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J'ai un moyen de voir le match mais faut venir sur un serveur discord.
Le discord du FF ?
Le Baps va les rendre LOCOS
il y a un mois
Bon, je suppose que ce discord n'est pas totalement noname même sur onche.
Je pensais que c'était surtout connu sur JVC.
This Was A Very Different Real Madrid
The most fascinating tactical part is what Real Madrid did when they didn't have the ball. Barcelona used their usual build up shape, a back 4 with a double pivot.with Fermin Lopez remaining high so Barcelona was essentially in their 4 2 3 1. Where under prior managers we might see Real Madrid being a bit more conservative defensively, Alonso was on the front foot and Real Madrid pressed very high with Guler joining Mbappé on the center backs and Tchouaméni and Bellingham on the pivots. So the only outlets would be the fullbacks. But Camavinga and Vinicius were pushing right up onto the fullbacks. So Szczęsny was often forced to long balls where Militao and Huijsen would often win the aerial duels. But sometimes Barcelona were willing to take risks in their build up meaning that one wrong pass could get Madrid into a goalscoring position quickly. Mbappé cuts off the pass infield as soon the ball is live so the only free option is Baldé Bellingham and Tchouaméni are covering the pivots eliminating the central options while Valverde is cutting out Rashford. So when Rashford does look to receive, he is forced backwards, allowing Real Madrid to win the ball and attack the box immediatly. With the high press it was vital for the center backs more often than not to push up and Huijsen often pushed on the free midfielder Lopez. Madrid were playing with fire. If the initial layer of press is broken, Barca would be bearing down on goal. In most encounters under Flick we tended to see Koundé trying to overlap to support Yamal when he cuts in. But here due to the ridiculous threat of Madrid counter attacking particularly down the left, Barcelona went with more of a 3 in the build and Yamal had to hold the width on the right flank. It meant Barcelona had a better rest defense shape.
But the fundamental problems for Real Madrid didn't change. Initially it was Bellingham Mbappé front 2 and later Guler Mbappé front 2. Either way Madrid found themselves consistently 2 v 3 down in the midfield. Lopez could drop between the lines, causing serious problems to Real Madrid. But Alonso had 2 consistent solutions. When Barca were attacking more slowly and Real were in a more controlled defensive phase, Tchouaméni would trust the midfield 2 to prevent the progression into Pedri and De Jong so it would be his role to drop in and follow Fermin Lopez as Madrid shifted to a back 5. But if the play was coming down the Barca right or the pivots weren't well positioned to press, Tchouaméni would have to push up and it would be up to Huijsen to stay touch. This could causes issues like Tchouaméni pushing onto Pedri meaning that Huijsen is on Fermin Lopez but Lopez keeps drifting meaning that Dean Huijsen almost ends up on the wrong side of Militao, leaving a massive gap in the defense. But Barcelona didn't have the quality to take advantage of these situations. As the match wore on, Barelona increasingly committed to that 3 2 5 shape with Rashford tucking in much more like Lopez on the far side instead of providing the width. This would have been one of the key reasons that Alonso moved Camavinga more to a right wing position as Camavinga's workrate meant that he would be happy to drop deep and help defend against the advancing Balde now allowing Rashford and Lopez in the half spaces to be monitored. This was especially important as Barcelona often likes to build on the left and overload the left hand side; Now when Madrid shifted across to cover, having a center back like Huijsen able to watch Lopez in the half space meant that Yamal wasn't granted too much space even on the switch.
At the same time it also meant that Madrid now had a midfield 3. So they were able to match Barcelona's man to man on the occasions where Lopez was dropping into the midfield. And Real as always were happy to sit a bit deeper because they knew they could be dangerous on the transitions particularly with Mbappé and Vinicius breaking in behind Barcelona's especially high line. And Vinicius could make this particularly dangerous when he dropped initially to pick up the ball and drew Koundé higher up the pitch as that would naturally grow the space in this area that Mbappé could target with the run in behind consistently. But was a masterful out of possession performance from Real Madrid.
Je pensais que c'était surtout connu sur JVC.
The most fascinating tactical part is what Real Madrid did when they didn't have the ball. Barcelona used their usual build up shape, a back 4 with a double pivot.with Fermin Lopez remaining high so Barcelona was essentially in their 4 2 3 1. Where under prior managers we might see Real Madrid being a bit more conservative defensively, Alonso was on the front foot and Real Madrid pressed very high with Guler joining Mbappé on the center backs and Tchouaméni and Bellingham on the pivots. So the only outlets would be the fullbacks. But Camavinga and Vinicius were pushing right up onto the fullbacks. So Szczęsny was often forced to long balls where Militao and Huijsen would often win the aerial duels. But sometimes Barcelona were willing to take risks in their build up meaning that one wrong pass could get Madrid into a goalscoring position quickly. Mbappé cuts off the pass infield as soon the ball is live so the only free option is Baldé Bellingham and Tchouaméni are covering the pivots eliminating the central options while Valverde is cutting out Rashford. So when Rashford does look to receive, he is forced backwards, allowing Real Madrid to win the ball and attack the box immediatly. With the high press it was vital for the center backs more often than not to push up and Huijsen often pushed on the free midfielder Lopez. Madrid were playing with fire. If the initial layer of press is broken, Barca would be bearing down on goal. In most encounters under Flick we tended to see Koundé trying to overlap to support Yamal when he cuts in. But here due to the ridiculous threat of Madrid counter attacking particularly down the left, Barcelona went with more of a 3 in the build and Yamal had to hold the width on the right flank. It meant Barcelona had a better rest defense shape.
But the fundamental problems for Real Madrid didn't change. Initially it was Bellingham Mbappé front 2 and later Guler Mbappé front 2. Either way Madrid found themselves consistently 2 v 3 down in the midfield. Lopez could drop between the lines, causing serious problems to Real Madrid. But Alonso had 2 consistent solutions. When Barca were attacking more slowly and Real were in a more controlled defensive phase, Tchouaméni would trust the midfield 2 to prevent the progression into Pedri and De Jong so it would be his role to drop in and follow Fermin Lopez as Madrid shifted to a back 5. But if the play was coming down the Barca right or the pivots weren't well positioned to press, Tchouaméni would have to push up and it would be up to Huijsen to stay touch. This could causes issues like Tchouaméni pushing onto Pedri meaning that Huijsen is on Fermin Lopez but Lopez keeps drifting meaning that Dean Huijsen almost ends up on the wrong side of Militao, leaving a massive gap in the defense. But Barcelona didn't have the quality to take advantage of these situations. As the match wore on, Barelona increasingly committed to that 3 2 5 shape with Rashford tucking in much more like Lopez on the far side instead of providing the width. This would have been one of the key reasons that Alonso moved Camavinga more to a right wing position as Camavinga's workrate meant that he would be happy to drop deep and help defend against the advancing Balde now allowing Rashford and Lopez in the half spaces to be monitored. This was especially important as Barcelona often likes to build on the left and overload the left hand side; Now when Madrid shifted across to cover, having a center back like Huijsen able to watch Lopez in the half space meant that Yamal wasn't granted too much space even on the switch.
At the same time it also meant that Madrid now had a midfield 3. So they were able to match Barcelona's man to man on the occasions where Lopez was dropping into the midfield. And Real as always were happy to sit a bit deeper because they knew they could be dangerous on the transitions particularly with Mbappé and Vinicius breaking in behind Barcelona's especially high line. And Vinicius could make this particularly dangerous when he dropped initially to pick up the ball and drew Koundé higher up the pitch as that would naturally grow the space in this area that Mbappé could target with the run in behind consistently. But was a masterful out of possession performance from Real Madrid.
il y a un mois
C'est comme l'arrête de Scezny contre Messi en coupe du monde mais de l'autre côté.
il y a un mois
Toute la créativité du Barca reposent sur Yamal et Pedri. Quand l'équipe adverse arrive à les arrêter, ils ne trouvent pas la solution. Alors imagine s'ils perdent 1 de ces 2 joueurs au prochain mercato estival.
il y a un mois
Putain, je suis dé-goû-té
Les admins svp, vous branlez pas sur du prn 12k 360° VR, ça fait lagguer onche
il y a un mois
La première mi temps et la deuxième mi temps c'est le jour et la nuit par contre.
il y a un mois





