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First officer needed to push substancial amount of left rudder to keep the aircraft going straight, due to the asymmetric thrust that was being produced, agreed to the diagnosis. In case of a severe engine damage, the Boeing 737 non normal checklist contains something known as memory items, items that pilots need to do from memory as quickly as they can due to the critical nature of the items. In this case the first officer would have called for the memory items to be completed and the captain would then have called them out for confirmation and the captain would have then called them out for confirmation before doing them to make sure its first officer agreed with the actions. He would have start with " Thrust lever, engine number 2. Confirm close? " First officer would look down confirming he was about to move the correct thrust lever and then called " Confirmed. " Captain would have closed it. In this case the thrust lever was already very closed. Next came " Engine start lever, engine number 2. Confirm cutoff? " " Confirmed. Cutoff. " " Engine fire warning switch, engine number 2. Confirm pull? " " Confirmed. Pulled. " All these memory items were designed to secure the engine down by shutting off the access to fuel and hydraulic fuels to the damaged engine. The last memory item was to rotate was to rotate the engine fire warning switch to release the fire extinguishers into the engine in case it was on fire. That was not the case here. Rest of the checklist could wait until the aircraft was established above the minimum sector altitude. Pilots could focus on climbing and retract the flaps. The smoke trailing the right wing was a mist of hydrualic fluid and fuel which was vented out into the air. Memory items were supposed to stop the fuel and hydraulics from reaching the engine. In this case the lines have been ruptured in board of the shut off values that were designed to do this job. So fuel and hydraulic fluid was gushing out from the supply lines.
Meanwhile control tower witnessed what happened and pressed the crash button to alert the firefighters because of the risk of crash. He then also realized that there was another aircraft that he cleared landing for as Nationwide flight was departing. He advised the crew on possible debris on the runway but didn't advise them to go around. It landed and after that the pilots of this plane confirmed to the tower that there were a lot of debris around the center line towards the last third of the runway. Captain Arnold heared this transmission on flight 723. He called a mayday, assessing that they were having thrust issues on the right engine and also hydraulic issues He asked if it was possible to clear the runway from those debris during the 15 / 20 minutes they would take to come back to the airport. Firefighters and rescue personnel were already standing at the edge of the runway. With all other available personnel of the airport they worked on moving away the rubble to the side of the runway. All the aircraft going to the airport were now diverted to George airport instead. Soon only Nationwide Flight 723 was flying in this airspace. Crew purser Marilyn was called into the cockpit and captain Arnold asked her to go through the cabin and have a look to give the pilots a damage report. She then informed that parts of the right engine was missing. In fact she knew that the whole engine was gone but she later said that she didn't want to worry the pilots too much. In a situation like this there is no such thing as too much information. It was better for the information to be the most accurate as possible. to plan course of action. In this case luckily it wouldn't have make any difference. Passengers were prepared now for an emergency landing. In case of a problem like this, several emergency checklists need to be completed.
In this case the crew would have started with completing the engine fire, severe damage or reparation checklist which starts out with the memory items and then continue by in a systematic manner, making sure that the aircraft is as safe as possible in this new configuration. This includes things like setting up the air conditionning system, to not use bleed air from the damaged engine, starting up the APU and crucially, balancing the fuel as the fuel would only be used from 1 tank in this situation. That can lead ao a substancial fuel imbalance wich can come with handling issues. In this case they should not try to correct the imbalance issue because if only the left engine is working, therefore only feeding fuel from the left tank that tank should be lower on fuel. If the right tank is lower, that's a clear indication of fuel leak. If they try to correct the imbalance here, they transfer precious fiel out through a gaping hole on that side. Unfortuantly the crew didn't think about that. On top of this due to the leaking hydrualic lines, the hydraulic pressure was quickly dropping. Captain showed great sign of humility and airmanship when he gave back the controls to the first officer after the plane started yawing and pitching. A basic system using radio altimeter combined with the aircraft's configuration to issue warnings were here back then. Problem is that terrain warnings might come very late as it's only reactive and not predictive like later versions are. To fly a single engine approach the crew would have used the one engine inoperative landing checklist which told them to prepare for flaps 15 landing. That meant they would land at higher speed than normal but also with less drag in case of a go around. Higher speed also meant better aerodynamic efficiency from the rudder which was needed due to the asymmetric thrust they were experiencing. First officer Perry needed to use almost full left rudder to help the aircraft going straight.
A go around method approach was not great considering fuel loss, hydraulic issues and weather reports indicating that visibility was getting worse with lower clouds drifting from False Bay. They lined up with the ILS approach.
First officer needed to push substancial amount of left rudder to keep the aircraft going straight, due to the asymmetric thrust that was being produced, agreed to the diagnosis. In case of a severe engine damage, the Boeing 737 non normal checklist contains something known as memory items, items that pilots need to do from memory as quickly as they can due to the critical nature of the items. In this case the first officer would have called for the memory items to be completed and the captain would then have called them out for confirmation and the captain would have then called them out for confirmation before doing them to make sure its first officer agreed with the actions. He would have start with " Thrust lever, engine number 2. Confirm close? " First officer would look down confirming he was about to move the correct thrust lever and then called " Confirmed. " Captain would have closed it. In this case the thrust lever was already very closed. Next came " Engine start lever, engine number 2. Confirm cutoff? " " Confirmed. Cutoff. " " Engine fire warning switch, engine number 2. Confirm pull? " " Confirmed. Pulled. " All these memory items were designed to secure the engine down by shutting off the access to fuel and hydraulic fuels to the damaged engine. The last memory item was to rotate was to rotate the engine fire warning switch to release the fire extinguishers into the engine in case it was on fire. That was not the case here. Rest of the checklist could wait until the aircraft was established above the minimum sector altitude. Pilots could focus on climbing and retract the flaps. The smoke trailing the right wing was a mist of hydrualic fluid and fuel which was vented out into the air. Memory items were supposed to stop the fuel and hydraulics from reaching the engine. In this case the lines have been ruptured in board of the shut off values that were designed to do this job. So fuel and hydraulic fluid was gushing out from the supply lines.
Meanwhile control tower witnessed what happened and pressed the crash button to alert the firefighters because of the risk of crash. He then also realized that there was another aircraft that he cleared landing for as Nationwide flight was departing. He advised the crew on possible debris on the runway but didn't advise them to go around. It landed and after that the pilots of this plane confirmed to the tower that there were a lot of debris around the center line towards the last third of the runway. Captain Arnold heared this transmission on flight 723. He called a mayday, assessing that they were having thrust issues on the right engine and also hydraulic issues He asked if it was possible to clear the runway from those debris during the 15 / 20 minutes they would take to come back to the airport. Firefighters and rescue personnel were already standing at the edge of the runway. With all other available personnel of the airport they worked on moving away the rubble to the side of the runway. All the aircraft going to the airport were now diverted to George airport instead. Soon only Nationwide Flight 723 was flying in this airspace. Crew purser Marilyn was called into the cockpit and captain Arnold asked her to go through the cabin and have a look to give the pilots a damage report. She then informed that parts of the right engine was missing. In fact she knew that the whole engine was gone but she later said that she didn't want to worry the pilots too much. In a situation like this there is no such thing as too much information. It was better for the information to be the most accurate as possible. to plan course of action. In this case luckily it wouldn't have make any difference. Passengers were prepared now for an emergency landing. In case of a problem like this, several emergency checklists need to be completed.
In this case the crew would have started with completing the engine fire, severe damage or reparation checklist which starts out with the memory items and then continue by in a systematic manner, making sure that the aircraft is as safe as possible in this new configuration. This includes things like setting up the air conditionning system, to not use bleed air from the damaged engine, starting up the APU and crucially, balancing the fuel as the fuel would only be used from 1 tank in this situation. That can lead ao a substancial fuel imbalance wich can come with handling issues. In this case they should not try to correct the imbalance issue because if only the left engine is working, therefore only feeding fuel from the left tank that tank should be lower on fuel. If the right tank is lower, that's a clear indication of fuel leak. If they try to correct the imbalance here, they transfer precious fiel out through a gaping hole on that side. Unfortuantly the crew didn't think about that. On top of this due to the leaking hydrualic lines, the hydraulic pressure was quickly dropping. Captain showed great sign of humility and airmanship when he gave back the controls to the first officer after the plane started yawing and pitching. A basic system using radio altimeter combined with the aircraft's configuration to issue warnings were here back then. Problem is that terrain warnings might come very late as it's only reactive and not predictive like later versions are. To fly a single engine approach the crew would have used the one engine inoperative landing checklist which told them to prepare for flaps 15 landing. That meant they would land at higher speed than normal but also with less drag in case of a go around. Higher speed also meant better aerodynamic efficiency from the rudder which was needed due to the asymmetric thrust they were experiencing. First officer Perry needed to use almost full left rudder to help the aircraft going straight.
A go around method approach was not great considering fuel loss, hydraulic issues and weather reports indicating that visibility was getting worse with lower clouds drifting from False Bay. They lined up with the ILS approach.
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They didn't stand a chance - Bhoja flight 213
On evening of April 20th 2012, 121 passengers and 6 crew boarded on Boeing 737 at Karachi in Pakistan. Flight 213 was being operated Bhoja Air and being the airline inaugural for Karachi to Islamabad, it was expected to take 2 hours. Over Islamabad, storms were brewing, creating conditions which the 2 pilots were not remotely trained to deal with. These pilots were so poorly trained that they hadn't even be taught how to fly this particular aircraft, a Boeing 737 200. All of their training and the manual on board were from an older version of the plane. That version had a much less sophisticated autopilot and other less advanced systems. They just knew that this plane was a bit more high tech but they weren't trained on the details of this newer technology. So they overestimated the aircraft's capabilities. The pilots were 58 years old captain Noorullah Khan Afridi and 53 years old Javaid Malik, the first officer. The captain was a former Air Force pilot with over 10 000 hours of flying experience. He had been flying 737 for several years with a different airline before switching to Bhoja earlier that year. The first officer was also a former Air Force pilot althought he was less experienced with 3 000 hours of flying experience. He worked for the same airline as the captain has worked previously and followed him over Bhoj air once he switched. The 2 pilots were friends and had been paired together for more than half of the flights they had flown with the new airline so far. The captain would make a serie of bad decisions on their approach to Islamabad. Despite the pilots overall experience, they each had only 80 hours on this specific version of the 737 200. The captain previously began training on a more modern version of the 737 at his last airline, but his training was discontinude after his supervisors deemed him unable to operate the automated fligth deck in a safe and efficient manner.
At first, the plane followed its route normally. But the aircraft they were flying on shouldn't have been allowed to carry passengers. That's because as far as Pakistan's civil aviation authority was concerned, Bhoja didn't have any advanced version of the 737. 200. They thought this fleet consisted solely of the base model 737. Indeed, Bhoja airline pilots training program reflected this. Pilots were only trained to fly the base model 737 200 and not the advanced version. It wasn't that the civil aviation authority didn't know this. In fact, they allowed Bhoja to operate this particular plane even though they hadn't granted its certificate of airworthiness to carry passengers. It also would later be claimed that senior officials at the airline had engaged with deals with the civil aviation authority, aka the CAA, to allow the airline to operate in the first place. It was about corruption. The Swiss Cheese model by psychologist James Pearson is often used to explain aircraft accidents. The diea goes that accidents when layers of safety represented here by the cheese slices have holes in them, which on some unfortunate occasions line up in such aa way as to allow an accident to happen. Naturally, the way to prevent similar accidents in the future is to add more layers of safety and to close up some of the holes. At the Bhoja company, the holes were numerous and big. The burreacrats and businessmen who arranged the state of affairs were not on the board of flight 213. Pilots could see on their radar that powerful storms were building in front of them.The storm at Islamabad was significant, with thunder and lightning, heavy rain and strong winds. The closer they got, the more the pilots saw how intense it was. Since the weather at their first alternate airport, at Lahore, was bad, the first officer suggested to check the weather on Pechawar, their second alternate airport. The captian dismissed this idea. Pilots are supposed to trust their instruments and not fate.
The first officer didn't question the captain who was like a mentor for him. The flight continud descending into the murky weather surroudning Islamabad. Ahead of the plane, the pilots could see what is known as a squall line, a serie of storms stretching across a long distance. One the other side of the squall line, lay the airport.
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They didn't stand a chance - Bhoja flight 213
On evening of April 20th 2012, 121 passengers and 6 crew boarded on Boeing 737 at Karachi in Pakistan. Flight 213 was being operated Bhoja Air and being the airline inaugural for Karachi to Islamabad, it was expected to take 2 hours. Over Islamabad, storms were brewing, creating conditions which the 2 pilots were not remotely trained to deal with. These pilots were so poorly trained that they hadn't even be taught how to fly this particular aircraft, a Boeing 737 200. All of their training and the manual on board were from an older version of the plane. That version had a much less sophisticated autopilot and other less advanced systems. They just knew that this plane was a bit more high tech but they weren't trained on the details of this newer technology. So they overestimated the aircraft's capabilities. The pilots were 58 years old captain Noorullah Khan Afridi and 53 years old Javaid Malik, the first officer. The captain was a former Air Force pilot with over 10 000 hours of flying experience. He had been flying 737 for several years with a different airline before switching to Bhoja earlier that year. The first officer was also a former Air Force pilot althought he was less experienced with 3 000 hours of flying experience. He worked for the same airline as the captain has worked previously and followed him over Bhoj air once he switched. The 2 pilots were friends and had been paired together for more than half of the flights they had flown with the new airline so far. The captain would make a serie of bad decisions on their approach to Islamabad. Despite the pilots overall experience, they each had only 80 hours on this specific version of the 737 200. The captain previously began training on a more modern version of the 737 at his last airline, but his training was discontinude after his supervisors deemed him unable to operate the automated fligth deck in a safe and efficient manner.
At first, the plane followed its route normally. But the aircraft they were flying on shouldn't have been allowed to carry passengers. That's because as far as Pakistan's civil aviation authority was concerned, Bhoja didn't have any advanced version of the 737. 200. They thought this fleet consisted solely of the base model 737. Indeed, Bhoja airline pilots training program reflected this. Pilots were only trained to fly the base model 737 200 and not the advanced version. It wasn't that the civil aviation authority didn't know this. In fact, they allowed Bhoja to operate this particular plane even though they hadn't granted its certificate of airworthiness to carry passengers. It also would later be claimed that senior officials at the airline had engaged with deals with the civil aviation authority, aka the CAA, to allow the airline to operate in the first place. It was about corruption. The Swiss Cheese model by psychologist James Pearson is often used to explain aircraft accidents. The diea goes that accidents when layers of safety represented here by the cheese slices have holes in them, which on some unfortunate occasions line up in such aa way as to allow an accident to happen. Naturally, the way to prevent similar accidents in the future is to add more layers of safety and to close up some of the holes. At the Bhoja company, the holes were numerous and big. The burreacrats and businessmen who arranged the state of affairs were not on the board of flight 213. Pilots could see on their radar that powerful storms were building in front of them.The storm at Islamabad was significant, with thunder and lightning, heavy rain and strong winds. The closer they got, the more the pilots saw how intense it was. Since the weather at their first alternate airport, at Lahore, was bad, the first officer suggested to check the weather on Pechawar, their second alternate airport. The captian dismissed this idea. Pilots are supposed to trust their instruments and not fate.
The first officer didn't question the captain who was like a mentor for him. The flight continud descending into the murky weather surroudning Islamabad. Ahead of the plane, the pilots could see what is known as a squall line, a serie of storms stretching across a long distance. One the other side of the squall line, lay the airport.
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