So Edmilson played the role of the libero, pushing up in the miedfield to the point that the formation sometimes looked like a 4 3 3. But Edmilson could also stay deeper and look for a ball into Gilberto Silva; This was the case especially when Juninho came alongside him in the miedfield as he tended to be more offensive and drifted high up the pitch. And crucially when Edmilson played deeper, then Roque and Lucio would shift into wider regions. This gave Cafu and Roberto Carlos 2 position defining wingbacks. Their passing and positionnal rotations quickly dragged mens out of position.
And Brazil was comfortable exploiting both the wide areas and the central regions. 3 of their matches were against teams that played with 3 center backs, Costa Rica, Turkey and Germany. So Roberto Carlos and Cafu were found in wide regions to be in 1 v 1 against their men. They had the physical as well as the technical ability to breeze past their men and make the cross When wide regions were targeted, the role of the forwards could vary. They could push up into the half spaces ALternativly Ronaldinho in particular could move to the left channel as a more traditionnal winger while Rivaldo and Ronaldo would shift across. Juninho if he was starting would push higher to take the place vacated by Ronaldinho. Edmilson would then push up in the miedfield to ensure they would not be overpowered in that area on the transition.
The Tactics Behind Spain's Dominance | How Spain Created The Most Dominant Team 2008-2012 |
Spain back then was known for their possession based football with slight and technical midfielders. The term used before tiki taka was " la furia ". It was a style of football that involved trying to get in good wide areas and swinging in as many crosses as possible into the twin forwards. The team changed during the 3 tournaments won but there were some pilars. Araones opeted for a 4 4 2 with creative players like Iniesta and David Silva out wide rather than crosses. In 2010 WC, Del Bosque opted for 4 2 3 1, giving them high control in the miedfield. This was morphing into a formation that was strikerless and wingerless 4 6 0. In 2008 euros, althought they played sometimes 4 4 2, there were instances when they played better in a 4 5 1 with a solitary forward with Torres being the lone forward and Fabregas being with Xavi in the midfield to form a 4 1 4 1. Despite attacking brillance of playes like Xavi, Iniesta, Torres and Silva, It could be argue that Marco Senna was the key to the team back then. In either formation he was the only midfielder primarly focused on the defensive tasks. That, combined with his incredible work rage, meant that he was the plateform to allow technical playmakers upfront to showcase their talents. Spain was much more lethargic in their possession. It was before Guardiola's revolution. It was more a passive position, often rotating the ball in the back until the perfect gap opened to play into the miedfield. In many ways, possession was used as a defensive tool, as their counter press had not been developed yet. So a loss of possession would have been much more costly especially when playing with a single pivot.
But when going into the meidfield, Senna often looked to pass to Xavi, who was the conductor of the game and the kye to stitching the midfield and the attack together. This was also the trigger for the inverted wide playmakers, David Silva and Iniesta, to drift into the half spaces, stark contrast to the old Spain where the wingers used to hug the touchline. At this time, both fullbacks, Ramos in particular, looked to move higher on the pitch to provide width in order to stretch the opposition's back line. In the final third, Spain had many options as they could choose to slip it into the wide fullbacks who looked for the cut back into the box or the cross as they had 2 aeriel capable forwards. But Villa could also drop into the midfield potentially drawing a center back out and creating another passing lane. Or if the center back stayed deep, he could create or shoot for himself. He could also push high alongside Torres, giving the miedfield more options to pass. When it came to defending, there was no rampant pressing. International sides rarely have the time to work on coordinated pressing mecanisms. So they would instead drop into a 4 5 1 mid block with Villa dropping into the midfield.
Busquets and Alonso came to replace Senna as Del Bosque opted for a double pivot. Spain used pacier wingers this time with Pedro and sometimes Villa moving on the wide left. Players like Fabregas and Silva also made massive contributions in certain matches. After their 1 0 loss against Switzerland, they had to play more cautious and less expensively. They switched to an even higher possession style, with players having much closer proximity. Their possession rose to 50% to 60%. It led Spain to score 8 goals in 7 matches. With the 3 maestro in the center of the pitch, being Busquets, Alonso and Xavi, Spain retained possession pretty easily. But the double pivots were not that physically gifted so 2 mens were needed to cover the width of the pitch. The double pivot was also a defensive precaution which allowed them to concede only 2 goals during the entire tournament. We often saw Iniesta start on the right. Naturally he drifted more inside to have the ball and create. It allowed Ramos to make his marauding runs when he overlapped. In the left as Villa attacked the box alongside Torres, Spain had good numbers in central zones, but it left a vacuum on the left as the Spanish left back Capdevila, was aging and less impressive than Ramos going forward. So as the tournament went, Spain shifted to a 1 men frontline It allowed the emerging Pedro out wide,a s he was much happier hugging the touchline. It stretched the opposition's back line a lot more. Defensivly Spain pressed more during this tournament with shades of Barcelona's system coming throught. However it was much less much less manic and more concerned about closing off passing lanes rather than creating turnovers high up.
In euro 2012 it was a strikerless system. Alba easily provided the width as a left back but Arebeola on the right was less impressive and more defensive minded. Instead of making quick switches like most teams would do, they used a thir man runner and pinpoint passing to get though on goal which they managed on several occasions.
Manchester United's Failed Post Ferguson Tactics | United's Tactical Evolution Post Ferguson |
The amount of trophies United won dropped significantly since Ferguson left the club in 2013. Initially David Moyes was selected to replace Ferguson. He was a respected manager well known for the defensive elements of his teams. They then moved on with Luis Van Gaal, who had a good international reputation. He was known for his positionnal brand of position football. Then came Mourinho, the superstar manager known for his adaptability. Fellaini came in the winter transfer cindow under David Moyes. Moyes first chooice squad had Rooney behind Van Persie and they would combine as they did successfully during Ferguson's final moments at United. Then Mata would come into the 10 position and Rooney was pushed further forward as Van Persie had a lot of injuries. The formation was a 4 2 3 1. One of the criticism Moyes had received was the inefficiency of the miedfield. At times when he was at Everton, Fellaini functionned as a second striker, looking to receive the ball as a target man but now Moyes dropped him deeper to form a double pivot alongside Carricx more often. Fellanini was playing this role well For Belgium national time. However at United he came under a lot of criticism. His passing range was limited and he tended to slow down the game. Also both Fellaini and Carricx were physically limited and were not the best runners. Rooney back then was playing more as an attacking miedfield ans so more willing to drop deep alongside the pivots. He would use his passing ranges to release runners in behind. So Moyes tried to adapt by bypassing the meidfield and use the wide regions more often The conservatice nature of the double pivots often allowed the fullbacks to flood forward Both Evra and Rafael would look to join the attack. On the right, Rafael would often look to overlap. They did this often to have good cross positions.
However both Rafael and Valencia were extremly righr footed, meaning there was never any threat of anyone coming infield, making the attacks more predictables. Down the left Young could cut in for the shoots or crosses but he could also go down the line. Evra could go forward with Young covering his aging legs on the defensive end of the things. Man United had the most crosses per game in the league. But with Ronney's injuries, he was used more as a target in the box with Fellaini only joining when they were chasing a goal. Moyes was shown the door after his tactics were simply too predictables for the others teams. Van Gaal was given more funds in his transfert window. The major incoming in hsi side included Di Maria, Schneiderlin, Martial, Blind, Falcao, Rohr and Schwensteiger. He used a variety of tactics across his 2 seasons. But his 2 most comon formations were the 4 2 3 1 and 4 1 4 1. With some variations being the 3 5 2. The general principles remained the same. There was much greater emphasis on possession, rising from 54% under Moyes to 59% during Van Gaal's first season. He often looked to build up from the back. Van Gaal would often started Blind, a natural miedfield, to start as a center back to facilitate this. The builder play was very methodical with players taking constant positions to automate many phases of the play. with the man on the ball knowing where his options would be before even received it. But Man united still had a problem in the miedfield. When Di Maria joined on the right, he could slot into the left central miedfielder role. His proactivity on the ball meant that he could drive the team up the pitch and look for opportunities to create. But he soon fall out of favor meaning Man United's miedfield often had Schneiderlin, Schweinsteiger and Herrera as cam. All were capable miedfielders but they were more focused on retaining the ball rather than create. Rooney would sometimes drop deep to create for Van Persie.
How Xabi Alonso’s Tactic BROKE Football!
Xabi Alonso went from pulling Bayer Leverkusen out of relegation to win the Bundesliga title in only 18 months, breaking German football. This club never won a league title since 100 years. From being a tiki taka team in first half to a counter attacking side in second half, based on diferent teams, Alonso keep changing his tactics. It only only confuses others teams but also make it almost impossible to break throught. They became the first team to win the league without loosing a single match. Since taking charge, Xabi has consistently used a 3 2 4 1 formation on paper. But instead of being ridig it keeps on changing during the match. It makes them unpredictable to play against. During build up they often play in a 4 2 4 asymetric shape with the right back staying upfront as a right winger while the back 4 spread wide to form the back 4. The reason is that German clubs are often press oriented, meaning it was difficult for others teams to build up short. So Xabi applied circular rotations, meaning that when opposition are pressing to the center backs, it passes it to the left back who deliberatly carries the ball and drifts toward the pivot. The right pivot simultaneously shifts on the right and takes on the right flank position. Due to this inward movement, it narrows down the front markers which frees up the right space for the right pivot who has a path to break throught the first line of pressure. But if opposition sits in low block this tactic can become ineffective. So to counter this, Alonso used a tactic that is a miw between Guardiola's in City and Zerbi's Brighton. For example when one of the center back passes the ball to one of the pivot, the pivot quickly passes the ball back to him.
It creates a pressing trigger to the markers to close the 2 players down which indirectly frees up spaces for the second pivot to receive an actual pass. It attract markers who are behind him. Due to this it creates an open space between the lines where one of the forwards drop deeper to receive the ball as a third man, which then draws one of the center backs and frees up space for the striker as fourth man. They use oppositio'ns press as a weapon against themselves. But if opposition, rather pressing 1 v 1 than pressing ni numbers with low press strategy, it also can be frawned. So to adress this, Xabi intentionally overload one presser with 2. WHe the center back is looking for a pass from one of the pivots, Palacios, who is close to Xhaka, intentionally jumps right in with Xhaka It confuses XHaka's marker who is being ready for a 1 v 1. Once the ball goes th Xhaka, Palacios is unmarked and becomes the third man to avance up the pitch. When entering in the second phase of build up, Alonso uses a combination between Guardiola's positionnal play and Diniz's relationnism. After the first phase, both pivots moves vertically to each other. Also their asymetrical approach makes Leverkusen play more on the right side of the pitch. It triggers the narrow right forward to shit to that side as well, creating a 6 box structure on one side of the pitch. At the same time Grimaldo the left back drifts wide to imitate his partner's winger role. If opposition commit a lot of mens to cover the 6 men box, then Bayer can easily switch play toward the left towards Grimaldo who only has one player to defend them. If they spread to cover the opposite player then it can create a 6 v 5 superiority on the other side where they can easily progress the ball with one touch. He uses Diniz's relationnism to overloard one side of the pitch and Pep's positionnal play by using the box tactic.
When they drift into the attacking phase, they switch from a 4 2 4 to a 3 2 5 structure where Grimaldo finally advances to act like his opposite partner, Frimpong. But rather playing this way it's generally used to trick the opposition's markers. If Leverkusen use a 3 2 5 shape, opposition often mark them using a 5 4 2 defensive structure. It makes difficult for Bayer to pass throught the block and often force them to rely on long balls. So to solve this one of the inverted forwards from the front 5 drops deeper and act as a roaming number 10. At the same time it gives both the wide center backs options to carry the ball forward while partnering Palacios with the roaming player. This makes the opposition shift to focus on the incoming center backs. It creates open spaces between the second and third line of defense. When receiving the ball, these players quickly join the front 4 and try to exploit the back line. Once they actually get near the box using this, the front 5 do the remaining work where they shift the entire opposition into one side. To achieve this they often pass the ball wide to the side player while the player inside the half spaces makes a deliberate wide run toward the flanks and draws his marker. This movement then frees up a striker without a man, leading the back line to spread towards him. When the ball is passed to the half space player it effectivly draws most of the opposition to the first half of the pitch which leaves the far right and right space player with just one marker. So a quick cross to them exposes the opposition's defense while creating a prime socring opportunity for Bayer Leverkusen. However Xabi's tactics trully emerges when out of possession. Witohut the ball they press in a 5 2 3 setup. The main objective was always to protect the center channels. So he created an interesting star line pattern to adress this.
For example, when opposition build up from the back, Alonso asks his front 3 to be narrow with both of the pivots just behind them, creating a compact star shape. It creates a numerical superiority in the center with a box 4 behind the striker. Even if the opposition still paly throught the center, Alonso encourages his wide center backs to step up as well makig it almost impossible to advance centrally. This forces the opposition to go wide. But as soon opposition plays wide the wingbacks quickly jumps onto them, creating a one side overload. The far sided center back track the wide options. It makes the opposition to go back and switches the play or trust their aerial ability. Even if the opposition breaks Bayer's perssing pattern, the team quickly transition into a 5 4 1 shape with the inverted forwards becoming the wide miedfielders. Due to the 3 center backs and the double pivots shileding the central areas, it helps to keep the opposition attack wide with the wingbacks and wide miedfielders to protect the flank. WHen they win the ball back using this, rather than quickly launching counter attack, Alonso let the opposition press them more in which he invites the opposition to couter press and let them commit more numbers forward. As the opposition is fully into their counterpress, Bayer quickly execute a long ball toward the forwards who are being left isolated. It makes them the most dangerous counter attacking sides as they use opposition's psychologie to their advantage. It can be only achieved with the player's roles. Rather than a traditionnal back 3, they form a back 4 with the right center back covering space behind the right wingback who is pushing up. The left back stays deep and takes the role of a wingback. Rather than being a traditionnal wingback, Grimaldo is one of the most versatile player in the squad who can operates as a winger during attacks, invert as a pivot during build up and even act as a third number 10.
However, he still fills his duties as a fullback when neede unlike Frimpong who had been assigned to a right winger role. Frimpong's positionning is even proactive than Trent as you might see him as a right winger, as a numer 10, even as a striker in various occasions. he also serves as press releasers due to his positionning for the central players. Palacios is a box to box miedfielder as he drops deep alongside Xhaka in the 4 plus 2 build up, then advances into spaces between the lines during the attack. Xhaka is the deep lying playmaker, being the main man launching counter attacks. Hoffman plays as a narrow attacking miedfielder giving Frimpong more spaces to take on the right wing while the right winger mostly controls the right half space. Wirtz in the other hand plays in a more wider role. When Grimaldo stays back to form a back 4, Wirtz takes the left wing to maintain the width. He also serves as a key playmaker with Grimaldo who drops between the lines to connect the miedfield with the attack. In order to create spaces for Wirtz between the lines, Xabi assigns both his center backs as ball players. He encourages them cto carry the ball and draw markers higher to open gaps between the lines. Boniface in front is used as a pressing forward. Due to his speed and strenght he plays a massive role for pressing the opposition from during the build up and in the counterpressing if they loose the ball. Their style os to blend the control with attacking mindset. In defense in order to apply a pattern at pressing they play with a high line and apply pressure across the opposition's half. In the ifnal third they are excellent at working the ball into the box, using close connexions and driving the ball at defense to create spaces between the lines or flanks.
Due to the close proximity of players, Alonso always favored short passes It's a possession based team who also excelles in counter attacks. A team that plays with a structure but also without. This is a team using opposition's counter press against them while also using counter press against their opponents.