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Bon, je suppose que ce discord n'est pas totalement noname même sur onche.
Je pensais que c'était surtout connu sur JVC.
This Was A Very Different Real Madrid
The most fascinating tactical part is what Real Madrid did when they didn't have the ball. Barcelona used their usual build up shape, a back 4 with a double pivot.with Fermin Lopez remaining high so Barcelona was essentially in their 4 2 3 1. Where under prior managers we might see Real Madrid being a bit more conservative defensively, Alonso was on the front foot and Real Madrid pressed very high with Guler joining Mbappé on the center backs and Tchouaméni and Bellingham on the pivots. So the only outlets would be the fullbacks. But Camavinga and Vinicius were pushing right up onto the fullbacks. So Szczęsny was often forced to long balls where Militao and Huijsen would often win the aerial duels. But sometimes Barcelona were willing to take risks in their build up meaning that one wrong pass could get Madrid into a goalscoring position quickly. Mbappé cuts off the pass infield as soon the ball is live so the only free option is Baldé Bellingham and Tchouaméni are covering the pivots eliminating the central options while Valverde is cutting out Rashford. So when Rashford does look to receive, he is forced backwards, allowing Real Madrid to win the ball and attack the box immediatly. With the high press it was vital for the center backs more often than not to push up and Huijsen often pushed on the free midfielder Lopez. Madrid were playing with fire. If the initial layer of press is broken, Barca would be bearing down on goal. In most encounters under Flick we tended to see Koundé trying to overlap to support Yamal when he cuts in. But here due to the ridiculous threat of Madrid counter attacking particularly down the left, Barcelona went with more of a 3 in the build and Yamal had to hold the width on the right flank. It meant Barcelona had a better rest defense shape.
But the fundamental problems for Real Madrid didn't change. Initially it was Bellingham Mbappé front 2 and later Guler Mbappé front 2. Either way Madrid found themselves consistently 2 v 3 down in the midfield. Lopez could drop between the lines, causing serious problems to Real Madrid. But Alonso had 2 consistent solutions. When Barca were attacking more slowly and Real were in a more controlled defensive phase, Tchouaméni would trust the midfield 2 to prevent the progression into Pedri and De Jong so it would be his role to drop in and follow Fermin Lopez as Madrid shifted to a back 5. But if the play was coming down the Barca right or the pivots weren't well positioned to press, Tchouaméni would have to push up and it would be up to Huijsen to stay touch. This could causes issues like Tchouaméni pushing onto Pedri meaning that Huijsen is on Fermin Lopez but Lopez keeps drifting meaning that Dean Huijsen almost ends up on the wrong side of Militao, leaving a massive gap in the defense. But Barcelona didn't have the quality to take advantage of these situations. As the match wore on, Barelona increasingly committed to that 3 2 5 shape with Rashford tucking in much more like Lopez on the far side instead of providing the width. This would have been one of the key reasons that Alonso moved Camavinga more to a right wing position as Camavinga's workrate meant that he would be happy to drop deep and help defend against the advancing Balde now allowing Rashford and Lopez in the half spaces to be monitored. This was especially important as Barcelona often likes to build on the left and overload the left hand side; Now when Madrid shifted across to cover, having a center back like Huijsen able to watch Lopez in the half space meant that Yamal wasn't granted too much space even on the switch.
At the same time it also meant that Madrid now had a midfield 3. So they were able to match Barcelona's man to man on the occasions where Lopez was dropping into the midfield. And Real as always were happy to sit a bit deeper because they knew they could be dangerous on the transitions particularly with Mbappé and Vinicius breaking in behind Barcelona's especially high line. And Vinicius could make this particularly dangerous when he dropped initially to pick up the ball and drew Koundé higher up the pitch as that would naturally grow the space in this area that Mbappé could target with the run in behind consistently. But was a masterful out of possession performance from Real Madrid.
Je pensais que c'était surtout connu sur JVC.
The most fascinating tactical part is what Real Madrid did when they didn't have the ball. Barcelona used their usual build up shape, a back 4 with a double pivot.with Fermin Lopez remaining high so Barcelona was essentially in their 4 2 3 1. Where under prior managers we might see Real Madrid being a bit more conservative defensively, Alonso was on the front foot and Real Madrid pressed very high with Guler joining Mbappé on the center backs and Tchouaméni and Bellingham on the pivots. So the only outlets would be the fullbacks. But Camavinga and Vinicius were pushing right up onto the fullbacks. So Szczęsny was often forced to long balls where Militao and Huijsen would often win the aerial duels. But sometimes Barcelona were willing to take risks in their build up meaning that one wrong pass could get Madrid into a goalscoring position quickly. Mbappé cuts off the pass infield as soon the ball is live so the only free option is Baldé Bellingham and Tchouaméni are covering the pivots eliminating the central options while Valverde is cutting out Rashford. So when Rashford does look to receive, he is forced backwards, allowing Real Madrid to win the ball and attack the box immediatly. With the high press it was vital for the center backs more often than not to push up and Huijsen often pushed on the free midfielder Lopez. Madrid were playing with fire. If the initial layer of press is broken, Barca would be bearing down on goal. In most encounters under Flick we tended to see Koundé trying to overlap to support Yamal when he cuts in. But here due to the ridiculous threat of Madrid counter attacking particularly down the left, Barcelona went with more of a 3 in the build and Yamal had to hold the width on the right flank. It meant Barcelona had a better rest defense shape.
But the fundamental problems for Real Madrid didn't change. Initially it was Bellingham Mbappé front 2 and later Guler Mbappé front 2. Either way Madrid found themselves consistently 2 v 3 down in the midfield. Lopez could drop between the lines, causing serious problems to Real Madrid. But Alonso had 2 consistent solutions. When Barca were attacking more slowly and Real were in a more controlled defensive phase, Tchouaméni would trust the midfield 2 to prevent the progression into Pedri and De Jong so it would be his role to drop in and follow Fermin Lopez as Madrid shifted to a back 5. But if the play was coming down the Barca right or the pivots weren't well positioned to press, Tchouaméni would have to push up and it would be up to Huijsen to stay touch. This could causes issues like Tchouaméni pushing onto Pedri meaning that Huijsen is on Fermin Lopez but Lopez keeps drifting meaning that Dean Huijsen almost ends up on the wrong side of Militao, leaving a massive gap in the defense. But Barcelona didn't have the quality to take advantage of these situations. As the match wore on, Barelona increasingly committed to that 3 2 5 shape with Rashford tucking in much more like Lopez on the far side instead of providing the width. This would have been one of the key reasons that Alonso moved Camavinga more to a right wing position as Camavinga's workrate meant that he would be happy to drop deep and help defend against the advancing Balde now allowing Rashford and Lopez in the half spaces to be monitored. This was especially important as Barcelona often likes to build on the left and overload the left hand side; Now when Madrid shifted across to cover, having a center back like Huijsen able to watch Lopez in the half space meant that Yamal wasn't granted too much space even on the switch.
At the same time it also meant that Madrid now had a midfield 3. So they were able to match Barcelona's man to man on the occasions where Lopez was dropping into the midfield. And Real as always were happy to sit a bit deeper because they knew they could be dangerous on the transitions particularly with Mbappé and Vinicius breaking in behind Barcelona's especially high line. And Vinicius could make this particularly dangerous when he dropped initially to pick up the ball and drew Koundé higher up the pitch as that would naturally grow the space in this area that Mbappé could target with the run in behind consistently. But was a masterful out of possession performance from Real Madrid.
Penalty ou pas?
How Carrick's Tactics Dominated The Manchester Derby
Manchester City looked to plit the center backs with Rodri as their main pivot. Bruno Fernandez's goal was to tie up the single pivot. Mbeumo's intervention would be on Khusanov. So Alleyne was the only easy outlet. He was not comfortable during the match. Aké was pushing up. Maino and Casemiro for Manchester Uniteed were backing up the press It forced Alleyne into hopeful long balls often. Even with little pressure, he struggled to make correct decisions. So Pep Guardiola tried to counter this by dropping Bernardo Silva into the left back position in possession for an easy outlet on the side. If they went directly to Rodri under pressure, Rodri would have 2 options with his 2 center backs. Man United used a 4 4 2 mid block even when Man City were in the middle third. Against this, City tried to adapt with a 3 4 3 diamond with Aké tucking in and Lewis would move on the right side of the diamond. On paper this sounds great as City could have numerical advantage both in the deep areas and in the central area. Dprgu would tuck in with the right back making it much harder to develop an overload. Khusanov as the right center back was agressive so much that his flank often ended up in 3 v 2. So Dorgu had to shift and if the remained midfielder didn't shfit across in time, the left back Shaw was still isolated 2 v 1. Rico Lewis could get into dangerous positions in this half space this way. So Man United accepted by times to drop deeper to compact space. As the central center back, Alleyne was seeing the most of the ball so they had to adapt and Rodri would become the central center back and become the main progressor of the ball with either Lewis, Bernardo or both looking to drop in while the left hand side looked to compensate. Since Man United's wingers had to prevent the midfielder's overlaod by having their wingers tucking in, City could still overload their back line. 5 v 4. So when City changed side,
United's back line had to shift across. That would free the switch and isolations. Semenyo often got into isolations but didn't make the most of it. When Kodu tried to find himself in isolations, Dorgu was disciplined in dropping in to try to double team against him. Man City dominated in possession stats mostly because they supported their build up play all the way into the final third, moving the backline extremely high up the pitch, allowing them to counter press or win any loose balls if the play broke down outside of Man United. Issue is that this leaves acres of space behind the back line that United looked to hit on the counter attack. with United often looking to play it first time into the runners in behind. During Man United's build up, initially Man City lined up in a 4 4 2 with Haaland and Foden up front being agressive on the center backs. Rodri and Bernardo were backing the press by pressing the Man United's pivots Casemiro and Mainoo. However Fernandez would be able to roam untamed between the lines. Man City knew they couldn't allow this to continue. Initially so City had Semenyo press the pivot rather than being wide, allowing Rodri to remain deeper between the lines. However if United retained possession after being able to play out, Semenyo was forced to play as a temporary midfielder which wasn't optimal. So Semenyo and Foden switches roles in the press. But Mbeumo did an excellent job at dropping between the lines which caused issues. Firstly because Semenyo was pressing high centrally, Rico Lewis pushed higher on Shaw which meant Khusanov had to watch for the wide man. So Rodri as a result couldn't fully commiitt to pick up the man between the lines in case he had to drop in and cover as part of the back 4. At the same time, Alleyne wasn't confident to push up to press Mbeumo. So he had space and at times, Man United excelled at finding runners in behind.
The Tactic that is Hacking Modern Football
Gegenpressing was on his peak of dominance and due to its fear, passing became riskier. More and more teams tried to just avoid it. But Roberto De Zerbi tries to change things. Before 2019 only the goalkeeper was allowed to stay inside until the first pass is made by him. But after football removed this rule, other would stay inside his box for the first pass. In the early 2010s, teams dominated by keeping the ball for long. The mroe you have the bll the higher chance is that your opponent will make mistakes. When the mistake arrived, they would attack the space it created. But by 2014, a system from Germany challenged it. So instead of sitting deep, teams started to press right from the start and made every pass look like escaping a running train. With the old rule still in place, the center backs had to stay outside of the box. Due to close proximity this allowed pressing to add even more numbers on the first receiver. So the keeper had no choice but to go long or diagonal. As a result, short build up became a luxury. After the rule, the gegenpressing teams didn't hold back and started pressing even higher but by doing so, left gaps in behind. In 2010, De Zerbi played in a Romanian club. When most of his teamates used their free time to relax, De Zerbi spent hours watching replays of Pep Guardiola's barcelona.as a number 10 he got so influced by this fearless possession football that he retired and became a football manager at the age of 33. Like Pep the first thing he didn't like as a manager was long balls as he believed that kicking the ball long and trying to win the second ball is a bet. Unlike Pep Guardiola, De Zerbi didn't have the team who could play as well. So he had 2 choices : either play the usual low block and attack on break that he hated the most. Or find a solution that could protect his philosophy while still being able to work with limited players.
With the 2019 rule change, De Zerbi observed that within the pressing teams, gaps between the front line and the back line started to increase so he thought if he pulls the oppositions deeper, this gap will further increase. If the ball is in the gap, only the back line has to be faced. Other managers like Pep Guardiola, Mikel Arteta and Luis Enrique tried to target that gap. Some tried side passes to open up that gap while other played long balls into it. But Ze Zerbi wanted to get the ball straight through the middle against this high press. The moment the opposition gets triggered to press the ball carrier, De Zerbi wants the ball to reach the player behind that presser. But instead of passing directly, De Zerbi employs a third player to move towards the ball carrier and act as a stepping stone. You fully focus on the passer so when you receive you have to turn and by that time, multiple markers are ready to close you down. But when having a third player receiving the ball on behalf of you it pulls markers towards him as a bait. It's the De Zerbia's S. When De Zerbi coached Brighton, he beat Klopp's Liverpool 3 - 0 in 2023. And the trend of short passing revived again. But it ain't tiki taka from Pep. Tiki taka starts with slow tempo and gradually then starts to rise when the spaces start to open up. Pep Guardiola was inspired by this and brings it to his own system at Man City. Even Xabi Alonso's Bayer Leverkusen during their winning season. Even Luis Enrique's PSG that won the UCL.
.
Manchester City looked to plit the center backs with Rodri as their main pivot. Bruno Fernandez's goal was to tie up the single pivot. Mbeumo's intervention would be on Khusanov. So Alleyne was the only easy outlet. He was not comfortable during the match. Aké was pushing up. Maino and Casemiro for Manchester Uniteed were backing up the press It forced Alleyne into hopeful long balls often. Even with little pressure, he struggled to make correct decisions. So Pep Guardiola tried to counter this by dropping Bernardo Silva into the left back position in possession for an easy outlet on the side. If they went directly to Rodri under pressure, Rodri would have 2 options with his 2 center backs. Man United used a 4 4 2 mid block even when Man City were in the middle third. Against this, City tried to adapt with a 3 4 3 diamond with Aké tucking in and Lewis would move on the right side of the diamond. On paper this sounds great as City could have numerical advantage both in the deep areas and in the central area. Dprgu would tuck in with the right back making it much harder to develop an overload. Khusanov as the right center back was agressive so much that his flank often ended up in 3 v 2. So Dorgu had to shift and if the remained midfielder didn't shfit across in time, the left back Shaw was still isolated 2 v 1. Rico Lewis could get into dangerous positions in this half space this way. So Man United accepted by times to drop deeper to compact space. As the central center back, Alleyne was seeing the most of the ball so they had to adapt and Rodri would become the central center back and become the main progressor of the ball with either Lewis, Bernardo or both looking to drop in while the left hand side looked to compensate. Since Man United's wingers had to prevent the midfielder's overlaod by having their wingers tucking in, City could still overload their back line. 5 v 4. So when City changed side,
United's back line had to shift across. That would free the switch and isolations. Semenyo often got into isolations but didn't make the most of it. When Kodu tried to find himself in isolations, Dorgu was disciplined in dropping in to try to double team against him. Man City dominated in possession stats mostly because they supported their build up play all the way into the final third, moving the backline extremely high up the pitch, allowing them to counter press or win any loose balls if the play broke down outside of Man United. Issue is that this leaves acres of space behind the back line that United looked to hit on the counter attack. with United often looking to play it first time into the runners in behind. During Man United's build up, initially Man City lined up in a 4 4 2 with Haaland and Foden up front being agressive on the center backs. Rodri and Bernardo were backing the press by pressing the Man United's pivots Casemiro and Mainoo. However Fernandez would be able to roam untamed between the lines. Man City knew they couldn't allow this to continue. Initially so City had Semenyo press the pivot rather than being wide, allowing Rodri to remain deeper between the lines. However if United retained possession after being able to play out, Semenyo was forced to play as a temporary midfielder which wasn't optimal. So Semenyo and Foden switches roles in the press. But Mbeumo did an excellent job at dropping between the lines which caused issues. Firstly because Semenyo was pressing high centrally, Rico Lewis pushed higher on Shaw which meant Khusanov had to watch for the wide man. So Rodri as a result couldn't fully commiitt to pick up the man between the lines in case he had to drop in and cover as part of the back 4. At the same time, Alleyne wasn't confident to push up to press Mbeumo. So he had space and at times, Man United excelled at finding runners in behind.
Gegenpressing was on his peak of dominance and due to its fear, passing became riskier. More and more teams tried to just avoid it. But Roberto De Zerbi tries to change things. Before 2019 only the goalkeeper was allowed to stay inside until the first pass is made by him. But after football removed this rule, other would stay inside his box for the first pass. In the early 2010s, teams dominated by keeping the ball for long. The mroe you have the bll the higher chance is that your opponent will make mistakes. When the mistake arrived, they would attack the space it created. But by 2014, a system from Germany challenged it. So instead of sitting deep, teams started to press right from the start and made every pass look like escaping a running train. With the old rule still in place, the center backs had to stay outside of the box. Due to close proximity this allowed pressing to add even more numbers on the first receiver. So the keeper had no choice but to go long or diagonal. As a result, short build up became a luxury. After the rule, the gegenpressing teams didn't hold back and started pressing even higher but by doing so, left gaps in behind. In 2010, De Zerbi played in a Romanian club. When most of his teamates used their free time to relax, De Zerbi spent hours watching replays of Pep Guardiola's barcelona.as a number 10 he got so influced by this fearless possession football that he retired and became a football manager at the age of 33. Like Pep the first thing he didn't like as a manager was long balls as he believed that kicking the ball long and trying to win the second ball is a bet. Unlike Pep Guardiola, De Zerbi didn't have the team who could play as well. So he had 2 choices : either play the usual low block and attack on break that he hated the most. Or find a solution that could protect his philosophy while still being able to work with limited players.
With the 2019 rule change, De Zerbi observed that within the pressing teams, gaps between the front line and the back line started to increase so he thought if he pulls the oppositions deeper, this gap will further increase. If the ball is in the gap, only the back line has to be faced. Other managers like Pep Guardiola, Mikel Arteta and Luis Enrique tried to target that gap. Some tried side passes to open up that gap while other played long balls into it. But Ze Zerbi wanted to get the ball straight through the middle against this high press. The moment the opposition gets triggered to press the ball carrier, De Zerbi wants the ball to reach the player behind that presser. But instead of passing directly, De Zerbi employs a third player to move towards the ball carrier and act as a stepping stone. You fully focus on the passer so when you receive you have to turn and by that time, multiple markers are ready to close you down. But when having a third player receiving the ball on behalf of you it pulls markers towards him as a bait. It's the De Zerbia's S. When De Zerbi coached Brighton, he beat Klopp's Liverpool 3 - 0 in 2023. And the trend of short passing revived again. But it ain't tiki taka from Pep. Tiki taka starts with slow tempo and gradually then starts to rise when the spaces start to open up. Pep Guardiola was inspired by this and brings it to his own system at Man City. Even Xabi Alonso's Bayer Leverkusen during their winning season. Even Luis Enrique's PSG that won the UCL.
.
Le Real va perdre
Le Baps va les rendre LOCOS
" Viser la lune ça ne me fait pas peur. " Yamal probablement.
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Vinicius qui a ragequit le terrain
VAR
9 minutes de temps additionnel ayaaaaaaaaaaa.
Toute la créativité du Barca reposent sur Yamal et Pedri. Quand l'équipe adverse arrive à les arrêter, ils ne trouvent pas la solution. Alors imagine s'ils perdent 1 de ces 2 joueurs au prochain mercato estival.
Putain, je suis dé-goû-té
Pedri expulsé.
Le tournant de la saison?
