Un post = un arabe remigré

Gloire à toi et à ton abnégation

Non ils l’on fait exploser

Ça glisse fortement . J'approuve a 100%

Putain jean ma qui n'arrive pas à passer le triso au classement , big cho

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Arsenal's tactics.

Why Arsenal's NEW Tactic is Breaking Rules?

During the 2 first seasons of Arteta at Arsenal, they played generally in 4 2 3 1 with mid or low block as they mostly relied on staying deep and hti on the break with wide players. However after signing players like ZInchenko, Rice and Havertz, Arteta shifted into a more proactive 4 3 3 with players being close of each other for efficient short passes. Also he set several positionnal rotations during diferent phases of the game. For example during their build up phase they used to play with a box shape in the midfield with Zinchenko inverting as the second pivot to establish a central dominance. However a lot of teams are now well aware about how to defend against this as they use their wide winger to invert with Zinchenko, creating their own box with additionnal winger providing an extra cover. This sometimes blocked the central routes for Arsenal. As a result they were forced to play wide where the backline is already man marking their wingers. So to overcome this, instead of making the box predictable, Arteta introduced a rotationnal box in which instead of Zinchenko, you might seee Havzrtz or Odegaard dropping back to form the box. You could also see Zincheko still inverting while Partey would move wide as a right back. Even the goalkepper could advance to play the role of a centre back. A particularity of these rotations is that it's maintaining a back 4 shape. So even if the center is heavily marked by the opposition, you could easily have wider movements with 2 v 1 advantages against the opposite fullbacks and create numerical overloads against the backline. This shape often helps Arsenal to play effectivly against the best pressing sides. By shifting from 3 + 2 to 4 + 2, Arteta invites more markers to press higher and split the opposition in 2. It creates spaces for the central miedfielder between the liens to exploit. Also the deeper positions of the forwards also drags the opposition's center backs higher than the fullbacks.
It creates open field allowing the wingers to go in via long balls. However when they enter into the second phase, Arsenal use 2 fundamental technics on both flanks to progress forward into the final third. On the left wing, the players being more direct, they use a combinations of third man play and throught balls to break the lines. While in the right because of having more technical players here, they use triangular patterns and positionnal rotations to trick the opposition. But among these 2 the majority of their balls come from the right side using wide triangles. However recently, most teams used triangular schemes this implies that opposition will commit more numbers on this flank and blocking routes to the opposite side. So to overcome this, with the arrival of Rice and his excellent movements, Arteta has gave him the freedom to move into higher spaces. So they switched from a wide triangle to a wide box, including Rice as an extra player. This provided a weapon to overcame the opposition's overloads and open multiple opportunities here. With a triangle when the right back, Ben White passed it to Saka and then made an overlap for example he was often marked by a defender, leaving Saka with 2 options, either trying a pass to Odegaard so he can cross, either trying to dribble the opposition. But now Rice could make runs into the half spaces. So having 2 players making runs in the same time, Saka has 2 options. Also the extra man allow them to switch play easier to the other side of the pitch. Also other tactic being used is the same side tactic. When Saka receive the ball in the right wing, the opposition shifts toward him. So he can make a side pass to Rice, making the opposition believe that they will go for the opposite side. But it indirectly open more roads into the same side. So instead of passing to the left, Rice pass it back to White, opening up spaces and catching the defense off guard.
When Arsenal get into the final third, last season, Zinchenko acted as a box to box while Ben White had a more advancec role with triangle rotations. This shape made them dangerous offensivly. But at the back they were left vulnerables as they could be targeted into the flanks with long balls. To adress this problem, rather than playing with 2 agressive fullbacks, Arteta played with only 1. When Zinchenko was not available, he played Tomiyasu who stayed deep as a wide center back, while Ben White could advance into the center to form large triangles if needed. It allowed them to have a wide presence to defend against the counters. It also created a 5 v 3 numerical superiority in the center and a 5 v 4 against the backline, offering both horizontal and vertical advantages. So even if the opposition narrows down, Arsenal has the wide presence to exploit the wider areas. However apart from the wide areas the majority of Arsenal's goals come from set pieces. This is possible because of the new crossing technics set up by Arteta. When they make a cross, Arsenal position 5 or 6 aerial strong players inside of the box. Instead of spreading these players uniformally, they overload the back post with one player covering the goalkepper. The reason for this is that if these players were positionned in front of the defenders, they could easily attract the direction of the ball, and the attackers simultaneously. When the attackers are behind them, they have to look the ball and the attackers in opposite direction. It puts them to dilemma, either delay their runs and they get vulnerable to concede from this. However out all the tactics what made Arsenal the best defensive team of the Premiere League during 2023 - 2024 season is Arteta's locking mechanism. To achieve this they use a hybrid pressing system which is a combination of zonal marking and man marking.
For example when the opposition start their build up by the center, Arsenal structure themselve into a zonal 3 4 3 shape with the fullback as the single pivot. Under that shape, each player has 2 focal point on either side, covering efficiently all the opposition players. So when the opposition try to play to one side, then these players swtich rapidly from zonal to man marking following the focal point in this zone. This locks the opposition from all the corners and force them to play long or go directly to the opposition. And as soon as they go long, instead of using the offside trap, Arsenal put one player against the ball while the rest switch back to their zonal maring and stay deep, attracting any potential passers to prevent counter attacks. This hybrid style disrupts the opposition's rythm and often forcing turnovers before they could advance to Arsenal's half. When this press is beaten by the opposition, Arsenal transition into a compact 4 4 2 in which the frontline tries to push the opposition further way whenever they make side or back pass. When opposition goes wide, Arsenal's wingers becomes the false fullbacks allowing the real fullbacks to cover the half spaces for any pass. Meanwhile, the rest of the backline overload centrally and reinforce themselves against any cross. This locks all attacking possibilities for the opposition. When they try to revert back, then these players switch to a high man to man pressing and push the opposition even further. This alternation between zonal marking and man marking to a compact defense has proven difficult to break, even for top teams like Liverpool or City. When it comes to the players roles, Arteta focuses on having one agressor out of the 2 fullbacks. When Zinchenko plays, he becomes the inverted wingback while when Tomiyasu plays, then Ben White takes on the inverted wingback.
In the midfield, instead of the double pivot, a single one is used with Rice acting as a box to box midfielder who drops back during the build up to form 4 + 2 shape and then advancing with Odegaard to form the box shape in the right. Odegaard is a roaming playmaker who can plays a key role in Arteta's positional rotations as he frequently interchanges positions with the pivot, with the wingers and even with the striker. His main job is to draw the markers with his movements and create spaces for his teamates to advance. While Saka can play as an inverted winger, he often stays wide to stretch the opposition then quickly moves inside to receive passes from the fullback. On the left Arsenal adopt a more direct approach using an inside forward to fit this strategy. Finally upfront after the arrival of Havertz Arsenal often deploys him as a false 9 to act lilke a roaming playmaker like Odegaard. He can drop into the midfielder to pull centrabcks out of position, make opposite runs with the winger and even act as a pivot to create spaces for the inverted wingback. Due to his technical ability, Havertz has created numerous chances for Arsenal in the center by being an extra playmaker which was not the case earlier. Arteta said in an interview that he prefered to dominate the game by constantly pressuring the opposition rather than controlling it with 100 touches but still remaining goal less. Out of possession they play in high block and try to lock the opposition's build up with their high pressing style. Instead of using offside trap they track the second man whatever the opposition plays a long ball. Like Guardiola, Arteta likes to to keep the possession by using short passes often. To create a strong dominant team, you must see in long term and trust the process with the same patience than Arsenal. His tactic not only transformed Arsenal but also gave them a strong identity. Due to this they may be capable of realizing something big in the upcoming future.

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This Is How Arsenal Tactically Dominated Madrid | Tactical Analysis : Arsenal 3-0 Real Madrid


Before the match started we could wonder how Real Madrid would cope with this Arsenal's potential midfield 5 given they tended to defend in a loose 4 4 2. In early minutes Real Madrid shifted in a 4 2 2 2 in the defensive phase. Vini and Mbappé had to sit effectively on the double pivot to make it work, the double pivot being Partey and Lewis Skelly. This way they might form a sort of midfield 6 that would have make centrla progression almost impossible. It in fact happened early on this match. One of the few things Arsenal didn't do well was about taking advantage of these wide space with Rma's front 2 being narrow and passive and the wingers also narrow and tucked in. There was plenty of rooms for the wide defenders to advance but they didn't do it, so Odegaard had to take matters in his own hands, dropping into the right center back space and showing how easy it could be to progress outwide that narrow 2 Real Madrid's problem was that for central progression being disallowed the whole match, the front 2 had to stay disciplined in their position, constantly tracking the pivots for 90 minutes. As the match went on, the positions of Mbappé and Vinicius began to waver, meaning that at least one of the pivots could be easily found. They had a clear route around or through the front 2. If Bellingham and Rodrygo went higher, Merion, Odegaard and Rice now had a 3 v 2 advantage against Camavinga and Modric, allowing Arsenal to have men between the lines. But despite the pressure applied on the center, the game was ultimatly won on the flanks. Each of the flanks were taken advantage of differently by Arteta, making most of his players strenght while fully taking advantage of the opposition's weaknesses. In the 3 - 2 shape, Timber tucked in which he usually do but in this match it added the benefit of shielding the left which is Real Madrid's main transitional strenght.

In the Premiere League we tended to see Timber joining the attack late from time to time. But in this match, he almost always sat deep. With Bellingham and Rodrygo narrow, Odegaard could drift wide when he was in the half space, drawing Bellingham even further infield, allowing Saka being in 1 v 1 versus Alaba. Saka often beat Alaba and went into good crossing positions. Saka also by times cut infield, one instance of them leading to the free kick that allowed Arsenal's first goal. In second half, Ancelotti made Bellingham shifting deep to double team Saka. But meanwhile with Merino and Rice occupying Camavinga and Modric, Odegaard could lurk on the blind side by times, in the half space. Neither Bellingham or Alaba were great at covering his runs, even through they weren't punished for this. While Arsenal's right flank was about isolation between Saka and Alaba, the left flank was about overload. Arsenal executed both in a masterful way. Both Lewis Skelly and Rodrygo, who played on paper wide, foud themselvesinfield whenever Arsenl was in possession. This signed the beginning of the end for Real Madrid. If Mbappé and Vinicius had been disciplined on the double pivot, Rodrygo could have remained tight on Rice. Instead, Skelly was often able to get away from Mbappé, leading to huge issues. Rodrygo was now 2 v 1 down against Lewis Skelly and Rice. If a pivot was trying to back him up, that pivot could be 2 v 1 against Rice and Merino dropping in. No matter what move Real Madrid made, it felt like the wrong move.
If Rodrygo pushed toward Skelly, this was the trigger for Rice to move into Arsenal's left space out wide, often receiving completly unchallenged, while Martinelli tied up Valverde and Merino tying up the central man, being often Modric. This would allow Rice and Martinelli to combine perfectly when Rice created a separation from Rodrygo to get into crossing positions into the box. Assuming the front 2 hadn't track, if Rodrygo was more disciplined in tracking Rice, Lewis Skelly was more than happy to get into these dangerous central zones, threatening to create some dangerous actions. Rice was the hub, with effective combinations with Martinelli and Lewis Skelly, but as importantly, Merino dropped constantly, meaning that Asencio was un unsure to whether to press and the sheer physicality of Rice could take over in these situations As whether it was a pivot or more often Rodrygo trying to keep up with him, they simply couldn't. The magnum opus of this tactical setup comes in the 75th minute when sloppy positionning of the front 2 means that Arsenal pivots are accessible. This draws Valverde but Merino has dropped in from 9 and was an extra receiver. Rice was ready to take advantage of the space left on the left as always, whenever Rodrygo is central. He progressed effortlessly as a result. Lewis Skelly is in a dangerous space and he uses it to find Merino who finishes the move.

You Might've Missed The Tactics In The Craziest Match | Barcelona 5-4 Benfica

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How PSG beat Liverpool in 2025.

The opening case of this match showcased Liverpool's agressive 4 2 4 press as they threatened to fully suffocate the Parisians. The same pressing structure that caused nightmares to some of the biggest teams of England. PSG at first didn't make exception. Szoboszlai joined the front 3, creating a first layer that looked almost impossible to penetrate.Time and time they were forced to go back to Donnaruma. But even here a man could continue his press, keeping the center back in his cover shadow. As a result PSG were often forced long. Initially the solution was Vitinha dropping alongside the center backs and Donnaruma during the goalkick with the hope to have both quantity and quality advantage since Vitinha is comfortable on pressure. Liverpool still was able at times to press the narrow men in the box still forcing PSG long and Donnaruma has a hard time to sometimes find the fullbacks directly. Turning point was when Luis Enrique made a subtle adjustment. Vitinha returned to his midfield position from the deeper zones and entrusting his back 4 to begin the build up. At first it was not a problem for Liverpool who could oeprate with a dedicated man to man shape in the midfield or with their 4 2 4. But the difference now was Dembelé starting to drop deeper and deeper meaning there was now a 4 v 3 in the midfield. It cause some indecisions in Liverpool's back 4, as we already saw in the first leg. Liverpool's center backs were often not backing up the press, meaning a Liverpool player higher up would have to choose between pressing a midfielder deep or dropping to Dembelé. It was a chooice between letting PSG having a relatively easy progression and allow a threat like Dembelé to roam between the lines. The best example was in the 12th minute, with the action leadinfg to PSG's goal with Dembelé dropping as a false 9 and the center backs not backing up the press due to the runners behind. So Dembelé can turns, finds Barcola on his right, leading to Dembelé's goal.
Szoboszlai had to reconsider his position and start deeper to not be completly overrun centrally. As a result, their press became more selective, opening the floodgates for PSG. But the key was that theyr were no longer building up in the center. Despite Szoboszlai staying more deep than before, Liverpool still wanted to keep high pressure with a winger often joining Jota's press more narrow, often Salah pressing Pacho while keeping Mendes in his cover shadow. However, Pacho's build up play was masterfull, taking his first touch higher up the pitch which had the double effect on the press. It drew Salahin further toward him It also changed the passing angle to Mendes meaning he was no longer in Salah's cover shadow. When Nuno Mendes was found, he had room to push up. And due to the presence of Dembelé, Liverpool was reluctant to cover. PSG's right flank told a similar story of tactical exploitation. Diaz was tasked with pressing from the left into Marquinhos. But PSG was now more composed under pressure. By finding the center backs first there was less dependency on Donnaruma's distribution. It also ensured that the winger was fully drawned onto Marquinhos, meaning that Hakimi was more easily found. It created a pressure dilemma for Robertson: either pressing Hakimi high up and leave space in behind for Barcola to exploit, either hold position and allow Hakimi time to progress the ball. The difficulty of this decision was coumpounded by Dembelé's false 9 positionning When he dropped deep, it became almost impossible for a center back to cover for Robertson. Because if for example Van Dijk drifted to cover, Dembelé could potentially exploit that space.
PSG's formation morphed throughout the match, sometimes forming a back 3 with 2 cb and 1 midfielder dropping. Other time Mendes was working as a third center back, specifically positionned to neutralize Salah on transition with the arrest defense while allowing the left winger to create an isolation against the right back, often Kvara against Trent. This structural flexibility made PSG difficult to counter. Then up the pitch, the fluid interchanging of positions between the attackers added another dimension to PSG's tactical approach. At times Dembelé would operate as a false 9 with Barcola wider but then they would rotate. Kvaratskhelia also rotated between the flanks, creating constant identification problems for Liverpool 's defenders and Dembelé's role was particularly effective in the final third. His ability to drop deep to receive was key but it was also possible through the movement of his teammates, the wingers and the midfielders particularly since their movements assured that both Van Dijk and Konaté were always hesitant to follow Dembelé when he dropped deep meaning that at times even when the runners did not go beyond, Dembelé could receive, turn and play out to the wingers in dangerous zones. Despite these sophisticated mechanisms, PSG struggled to convert their tactical advantage into goals, consistently reaching dangerous positions but lacking the clinical edge to make their dominance count on the scoreboard. Alisson kept Liverpool alive for a long time.

Why Bordalás Is The Most Hated Manager in La Liga

Jose Bordanas is the ultimate antagonist of spanish football, a manager thriving on disruption and ignoring all tactical trends. So much that his style had been called anti football. A total rejection of possession and passing based style. Bordalas has a reputation of overachieving with modest squads. Getafe beat Athlético Madrid during 2024 / 2025 season, drew Barcelona, On only 3 occasions they conded 3 goals during this season. The game plan is just to sit back in an incredibly compact block and wait for the right chance to strike. When they get the ball they go forward as quickly as possible. But Getafe is not just about defense, brute force and long balls. Their defensive structure is meticulously designed to frustrate opponents. They rank first in amount of duels per game but last for pretty much any passing metric. However some stats are misleading like their high gegenpressing intensity or their high buildup disruption percentage. In reality, it's because they allow the opponent to start the attack from much further up the pitch. Against some other teams they can be more comfortable pressing higher up the pitch like against Seville. But when living in their mid or low block structure, they become really difficult to play against. Most of the season they lined up into a 4 4 2 and sometimes shifting into a 4 1 4 1. But the principles remain the same : not letting midfielders any time on the ball. This isn't just low block park the bus. In fact Getafe's defensive line starts surprisingly high, second only to Barcelona in la liga. Their first line of pressure isn't designed to win the ball back. But rather shadow mark any central player.s, ensuring that if a player in this position receives the ball, they are instantly swamped, forcing the opposiiton to either shift the ball out wide, or go long over the defensive line. None s ideal. The defensive line doesn't rely on offside traps like Barcelona. Instead they are ready to drop and follow the runners in behind.
This was evident with their win against Athlético Madrid. Alvarez and Griezmann found no space in the center, forcing Athlético to go long that never found proper supporting structure. When going out wide it's almost impossible for the opponent to outnumber Getafe because the whole team will defend in a compact bloc, shifting as an unit to whether flank the ball is on. With no holding midfielder rotating to add support, Getafe can get 4 or 5 players otu wide before opponents can get more players to support. Against Athlético it was nearly as 3 v 2 on the right flank. And on the left flank, it was 4 v 3. Same story against Osasuna. They encourage passes out wide into the space between the lines. Rather to rush to close down the players in possession, Bordalas wants his team to completly shut off certain routes. As soon as the pass is made, the whole team surround the player in possession, giving him no option to move the ball forward. The defensive line is agressive and can push agressively forward when needed. Midfielders and strikers can then start the counter attack. They are not that good at counter attacks but they try. Agression in midfield is why Getafe gets a lot of fouls and yellow cards. They would rather defend from a free kick than from open play. Teams like Real Madrid and Barcelona are glued to their spot when matching Getafe as none of their rotations work, being forced to play into the space Getafe want them to play. Vast majority of chances Getafe concedes are crosses into the box. Only one player is above the line of the ball ready to counter attack when the whole rest of the team helps in defense. They concede either when opponent counter attack with Getafe's back line exposed, either from crosses.
Getafe's defensive record in la liga speaks for itself. The same can't be said about their offensive numbers as their attack is one of the worst of la Liga. Even when the team looks to start attacking from a deeper position, goal kicks are always taken long. The center backs passing map also shows they rarely repeat the same pattern during cnosecutive games. Sometimes they passes around the back line other time it's more direct to the striker. But it's never the exact same in every match. They have physical players in the midfield that can win the loose ball. THey get fouled constantly in the era. THey can knock it out of a throwing. It does an excellent job at keeping their opponent far away from their goal. The few times they are able to move into the opposition's half, it's mostly coming from wingers dribbling into a more central position and feeding the strikers running in behind. At most their attacks will be with 5 players. But when in possession their main focus is to keep a solid defensive shape. Their goal chances mostly come when the opposition is not correctly positioned. Defending against Getafe can be tricky as their wingers are very good at dribbling inside and there is usually big gaps for them to move into. But that's where their positive points in attack end as there is still a lot to be desired when it comes to finishing, ranking last in the league for XG per shot. With calculated chaos, Bordalas ensure no game against Getafe will be easy.

Postecoglou's tactics at Tottenham.

Why Ange Postecoglou is the Next Big Thing in Football?

With no traditionnal fullbacks in the structure, by using diamonds and triangular patterns, he has turned spurs into a vertical tiki taka team which is capable of breaking any opposition's defense. He uses a 4 3 3 formation but during possession, it transforms into a 2 3 5 structure. Where Pep and Arteta uses an inverted fullback, Postecoglou uses 2 inverted fullbacks which is quite unique. During the build up phase, they have 2 1 2 structure where the fullbacks moves into the center and the cdm drops deeper to form a link between the centerbacks and the central fullbacks. It facilitates circulation against high pressing teams with quick short passes. As the game progress into the second phase, one of the central midfielder drop deeper into the flanks while the striker, the winger and the other number 8 drift wide, creating a double diamond inside of the pitch. It creates numerical diagonal and vertical passing options into the final third allowing fluid transitions from defense to attack and encouraging vertical playing style. In addition to olverload the wide areas, it also gives a significant overload in the center with the fullbacks moving into the center. This way the team can create a miedfield powerhose with 5 v 3 which can let multiple players unmarked proovking more passing options and helping to move the ball more with more efficiency. When the opposition add more players centrally, Spurs can quickly switch to a double diamond to exploit the wide areas. This traps the oppositions from all sides. In the final third, they maintain the 2 3 5 structure but add more flexibility and positional rotations. For example if the opposition is too rigid, 2 wingers could move a bit more inside, leaving the way for the fullbacks to push forward.
Alternativly, the wingers can also stretch the opposition by staying as wide as possible which can leave gaps into the half spaces to run in which is often executed by the inverted fullbacks or the number 8, meaning that 7 players are involved into the attack. These players have the freedom to move into the spaces and change their positions, confusing the defensive line, resulting in goalscoring ipportunities. Without the ball, the team gives priority to recuperate the ball in high positions on the pitch. One of the problems of the tactic is that when the 2 fullbacks are inverting, it let wide spaces for the opposition to launch a quick counter attack. To solve the problem, the center defensive midfielder drop deep to form a back 3 with the centerbacks. This strategy is efficient but no without risk. The structure need rapid adaptations to maintian solidity in defense. Firstly the striker act like a deep lying forward and interchanging positions with wingers and the 8, looking to create or run into the spaces into the opposite's defense while the winger stay wide but can also invert. Because of the absence of fullbacks, the wingers are positionned as wide as possible. But there are moments whe the wingers can adopt a narrower position allowing the 2 fullbacks to overlap. It makes difficult for opponent to predict their movements. In the middle, Maddison and Sarr use perfectly their roaming playmaker roles, moving constantly out of their positions to find spaces, whatever by making runs into the half spaces, or drifting wide into the pitch to create this double diamond structure. They also have the freedom to drop deeper if needed, acting like outlet options to build the game from deep. Bissouma, the cdm, act like a miw between a deep lying playmaker and a defensive destroyer. His excellent ball control and his passing abilities allow him to dictate the tempo of the game. Acting as a pivot connecting defensive and offensive units.