Chelsea started the match in a 4 2 3 1 with the curious choice of Reece James as the holding midfielder alongside Caicedo Defensively speaking, Caicedo and James would follow Neves and Ruiz not giving them any chance to rotate. As PSG looked to build, they would drop into a wide back 4 with Vitinha also dropping deep to try and receive the ball. Initially he would have space between the front 2 of Fernandez and Joao Pedro to rotate possession. But as he would move up on the pitch depending on which side they they were building down, either Caicedo or James would step forward to close him down and Chelsea's defensive line would break with one of the center backs pushing forward to close down any player in the midfield. It led to a mix system for Chelsea as it was man marking in the center of the pitch but a slightly more zonal first press in the space out wide. It led to a very dynamic defensive line. We know that PSG players are known to rotate continuously. Players can start into the midfield but rotate into attack and the front 3 have the freedom to move into deeper positions. So Chelsea were continously swapping positions, changing which way they formed the backline. But whoever stepped into the backline was then keeping the same shape in an organized way which is extremely difficult to do consistently. Neto was a lot of time helping Chelsea to form a back 5, essentially playing as a wingback. PSG often use Hakimi to bring the width with the right winger Doué often moving more centrally. That's why Chelsea were shifting into a back 5 when PSG had possession. It allowed Cucurella to stay tigher on Doué and follow his rotations more closely. It also meant there was an extra player to form the backline if Cucurella was to step forward.
A few times in the first half PSG could find space on this flank by timing their runs well and finding a player in behind. But they barely could create chances. It meant that in deep positions, Chelsea were often in a 5 3 2 shape to close off any chance of central progression. If PSG attempted to play centrally, James and Caicedo were perfect in this game and quick to close down any player in the center. As PSG struggled to find space on the middle, Dembélé was dropping deeper and deeper off the defensive line to receive the ball, often hovering around the left channel. This position could cause some small issues for Chelsea especially because of this fluid defensive system. In the second half, Chelsea dropped a bit deeper in the pitch when defending, meaning that players like Vitinha had more time on the ball. to push forward and on a few occasions did break through the center, often leading to long range efforts or play shifting out wide. However outside of Dembélé's big chance in the second half saved by Sanchez, Chelsea defended perfectly. Outside the saves, Sanchez was very good on the ball as well.Sanchez was a key to how Chelsea could be dominant in the first half. When the opposition is building from the back, PSG want to be aggressive and Dembélé is tasked to rush to the keeper constantly when he has the ball. Chelsea was playing with Sanchez almost entirely from Chelsea's left, ensuring that PSG was more shifted to Chelsea's left flank so there would be more space to the right for Chelsea to exploit. From the right flank, they almost never used Sanchez.
On a few occasions during this season, Sanchez was trapped on his weak foot so by not putting him into this position entirely, it meant he had a much bigger impact on the ball. This is what led to Chelsea's first goal with Gusto forcing a mistake from Mendes before Palmer could finish. Chelsea had Pedro moving into this right flank. The second goal came from Chelsea winning the ball back in the center, catching PSG off balance and the third goal was thanks to a perfect rotation. The moment Chelsea had the possession, we saw their 2 3 5 shape with Cucurella, Caicedo and James forming the middle line, forming a sort of defense before the last defensive line, pressing relentlessly and not allowing PSG to create any dangerous counterattacks. In the second half, Chelsea looked to defender a bit deeper to keep that scoreline and create chances from counter attacks with Liam Delap having a great impact on the game, forcing 2 good saves from Donnarumma.
J'ai regardé 597 minutes du Real Madrid d'Alonso. Il faut absolument parler de ses tactiques | An...
Xabi Alonso used 3 different formations during the Club World Cup, each one desigend to correct flaws from the previous one. No matter the formation, Alonso builds up the sasme way, with a back 3. It starts with Courtois. Under Ancelotti, Courtois was more of a traditionnal goalkepper, rarely venturing beyond his penalty area. Whenever Real Madrid beings deep, if they begin with the back 4, he has to push up between the center backs to create that vital 3. By doing this, Alonso doesn't have to drop another outfield player deep to create the initial numerical superiority. This extra man can push higher up the pitch where he can hurt the opponent. Football has an endless cycle of creating a tactic, an opponent countering it, and adaptaing to this counter. In possession, they were rarely in a midfield 3 when Trent was playing, because he was inverting into the midfield to create a 4 man midfield. Formations are just the vocabulary, principles are the language of football. And the principle here is the desire for Alonso to have a central overload in order to take the most direct route to the goal. But most of the opponents anticipated this, meaning that the opposition mostly defended in a narrow and compact shape, mostly with a front 2, which is why Alonso wants to build with a back 3 : to have an easy outlet. The back 3 changed depending on the match. Against Al Hilal, Fran Garcia was the third man, as the left center back. Whether Madrid used a midfield diamond or a back 5, Fran Garcia was not expected to invert at all but isntead stay wide. This cause major issues because in the diamond and the back 5, he often found himself isolated. This is a situation Madrid should aim to avoid. When he got the ball, the opponent's press suddently kicked into high gear. The thing is that passing ability is not Fran Garcia's main strenght. Garcia often went backwards as well, especially since he had no easy support ahead of him.
The adaptation for Alonso involved a slight tweat in the role of Vinicius. Initially when Fran Garcia received, Vini was more central. but as the tournament progressed, Fran Garcia was a signal for Vinicius to immediatly move wide in support. They could pin the fullback deep to give Fran Garcia more time on the ball, as most opponents were reluctant to commit a central man to press Garcia due to Real Madrid's central overload. But even if Garcia was still under pressure, at least now he had a simpler option up the line. The Vinicius solution helped when Garcia was isolated out wide. When Madrid was building in a back 4, the inversion meant that Huijsen ended up being the central center back. But in a dedicated back 3, he could start and remain as the left center back. From there he showed the composure and passing range that Garcia lacked, meaning that he could play those penetrative passes into the Madrid midfield advantage to take hold. However, the teams were still defending narrowly. Real Madrid needed to get outside of that. So Real Madrid's back 3 couldn't just remain static, which is why Huijsen moved to these pseudo left back zones. This completly changed Madrid's dynamic. Huijsen was an excellent ball carrier when he received, very comfortable with the ball at his feet. So he pushed higher up the pitch to get the ball into areas where he could potentially find the creative players in their most effective zones. Because of that, Garcia was no longer stuck deep and played higher up the pitch. where his greatest strenght which are his pace and his running actually mattered. With Vinicius drifting wide into the half space to draw defenders, Garcia Fran Garcia could make overlapping runs that suit his game perfectly.
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