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¡Esta serpiente marina MATÓ a un Celestino! https://streamable.com/fmjgjb
il y a 10 mois
C'est chaud quand même...mais si le PSG est la seule équipe française a pas être qualifié pour le second tour ...déjà...
il y a 10 mois
Si un club français ,autre que le PSG, pouvait gagner la LDC un jour
Paris FC possible si y'a vraiment le rachat
il y a 10 mois
Looking at the UCL history you will rarely see a french club lifting the trophy. That doesn't meant France lacked talents. In fact they have produced some of the best youngsters in the world. But the french league never had the same financial strenght or global spotlight as the other top leagues back then. It was often seen as a selling league where players grew then moved to bigger clubs abroad for better pay and competition. Because of that PSG was often seen like clubs like Leipzig or Ajax, often making it to the UCL but rarely reaching the final stages. In the 2000s, the french league started to look for investors who could buy out clubs and transform them. So in 2011, an investor from Qatar showed interest in buying the capital's biggest club. The main goals from the club and the investors was to raise Ligue 1's popularity. From Zlatan and Thiago Silva to Cavani and Di Maria, Paris Saint Germain went all out signing big names from across Europe. These moves brought them all the attention they were hoping for. But they also wanted to prove to the world that they could beat the best clubs of the continent and a regular UCL contenders. So they pushed even harder and spent 400 millions of euros to sign Neymar and Mbappé, a move that broke all the transfer records and made global headlines. That gamble almost paid off when in 2020 they finally reached the UCL final. The only goal scored in that final was by their academy graduate, against them. But that warning wasn't enough for PSG to wake up as 1 year after that, they went after Lionel Messi. With his arrival, PSG was spending 1,2 billion dollars on just these 3 players : Messi, Mbappé and Neymar. They brought up even bigger names then to stack up their squad with stars. However this would lead PSG to their most difficult period since years. Not only they failed to reach their usual 100 goals, but they also started to concede more than ever.
PSG got a front 3 well established who already proved to the world. Apart from scoring goals and assists, they is very little chance that they will track back consistently or press aggressively. So PSG had 7 outfield players to do all the defensive work. And if you use 2 creative midfielders to feed the big 3, you are left with just 5, which is basically an open way for oppositions to score. So to patch this, PSG had to sacrifice creativity and use more defensive minded players whose only job was to win the ball back and hold the structure. This was why the front 3 had to do all the attacking work : because the team was too busy to survive without the ball. Also when you look at the natural movements of the front 3, all of them tended to drift centrally with the ball. So to maintain the width, the fullbacks were constantly forced to push higher up the pitch to provide width and deliver crosses. This made their defensive flanks wide open for the opposition to counter. Also when you have a team full of egos and personalities, the manager naturally becomes less important and that makes it harder for him to successfully implement his desired system. So this caused a major disconnect between the PSG star players, the supporting cast and the manager. As a result, after suffering back to back 2 early UCL exits in the round of 16 against Real Madrid and Bayern Munich, in May 2023, PSG's ultras gathered outside the club headquarters and even outside Neymar's house, holding banners in their hands and demanding for both Messi and Neymar to be out. That was the turning point. After that protest, PSg's board finally decided to quit the ultimate team policy and play the usual career mode with the focus to not dominate Europe for just 1 or 2 seasons but to build a legacy that last for years to come. For that they needed a squad that was young, grounded and ready to give everything for the badge.
To lead this rebuild, they brought in Luis Campos as the football advisor, a man known for spotting exceptionnal raw talents and building teams from the ground up. Also they needed a manager that could be the face of the club, a true leader that could be feared and respected. And who else than Luis Enrique who already won the treble with MSN in Barcelona, who benched Messi for showing poor discipline at a point and didn't back down even when Messi refused to train for several days after that. French journalist Julien Laurens revealed that for a long time, the club was run by superstars. If they didn't want to do something, they wouldn't do it. They would go straight to the president. It undermined the coach, but not anymore with Luis Enrique. As soon as Luis Enrique arrived, in order to tackle Mbappé's lack of defending, he literally called him and said what hs famously said in the video where he reminded to Mbappé that he was fan of Michael Jordan, that he had to be a true leader like him, to set the example. However 1 month later, the frenchman publicly announced his decision to leave as a free agent. Luis Enrique didn't back down, telling that his philosophy didn't consist of letting Mbappé do anything he wants, that this was the old philosophy, one that didn't win anything special. After Mbappé left, a lot of analysts and medias didn't take the new PSG team seriously, thinking that this would be the weakest PSG squad since the takeover. It turned out that the departure was a blessing in disguise. Within his first 2 seasons, Luis Enrique completly transformed PSG by blending glassroots french talents with some key signings who were known for their high energy and their teamwork. The only thing about these were that each positions had at least 2 quality contenders to bring more competition within the squad, something the club lacked during the superstars era.
The message by Luis Enrique was clear : If you don't give your best, you will get replaced. As Dembélé once said, the coach said that if they didn't press or defend, someone else would take their place. Many times you would see a winger running all the way back into the fullback's territory just to double up and create a 2 v 1 trap on the opposition's winger, something that couldn't be done during the superstars era. As for PSG's kick off strategy, they kept throwing off the ball into the same area. As soon as the ball goes out for a throwing, you would see almost all the PSG players pushing up and staying behind all the possible options for the thrower. Because of the PSG marker stands just behind the receiverss, as the ball comes towards them, they become blind to the pressure so the receiver can either make a back pass, either make a risky side pass under pressure. This increases their chances to win the ball higher up the pitch and creates a counter attacking situations against an unprepared defense. But this PSG not only is excellent at pressing, but they are also one of the few sides capable of escaping high presses just like theirs. Sometimes you see a defender stepping up to try and press a forward like false 9 Dembélé, which opens up a gap in which another PSG player will run into. During build up sometimes you often see PSG's back 3 playing the ball deeper and wider even towards their last option and at the same time, the midfielders also drop deeper to support. This pulls the entire opposition's first 2 lines forward which created a visible space in their original position. And with Dembélé dropping deep to receive the ball, he has now a vulnerable backline ahead with the wingers already in full forward motion. So the goal is clear : if you decide to press us, we will use your press against you. This technique was popularized by Roberto de Zerbi.
Just like Xabi Alonso, Luis Enrique is someone who values both discipline and creativity. That means that he still maintains a clear structure where every player has a role and some defined zones. However, they have creative freedom. With the only condition of this freedom being selfless and it must benefit the team. If you are a player, notice open space in an unexpected area or your teammate is getting outnumbered then you are encouraged to make that free run. But if that's not the case then you stick to your role, hold your zone and rotate within your structure. Just look like at the positionnal map of Kvara. He is supposed to be a left winger but you can see him receiving the ball in almost every zone of the pitch. So rather than playing with a fixed pivot or a classic number 9, almost all Enrique's players have the freedom to run into any random area only if it's beneficial for the team. This blend of individual freedom along with tactical discipline has fulfilled the need of both the players and the manager, and turned PSG into one of the most unpredictable side in world football. While this unpredictability can have its advantages, it can become a weakness by times. When we look at PSG's setup, except for the 2 center backs, almost every other outfield player is able to make creative movements when needed. But even with this positional freedom, Enrique maintains a strict positionnal structure during attacks where he always use a back 3 as a rest defense, who stays back all the time. So to complete that shape, you would often see a fullback, their left fullback Mendes drop deep. Or if both fullbacks pushed high, a midfielder like Vitinha or even Ruiz could fill that role. But there can be moments were both the midfielders and the fullbacks get involved in attacks so much that they fail to recover on time, leaving just 2 players exposed to a counter attack. This is what led to Aston Villa's first goal in the first leg against PSG.
il y a 2 mois
Some might wonder why didn't Inter Milan capitalize on this during the UCL final especially with their worldclass counterattacks. Luis Enrique often use a counterattack drill before big matches. Luis Enrique stands near the halfway line, sets up a team of a back 3 and a pivot which is up against a front 4 pressers. One more player is there but stays static in a resting position until Luis Enrique calls him into action. So the drill begins with the backline calmly circulating the ball. As soon as Enrique blows the whistle, the pressers immediatly freeze in their position, while the defender with the ball is allowed to advance and take a shot on the goal. But right at that moment, Luis Enrique kicks a second ball toward the resting player who is near the cone. This creates a real time counter attacking situation scenario where the back 2 and the pivot have to defend against 5 players. This drill keeps on repeating in a loop until the coach decides to stop. This constant practise made their backline nearly immune in the final and made it almost impossible for Inter to score. Speaking about the final when we take a step back and look at the players who led PSG to glory, this wasn't close to be the most famous PSG squad but it was the most connected, the most united and arguably the most complete team the club ever had. After years of chasing worldclass players from around the world, PSG realized the most valuable pieces they had been searching for weren't outside but rather inside in their own backyard. So now they have the chance to build a foundation rooted in its own identity. An identity that develops talents, not just buys it. And for Luis Enrique, that Champions League win wasn't just tactical. It was personal.
What happens when you put 3 of the best attacking players in the world in the same team? Sometimes greatness ( MSN in Barcelona ), and sometimes disappointment ( MMN in PSG ). Back then in Barcelona, Messi was the focal point as the false 9. So the first matches of the 2014 / 2015 season, Suarez played at the right wing where he looked awkward and ouf of place. But Messi accepted to revert to his right winger position to allow Suarez to provide a dedicated focal point for the attack and that changed the game. Messi embraced his wider position and could stay on his zone to take on his fullback. Of course he was causing havoc in the wider zones just as he used to do centrally. After all, Messi started his career as a right winger with Eto'o as a center forward. When Messi was wide, Neymar would let his tendency to drift in take root and he could momentarily be the creator in chief. But one of Suarez's greatest strenght was his movement and his selflessness in it. At the best possible movement. At any possible moment he could make a dart into a wider zone, dragging defenders with him and creating space for Messi infield to cut infield and do whateever he felt like with the ball. From the left, Neymar was happy to come infield when the situation demanded it. But he was more likely to hold his width than Messi. Neymar would often get passed his man time and time out wide. Messi was more likely to drop at the top of the midfield diamond while could run in behind when needed to give them more depth to open up the opposition and Suarez could do the same at time When those 2 coexisted in the middle of the pitch, they had prime Suarez and his elusive movements and his ability to finish from anywhere.
This didn't translate to PSG despite the fact that 2 of the players were the same on paper. However both weren't at their prime anymore. Where Neymar used to be a bix of an attacker who loved to get on the ball but could also run in behind if he had sufficient support with him, now he wanted to be on the ball as much as Messi. It led to the pair treading on each other toes as they found themselves occupying similar spaces. But the type of player Mbappé is was the biggest problem. Unlike Suarez, Mbappé was not happy playing as a sole center forward. He preferred to play in a free wider role or as part of a front 2 with his target man alongside him. But him drifting wide left would have lead to him invading Neymar's zone just like Neymar's invaded Messi's. At worst they were a tangled mess trying to achieve the same things. In Barca, MSN had their best roles and had enough freedom to express themselves. At PSG none of them was happy with taking the traditionnal center forward role. Not only that but the front 3 at Barca knew the players behind them and the movements they would make. At PSG they had 2 managers including Pochettino who struggled to settle on a single formation, fluctuating primarly between a 4 3 3 with Messi wide on the right, and a 4 2 3 1 with Messi as a number 10. The second season, Christophe Galtier switched to a back 3 with 2 flying wingbacks, Mendes and Hakimi. Barcelona was a possession oriented stsyle with a clear identity. Their primary role was to keep possession and move up the pitch in a controller manner. And Luis Enrique also did bring an increased directness to the team which only served to make them better because the rest of the side sat back and did most of the defending, allowing the front 3 to loiter higher on the pitch ready to strike at the neck of their opponent.
This was facilitated by the fact that they arguably had the best pivot in history who would pick up the ball off the center backs and begin to move higher up the pitch with Iniesta who could receive and carry the ball up the pitch or be ready to provide the final creative flourish to allow the attackers to focus on attacking. But with Xavi aging, they missed the insane deep progression that Xavi usually provided so at times Messi dropped deeper to help with the progression. However at PSG he was required to drop even deeper and deeper especially in PSG's 4 2 3 1 with PSG finding themselves light in the midfield. If the opposition managed to cut out Veratti, the only progressive option, it was up to Messi to move very deep which would reduce connectivity to his fellow forwards. Even in the 4 3 3 they faced issues as the third midfielder was Wijnaldum. who is an off the ball midfielder looking to attack the box rather than progress the ball. The fullbacks also helped the cause at Barcelona with Jordi Alba and Dani Alves pushing aggressively forward, meaning that both Messi and Neymar could at times move more centrally and have combination opportunities. PSG tried to replicated this with Hakimi and Mendes as a duo. However the positionning overlap due to not having a dedicated forward then showed some strain. With 2 men in the midfield and occasionally a third attacking midfielder, when the fullbacks pushde very high, they left the midfield 2 and the 2 center backs very exposed to counter attacks.
This is why Galtier opted for a back 3 to try to give them more solidity altough with limited success. Even if Barcelona sometimes faced similar issues, the more considered attacking play allowed Barcelona to move up as unit, allowing them more opportunities and giving them more chance to counter press before they could counter attack. Suarez's workrate meant that they were able to harry the opposition higher up with a spritly Neymar somewhat doing a job defensively. The midfield was also trying to cover the defensive weakness especially with Rakitic covering the space behind Messi to offer more balance as a mobile man. As for PSG their ineffective press meant that the opposition would get pass them easily. and the midfield would be underloaded, especially when Messi was playing as the most attacking midfielder. The back 3 gave them more pitch coverage and the high attacking wingbacks meant that PSG had a 2 men shield before their backline was directly attacked. In Barca, Neymar contributed a lot defensively while Suarez led the defensive contributions with his pressing and workrate. In PSG, none of the front 3 even gave the impression of defending for a second longer than needed. That meant this side defended with a block of either 4 either 5 and at max 7 if their wingbacks held theri positions. But it still made it a lot easier for the oppositions to progress through these deeper regions.
The trio still made a total of 52 assists to each other in 2 seasons with Messi especially assisting to Mbappé. The trio combined every 125 minutes on average which is good. However it still pales compared to the fact that MSN combined every 72 minutes on average during their 3 seasons in la liga. MSN trio also played 80 games together in la liga alone meaning they were available 85% of the games with the biggest issue being Neymar missing 11 games due to injuries in the 2015 / 2016 season and Messi missing 16 games that same season. Messi missed 15 games for PSG in 2021 / 2022 season and 23 in the 2022 / 2023 season. As for Neymar, he missed 38 games in all competitions, the equivalent of a full league season. They only played together for 36% of the league total minutes. Also, Neymar came at PSG to escape the shadow of Messi. He had ballon d'or ambitions and wanted a team built around him. Mbappé was the local boy with insane potential and with each passing year, his power and influence extended, culminating into him somewhat having a say about the players coming into the club for his last 2 seasons at PSG. He was becoming the main face of the club, not Neymar or even Messi who was accostumed to be the main man since his early 20s.
il y a 2 mois
Luis Enrique arrived in a contest where Barcelona's golden squad started to get old. Valdes and Puyol were not there anymore. Xavi and Iniesta were not in their prime anymore. Among the signings done during Enrique's 3 years at Barcelona included Ter Stegen, Bravo, Suarez, Rakitic, Mathieu and Umtiti. Throughout his 3 seasons, he generally stuck to the 4 3 3 althought at times during his third and final season, he experimented with the 3 4 3. In all 3 seasons, Barcelona was a possession oriented side with at least more than 60% possession on average and more than 65% possession during their first season. When opponents sit deeper in a block, Barcelona used still a lot of their tiki taka patterns, moving the ball slwoly up the pitch by utilizing their midfield and trying to shift the opposition to create gaps in their shape. But under Enrique, the central midfielders were not as influencial as they were under previous managers because in the previous years, Messi aside, the 3 midfielders were the best of their team, with Busquets, Xavi and Iniesta. However, Rakitic would soon replace Xavi. Their best players of the team were now higher up the pitch. It was the famous front 2 MSN ( Messi, Suarez, Neymar ). To get the ball to them as quickly as possible, quicker build up play became essential so they could have as much time on the ball as possible. So where before the ball went from the center backs to the central midfielders who rotated it amongst themselves, we now saw them utilizing the wide regions much more. The ball more often shifted from the center backs to the fullbacks who remained deeper as the build up.options and they would progress it up the line to their respective winger. Or of the ball went through the central midfielders, it wouldn't spend much time there, being quickly spread out to the wings.
This quick play down the flanks often meant that first of all, if they could bypass the opposition's midfield before they had the time to form a second block in front of the back 4. Plus, it increased the chances of both Messi and Neymar being in 1 v 1 situation with their man. Naturally, the fullbacks would look to push higher up the pitch to support . So having the central midfielders slightly deeper rather than higher creating chances meant that they had a better chance to stop the transitions into the wide areas. Higher up the pitch, Barcelona had several ways to break the opposition down. It should be noted that during the early stages, the MSN weren't very sync. Messi was still very much a false 9. Initially, it was Suarez who was on the right wing and he was rather ineffective from this position. Eventually, Messi played on the right handside. Messi still tended to drift infield with Dani Alves relishing the opportunity to push high up the pitch with the 2 of them who could combine in tight spaces to create space for Alves on the flanks to then look for the cutbacks. However, even Rakitic tended to push out wide outside of Messi so they could create a complete overload there. If the opposition didn't adapt, Barca could create chances from out wide here or creating shooting opportunities from either Messi or Rakitic. So teams were often dragged across the pitch to fix this, which would then free space on the left hand side. The switch was crucuial, with Neymar often being found and in 1 v 1, he constantly attacked his fullback either on the outside to look for the cross, or cutting infield to then get his shot off. At times before the switch, Neymar also moved infield to drag his fullback further in, which allowed Jordi Alba high. Messi often switched it wide to Alba before moving into the box to look for the finish.
Of course Neymar also often looked to move more centrally to make the difference and then Iniesta from his central role was also comfortable moving into these wide regions on the left hand side to compensate althought they were more dependent on Jordi Alba for that. So Iniesta could remain central, opening a potential outlet on the flanks. At the end of the day, it was also the sheer individual quality that made the difference when needed. On the defensive side, Barcelona looked to press high up in the first couple of seasons. This is because the front 3 didn't tend to track back a lot. So dropping deep meant that they were defending with only 7. And they were very effective in their 2 first seasons, winning the ball high up with a pass per defensive action of under 6. But when the press was borken, of course they had to drop deep. The front 3 stayed high up the pitch and in some way it was a form of defending as their quality meant that opponents had to leave at least one more fullback than usual to help defend. On the break, Barcelona was dangerous as they didn't look to get into a phase of possession and instead, looked for the direct attack with Messi often coming deep to collect while Suarez moved right.
il y a 2 mois