Qd paris perdras en demi contre le Real tu seras libéré de ton fardeau et de cette signature infamante
Ils risquent pas de perdre contre le réal vu que le réal a perdu 3-0 contre arsenal
Ils risquent pas de perdre contre le réal vu que le réal a perdu 3-0 contre arsenal
Le PSG qui a battu Liverpool. L'Inter qui a battu le Barca. Les 2 meilleures équipes du monde qui sont tombées avant la finale.
I Don't Think We Realise What PSG Just Did | How Enrique Out-Manouvered Slot
The opening case of this match showcased Liverpool's agressive 4 2 4 press as they threatened to fully suffocate the Parisians. The same pressing structure that caused nightmares to some of the biggest teams of England. PSG at first didn't make exception. Szoboszlai joined the front 3, creating a first layer that looked almost impossible to penetrate.Time and time they were forced to go back to Donnaruma. But even here a man could continue his press, keeping the center back in his cover shadow. As a result PSG were often forced long. Initially the solution was Vitinha dropping alongside the center backs and Donnaruma during the goalkick with the hope to have both quantity and quality advantage since Vitinha is comfortable on pressure. Liverpool still was able at times to press the narrow men in the box still forcing PSG long and Donnaruma has a hard time to sometimes find the fullbacks directly. Turning point was when Luis Enrique made a subtle adjustment. Vitinha returned to his midfield position from the deeper zones and entrusting his back 4 to begin the build up. At first it was not a problem for Liverpool who could oeprate with a dedicated man to man shape in the midfield or with their 4 2 4. But the difference now was Dembelé starting to drop deeper and deeper meaning there was now a 4 v 3 in the midfield. It cause some indecisions in Liverpool's back 4, as we already saw in the first leg. Liverpool's center backs were often not backing up the press, meaning a Liverpool player higher up would have to choose between pressing a midfielder deep or dropping to Dembelé. It was a chooice between letting PSG having a relatively easy progression and allow a threat like Dembelé to roam between the lines. The best example was in the 12th minute, with the action leadinfg to PSG's goal with Dembelé dropping as a false 9 and the center backs not backing up the press due to the runners behind. So Dembelé can turns, finds Barcola on his right, leading to Dembelé's goal.
Szoboszlai had to reconsider his position and start deeper to not be completly overrun centrally. As a result, their press became more selective, opening the floodgates for PSG. But the key was that theyr were no longer building up in the center. Despite Szoboszlai staying more deep than before, Liverpool still wanted to keep high pressure with a winger often joining Jota's press more narrow, often Salah pressing Pacho while keeping Mendes in his cover shadow. However, Pacho's build up play was masterfull, taking his first touch higher up the pitch which had the double effect on the press. It drew Salahin further toward him It also changed the passing angle to Mendes meaning he was no longer in Salah's cover shadow. When Nuno Mendes was found, he had room to push up. And due to the presence of Dembelé, Liverpool was reluctant to cover. PSG's right flank told a similar story of tactical exploitation. Diaz was tasked with pressing from the left into Marquinhos. But PSG was now more composed under pressure. By finding the center backs first there was less dependency on Donnaruma's distribution. It also ensured that the winger was fully drawned onto Marquinhos, meaning that Hakimi was more easily found. It created a pressure dilemma for Robertson: either pressing Hakimi high up and leave space in behind for Barcola to exploit, either hold position and allow Hakimi time to progress the ball. The difficulty of this decision was coumpounded by Dembelé's false 9 positionning When he dropped deep, it became almost impossible for a center back to cover for Robertson. Because if for example Van Dijk drifted to cover, Dembelé could potentially exploit that space.
PSG's formation morphed throughout the match, sometimes forming a back 3 with 2 cb and 1 midfielder dropping. Other time Mendes was working as a third center back, specifically positionned to neutralize Salah on transition with the arrest defense while allowing the left winger to create an isolation against the right back, often Kvara against Trent. This structural flexibility made PSG difficult to counter. Then up the pitch, the fluid interchanging of positions between the attackers added another dimension to PSG's tactical approach. At times Dembelé would operate as a false 9 with Barcola wider but then they would rotate. Kvaratskhelia also rotated between the flanks, creating constant identification problems for Liverpool 's defenders and Dembelé's role was particularly effective in the final third. His ability to drop deep to receive was key but it was also possible through the movement of his teammates, the wingers and the midfielders particularly since their movements assured that both Van Dijk and Konaté were always hesitant to follow Dembelé when he dropped deep meaning that at times even when the runners did not go beyond, Dembelé could receive, turn and play out to the wingers in dangerous zones. Despite these sophisticated mechanisms, PSG struggled to convert their tactical advantage into goals, consistently reaching dangerous positions but lacking the clinical edge to make their dominance count on the scoreboard. Alisson kept Liverpool alive for a long time.
I Don't Think We Realise What PSG Just Did | How Enrique Out-Manouvered Slot
The opening case of this match showcased Liverpool's agressive 4 2 4 press as they threatened to fully suffocate the Parisians. The same pressing structure that caused nightmares to some of the biggest teams of England. PSG at first didn't make exception. Szoboszlai joined the front 3, creating a first layer that looked almost impossible to penetrate.Time and time they were forced to go back to Donnaruma. But even here a man could continue his press, keeping the center back in his cover shadow. As a result PSG were often forced long. Initially the solution was Vitinha dropping alongside the center backs and Donnaruma during the goalkick with the hope to have both quantity and quality advantage since Vitinha is comfortable on pressure. Liverpool still was able at times to press the narrow men in the box still forcing PSG long and Donnaruma has a hard time to sometimes find the fullbacks directly. Turning point was when Luis Enrique made a subtle adjustment. Vitinha returned to his midfield position from the deeper zones and entrusting his back 4 to begin the build up. At first it was not a problem for Liverpool who could oeprate with a dedicated man to man shape in the midfield or with their 4 2 4. But the difference now was Dembelé starting to drop deeper and deeper meaning there was now a 4 v 3 in the midfield. It cause some indecisions in Liverpool's back 4, as we already saw in the first leg. Liverpool's center backs were often not backing up the press, meaning a Liverpool player higher up would have to choose between pressing a midfielder deep or dropping to Dembelé. It was a chooice between letting PSG having a relatively easy progression and allow a threat like Dembelé to roam between the lines. The best example was in the 12th minute, with the action leadinfg to PSG's goal with Dembelé dropping as a false 9 and the center backs not backing up the press due to the runners behind. So Dembelé can turns, finds Barcola on his right, leading to Dembelé's goal.
Szoboszlai had to reconsider his position and start deeper to not be completly overrun centrally. As a result, their press became more selective, opening the floodgates for PSG. But the key was that theyr were no longer building up in the center. Despite Szoboszlai staying more deep than before, Liverpool still wanted to keep high pressure with a winger often joining Jota's press more narrow, often Salah pressing Pacho while keeping Mendes in his cover shadow. However, Pacho's build up play was masterfull, taking his first touch higher up the pitch which had the double effect on the press. It drew Salahin further toward him It also changed the passing angle to Mendes meaning he was no longer in Salah's cover shadow. When Nuno Mendes was found, he had room to push up. And due to the presence of Dembelé, Liverpool was reluctant to cover. PSG's right flank told a similar story of tactical exploitation. Diaz was tasked with pressing from the left into Marquinhos. But PSG was now more composed under pressure. By finding the center backs first there was less dependency on Donnaruma's distribution. It also ensured that the winger was fully drawned onto Marquinhos, meaning that Hakimi was more easily found. It created a pressure dilemma for Robertson: either pressing Hakimi high up and leave space in behind for Barcola to exploit, either hold position and allow Hakimi time to progress the ball. The difficulty of this decision was coumpounded by Dembelé's false 9 positionning When he dropped deep, it became almost impossible for a center back to cover for Robertson. Because if for example Van Dijk drifted to cover, Dembelé could potentially exploit that space.
PSG's formation morphed throughout the match, sometimes forming a back 3 with 2 cb and 1 midfielder dropping. Other time Mendes was working as a third center back, specifically positionned to neutralize Salah on transition with the arrest defense while allowing the left winger to create an isolation against the right back, often Kvara against Trent. This structural flexibility made PSG difficult to counter. Then up the pitch, the fluid interchanging of positions between the attackers added another dimension to PSG's tactical approach. At times Dembelé would operate as a false 9 with Barcola wider but then they would rotate. Kvaratskhelia also rotated between the flanks, creating constant identification problems for Liverpool 's defenders and Dembelé's role was particularly effective in the final third. His ability to drop deep to receive was key but it was also possible through the movement of his teammates, the wingers and the midfielders particularly since their movements assured that both Van Dijk and Konaté were always hesitant to follow Dembelé when he dropped deep meaning that at times even when the runners did not go beyond, Dembelé could receive, turn and play out to the wingers in dangerous zones. Despite these sophisticated mechanisms, PSG struggled to convert their tactical advantage into goals, consistently reaching dangerous positions but lacking the clinical edge to make their dominance count on the scoreboard. Alisson kept Liverpool alive for a long time.