Post.
DISAPPEARING Engine! The Incredible story of Nationwide 723
In the plane, there are 4 cabin crew and 2 pilots. Marilyn Rink was the cabin controller, one of the most experienced cabin crew member of the airline. The captain was the 50 years old Trevor Arnold, experienced pilot with 13 860 hours at the time of the flight including 3 277 hours on the Boeing 737 - 200. He started flying for Nationwide back in 1997 and had been been during a few years flying for other operators until 2006 when he came back again. By contrast, his first officer was Daniel Perry , 25 years old He was brand new on this job, starting flying for Nationwide only 1 month before this flight with a total flying hours of 1 000 hours only including 278 hours on the type which he had gotten his type rating on earlier that same year. Captain was skilled operator and a stickler for following rules and standard operating procedures. For the first officer it was probbaly a good new because the less experienced you are, the more important it's that everyone follows procedures. That's the only thing you have to hold on into until your experience builds up. Pre flight briefing was okay. Just light rain in Cape Town, northerly winds and a layer of clouds. The plane was part of the very first variance of the 737 family called " The Originals ". Most of us just refer to them as " The Jurassics ". Thie aircraft handled just like a sport car. This particular 737 - 200 advanced model first came out in 1971 and it was equipped with slightly more powerful Pratt and Whitney JT8D-15 engines, improved aerodynamics auto brakes and a higher fuel capacity compared to the original 200 giving it a better range and overall efficiency. The 2 engines were low bypass ratio turbofan engines, making them long and thin.
They were used because when Boeing were designing the original 737 they wanted an aircraft that would have a low ground clearance so they could be easy to work on for ground handlers since Boeing assumed that it would mainly operate into smaller airports where the facilities might not be that great. This meant that the engines were mounted directly onto the wings without without any pylons. The engines were attached with 2 main mounts, one forward and one aft and thena secondary support assembly forward of tha aft engine mount behind. The engine supports are bolted onto the wing using cone bolts which are constructed to hold up for any normal loads that the engine might experience But if a strong enough force is applied to them, for eample if a gear up landing would happen, the bolts were designed to shear off and release the engines and therefore protect the wing and overall airplane main structure. It was very important that these bolts were mounted correctly with the exact amout of torque applied to them to avoid over stressing the bolts which could lead to metal fatigue. to avoid over stressing the bolts, which could lead to metal fatigue. This was a known issue especially on the older type of engine mouts that were fitted to this particular aircraft. So the FAA issued an airworthiness directive several years earlier outlining strict inspection intervals to be done at least every 700 cycles of these mounts and bolts.
At the time of the accident, Nationwide were operating 11 Boeing 737 - 200s. They were doing all their maintenance in house in their own maintenance organization But prior to 2007 the organization faced some problems. Key management personnel most often the quality manager ended up quitting their jobs just prior to the renewal audits of the Air Maintenance Organization or AMO approval. Because the audits always highlightened several non compliances with existing rules and regulations Most of these findings were never properly addressed or closed which is why, like unbeknown to the pilots, the AMO was lacking a formal license to operate at the time of the accident. The maintenance work continued to be done based on an unofficial mail sent from the South African Civil Aviation authorities allowing them to continue for now. But there didn't exist any provisions for such an extension. One of the findings that were later revealed was that the accident aircraft didn't have any records of any inspections of the engine mounts for the previous 5 years prior to the accident. Pilots were unaware of this. Only thing pilots can do is to verify that all documentation is available and that all applicable certification dates are in date and obviously that the aircraft looks good during the walkaround. The plane was taking off, soon reaching the high speed regime of the takeoff from which is a rejected takeoff is only executed if an engine failure, fire, or a predictive windshear warning is heard, or if the runway is blocked or the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly. Reason pilots only reject for those things above 80 knots is because it's normally safer from that position to take the aircraft into the air and deal with whatever problem you might have when you are already airborne. This will give more time to think and troubleshoot and pilots will then have the full use of the whole runway for landing if you then decide to come back.
Aircraft would have used a lot of runway accelerating up to this point. And the speed would be relatively high so even though it would be possible the stop the aircraft safely all the way up to the decision speed of V1. It would likely be safer and better to just bring any minor problem into the air. That's what pilots call being go minded. Most airlines adopted this philosophy today. Just before the plane took off, something went wrong on the right wing when the aft cone bolt which was holding the engine in place had developed a small fatigue crack and during the rotation, the crack suddently gave away and the bolt fractured. In normal conditions, the secondary engine support assembly is supposed to be able to hold the load if the aft mounts fails. But this secondary support also failed. Secondary support was never found after the accident so we don't know what happened. Either it also broke from the strain or as some newspapers reported after the accident, it might not have been fitted at all after the last engine overhaul. Anyway now nothing was holding the back part of the engine in place while it was still producing full takeoff thrust. This basically transformed the forward engine mount into a pivot point around which the engine could move. The consequence was that now the engine started to swing forward and upwards. Since the thrust levers were mechanically connected via a control wire to the engine, this wire was now pulled back with the full force of the departed engine which caused the right engine thrust lever in the cockpit to whisk backyard and slam into the pedestal so hard that it left a deep indentation to it. Other consequence was the right engine started producing an upward thrust vector on the right wing causing the aircraft to quickly roll to the left. Fortunatly the first officer was quick to react and input the right aileron and left rudder to keep the aircraft under control as it was slowly climbing away from the runway.
It happened after the aircraft had passed V1, the decision speed rejecting the takeoff was now not an option. From this point it was all about keeping the aircraft flying and figuring out what was going on. Now the forward engine mount support couldn't handle the kind of forces it was being subjected to. The outboard cone bolt sheared off as it wsa designed to do but the inboard one didn't have tim to do so which had the consequence that the engine just tore off. It tore off all the hydraulic and fuel lines. It leds to a gaping hole in the wing where it used to be mounted. One passenger saw the whole thing unfold which in realitiy took only a few seconds Pilots heard a huge bang as the engine separated but a few seconds later a strange tearing sound and a suddent jolt of bank, this time to the right. After that the aircraft finally started to handle more like the way that the pilots had been trained it would after a normal engine failure. The captain brought the land gear up and started troubleshooting the issue Immediate indications they had available was the retarded thrust lever 0 or decreasing engine indications on engine number 2 plus a thrust reversive warning on the same engine. As well as low pressure warnings from the associatied engine driven hydraulic pump. All of this minus the thrust lever indication were clear signs of some kind of engine failure on number 2 engine. but both pilots were careful not to draw any quick conclusions at this point. Because this failure had so far not acted like any other failure they have seen or practiced on the simulator, They were aware of the misidentification that happened to the pilots of British Midlands Flight 092 who, after similar indications, had shot down the wrong engine back in 1989. They didn't want to do the same mistakes so at several hundreds feet of alttiude, the captain went through all indications and came to the conclusion they suffered some severe damage in engine 2.
DISAPPEARING Engine! The Incredible story of Nationwide 723
In the plane, there are 4 cabin crew and 2 pilots. Marilyn Rink was the cabin controller, one of the most experienced cabin crew member of the airline. The captain was the 50 years old Trevor Arnold, experienced pilot with 13 860 hours at the time of the flight including 3 277 hours on the Boeing 737 - 200. He started flying for Nationwide back in 1997 and had been been during a few years flying for other operators until 2006 when he came back again. By contrast, his first officer was Daniel Perry , 25 years old He was brand new on this job, starting flying for Nationwide only 1 month before this flight with a total flying hours of 1 000 hours only including 278 hours on the type which he had gotten his type rating on earlier that same year. Captain was skilled operator and a stickler for following rules and standard operating procedures. For the first officer it was probbaly a good new because the less experienced you are, the more important it's that everyone follows procedures. That's the only thing you have to hold on into until your experience builds up. Pre flight briefing was okay. Just light rain in Cape Town, northerly winds and a layer of clouds. The plane was part of the very first variance of the 737 family called " The Originals ". Most of us just refer to them as " The Jurassics ". Thie aircraft handled just like a sport car. This particular 737 - 200 advanced model first came out in 1971 and it was equipped with slightly more powerful Pratt and Whitney JT8D-15 engines, improved aerodynamics auto brakes and a higher fuel capacity compared to the original 200 giving it a better range and overall efficiency. The 2 engines were low bypass ratio turbofan engines, making them long and thin.
They were used because when Boeing were designing the original 737 they wanted an aircraft that would have a low ground clearance so they could be easy to work on for ground handlers since Boeing assumed that it would mainly operate into smaller airports where the facilities might not be that great. This meant that the engines were mounted directly onto the wings without without any pylons. The engines were attached with 2 main mounts, one forward and one aft and thena secondary support assembly forward of tha aft engine mount behind. The engine supports are bolted onto the wing using cone bolts which are constructed to hold up for any normal loads that the engine might experience But if a strong enough force is applied to them, for eample if a gear up landing would happen, the bolts were designed to shear off and release the engines and therefore protect the wing and overall airplane main structure. It was very important that these bolts were mounted correctly with the exact amout of torque applied to them to avoid over stressing the bolts which could lead to metal fatigue. to avoid over stressing the bolts, which could lead to metal fatigue. This was a known issue especially on the older type of engine mouts that were fitted to this particular aircraft. So the FAA issued an airworthiness directive several years earlier outlining strict inspection intervals to be done at least every 700 cycles of these mounts and bolts.
At the time of the accident, Nationwide were operating 11 Boeing 737 - 200s. They were doing all their maintenance in house in their own maintenance organization But prior to 2007 the organization faced some problems. Key management personnel most often the quality manager ended up quitting their jobs just prior to the renewal audits of the Air Maintenance Organization or AMO approval. Because the audits always highlightened several non compliances with existing rules and regulations Most of these findings were never properly addressed or closed which is why, like unbeknown to the pilots, the AMO was lacking a formal license to operate at the time of the accident. The maintenance work continued to be done based on an unofficial mail sent from the South African Civil Aviation authorities allowing them to continue for now. But there didn't exist any provisions for such an extension. One of the findings that were later revealed was that the accident aircraft didn't have any records of any inspections of the engine mounts for the previous 5 years prior to the accident. Pilots were unaware of this. Only thing pilots can do is to verify that all documentation is available and that all applicable certification dates are in date and obviously that the aircraft looks good during the walkaround. The plane was taking off, soon reaching the high speed regime of the takeoff from which is a rejected takeoff is only executed if an engine failure, fire, or a predictive windshear warning is heard, or if the runway is blocked or the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly. Reason pilots only reject for those things above 80 knots is because it's normally safer from that position to take the aircraft into the air and deal with whatever problem you might have when you are already airborne. This will give more time to think and troubleshoot and pilots will then have the full use of the whole runway for landing if you then decide to come back.
Aircraft would have used a lot of runway accelerating up to this point. And the speed would be relatively high so even though it would be possible the stop the aircraft safely all the way up to the decision speed of V1. It would likely be safer and better to just bring any minor problem into the air. That's what pilots call being go minded. Most airlines adopted this philosophy today. Just before the plane took off, something went wrong on the right wing when the aft cone bolt which was holding the engine in place had developed a small fatigue crack and during the rotation, the crack suddently gave away and the bolt fractured. In normal conditions, the secondary engine support assembly is supposed to be able to hold the load if the aft mounts fails. But this secondary support also failed. Secondary support was never found after the accident so we don't know what happened. Either it also broke from the strain or as some newspapers reported after the accident, it might not have been fitted at all after the last engine overhaul. Anyway now nothing was holding the back part of the engine in place while it was still producing full takeoff thrust. This basically transformed the forward engine mount into a pivot point around which the engine could move. The consequence was that now the engine started to swing forward and upwards. Since the thrust levers were mechanically connected via a control wire to the engine, this wire was now pulled back with the full force of the departed engine which caused the right engine thrust lever in the cockpit to whisk backyard and slam into the pedestal so hard that it left a deep indentation to it. Other consequence was the right engine started producing an upward thrust vector on the right wing causing the aircraft to quickly roll to the left. Fortunatly the first officer was quick to react and input the right aileron and left rudder to keep the aircraft under control as it was slowly climbing away from the runway.
It happened after the aircraft had passed V1, the decision speed rejecting the takeoff was now not an option. From this point it was all about keeping the aircraft flying and figuring out what was going on. Now the forward engine mount support couldn't handle the kind of forces it was being subjected to. The outboard cone bolt sheared off as it wsa designed to do but the inboard one didn't have tim to do so which had the consequence that the engine just tore off. It tore off all the hydraulic and fuel lines. It leds to a gaping hole in the wing where it used to be mounted. One passenger saw the whole thing unfold which in realitiy took only a few seconds Pilots heard a huge bang as the engine separated but a few seconds later a strange tearing sound and a suddent jolt of bank, this time to the right. After that the aircraft finally started to handle more like the way that the pilots had been trained it would after a normal engine failure. The captain brought the land gear up and started troubleshooting the issue Immediate indications they had available was the retarded thrust lever 0 or decreasing engine indications on engine number 2 plus a thrust reversive warning on the same engine. As well as low pressure warnings from the associatied engine driven hydraulic pump. All of this minus the thrust lever indication were clear signs of some kind of engine failure on number 2 engine. but both pilots were careful not to draw any quick conclusions at this point. Because this failure had so far not acted like any other failure they have seen or practiced on the simulator, They were aware of the misidentification that happened to the pilots of British Midlands Flight 092 who, after similar indications, had shot down the wrong engine back in 1989. They didn't want to do the same mistakes so at several hundreds feet of alttiude, the captain went through all indications and came to the conclusion they suffered some severe damage in engine 2.
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First officer needed to push substancial amount of left rudder to keep the aircraft going straight, due to the asymmetric thrust that was being produced, agreed to the diagnosis. In case of a severe engine damage, the Boeing 737 non normal checklist contains something known as memory items, items that pilots need to do from memory as quickly as they can due to the critical nature of the items. In this case the first officer would have called for the memory items to be completed and the captain would then have called them out for confirmation and the captain would have then called them out for confirmation before doing them to make sure its first officer agreed with the actions. He would have start with " Thrust lever, engine number 2. Confirm close? " First officer would look down confirming he was about to move the correct thrust lever and then called " Confirmed. " Captain would have closed it. In this case the thrust lever was already very closed. Next came " Engine start lever, engine number 2. Confirm cutoff? " " Confirmed. Cutoff. " " Engine fire warning switch, engine number 2. Confirm pull? " " Confirmed. Pulled. " All these memory items were designed to secure the engine down by shutting off the access to fuel and hydraulic fuels to the damaged engine. The last memory item was to rotate was to rotate the engine fire warning switch to release the fire extinguishers into the engine in case it was on fire. That was not the case here. Rest of the checklist could wait until the aircraft was established above the minimum sector altitude. Pilots could focus on climbing and retract the flaps. The smoke trailing the right wing was a mist of hydrualic fluid and fuel which was vented out into the air. Memory items were supposed to stop the fuel and hydraulics from reaching the engine. In this case the lines have been ruptured in board of the shut off values that were designed to do this job. So fuel and hydraulic fluid was gushing out from the supply lines.
Meanwhile control tower witnessed what happened and pressed the crash button to alert the firefighters because of the risk of crash. He then also realized that there was another aircraft that he cleared landing for as Nationwide flight was departing. He advised the crew on possible debris on the runway but didn't advise them to go around. It landed and after that the pilots of this plane confirmed to the tower that there were a lot of debris around the center line towards the last third of the runway. Captain Arnold heared this transmission on flight 723. He called a mayday, assessing that they were having thrust issues on the right engine and also hydraulic issues He asked if it was possible to clear the runway from those debris during the 15 / 20 minutes they would take to come back to the airport. Firefighters and rescue personnel were already standing at the edge of the runway. With all other available personnel of the airport they worked on moving away the rubble to the side of the runway. All the aircraft going to the airport were now diverted to George airport instead. Soon only Nationwide Flight 723 was flying in this airspace. Crew purser Marilyn was called into the cockpit and captain Arnold asked her to go through the cabin and have a look to give the pilots a damage report. She then informed that parts of the right engine was missing. In fact she knew that the whole engine was gone but she later said that she didn't want to worry the pilots too much. In a situation like this there is no such thing as too much information. It was better for the information to be the most accurate as possible. to plan course of action. In this case luckily it wouldn't have make any difference. Passengers were prepared now for an emergency landing. In case of a problem like this, several emergency checklists need to be completed.
In this case the crew would have started with completing the engine fire, severe damage or reparation checklist which starts out with the memory items and then continue by in a systematic manner, making sure that the aircraft is as safe as possible in this new configuration. This includes things like setting up the air conditionning system, to not use bleed air from the damaged engine, starting up the APU and crucially, balancing the fuel as the fuel would only be used from 1 tank in this situation. That can lead ao a substancial fuel imbalance wich can come with handling issues. In this case they should not try to correct the imbalance issue because if only the left engine is working, therefore only feeding fuel from the left tank that tank should be lower on fuel. If the right tank is lower, that's a clear indication of fuel leak. If they try to correct the imbalance here, they transfer precious fiel out through a gaping hole on that side. Unfortuantly the crew didn't think about that. On top of this due to the leaking hydrualic lines, the hydraulic pressure was quickly dropping. Captain showed great sign of humility and airmanship when he gave back the controls to the first officer after the plane started yawing and pitching. A basic system using radio altimeter combined with the aircraft's configuration to issue warnings were here back then. Problem is that terrain warnings might come very late as it's only reactive and not predictive like later versions are. To fly a single engine approach the crew would have used the one engine inoperative landing checklist which told them to prepare for flaps 15 landing. That meant they would land at higher speed than normal but also with less drag in case of a go around. Higher speed also meant better aerodynamic efficiency from the rudder which was needed due to the asymmetric thrust they were experiencing. First officer Perry needed to use almost full left rudder to help the aircraft going straight.
A go around method approach was not great considering fuel loss, hydraulic issues and weather reports indicating that visibility was getting worse with lower clouds drifting from False Bay. They lined up with the ILS approach.
First officer needed to push substancial amount of left rudder to keep the aircraft going straight, due to the asymmetric thrust that was being produced, agreed to the diagnosis. In case of a severe engine damage, the Boeing 737 non normal checklist contains something known as memory items, items that pilots need to do from memory as quickly as they can due to the critical nature of the items. In this case the first officer would have called for the memory items to be completed and the captain would then have called them out for confirmation and the captain would have then called them out for confirmation before doing them to make sure its first officer agreed with the actions. He would have start with " Thrust lever, engine number 2. Confirm close? " First officer would look down confirming he was about to move the correct thrust lever and then called " Confirmed. " Captain would have closed it. In this case the thrust lever was already very closed. Next came " Engine start lever, engine number 2. Confirm cutoff? " " Confirmed. Cutoff. " " Engine fire warning switch, engine number 2. Confirm pull? " " Confirmed. Pulled. " All these memory items were designed to secure the engine down by shutting off the access to fuel and hydraulic fuels to the damaged engine. The last memory item was to rotate was to rotate the engine fire warning switch to release the fire extinguishers into the engine in case it was on fire. That was not the case here. Rest of the checklist could wait until the aircraft was established above the minimum sector altitude. Pilots could focus on climbing and retract the flaps. The smoke trailing the right wing was a mist of hydrualic fluid and fuel which was vented out into the air. Memory items were supposed to stop the fuel and hydraulics from reaching the engine. In this case the lines have been ruptured in board of the shut off values that were designed to do this job. So fuel and hydraulic fluid was gushing out from the supply lines.
Meanwhile control tower witnessed what happened and pressed the crash button to alert the firefighters because of the risk of crash. He then also realized that there was another aircraft that he cleared landing for as Nationwide flight was departing. He advised the crew on possible debris on the runway but didn't advise them to go around. It landed and after that the pilots of this plane confirmed to the tower that there were a lot of debris around the center line towards the last third of the runway. Captain Arnold heared this transmission on flight 723. He called a mayday, assessing that they were having thrust issues on the right engine and also hydraulic issues He asked if it was possible to clear the runway from those debris during the 15 / 20 minutes they would take to come back to the airport. Firefighters and rescue personnel were already standing at the edge of the runway. With all other available personnel of the airport they worked on moving away the rubble to the side of the runway. All the aircraft going to the airport were now diverted to George airport instead. Soon only Nationwide Flight 723 was flying in this airspace. Crew purser Marilyn was called into the cockpit and captain Arnold asked her to go through the cabin and have a look to give the pilots a damage report. She then informed that parts of the right engine was missing. In fact she knew that the whole engine was gone but she later said that she didn't want to worry the pilots too much. In a situation like this there is no such thing as too much information. It was better for the information to be the most accurate as possible. to plan course of action. In this case luckily it wouldn't have make any difference. Passengers were prepared now for an emergency landing. In case of a problem like this, several emergency checklists need to be completed.
In this case the crew would have started with completing the engine fire, severe damage or reparation checklist which starts out with the memory items and then continue by in a systematic manner, making sure that the aircraft is as safe as possible in this new configuration. This includes things like setting up the air conditionning system, to not use bleed air from the damaged engine, starting up the APU and crucially, balancing the fuel as the fuel would only be used from 1 tank in this situation. That can lead ao a substancial fuel imbalance wich can come with handling issues. In this case they should not try to correct the imbalance issue because if only the left engine is working, therefore only feeding fuel from the left tank that tank should be lower on fuel. If the right tank is lower, that's a clear indication of fuel leak. If they try to correct the imbalance here, they transfer precious fiel out through a gaping hole on that side. Unfortuantly the crew didn't think about that. On top of this due to the leaking hydrualic lines, the hydraulic pressure was quickly dropping. Captain showed great sign of humility and airmanship when he gave back the controls to the first officer after the plane started yawing and pitching. A basic system using radio altimeter combined with the aircraft's configuration to issue warnings were here back then. Problem is that terrain warnings might come very late as it's only reactive and not predictive like later versions are. To fly a single engine approach the crew would have used the one engine inoperative landing checklist which told them to prepare for flaps 15 landing. That meant they would land at higher speed than normal but also with less drag in case of a go around. Higher speed also meant better aerodynamic efficiency from the rudder which was needed due to the asymmetric thrust they were experiencing. First officer Perry needed to use almost full left rudder to help the aircraft going straight.
A go around method approach was not great considering fuel loss, hydraulic issues and weather reports indicating that visibility was getting worse with lower clouds drifting from False Bay. They lined up with the ILS approach.
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They didn't stand a chance - Bhoja flight 213
On evening of April 20th 2012, 121 passengers and 6 crew boarded on Boeing 737 at Karachi in Pakistan. Flight 213 was being operated Bhoja Air and being the airline inaugural for Karachi to Islamabad, it was expected to take 2 hours. Over Islamabad, storms were brewing, creating conditions which the 2 pilots were not remotely trained to deal with. These pilots were so poorly trained that they hadn't even be taught how to fly this particular aircraft, a Boeing 737 200. All of their training and the manual on board were from an older version of the plane. That version had a much less sophisticated autopilot and other less advanced systems. They just knew that this plane was a bit more high tech but they weren't trained on the details of this newer technology. So they overestimated the aircraft's capabilities. The pilots were 58 years old captain Noorullah Khan Afridi and 53 years old Javaid Malik, the first officer. The captain was a former Air Force pilot with over 10 000 hours of flying experience. He had been flying 737 for several years with a different airline before switching to Bhoja earlier that year. The first officer was also a former Air Force pilot althought he was less experienced with 3 000 hours of flying experience. He worked for the same airline as the captain has worked previously and followed him over Bhoj air once he switched. The 2 pilots were friends and had been paired together for more than half of the flights they had flown with the new airline so far. The captain would make a serie of bad decisions on their approach to Islamabad. Despite the pilots overall experience, they each had only 80 hours on this specific version of the 737 200. The captain previously began training on a more modern version of the 737 at his last airline, but his training was discontinude after his supervisors deemed him unable to operate the automated fligth deck in a safe and efficient manner.
At first, the plane followed its route normally. But the aircraft they were flying on shouldn't have been allowed to carry passengers. That's because as far as Pakistan's civil aviation authority was concerned, Bhoja didn't have any advanced version of the 737. 200. They thought this fleet consisted solely of the base model 737. Indeed, Bhoja airline pilots training program reflected this. Pilots were only trained to fly the base model 737 200 and not the advanced version. It wasn't that the civil aviation authority didn't know this. In fact, they allowed Bhoja to operate this particular plane even though they hadn't granted its certificate of airworthiness to carry passengers. It also would later be claimed that senior officials at the airline had engaged with deals with the civil aviation authority, aka the CAA, to allow the airline to operate in the first place. It was about corruption. The Swiss Cheese model by psychologist James Pearson is often used to explain aircraft accidents. The diea goes that accidents when layers of safety represented here by the cheese slices have holes in them, which on some unfortunate occasions line up in such aa way as to allow an accident to happen. Naturally, the way to prevent similar accidents in the future is to add more layers of safety and to close up some of the holes. At the Bhoja company, the holes were numerous and big. The burreacrats and businessmen who arranged the state of affairs were not on the board of flight 213. Pilots could see on their radar that powerful storms were building in front of them.The storm at Islamabad was significant, with thunder and lightning, heavy rain and strong winds. The closer they got, the more the pilots saw how intense it was. Since the weather at their first alternate airport, at Lahore, was bad, the first officer suggested to check the weather on Pechawar, their second alternate airport. The captian dismissed this idea. Pilots are supposed to trust their instruments and not fate.
The first officer didn't question the captain who was like a mentor for him. The flight continud descending into the murky weather surroudning Islamabad. Ahead of the plane, the pilots could see what is known as a squall line, a serie of storms stretching across a long distance. One the other side of the squall line, lay the airport.
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They didn't stand a chance - Bhoja flight 213
On evening of April 20th 2012, 121 passengers and 6 crew boarded on Boeing 737 at Karachi in Pakistan. Flight 213 was being operated Bhoja Air and being the airline inaugural for Karachi to Islamabad, it was expected to take 2 hours. Over Islamabad, storms were brewing, creating conditions which the 2 pilots were not remotely trained to deal with. These pilots were so poorly trained that they hadn't even be taught how to fly this particular aircraft, a Boeing 737 200. All of their training and the manual on board were from an older version of the plane. That version had a much less sophisticated autopilot and other less advanced systems. They just knew that this plane was a bit more high tech but they weren't trained on the details of this newer technology. So they overestimated the aircraft's capabilities. The pilots were 58 years old captain Noorullah Khan Afridi and 53 years old Javaid Malik, the first officer. The captain was a former Air Force pilot with over 10 000 hours of flying experience. He had been flying 737 for several years with a different airline before switching to Bhoja earlier that year. The first officer was also a former Air Force pilot althought he was less experienced with 3 000 hours of flying experience. He worked for the same airline as the captain has worked previously and followed him over Bhoj air once he switched. The 2 pilots were friends and had been paired together for more than half of the flights they had flown with the new airline so far. The captain would make a serie of bad decisions on their approach to Islamabad. Despite the pilots overall experience, they each had only 80 hours on this specific version of the 737 200. The captain previously began training on a more modern version of the 737 at his last airline, but his training was discontinude after his supervisors deemed him unable to operate the automated fligth deck in a safe and efficient manner.
At first, the plane followed its route normally. But the aircraft they were flying on shouldn't have been allowed to carry passengers. That's because as far as Pakistan's civil aviation authority was concerned, Bhoja didn't have any advanced version of the 737. 200. They thought this fleet consisted solely of the base model 737. Indeed, Bhoja airline pilots training program reflected this. Pilots were only trained to fly the base model 737 200 and not the advanced version. It wasn't that the civil aviation authority didn't know this. In fact, they allowed Bhoja to operate this particular plane even though they hadn't granted its certificate of airworthiness to carry passengers. It also would later be claimed that senior officials at the airline had engaged with deals with the civil aviation authority, aka the CAA, to allow the airline to operate in the first place. It was about corruption. The Swiss Cheese model by psychologist James Pearson is often used to explain aircraft accidents. The diea goes that accidents when layers of safety represented here by the cheese slices have holes in them, which on some unfortunate occasions line up in such aa way as to allow an accident to happen. Naturally, the way to prevent similar accidents in the future is to add more layers of safety and to close up some of the holes. At the Bhoja company, the holes were numerous and big. The burreacrats and businessmen who arranged the state of affairs were not on the board of flight 213. Pilots could see on their radar that powerful storms were building in front of them.The storm at Islamabad was significant, with thunder and lightning, heavy rain and strong winds. The closer they got, the more the pilots saw how intense it was. Since the weather at their first alternate airport, at Lahore, was bad, the first officer suggested to check the weather on Pechawar, their second alternate airport. The captian dismissed this idea. Pilots are supposed to trust their instruments and not fate.
The first officer didn't question the captain who was like a mentor for him. The flight continud descending into the murky weather surroudning Islamabad. Ahead of the plane, the pilots could see what is known as a squall line, a serie of storms stretching across a long distance. One the other side of the squall line, lay the airport.
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