🇪🇺 🏆⚽️ UEFA EURO 2024 Allemagne ⚽️🏆🇪🇺

Plus de matchs maintenant, c'est terminé

Cet Euro n'était pas terrible, mais on s'est quand-même bien amusé sur ce topic, l'ambiance était sympa

Il reste le foot aux jojo lympiques mais bon

Il reste la finale de copa américa.

Dans ton sondage tu avais oublié l'Espagne.

C'est ballot

sinon https://flysporthd.com/le[...]rld-uefa-champions-league

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1 an après. Les souvenirs.



On possession, Spain opted for a 2 mens build up with both fullbacks. As Croatia defended with just a single forward there was no need for one more men. Spain had a numerical advantage already. Sometimes Modric would make it men to men but only occasionally. But the potential of letting Spain having a numerical advantage in central areas meant that he remained deep for the most part, ensuring that Croatia could cover the central regions. That meant that it was the wide regions that provided opportunities for Spain especially the left one. If Spain tried to play in the left, UYamal would stay on the opposite side out wide and Carvajal also stayed wide. But rather than overlap he was here to be an outlet option for Yamal if he was not able to get pass his man. A key for Spain in the left was Nico Williams but rather than hugging the touchline like Yamal, he moved into the inside channels causing troubles and Croatia had a hard time to decide if it was either Stanisic or Sutalo to pick him up. And when it was Sutalo it meant that Williams could take advantage of his pace for spaces created While Carvajal was more conservative, Cucurella would often make late runs and tried to get crosses in high up the pitch or find Williams. But having only the 2 center backs and Rodri being isolated, SPain could be vulnerable on the wide regions. And Croatia would quickly transition into these areas.
When Croatia was looking to build from the goal kick with the center backs assisting the goalkepper, Spain were hyper agressive in the press. Pedri and Morata formed the front 2. These 2 would look to give the Croatian miedfielders a cover shadow so that meant whichever way Croatia started, a forward could press with Ruiz in support as he was looking to cover 2 miedfielders. It would either force a pass into the fullbacks, where the winger could agressivly press, either a risky pass into the miedfield where Spanish miedfielders were ready to win the ball back. Both Majer and Kramaric tended to come infield while Brozovic dropped deeper in the build up. It allowed both Gvardiol and Stanisic super high. Williams and Yamal were not the most disciplined at tracking back, meaning that Croatia sometimes made inroads, particularly down Gvardiol's side. But it did present a massive opportunity on the transition for Spain. And Williams and Yamal would have a lot of spaces to counter attack. The first goal is a perfect example of this. When the ball breaks down, the 2 center backs are isolated, not knowing between either covering the spaces more out wide, or Morata in the center.

Germany started the match in a 4 2 3 1 while Scotland started the match in a 3 4 3. However in their defensive shape it looked more like a 5 4 1. For Germany Havertz pushed on top and the rest of the front 3 were between the lines. Just behind Adams, Andrich was the holding miedfielder. Kross was basically playing like a center back. Basically in possession G ermany were in 3 3 3 1. The fullbacks also caused a lot of issues for Scotland's miedfield. They were trying to pin Scotland's wingbacks as well which created spaces for Witz, Gundogan or even Musiala If Adams tried to close down Kross, Germany just had to move on the other side to Rudiger for example or even Tah. The majority of German's progression happened in these channels into the half spaces, especially in their left half space. But if central miedfielder like McTominay stepped up, then the ball could go into the central areas if Gundogan dropped deeper. Kross, Wirtz and the fullback often created triangle passes.N And even if the wingback tried to close him down then spaces could be exploited from behind them. Kross often got into positions where he could make quick swithces. And having Musiala and Havertz threatening to make runs behind Scotland's defense, Scotland's defense had to stay back. It allowed the right back Kimmich to push forward and pick a position. He could then have a 2 v 1 against the fullback, Robertson. In the first goal, Musiala attracted both the wingback and the left center back who could not step out otherwise it would leave spaces for Musialia in the half space for the ball in behind and then cross. But because the defense is being pushed back, it frees spaces at the edge of the box and Wirtz was extremly clever in his positionning. Because Germany could their runs from deeper positions, it would mean that the defensive line would often push up and as they did push up, you have these players making runs in behind.
It's also worth noting that Germany's defensive structure was very effective as they shut down every Scotland's attempts. They prevented Scotland to start from the back by overloading each side of the pitch in which Scotland was trying to build down If they tried from the right for example, every Germans would pushed on this side. However there were few situations when Scotland could take advantage from this by making quick switches to the other side with Robertson or CHristie moving out wide. However even if Germany was good at stopping every threats when this happened, we should make attention to this.









It's safe to say that Turkey vs Georgia match was one of the most entertaining of the group stage here. One of the reason of that is Turkey playing an attractive and creative offensive football. Only problem is that left them exposed more at the back. There were also smart rotations. Turkey lined up with a 4 2 3 1 while Georgia lined up with a 3 5 2. Georgia plan at the beginning of the game was relying on counter attacks. They did this by starting with a 5 3 1 formation. Due to clever positionnal rotations by the 3 miedfielders,Turkey was able to retain possession. In fact Turkey'sfullbacks pushed quite a lot. Each winger, Guler and the left wing, moved in harmony with the fullbacks either side of the centerbacks, allowing them to stretch the opposition's defense and pick interesting positions in attack. If Guler had the ball the opposition was relativly slow to close him down and when they did, it freed spaces in the miedfield for more penetrative passes. Guler carrying the ball in the half spaces created interesting combinations with the fullback outwide providing the width and him, and even Calhanoglu. In the first half Guler was able to make interesting crosses. Turkey had so many players ready to attack the box and the crosses after combinations were something Turkey would look to exploit quite a lot in the first half. But It wasn't just on the right flank. On the left flank there were also some rotations where the holding miedfielder, Ayhan allowed Kadioglu to push up on the left. In some others situations the attacking miedfielder, Kokcu, would move into these positions in the left, getting a lot of players involved in these rotations between the lines. It was difficult to know which space Georgia needed to cover. These types of rotations led to Turkey's first goal. They had like 6 players into the box, including the cdm Calhanoglu.
A reason why it worked while England failed against Serbia is that while rotations were attempted, some players didn't pick up the right positions. When Turkey tried some balls from deep behind Georgia's defense to catch them off guard, Georgia defended against them pretty well. Combinations between Guler , Çalhanoglu and Ayhan created dynamic movements. You never knew exactly where would the chances come from, either Calhanoglu pushing between the lines, either Guler dropping deep and sending the ball outwide for a fullback overlapping, etc... You could also see moments where Yidliz the right winger stay outwide while the fullback pick on the half spaces. Yılmaz could also come here. However there was a flaw here and that's what Georgia was looking for, counter attacks. By having your fullbacks pushing high to hold the width and these miedfielders sometimes dropping deep sometimes pushing in front, it left a lot of spaces in the flanks, where Georgia wanted to take advantage off. When Turkey lost the ball we could see them adopting an extremly agressive counterpress. But when it didn't work we could see a lot of runs in the channels Georgia didn't take advantages of it but still showed they could be dangerous in these situations. Georgia managed well sometimes to move the ball from one flank to the other and their goal came from that kind of situation. When Turkey took advantage, Georgia went more agressive and played in 3 2 5 and even sometimes 3 1 6. They tried to work on these half spaces with runs here and outwide. A lot of dangerous situations came from the ball being played from the center straight into the striker.

Spain was able to exploit a weakness in Italy's defensive structure.Both teams started on paper in 4 3 3. However in reality, Spain had possession in the vast majority of the match. One of the reasons Spain can control the tempo and the possession that well during the build up is the position of their fullbacks. They are both used very deep and very wide. Basically a back 4 but they can circulate the ball and make it very difficult for the opposition to close down the players who have the ball. Italy looked to press men to men in the first phase of build up. Scamacca was in 2 v 1 against the centerbacks. So they could push Frateesi higher. Then you have Jorginho or Barella trying to pick up Rodri in the center while Chiesa and Pellegrino would push to cover out wide. So if Barella pressed Rodri, Jorginho could be in 1 v 2 against Ruiz and Pedri. Italy had Calafiori pushing up in the miedfield even if he is a centerback. It left the backline in a 3 v 3 against Williams, Morata and Yamal. So Spain would instead try to exploit the spaces between the lines. Morata could that well as he was occupying positions between the lines. Since these positions, Spain could move out wide with the wingers being very good in 1 v 1 situations especially Nico Williams against Di Lorenzo. Then Italy adopted a more passive 4 1 4 1 in defense. But the issue was still Spain's fullbacks when thye had possession further up the pitch. Cucurella and Carvajal were hugging the touchline and Italy wanted to close them down. They did this with Chiesa and Pellegrino moving outwide.The issue is that it left gaps into the half spaces that Spain was able to exploit. These spaces were dangerous against Croatia as well. But against Croatia, Spain did it in a diferent way. Ruiez would often be in that half spaces on Cucurella's side and then switch to the opposite flank. Spain was confident with playing diagonical passes to the wingers.
While Yamal was the major danger in the first match, in the second against Italy, Nico Williams was more dangerous. In this match however they weren't relying a lot on switching plays consistently. They were playing more on the side of the ballon. Pedri was comfortable moving in the other side where the ball was to create overloads alongside guys like Morata, Rodri, Cucurella, Williams, Ruiz and Laporte. Chiesa and pellegrini's positions were an issue because it left the fullbacks isolated for a 1 v 1. In the left also we saw a lot of combinations between Williams and Cucurella with Cucurella often attacking these half spaces in the left. A lot of rotations were happening outwide with Fabian Ruiz as well. Add Rodri, Morata and Pedri to this and it's no wonder why Spain managed to control the tempo of the game. When the fullbacks were closed down, the ball was moving to the wingers either directly, either indirectly from outwide to central player who whould then move it against out wide to the winger, creating a 1 v 1 situation. As soon as Williams was on Di Lorenzo, Morata would push on Bastoni so Bastoni couldn't add more help. Chiesa would not track back effectivly. When Italy does their build up, Spain moved a lot of players on the side where the ball is with the defenders being comfortable pushing forward. Spain left a lot of spaces in the opposite flank but Italy didn't find these spaces. Off the ball, Spain kept an agressive pressing staying essentially in his 4 3 3 structure. Williams and Yamal were very agressive on their back 3 when they tried to build. The middle was controlled by Spain so Italy wanted to switch on 3 2 5 with a lot of runs in these positions into the half spaces. Italy already won euro with Spinazolla on the left flank so it's not a surprise they are dangerous here with Di Marco this time. But 3 2 5 didn't work that much and even if they made some changes they weren't able to create any real dangerous opportunities.






Spain was able to exploit a weakness in Italy's defensive structure.Both teams started on paper in 4 3 3. However in reality, Spain had possession in the vast majority of the match. One of the reasons Spain can control the tempo and the possession that well during the build up is the position of their fullbacks. They are both used very deep and very wide. Basically a back 4 but they can circulate the ball and make it very difficult for the opposition to close down the players who have the ball. Italy looked to press men to men in the first phase of build up. Scamacca was in 2 v 1 against the centerbacks. So they could push Frateesi higher. Then you have Jorginho or Barella trying to pick up Rodri in the center while Chiesa and Pellegrino would push to cover out wide. So if Barella pressed Rodri, Jorginho could be in 1 v 2 against Ruiz and Pedri. Italy had Calafiori pushing up in the miedfield even if he is a centerback. It left the backline in a 3 v 3 against Williams, Morata and Yamal. So Spain would instead try to exploit the spaces between the lines. Morata could that well as he was occupying positions between the lines. Since these positions, Spain could move out wide with the wingers being very good in 1 v 1 situations especially Nico Williams against Di Lorenzo. Then Italy adopted a more passive 4 1 4 1 in defense. But the issue was still Spain's fullbacks when thye had possession further up the pitch. Cucurella and Carvajal were hugging the touchline and Italy wanted to close them down. They did this with Chiesa and Pellegrino moving outwide.The issue is that it left gaps into the half spaces that Spain was able to exploit. These spaces were dangerous against Croatia as well. But against Croatia, Spain did it in a diferent way. Ruiz would often be in that half spaces on Cucurella's side and then switch to the opposite flank. Spain was confident with playing diagonical passes to the wingers.

While Yamal was the major danger in the first match, in the second against Italy, Nico Williams was more dangerous. In this match however they weren't relying a lot on switching plays consistently. They were playing more on the side of the ballon. Pedri was comfortable moving in the other side where the ball was to create overloads alongside guys like Morata, Rodri, Cucurella, Williams, Ruiz and Laporte. Chiesa and pellegrini's positions were an issue because it left the fullbacks isolated for a 1 v 1. In the left also we saw a lot of combinations between Williams and Cucurella with Cucurella often attacking these half spaces in the left. A lot of rotations were happening outwide with Fabian Ruiz as well. Add Rodri, Morata and Pedri to this and it's no wonder why Spain managed to control the tempo of the game. When the fullbacks were closed down, the ball was moving to the wingers either directly, either indirectly from outwide to central player who whould then move it against out wide to the winger, creating a 1 v 1 situation. As soon as Williams was on Di Lorenzo, Morata would push on Bastoni so Bastoni couldn't add more help. Chiesa would not track back effectivly. When Italy does their build up, Spain moved a lot of players on the side where the ball is with the defenders being comfortable pushing forward. Spain left a lot of spaces in the opposite flank but Italy didn't find these spaces. Off the ball, Spain kept an agressive pressing staying essentially in his 4 3 3 structure. Williams and Yamal were very agressive on their back 3 when they tried to build. The middle was controlled by Spain so Italy wanted to switch on 3 2 5 with a lot of runs in these positions into the half spaces. Italy already won euro with Spinazolla on the left flank so it's not a surprise they are dangerous here with Di Marco this time. But 3 2 5 didn't work that much and even if they made some changes they weren't able to create any real dangerous opportunities.

At first view, Germany committing sometimes 6 players in attack should be a catastrophic system with Kross playing alongside the centerbacks and Andrick playing as the pivot. For Germany it's working and it's not uncomon to see cdm dropping back alongside the centerbacks like Kross is doing. The main difference is that Kross is not playing centrally but he is rather dropping narrow on the left. It's preventing teams that want to press you to really press you. If Kross manage to open up that space in front of him not only he has the whole pitch in front of him but it's also less risky because if he gives the ball away it's not as bad as if he was central. Scotland was not the team that wanted to press a lot in these half spaces Kross was in. What's important is what happene ahead of him when he is in these spaces with the ball. Germany used their fullbacks as the main width providers and 4 main attackers, Wirtz, Gundogan, Musialia and Havertz. Musiala had the freedom to go whenever he wanted while Wirtz did a lot of works in this right handspace where he wanted to be. He is also free to come in the left handside During the second goal against Hungrary, the left back is making his run, dragging one of the defenders while the others don't know if they should stay or go. You had also that situation against Scotland where Kai Havertz dropped deep so he could receive from Kross, dragging a defender and opening spaces. Musiala makes his run and Kross spots this. Then even if Musialia doesn't receive any ball, the space created by his run saw German players going in that space
Scotland had not the time to reorganize or resert themselves. Players make individual decisions between moving or staying, making it more difficult. Germany has a lot of talentet players who can move wide, move more centrally,make a lot of things with their movements but what makes it so good is that it's a relativly simple concept. It looks at first difficult with Musialia and Wirtz shifting more inside, to have only Andrich holding this whole thing together in the center. While England, Portugal and France seem to struggle to find a system, Germany just like Spain seem to know what they are and will doing. Also we could wonder before the tournament if Havertz would be play as a false striker position or with Fullkrug who love to be a pure striker. In fact, Havertz is doing everything and we are seeing this with his heat map since he is dropping off often , out wide, or being in the 10 role, creating for his teamates in small spaces while also b eing in the box as a striker.





One of the most comon way for teams is to use a back 3 during the build up. Despite this being already popular at club level, it can be surprising that so many nations has done it. The favourites nations tended to start in a 4 2 3 1 or a 4 3 3 and the challenging nations lining up with eithe a 3 4 3 either a 3 5 2 or 5 3 2. Germany start with a 4 2 3 1. However when building up from the back, Kross drops aside of the centerbacks on the left, allowing their fullbacks to gain a lot of width on the flanks, giving Germany a lot of attacking options. It's one of the reasons why they became a lot more favourite in this euros, as this build up structure is very difficult for opposite's fullbacks. Portugal has often their defensive midfielder Palhinha dropping between the centerbacks, looking when possible to make a long pass to the wingers from a more protected position. Others nations like France, England and Italy who were not showing a level that good in the euros, their back 3 involved their right fullback tucking inside with the left fullback pushing much further up on the flank. The major difference then is how many players they are using as pivots in the center. A lot of nations choose 2 players. But others nations like Germany or Portugal only keep one player in this position and allow more players to push between the lines. Most comon defensive structures in the euros were 5 3 2, 4 4 2 or 5 4 1 formations. The 2 firsts had 2 strikers on the top. By switching to a back 3, you make opponent making a chooice between either having a midfielder being out of his line to press but let more spaces behind, or accept the numerical disadvantage and force the opposition in areas out wide.
Switching to a back 3 can allow to free a player to pass in the midfield. It's how teams like England has been able to control the ball. Using a wide back 3, Denmark had been able to bypass the initial press pretty easily and attract the midfield line out of position to free spaces. One of the most impressive teams so far is obviously Spain. They scored a lot of goals while not conceding a single time during this group stage. Even out of possession they maintain their 4 3 3 structure, making sure the opposition's backline isn't given the time on the ball to make the right chooice. When the opposiiton push up into Spain's third, It can quickly switch into a 4 5 1 structure or 4 4 2 structure and block off every options in the central areas. By making this switch it's not easy for opposition to push forward and it ends up oftnen with them having one less player participating in the attacking shape. Spain is one of the few teams that is not using 3 players during the build up. Keeping their backline of 4 has caused some problems to the opposition Another thing to note from Spain is their supercharged overloads on possession. Relationnism is not as intense as Fernando Denise or some others South American managers. A big side of relationnism is big overloads in possession to create more connextions between players. Spain often use their 3 box to box midfielders to support their winger on the ball. Germany has 4 offensive players constantly rotating and dropping deep to look for the progression. Turkey is looking to overload around the ball with the defensive midfielder pushing up much further on the pitch when Turkey has possession. Switzerland has their left wingback often moving in more central positions when attacking on the right flank. It's made to free a player on the other side of the pitch after forcing a lot of players in this side of the pitch.
Spain has a lot of positionnal players considering the clubs where they are playing. Germany is a mix of diferent playing styles. We also see that defenses tend to be very deep, allowing more shoots from the edge of the box. Denmark's goal vs England is a good example of that.

How they use Williams and Yamal is what set Spain apart from others teams we saw last years. Also how they use Ruiz and Pedri. Before Spanish teams would accumulate passes would try to retain possession. But this team want to move the ball freely, quickly and vertically on the pitch to hit you where it hurts. Spanish's midfielders are also very active, not only in the last third but also recuperating the ball in all these regions. They are active on the whole width on the pitch. For example when you see Pedri's heat map he was less involved than Fabian Ruiz defensivly but there is still this horizontal movements constant from right to left. Firstly they try to find the spaces themselves to pick the ball and try to set things. Secondly they are able to drift out of their natural side. They can pull all the defenders away to free and leave the wide attackers in 1 v 1 situations where they are thriving. They are circulating the ball in small triangles to move it directly for someone forward after. But sometimes the wingers are not even trying to ifnd numerical advantage situations. They believe in their capacity to beat their defender. Spain likes to run. In WC 2022 they averaged 75% possession. Now this stat has fallen to 56%. But the attempts increased from 15 to 27. They are the leading team of the tournament at trying to pass the opponent. For progressive carries, Spain is also the first team of the tournament as well as chances from take on. We could also see that Spain is determinate to stretch their opponents.
Also Spain before used to not care too much about the defensive aspect of their game as they were always having massive possession. But as their possession dropped they had to care more about what opposition could do with the ball. Before the quarter finals in term of ground duel won %, Spain are only barely in top 20. But in the same time they are first when it comes down to ball recoveries as they have 228 and 209 for Portugal. Rythm, determination and direct runs they use in attack are their best defensive weapon. They are also maybe the best high pressing team in the whole tournament. They also have the highest turnover won with 20 for only 11 for the seconds being Austria and France. Spain also has 7 counter attack shoot, being first alongside Netherlands. Germany has 6. There are a lot of runs from the 2 central midfielders and all the turnovers between attacking players are tiring style for the legs. When it comes down to the minutes played per player in this euro, not only Spain rested almost their entire squad but also they are very comfortable at making entering players from the bench. When it comesto Rodri he was often an option in the center of the pitch, he was in front of the opposite defenders, covered the channels vacated helped to progress the ball when they were on possession What makes Rodri so important is not only the number of passes or his capability to retain possession but it's mostly his vision and his passing range. Also Rodri being the single pivot mean that he is a magnet for the opposition to press into. Because Rodri is so good when he gets into these central deep positions, with players in front of him moving horizontally, he knows that he doesn't need to pass where Pedri is but where Pedri will be.





Switzerland is making constant rotatinos from deep areas allowing them then to take control of the pitch rapidly. Using Sommer as an extra defender allows the wide centerbacks being ROdriguez and Shar to spread wide outwide during the first phases of build up. This deep line frees the wingbacks to pick diferent positions. In the right the position of Ndoye is a bit more traditionnal as he is mostly hugging the touchline and looking to attack more frequently while giving width to their attacks. Aerisher as the left wingback is in the other hand taking diferent positions. He moves centrally a lot more frenquently than traditionnal wingbacks. It creates a good trio with him, Xhaka and Freuler in the center of the pitch. Unless opposition press very agressivly, Xhaka is often used as single pivot in the center. The front 3 is not trying to necessary hug the touchline on their respective side or spread wide. Instead they stay close to each other especially during build up, meaning that if they have a quick ball forward, they already created an overload in the center of the pitch.

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When Spain had build up an important thing was Kimmch's position. He was very agressive and pushing up on Cucurella meaning Sané would occupy a more central position on Fabian Ruiz. Most of Spanish players in the center were covered, meaning that only channels available for Spain to build from the back were outwide. That's why we often saw Simon also doing long balls into Morata. Sometimes it worked since with Morata's hold up play with Williams, Rudiger and Tah were shifted toward the same side. You saw often Williams trying to pick the ball out wide and playing throught the lines changing play often to Yamal who was the other winger on the other side. Germany realized they couldn't press too agressivly because Germany would see the ball being passed behind them. When Kimmich came back to mark Williams, it meant Sané would have to close down Cucurella. But then Spain would be very comfortable playing in the half spaces. A lot of times Williams trief to link up play with Morata. A lot of times Cucurella would catch the opposition off guard when he made the runs here and then Williams would try to attack the spaces out wide from behind. Sometimes It would even be Morata shifting in this position with Fabian Ruiz covering and trying to disrupt Germany's defensive line. For Spain a lot of their chances came from the left inside channel with combinations between Williams, Morata and Cucurella but also a lot of chances came because Spain was very agressive and effective in their counter press structure. Germany's midfielders got closed down very quickly. As for Germany their 4 2 3 1 became as usual a 3 3 1 3 shape. The back 3 consisting of Rudiger, Tah and Kross allow their fullbacks to push very high In first half it was difficult for them to take advantage of numerical advantage in the center but as the game progressed these overloads became more crucial.
Also this back 3 left Spain with a dilemma, either pressing man to man but letting a lot of spaces to the fullbacks out wide, either dropping their backline more and not be overloaded here. But then they allow not only Germany to be in control but also dominate in the opposition's half. At the beginning of second half Spain got their first goal and it came from Morata being able to pass to Yamal who would then take on his men and pass to Olmo who made a very clever run on the edge of the box and finish it. When players entering in the game we saw some tactical changes and structural ones. Havertz was playing for example more like an attacking midfielder after Gundogan was replaced by Fullkrug. Also the introduction of Fullkrug meant that Germany wanted to cross into the box more frequently. As Germany gained control of the game these delivering into the box were even more dangerous. Spain subbed out Yamal for Ferran Torres, Morata subbed off for Merino, a midfielder while Oyarzabal replaced Nico Williams. Germany subbed out Tah for Muller, who was a much more offensive player obviously. Now Andrich was acting as an extra centerback alongside Rudiger. Outside Oyarzabal and Merino, Spain was deep in central position at the end of the second half. Germany tried to stretch Spain and even if Germany got slowed down, Spain didn't hold until the end. The qualizerd came from a cross and then Kimmich head the ball to Wirtz who score. In extra time Spain's structure was less attacking. Olmo went on the left flank instead of Ruiz meaning that Merino could adopt a more natural position as a midfielder and Spain had a more coherent attack. It's what got Spain the winning goal late in the extra time with Olmo crossing and Merino heading the ball to Germany's goal in the top bin.




France's only change compared to the quarter was bringing Dembelé instead of Griezmann. For Spain replaced Normand and Navas on the right replaced Carvajal. Notice that Maignan short passes were often on the right showing that France looked to build mostly on this side. They would then invite pressure and drag Spain's defenders on this side. Then when they can, switch rapidly. When it was done, Mbappé often foud himself against Nawas being isolated. At first it worked since Navas had a quick yellow card and France's goal came from his side. Navas didn't want to take risks and sit in front of him, not committing a lot which is understandable. A cross close to the second post and Kolo Muani scores his header. As for Germany it took longer to understand that danger might come from these zones since Cucurella is not that good in the airs while Laporte can also be beaten here. Spain still adapted in term of plays and players. Also they had Yamal. One thing France did well defensivly is that they cut all first passes to Rodri. For Spain it's very important to bring ball into the good zone and allow him to make line breaking passes. Rodri had low passes comparing to his standards. Most Rodri's passes were backward or sideway. He didn't make a pass into the final third once. So Spain had to rely more on Williams and Yamal in the wings and everytime they had 1 v 1 vs their fullbacks Koundé and Hernandez, Dembelé or a midfielder, even Mbappé sometimes would help to defend against them. Williams and Yamal's number of dribbles were more limited. After France scored, Yamal, when he went to opposite fullback, the number 8 dropped to double on him. Then he left the right handside to align on Alvaro Morata Then Morata drop into the right, dragging Hernandez. That left him on 1 v 1 against Rabiot. Then he made his long shoot and scored.
This goal not only shows his shoot quality but also how his understanding of spaces and movements are good. Just before the goal he moved into a deeper zone with Dani Olmo who can receive the ball but instead he stays here. He then goes into the right handside. Since Rabiot cut the passing line Yamal drags his attention then Olmo goes into the right handside. As France goes narrow with Olmost being central, that allows Navas to be found on the right who goes for the cross. Saliba deflects it to prevent Morata to score. But it comes back to Olmo who combine with Morata again to score the second goal. One of the reasons why Mbappé disappeared as the match went was Yamal. While Nico Williams was forcing the defenders back, being a permanent threat, Yamal dropped much deeper, almost alongside Navas. Yamal was basically tracking back to defend against Mbappé. You can notice that the successfull crosses from France came from their left side when they crossed into Cucurella's zone. But they also did most of their crosses from the right side, where Dembelé was. When Giroud came on, it would be expected for Spain to defend against a lot of crosses. But they had only 2 crosses in the last 10 minutes.

Discipline positionning was Netherlands main strenght against Turkey. They had good balance and structure. They were not too far back while not being too far upfront. They had 3 players upfront, a sort of miedfield 5 including the 2 fullbacks and the 2 cb Van Dijk and De Vrij in the back when they were building and when they had possession. At least that's their average position. Aké made a lot of defensive operations on the left handside. But Gakpo showed how dangerous he was on the left handside. Despite conceding first, Netherlands still respected their game plan. Reason why Gakpo played so well is the pourcentage of attacking touches on each third for Turkey. 63% of them came in the right side. And the right side was occupied by Arda Guler. When Guler has the ball you often see him more centrally or on the right half space by when dispossessed he had to come back in the right side of the pitch to defend in 5 4 1. So Gakpo was on the touchline. In the other hand, Gakpo would be efficient at taking on his fullback. Unlike traditionnal wingers who try to beat his men to get a cross, h would drift inside of the inside of the box to get a chance to shoot. On the second goal, with a run from theback, he forces an own goal. He can scores, make turnovers, retain possession and dribble well. One reason why England didn't concede that much is that teams they faced didn't have a lot of starboys. Here Netherlands has Gakpo, Depay who won Golden Boy prize in the past while Xavi Simons is current Golden Boy winner. Gakpo will be dangerous and England will have to make a chooice between either having Kyle Walker for the defensive security, either TAA if you want to be more offensive and even maybe making Trippier play at the right again just like in the euros 2021.




Spain showed greater strenght than France during possession phases while France struggled to show same consistency. Spain kept their 4 3 3 structure and they wanted to advance in these pockets of space either side of the opposition. It's mostly because of the positions of the fullbacks that they managed to find these spaces. The fullbacks often start deep during the first phase so if the opposition want to press them more agressivly then they have these channels available. Since oppositions know how they play now they stay deeper. They still managed to move the ball into the center because of excellent rotations between Rodri, Ruiz and Olmo. Even if Olmo started on the right handside it's not rare to see him going more on Ruiz side even taking positions out wide on the left. If Cucurella drift a bit more centrally Rodri was not afraid of adding numbers between the lines. They tried to force France to compact their shape on this side of the pitch. With players creating overloads in some specifical areas they were comfortable of retaining possession and circulate the ball. Sometimes Morata was receiving the ball with Olmo in a more central position, Ruiz and Rodri adding support, Olmo having the ball and looking for Williams out wide against Koundé. Sometimes It was Cucurella pushing up between the lines with Ruiz in a more defensive role to cover behind him.
Of course if frees more spaces on the opposite flank. Why these switches are so dangerous is because Lamine Yamal would often receive the ball and then Navas would enter in action, often overlapping on the flank. This meant that Theo Hernandez was often in 2 v 1 resulting in Rabiot being more defensive to help him. Then Spain would commit a lot of numbers to attack the back post. To attack the final third, the overlaps showe dto be important because both wingers had support when they received the ball. So France faced 3 different situations. If they wanted to compact their shape there ware spaces out wide but if they wanted to cover every overloads, then Spain had more spaces in the center to drift inside and create opportunities. That being said when France won the ball back they had a lot of spaces to exploit especially in the opposite flank, mostly on their left side where Hernandez and Mbappé were. These counter attacks allowed France to create chances in the first half and even sometimes in the second half with the introduction of Griezmann and Barcola who would often try to break the press and feed Mbappé. While France started in 4 2 3 1 or 4 3 3 their defensive structure looked more like a 3 4 3 with Tchouaméni dropping between the centerbacks and the fullbacks adopting a slightly more agressive approach out wide. It's how France created their first goal with Koundé pushing high, Dembelé picking the ball in a deeper position and Rabiot on this flank trying to create a slight overload. It forced Spain to ba a more narrow and when the switch happened Mbappé was 1 v 1 against Navas and Hernandez forces the defense to not focus only on Mbappé. Then Mbappé cross and Kolo Muani scores after beating Laporte in the airs.
These rotations outwide could be dangerous for Spain with Dembelé, Kolo Muani, Koundé and Kanté creating a lot of overloads on their right channel. This became less frequent as the match went on especially because Koundé adopted a more passive position. Then if Dembelé wanted to go more centrally, Cucurella would follow him with no one providing the width for France. So Dembelé had to stay close of the touchline. France ended with a lot of players at the back. Koundé became a bit slow to add support to Dembelé, meaning that Dembelé ended up being isolated in that right flank. On France's left, Hernandez would be on the othe rhand quickly to overlap and with his support Mbappé could have more 1 v 1 against Navas to exploit or pass it to Hernandez who would try to make it into the box. But at the end of the day, Spain had more positionnal rotations in their attacks than France. France could not create as different occasions as Spain. Their positionning and their moves were not as fluids.

Goalkick situation was where Sxitzerland was the most comfortable for pressing with Rieder and Embolo pressing the centerbacks. The pivots Freuler and Xhaka would look to back this by pressing both Maino and Rice with Rice often as the deepest pivot, dragging his men higher on the pitch. So that creates a pocket ofspace where England could play particulary to Bellingham because of the vertical space created by Rice by dropping deeper but also the fact that Bellingham is more physical than Foden. So with a long ball he was more able to hold on his man while a centerback tried to back up the press. In open play, England's play was more fluid, and Switzerland kept the same formation with Saka starting higher Walker could look to join him up the pitch and create opportunities for 2 v 1. Vargas being more central meant that Switzerland shape looked like a 5 3 2.Having Walker higher allowed Saka to drift a bit more centrally allowing an extra miedfielder like Bellingham to drop deeper so England could have potential 3 v 2 in these zones. On possession, Saka and Trippier operated as high on the pitch as they could. Trippier was actually often the highest positionned player for England, pushing Swiss winger much deeper and creating spaces in this zone especially if both pivots were still tied up.
So if Rieder was still high up the pitch pressing, Bellingham would have a lot of spaces in deep region and would look to use his capability to moveup the pitch. But down the left handside they faced the same problem that they had throughout the whole tournament. Trippied is right footed so when he got the ball on the outside, Bellingham whe he managed to take on his men, both would end up having a tendency to cut back in with their stronger foot, slowing down the play, or ending having a cross with their weak foot, making it less effective. Best example of this is that Shaw, despite coming on in the 77th minute, playing technically as a left centerback, attempted just as many crosses as Trippier. Despite that, Switzerland didn't want this situation to keep happening in these wide regions. So they could drop into a more traditionnal 5 4 1 when the game demanded and now England had different types of opportunities because England had 4 excellent central miedfielders so they had an opportunity to form an overload. Swiss pivots both couldn't cover in the same time the higher and the deeper miedfielders. Mostly they choose to stay tighter in the deepest pivots, believing that making these line breaking passes would be made more difficult.
But we also saw Foden and Bellingham both dropping into deeper regions and receiving the ball extremly easily. Both had high amount of touches. Reason of that is that Switzerland didn't mind Foden having the ball deep. Because even if he receives deep, Switzerland could compact themselves and reduce space between the lines.On second half, England had a bit more success in their plan. One mistake and after Frieder and Embolo did the same job, no pressure on the ball carrier, resulting in the ball being passed between the lines; Then Foden is found, resulting into a good crossing. England did a good job at ensuring that Saka was always a winger whatever they were on the ball and with many central miedfielders, they looked to overload one side of the miedfield with their miedfielders with Kane dropping sometimes dropping even deeper than Bellingham and Foden. It woud force Switzerland to come across with his defense to compensate for this situation. That's when a switch to Saka was possible. Also having a back 5 allow to cover the width of the pitch more efficiently. So Switzerland was well positionned to cut out the switch. So Switzerland would be often well positionned to cut ouf the switch. But England still managed to get that switch with quick passes from Kane. And Saka was dominant down the right flank, whatever he was against 1 men or 2 as he was passing them consistently both inside and on the outside. He had the most dribbles and key passes for this side.
Then he equalized. As for defensive phase, England could switch more like a back 4 While in theiroy England could line up in a 5 4 1 , in reality, both Foden and Bellingham found themselves advanced ahead of Kane, looking to apply more pressure on the centerbacks, while Kane looked to tigh up with whichever pivot came deeper. As for the second pivot, Maino would often advance from deeper region on the pitch. Also Rodriguez often pushed high, allowing the wingback Aebisher, on paper, to push on the miedfield. But Saka who was tracking back, was often dragged with him, meaning that the 5 4 1 became a 4 2 4 and hten a loopsided 4 3 3 But England's pressing was effective at times and we saw Switzerland, obsesssed with building from the back, committing couple of errors that could have lead to devastating consequences. The covering of central regions meant the Swiss progression went mostly in the sides mostly the left one who has 44%. The goalkepper Yann Sommer was also important when it came to getting out of this pressure at times. As he pushed higher acting like an extra centerback, Shar could move wider as a right back. He could then find himself free and get into dangerous crossing positions. From this high wingback position, Shar got 4 crosses and 1 shoot. That was more than decent performance althought not genius in any way. It was still good to take them into the semi finals after penalties.



No need to talk about the depth and the quality England has. Of course England has the potential to beat Spain. We saw before that the entrances of Toney against the Swiss and Cole Palmer againt Netherlands were crucial. Bien sûr il y a eu l'entrée de Watkins contre les Pays Bas. Rodri will be the key. If he is allowed to do what he want to do, Spain will easily win. Rodri's game against France wasn't even his best game and yet Spain dominated and won. So imagine if Rodri is given more freedoms? He can carry the ball forward, sit back with the 4 defenders, dictate the play from the back, from the central zones, he can also drifts. Notice that Chelsea did a lot of draws against Man City. And they did it by targeting Rodri. They stopped City's box miedfield by using 2 players that will be most likely on England's bench, Cole Palmer and Connohr Gallagher. La stratégie de Chelsea était de cibler le moment exact où Rodri était isolé. Quand City revenait dans une défense à 4 il y avait toujours ce temps avant que Bernardo Silva ou quelqu'un d'autre ne revienne pour former un double pivot. And the permanent rotations between Gallagher, Palmer, Sterling and Jackson upfront targeting Rodri when he was isolated caused problems to City. Les combinaisons entre Saka, et les 2 milieux offensifs que sont Foden et Bellingham peuvent faire mal à Rodri également.If Rodri is allowed to breath, England will loose because Spain will not only have possession but also dictate the tempo of the game. Saka and Walker managed well Gakpo on the left side vs Netherlands. They can do it against vs Nico Williams. The big issue is Trippier or Shaw against Yamal on that other wing. As for England, the combinaitions between Maino and Foden in these kind of right half spaces in these pockets of spaces were phenomenal. The way Maino can turn so quickly will be a vital aspect in these dangerous positions.

While Spain had the possession during the first half, England defended very well. And they didn't allow their key players to have a lot of time and space with the ball. England was man marking Rodri, their most dangerous player, consistently during the first half. Foden woudl follow him whetever Rodri would go. The fullbacks would be covered by Bellingham and Saka during the first phase of build up, meaning that if the ball went out wide, they instantly would try to close these players down. If the ball went to the wingers Yamal or Williams, Shaw and Walker were very disciplined, being able to close these spaces down. While England adopted a pretty low defensive block in the first half, they were able to limit Spain's spaces. Spain couldn't create any major opportunity. England didn't look to press very agressivly and we did see that in the situation between Laporte and Normand who were in 2 v 1 situation against Kane, who was juggling his position between these 2 players. Kane was pretty slow in his press so Spain was able to pass this first line of press pretty easily and move the ball out wide. But even when a centerback was carrying the ball in front, he didn't have a lot of options, with Rodri being man marked by Foden, Bellingham was closing down Carvajal and even if the ball went to Yamal, Shaw was very disciplined at closing him down and not allowing him to have a lot of time and space on the ball. On England's right side, Saka was also very disciplined, tracking back for Cucurella and Walker didn't allow Williams to have much time and space on the ball. Even the central midfielders Rice and Maino were able to limits Fabian RUiz and Dani Olmo's movements at least in first half, because when Ruiz dropped deeper, Maino was comfortable pushing forward.
Rice followed Olmo's movements quite effectivly. That being said, when England won the ball back, Rice's first balls and his distribution were pretty limited especially as Spain's counter pressing was quite effective, allowing them to quickly win the ball back and then attack forward. With both Ghehi and Stones as cb being in 2 v 1 against Mora just like Spanish's cb vs Kane, England was able to defend well England's plan was to counter attack. One main issue of England's game if that they weren't able to hold the ball when they finally got a hold of it.
During the build up, England often relied on Pickford's long balls, either on Kane either out wide. When the ball arrived on Kane, he basically never won an aerial duel. Sometimes It was outwide to Saka with Walker agressivly pushing up If England played the ball into these zones, they rarely were able to play it forward and to find spaces in behind. Mostly because when the ball came in then Harry Kane wasn't making a forward run so there was no one threatening an immediate ball in behind the defensive line. When the ball was won and passed by Bellingham to Kane who dropped deep, Kane was pretty slow and didn't create any dangerous opportunities. In second half, Soain made a forced change that was a bless in disguise for their attack. When Rodri was subbed out for Zubimendi because of an injury, for some reason, Foden didn't keep the same man to man marking structure. In the second half, Foden started to push forward a lot more agressivly It meant that Foden was now putting pressure on the centerbacks a lot more consistently alongside Harry Kane. The issue is that it left one player completly free in the center of the pitch. So Maino sometimes pushed into Zubamendi, or sometimes Rice pushed into a more agressive position. Before the first goal, Foden try to close down the centerback With Bellingham needing to close down 2 players in the same time it freed Carvajal who instantly playsd the ball into Yamal who catch Shaw on the wrong side of the spanish winger.
As Yamal attacks in the center in dangerous situation, the free players in the center become even more an issue for England because Walker has to tighten his run to cover Fabian Ruiz, leaving Williams acres of spaces to finish the chance. After this goal, Spain took control of the midfield and Olmo had more spaces between the lines. Even after Watkins entered to sub Harry Kane, England's structure stayed kinda the same and England relied on long balls over the defense that were not effective most of the time. When Palmer came on instead of Maino, Foden moved outwide while Palmer was the attacking midfielder. Bellingham was being put into a more defensive role alongside Declan Rice. These changes paid off as England equalized thanks to Palmer's long shoot. But rather than going for the second goal, England shifted into a more defensive mentality. With Spain's ability to outnumber the midfield, England was getting caught in the center a lot more frequently. Before the second goal, Fabian Ruiz receives between the lines and Rice cannot close him down fast enough. An excellent play sees Oyarzabal playing outwide to Cucurella Walker's position need to be questionned here but Cucurella take the opportunity to deliver an excellent ball into the box for Oyarzabal to put Spain 2 1. Only England's chance was Rice's header saved by Unai Simon followed by Ghehi's header saved by an excellent line clearance from Dani Olmo.






Before Nagelsmann came, Germany was known for their possession based football which focused on high pressing and fluid attacking play with each player executing specifies duties to maintian structure and discipline. After Nagelsmann arrived, he introduced the un discipline positionnal play where each player is encouraged to interchange roles, regardless of maintaining a rigid structure. The reason for this is that Nageslamann believes that 30% of coaching is tactic and 70% is about social competences. He knows that every player is motivated by diferent things and need to be adressed correctly. He customized his tactics to align with each player's behavior at their respective clubs. For example when the left back advanced you would see Kross shifting to the left half space, just like he does for Real Madrid. It also allows Kimmich in the right to take his natural right wingback role. Gundogan, the 10, is allowed to drop deep and mimic box to box like he does in Barcelona. So the players can adapt without much need need to settle. During build up they adapt to opposition. For example if the opposition plays in 4 4 2 low block, Germany plays with their 3 + 1 shape. If opposition press with a front 4, Gundogan drops deep to form a second pivot and form a 3 + 2 shape. But if they also add an additionnal midfielder, Kross stays in his original position while the goalkepper join the centerbacks and the fullbacks stay deep, creating a massive 3 + 4 shape against 5 pressers. So they maintain a numerical superiority in the back and take control. With fullbacks being so agressive, Nagelsmann introduced 3 number 10 so the wingers plays not as traditionnal wingers but more centrally alongside the natural 10. It perfectly suits players like Musiala and Wirtz who are used to this in their clubs.
These 3 players has more freedoms than the rest of the squad. For example, the wide players playing officially as wingers can drop to create a diamond shape with the pivot, position themselves diagonically to move the ball into open spaces or even drift wide to create triangular rotations with the fullbacks and the centerbacks. It leaves a dilemma to the opposition because when they are defending with their general shape, if often leave a space for a number 10 to exploit. So the opposition need to move their entire midfield deeper to cover these 3 number 10. This creates a breathing space for Germany to build up from the back. Germany also stretch itself both horizontally and vertically across the pitch. For example with a 3 1 6 instead of a flat back 3, Kross is slighty higher than the rest and the left back would be deeper than the right back and the number 10 occupy asymetrical positions. It creates situations where each player is playong on specifical horizontal and vertical lanes. It makes it difficult for oppositions to maintain their zonal positions. In their attacking phase, Kross usually moves up in cdm position as the other pivot, causing huge troubesl for oppositions. With opposition's deep midfielders having to lave their positions to pressurize them, it creates spaces, forcing opposition's fullbacks to be narrow, leaving the German's fullbacks wide open. Then when the fullback can cross, the Germans creates an overload into the box with their central players. So a quick cross give a few time only to the opposition to track all the incoming movements. If the opposition plays with a back 3, the wingbacks can track more easily the fullback's movements. In this case Nageslsmann manipualte opponente with tense rotationnal plays
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cliquez pas, virus.