[FINALE Europa League] Manchester United - Tottenham Hotspur

Les coupes d'Europe sont gravés en Français

A défaut de les gagner.

C'est comme trouver un pokémon shiny, ça arrivera rarement.

Ha ok aya j’avais oublié

Après bon l’euro 2024 à part l’Espagne, l’Allemagne et la Géorgie on va pas dire que le reste c’était du beau jeu

C'est plus Luke Shaw qui passe son temps à perdre des finales à Man U et pour l'Angleterre.

Football de terroriste de la part de Tottenham en deuxième mi temps. Mais mérité quand même ceci dit. 1 des 2 clowns devait finir champion après tout.

Son qui la gagne pour sa dernière chance. C'est beau. 10 années à Tottenham et sa loyauté a enfin payé. Content pour lui pour ma part.

https://x.com/ESPNFC/status/1925295076458041842

https://x.com/premierleague/status/1925301781652738472

https://x.com/brfootball/status/1925298188996546931

https://x.com/Dominos_UK/status/1920583105179472087

https://x.com/TrollFootball/status/1925307926321012786

This Europa League ifnal won't be remembered for its quality for sure. Postecoglou abandonned his philosophy and made the game as chaotic as possible. Man Unitedd was dominating possession but failed in the exact same way. Since both teams had a terrible season in the Premiere League, this final was a must win and must not loss for both managers. Postecoglou changed his philosophy with no high line anymore, no aggressive press and absolutly no build up. And it was his best decision of the year. Postecoglou was determined to stick to his game plan at all costs. Despite the extensive injuries the Spurs suffered, they would always build from the back. They play the least amount of ball among the PL teams. They tried to be patient in their attacks and get a lot of players forward, especially with the rotations of the fullbacks into more central positions. When it works, it's a system that can quickly overload a defensive line and find a free player. THe problem is that it almost never worked this season. They had the lowest xG conceded from their own goal kicks and more often than not, it would simply leave their defense too exposed and the fullbacks getting overrun on the flanks. Defensively speaking, they were one of the worst teams in the league and counterattacks were one of their biggest weaknesses. But in the Europa League, Totenham were more in control and he sets up the team differently in knock out competitions as Postecoglou himself said. In the fianl, Vicario essentially didn't build up from the back once, with every goal kick being long and much of the game became a scrap for the second ball. Also Onana would lean into this philosophy as well.This made the early stage of the game very chaotic. Some free kicks, throwings and corners gave the Spurs decent opportunities. But no real clear cut chance for both teams. I oftenresulted into the Spurs losing possession and moving into a low block.
It still led to some dangerous moments when Spurs gained the ball with some of their players pushing forward. Tottenham wanted to attack by crossing into the box as much as possible. While we didn't see much in term of positional rotations and structured attacks, these crosses from out wide caused Man United some difficulties at times with Tottenham being able to find overloads on both flanks, mostly because their fullbacks would push forward beyond Man United's wingbacks and would give the wingers more time to line up across into the box. Eventually, this system, combined well to lead to the only goal of the game. An intercepted pass and the Spurs could push forward. A decent passing combination on Spurs left flank led to Johnson getting the cross onto the front post for a ball ultimatly deflected by Luke Shaw into his own goal. It was a scrappy goal for a scrappy game. Their low and compact block thejn meant no progression for Man United down the middle. And by overloading the areas out wide, they would cause Man United issues on the counter and from crosses. Especially, Richarlison put an excellent defensive shift and helped out a lot on Spur's left flank while Romero and Van de Ven gave Hojlund no space for the entirety of the game.


As for Man United, it was a performance that highlightened everything wrong during this season : a team caught between ideas, lacking identity and continuously trying the same thing with no success. However, compared to Spurs, we got a good glimpse of what their tactics were in possession. Whilst Man United also didn't play out from the back, they tried and lure the press from Spurs more often. From a deep position, their objective was to free Fernandez in the center. They did this by having Maguire stay in a more advanced position alongside Casemiro with the 2 wide center backs forming the back 3 with Onana. From there, as the play would shift out wide, their main idea was to play the ball into the left channel that would open up with Dorgu dropping deep. However, there was a hard time to exploit this space effectively with Hojlund and Mount. Where we saw more interesting ideas was as they moved into build up from a more advanced position. Because Spurs kept a pretty low defensive line and their first pressing line was still quite aggressive, it freed up some space for Fernandez to find space. The vast majority of attacks for Man United would start on their left flank, dragging Spurs over to this position. From there, Bissouma was tasked with ensuring there was no easy pass for Hojlund so he would often move to cover which meant Fernandez could at time receive the ball directly, a move we saw into the second half. But more often than not, Mazraoui would be the extra man by moving centrally and overloading the midfield. This was a position that Man United often found themselves in a few times in the first half. And the interchanging of positions between Dialloa nd Mazraoui on the right flank weren't bad at all. It led to some confusion for Spurs's defensive line. And they often found space on the flank to push forward.
But here is where the positives for Man United in attack end. Once they found themselves in this position further up the pitch, they had no solution. The main idea seemed to break from left to right and then switch play into Dorgu in the opposite flank. On occasions, it worked but even when he was able to push forward, either this switch didn't make it the full lenght and was easily intercepted, or Dorgu was isolated in his flank with no real support to create any substancial threat. United attempted this switch countless of times. While late in the game with Garnacho, it provided more attacking threat, it was easily dealt with. When Manchester Unite weren't switching play, they looked for hopeful balls over the defensive line or crosses into the box. But because of Tottenham's compact defensive line, they never really found their target. The biggest chances for Man United came from Shaw meeting Dorgu's cross in the last minute, but it was saved by Vicario. The other one was before, when Solanke and Vicario allowed with their miscommunication, Hojlund to have a header, but it was ultimatly saved by Van de Ven in an acrobatic way. Outside of this, Spurs defended really well and ended up crowned champions of the Europa League.

As the game went on, Postecoglou made a few smart tweaks while Amorim stayed rigid until the 86th minute without a single structural change. It was a battle between 2 unadaptable, stubborn ideologically imprisonned within their own mind managers. But Ange was the only one who could at the end of the day change for the greater good during this match. Man United wanted to stagger Casemiro and Fernandez with one dropping deeper and the other pushing on to open up better passing angles and make it harder to press and getting up the pitch quicker. Spurs wanted to leave Richarlison and Johnson extremely wide to force Man United's wingbacks to sit deeper and thus forcing a back 5. The idea was to isolate Casemiro and Fernandez. So when Tottenham's fullbacks invert into the middle, they should over whelm them in that area. The funny thing is that neither of these things happened. Both teams seemed afraid to play their own brand of football. Usually, Tottenham to circulate the ball with some interchanges to bait the opposition before going through them. Yet during this game they wanted to get rid of the ball from their own third as fast as they could, going long. And it was the team with the lowest or second lowest second ball percentage in the Premiere league this season. There was no attempt to engage a structural play from the back. Man United and Onana did pretty much the same, which made the game even more chaotic than it was. As a result, both teams abandoned the middle of the pitch. Nobody wanted to get caught in the build up or to give away with a bad pass or lose it on the turn. The whole first half was about moving the ball on the flanks. For Man United it was about getting Diallo in 1 v 1 against his fullback. For Tottenham in the other hand, it became all about crosses. Yet, nor Hojlund or Silanki had a single touch in the opposition's box during the entire firs thalf.
Before Tottenham's goal, Man United conceded some goos crosses that should have alerted them that they needed to stay in their shape and not be dragged around.

Why This New Pressing Tactic is Changing Football
4 years ago, an average high press often involved a pressing team having a man disadvantage in the center, but would rotate to cover passing lanes and block central progression. In 2025 today, the press is more aggressive and the entire team is locked into a man marking system. Across the Premiere League and Europe, we see more teams using this setup. Years ago, it would have been seen as far too risky, leaving the defense too exposed to quick transitions. It was around the start of the decade that playing out from the back went from something the best teams in Europe were doing to something all teams would look to use. And it became an increasingly important part of the game. It was mostly down to the fact that having a goalkeeper be involved in the attacking move would naturally give you a man advantage, leading to this initial phase being a 10 v 11. Defensively speaking, the extra player posed a threat. If you closed down the gk it frees up a player in a more advanced position, and quick passing combinations around the back started to find ways of exploiting aggressive defenses more and more frequently. So initially, the solution seemed to allow the opposition to have this advantage. Don't committ too many players forward and even fi they break out, you still have enough players back to defend. In fact, while you may be outnumbered initially, you could still easily keep a 4 v 3 on the defensive line and make sure there is no easy pass into the striker. It's either the whole team si aggressive or the front 2 realizes they are outnumber so they step back to form their mid block. With this man disadvantage, the main objective was to lure the keeper into playing the ball into certain positions, usually on the flank where it was easier to get trapped.
But regardless what trap or system a team looked to use, the answer for the team in possession was pretty straightforward, with the right passes and the right players building up from the back will always result in a free player. And this is why build up became a fundamental tool for teams to master as with the right pass at the right moment after a long time of circulating the ball, you could cut out up to 6 players. Eventually the defensive teams started to catch on to what is going on. As more teams relied on build up defenders and goalkeppers became far more comfortable under pressure and would learn the exact ways to exploit the extra outfield player. And that's where man oriented pressing started to become the solution. It was not only about the intensity but also about removing the free man entirely. If you could match every player and force the goalkepeer into uncomfortable areaa, you could take away their advantage and tilt the risk in your favour. The core driving force of why a man oriented pressing system can work so well against a build up is because you are not allowing a player to receive on the turn. Even if they break the first line of press, when the player receives the ball, he will be instantly closed down and will have to find another player to lay the ball off in order to progress. A few years ago, a team could find the free player on the turn and he could push forward which is a harder situation to defend against. To match up man to man, it does require the defensive team to make a choice. Let's say for example both teams line up in a 4 2 3 1, the most common formation in the modern game. The 2 center backs would be picked up by the striker and the attacking midfielders, the wingers would stay on the fullbacks, and the holding midfielder would match up in the center.

In this case the only choice a team has to make in this position is how to close down the attacking midfielder which is now almost always closed down by one of the center backs, breaking the defensive line. Breaking the defensive line is not uncommon but this aggressive use during opposition's build up was not common. But there is still the main issue of the initial 3 v 2 from the goalkepper. Because the instant you close the keeper down, the outfield player does have space to push forward. But the manangers seem to come to the conclusion that this advantage is is not that big for the team in possesssion. Because as the goalkepper is closed down, the striker on the other side from where he received the pass will slowly curve his run to ensure there is no easy pass back to the center back in this position. But because the options in the center now have much less time on the ball, along with the other striker ensuring the pass through the middle is not easy to pull off, the third man pass that was so dangerous just a few years ago is now suddently not as effective. This is where the risk reward mentality of man marking against opponent's build up comes back into play. Say a team is auccessfull at building out from the back and moves into midfield, the reward is still not that great because you still don't have a man advantage because all the players ahead of you are correctly followed and you are still far from the opponent's goal, giving the defending team time to get back. And the risk if you lose possession in this area can be very high and can frequently lead to a goal scoring opportunity. Now when talking about man marking systems, there is another element we need to speak about. Because this doesn't mean that all the defensive players will instantly latch on to their direct opponents and follow them across the pitch. And they will give them certain space to lure the pass into specific areas.

For example, let's say the left winger has to press the opposition's right back. In this case, he wouldn't instantly close down the right back before he received the ball as this would open up a very dangerous central channel for the center back to play the ball forward. Rather, the winger will stay in his position and force the pass out wide into the right back before closing him down. Simultaneously, the right winger might move into a more central position to ensure they don't get outnumbered in the midfield. So even tough each player has a direct opponent, there are still a lot of moments in which they will move away from this player. And if the opponent is successfull during build up, the vast majority of the teams will then switch to a zonal marking principle, for example shifting to a 4 4 2 defensive shape. There are very few teams that adopt man marking across the whole pitch. One of the best examples is Atalanta under Gian Piero Gasperini. In the Premiere League, one of the best example of this man marking system can be seen with Newcastle under Eddie Howe. The high press is a crucial part of their tactics and they have been able to dominate press with relentless press,e ven whilst having relatively low possession. Their press is structured in a way to force players out wide The striker will curve his run and all the players in the center are covered, giving the goalkepper from the opposition fewer options. Either move the ball out wide and go down line, or go long directly into your forwards which are guarded by the defenders. This style is reflected in their high regain from this season. Whilst there are a few high up the pitch, the vast majority of them are coming out wide or behind the midfield line, as the opposition is playing long balls into the defense. From this position they had countless goal scoring opportunities. They have an average 0,32 goals per game from high regains.
At time they can get caught out with these long balls but the main issue in Newcastle's system is how they deal with a pass to the free center back when the goalkepper is closed down. This has led to the opposition having space to push forward. But because the remaining players further ahead are still closely followed, the options for the player on the ball are still very limited. One team that has an excellent way of countering this is Inter Milan. From goal kicks they also adopt a man oriented system but it's a lot more dynamic compared to teams like Newcastle and there are more changes in making taking place. Sometimes when the striker closes the gk down, he wouldn't have the time to move over to the free player. So the midfielder continues his run forward, giving time to the striker time to cover the player in the center and return to a man marking system, but also now having forced the opponent out wide. While this man oriented press is certainly becoming a more common approach, this doesn't mean that all the successfull teams are using this style. Take for example Man City under Pep Guardiola. Whilst they still aim to win the ball back high up the pitch, their fault isn't the relentless man marking system we see from teams like Newcastle, and will often press with a man disadvantage, and keeping a numerical advantage in the midfield. Another great example is Bournemouth under Andoni Iraola who rank as some of the best pressers of the Premiere League. And they often do this while keeping a man disadvantage in the center. But the instant the ball is played into certain positions, the whole team is aggressive at pushing forward. So this free player is actually a trap. The opposition often tended to fall for this during that 2024 / 2025 season. So whilst this aggressive press is the dominant trend, different and equally effective philosophies still exist at the highest level.