🇪🇺 🏆⚽️ UEFA EURO 2024 Allemagne ⚽️🏆🇪🇺

Goalkick situation was where Sxitzerland was the most comfortable for pressing with Rieder and Embolo pressing the centerbacks. The pivots Freuler and Xhaka would look to back this by pressing both Maino and Rice with Rice often as the deepest pivot, dragging his men higher on the pitch. So that creates a pocket ofspace where England could play particulary to Bellingham because of the vertical space created by Rice by dropping deeper but also the fact that Bellingham is more physical than Foden. So with a long ball he was more able to hold on his man while a centerback tried to back up the press. In open play, England's play was more fluid, and Switzerland kept the same formation with Saka starting higher Walker could look to join him up the pitch and create opportunities for 2 v 1. Vargas being more central meant that Switzerland shape looked like a 5 3 2.Having Walker higher allowed Saka to drift a bit more centrally allowing an extra miedfielder like Bellingham to drop deeper so England could have potential 3 v 2 in these zones. On possession, Saka and Trippier operated as high on the pitch as they could. Trippier was actually often the highest positionned player for England, pushing Swiss winger much deeper and creating spaces in this zone especially if both pivots were still tied up.
So if Rieder was still high up the pitch pressing, Bellingham would have a lot of spaces in deep region and would look to use his capability to moveup the pitch. But down the left handside they faced the same problem that they had throughout the whole tournament. Trippied is right footed so when he got the ball on the outside, Bellingham whe he managed to take on his men, both would end up having a tendency to cut back in with their stronger foot, slowing down the play, or ending having a cross with their weak foot, making it less effective. Best example of this is that Shaw, despite coming on in the 77th minute, playing technically as a left centerback, attempted just as many crosses as Trippier. Despite that, Switzerland didn't want this situation to keep happening in these wide regions. So they could drop into a more traditionnal 5 4 1 when the game demanded and now England had different types of opportunities because England had 4 excellent central miedfielders so they had an opportunity to form an overload. Swiss pivots both couldn't cover in the same time the higher and the deeper miedfielders. Mostly they choose to stay tighter in the deepest pivots, believing that making these line breaking passes would be made more difficult.
But we also saw Foden and Bellingham both dropping into deeper regions and receiving the ball extremly easily. Both had high amount of touches. Reason of that is that Switzerland didn't mind Foden having the ball deep. Because even if he receives deep, Switzerland could compact themselves and reduce space between the lines.On second half, England had a bit more success in their plan. One mistake and after Frieder and Embolo did the same job, no pressure on the ball carrier, resulting in the ball being passed between the lines; Then Foden is found, resulting into a good crossing. England did a good job at ensuring that Saka was always a winger whatever they were on the ball and with many central miedfielders, they looked to overload one side of the miedfield with their miedfielders with Kane dropping sometimes dropping even deeper than Bellingham and Foden. It woud force Switzerland to come across with his defense to compensate for this situation. That's when a switch to Saka was possible. Also having a back 5 allow to cover the width of the pitch more efficiently. So Switzerland was well positionned to cut out the switch. So Switzerland would be often well positionned to cut ouf the switch. But England still managed to get that switch with quick passes from Kane. And Saka was dominant down the right flank, whatever he was against 1 men or 2 as he was passing them consistently both inside and on the outside. He had the most dribbles and key passes for this side.
Then he equalized. As for defensive phase, England could switch more like a back 4 While in theiroy England could line up in a 5 4 1 , in reality, both Foden and Bellingham found themselves advanced ahead of Kane, looking to apply more pressure on the centerbacks, while Kane looked to tigh up with whichever pivot came deeper. As for the second pivot, Maino would often advance from deeper region on the pitch. Also Rodriguez often pushed high, allowing the wingback Aebisher, on paper, to push on the miedfield. But Saka who was tracking back, was often dragged with him, meaning that the 5 4 1 became a 4 2 4 and hten a loopsided 4 3 3 But England's pressing was effective at times and we saw Switzerland, obsesssed with building from the back, committing couple of errors that could have lead to devastating consequences. The covering of central regions meant the Swiss progression went mostly in the sides mostly the left one who has 44%. The goalkepper Yann Sommer was also important when it came to getting out of this pressure at times. As he pushed higher acting like an extra centerback, Shar could move wider as a right back. He could then find himself free and get into dangerous crossing positions. From this high wingback position, Shar got 4 crosses and 1 shoot. That was more than decent performance althought not genius in any way. It was still good to take them into the semi finals after penalties.



No need to talk about the depth and the quality England has. Of course England has the potential to beat Spain. We saw before that the entrances of Toney against the Swiss and Cole Palmer againt Netherlands were crucial. Bien sûr il y a eu l'entrée de Watkins contre les Pays Bas. Rodri will be the key. If he is allowed to do what he want to do, Spain will easily win. Rodri's game against France wasn't even his best game and yet Spain dominated and won. So imagine if Rodri is given more freedoms? He can carry the ball forward, sit back with the 4 defenders, dictate the play from the back, from the central zones, he can also drifts. Notice that Chelsea did a lot of draws against Man City. And they did it by targeting Rodri. They stopped City's box miedfield by using 2 players that will be most likely on England's bench, Cole Palmer and Connohr Gallagher. La stratégie de Chelsea était de cibler le moment exact où Rodri était isolé. Quand City revenait dans une défense à 4 il y avait toujours ce temps avant que Bernardo Silva ou quelqu'un d'autre ne revienne pour former un double pivot. And the permanent rotations between Gallagher, Palmer, Sterling and Jackson upfront targeting Rodri when he was isolated caused problems to City. Les combinaisons entre Saka, et les 2 milieux offensifs que sont Foden et Bellingham peuvent faire mal à Rodri également.If Rodri is allowed to breath, England will loose because Spain will not only have possession but also dictate the tempo of the game. Saka and Walker managed well Gakpo on the left side vs Netherlands. They can do it against vs Nico Williams. The big issue is Trippier or Shaw against Yamal on that other wing. As for England, the combinaitions between Maino and Foden in these kind of right half spaces in these pockets of spaces were phenomenal. The way Maino can turn so quickly will be a vital aspect in these dangerous positions.

While Spain had the possession during the first half, England defended very well. And they didn't allow their key players to have a lot of time and space with the ball. England was man marking Rodri, their most dangerous player, consistently during the first half. Foden woudl follow him whetever Rodri would go. The fullbacks would be covered by Bellingham and Saka during the first phase of build up, meaning that if the ball went out wide, they instantly would try to close these players down. If the ball went to the wingers Yamal or Williams, Shaw and Walker were very disciplined, being able to close these spaces down. While England adopted a pretty low defensive block in the first half, they were able to limit Spain's spaces. Spain couldn't create any major opportunity. England didn't look to press very agressivly and we did see that in the situation between Laporte and Normand who were in 2 v 1 situation against Kane, who was juggling his position between these 2 players. Kane was pretty slow in his press so Spain was able to pass this first line of press pretty easily and move the ball out wide. But even when a centerback was carrying the ball in front, he didn't have a lot of options, with Rodri being man marked by Foden, Bellingham was closing down Carvajal and even if the ball went to Yamal, Shaw was very disciplined at closing him down and not allowing him to have a lot of time and space on the ball. On England's right side, Saka was also very disciplined, tracking back for Cucurella and Walker didn't allow Williams to have much time and space on the ball. Even the central midfielders Rice and Maino were able to limits Fabian RUiz and Dani Olmo's movements at least in first half, because when Ruiz dropped deeper, Maino was comfortable pushing forward.
Rice followed Olmo's movements quite effectivly. That being said, when England won the ball back, Rice's first balls and his distribution were pretty limited especially as Spain's counter pressing was quite effective, allowing them to quickly win the ball back and then attack forward. With both Ghehi and Stones as cb being in 2 v 1 against Mora just like Spanish's cb vs Kane, England was able to defend well England's plan was to counter attack. One main issue of England's game if that they weren't able to hold the ball when they finally got a hold of it.
During the build up, England often relied on Pickford's long balls, either on Kane either out wide. When the ball arrived on Kane, he basically never won an aerial duel. Sometimes It was outwide to Saka with Walker agressivly pushing up If England played the ball into these zones, they rarely were able to play it forward and to find spaces in behind. Mostly because when the ball came in then Harry Kane wasn't making a forward run so there was no one threatening an immediate ball in behind the defensive line. When the ball was won and passed by Bellingham to Kane who dropped deep, Kane was pretty slow and didn't create any dangerous opportunities. In second half, Soain made a forced change that was a bless in disguise for their attack. When Rodri was subbed out for Zubimendi because of an injury, for some reason, Foden didn't keep the same man to man marking structure. In the second half, Foden started to push forward a lot more agressivly It meant that Foden was now putting pressure on the centerbacks a lot more consistently alongside Harry Kane. The issue is that it left one player completly free in the center of the pitch. So Maino sometimes pushed into Zubamendi, or sometimes Rice pushed into a more agressive position. Before the first goal, Foden try to close down the centerback With Bellingham needing to close down 2 players in the same time it freed Carvajal who instantly playsd the ball into Yamal who catch Shaw on the wrong side of the spanish winger.
As Yamal attacks in the center in dangerous situation, the free players in the center become even more an issue for England because Walker has to tighten his run to cover Fabian Ruiz, leaving Williams acres of spaces to finish the chance. After this goal, Spain took control of the midfield and Olmo had more spaces between the lines. Even after Watkins entered to sub Harry Kane, England's structure stayed kinda the same and England relied on long balls over the defense that were not effective most of the time. When Palmer came on instead of Maino, Foden moved outwide while Palmer was the attacking midfielder. Bellingham was being put into a more defensive role alongside Declan Rice. These changes paid off as England equalized thanks to Palmer's long shoot. But rather than going for the second goal, England shifted into a more defensive mentality. With Spain's ability to outnumber the midfield, England was getting caught in the center a lot more frequently. Before the second goal, Fabian Ruiz receives between the lines and Rice cannot close him down fast enough. An excellent play sees Oyarzabal playing outwide to Cucurella Walker's position need to be questionned here but Cucurella take the opportunity to deliver an excellent ball into the box for Oyarzabal to put Spain 2 1. Only England's chance was Rice's header saved by Unai Simon followed by Ghehi's header saved by an excellent line clearance from Dani Olmo.






Before Nagelsmann came, Germany was known for their possession based football which focused on high pressing and fluid attacking play with each player executing specifies duties to maintian structure and discipline. After Nagelsmann arrived, he introduced the un discipline positionnal play where each player is encouraged to interchange roles, regardless of maintaining a rigid structure. The reason for this is that Nageslamann believes that 30% of coaching is tactic and 70% is about social competences. He knows that every player is motivated by diferent things and need to be adressed correctly. He customized his tactics to align with each player's behavior at their respective clubs. For example when the left back advanced you would see Kross shifting to the left half space, just like he does for Real Madrid. It also allows Kimmich in the right to take his natural right wingback role. Gundogan, the 10, is allowed to drop deep and mimic box to box like he does in Barcelona. So the players can adapt without much need need to settle. During build up they adapt to opposition. For example if the opposition plays in 4 4 2 low block, Germany plays with their 3 + 1 shape. If opposition press with a front 4, Gundogan drops deep to form a second pivot and form a 3 + 2 shape. But if they also add an additionnal midfielder, Kross stays in his original position while the goalkepper join the centerbacks and the fullbacks stay deep, creating a massive 3 + 4 shape against 5 pressers. So they maintain a numerical superiority in the back and take control. With fullbacks being so agressive, Nagelsmann introduced 3 number 10 so the wingers plays not as traditionnal wingers but more centrally alongside the natural 10. It perfectly suits players like Musiala and Wirtz who are used to this in their clubs.
These 3 players has more freedoms than the rest of the squad. For example, the wide players playing officially as wingers can drop to create a diamond shape with the pivot, position themselves diagonically to move the ball into open spaces or even drift wide to create triangular rotations with the fullbacks and the centerbacks. It leaves a dilemma to the opposition because when they are defending with their general shape, if often leave a space for a number 10 to exploit. So the opposition need to move their entire midfield deeper to cover these 3 number 10. This creates a breathing space for Germany to build up from the back. Germany also stretch itself both horizontally and vertically across the pitch. For example with a 3 1 6 instead of a flat back 3, Kross is slighty higher than the rest and the left back would be deeper than the right back and the number 10 occupy asymetrical positions. It creates situations where each player is playong on specifical horizontal and vertical lanes. It makes it difficult for oppositions to maintain their zonal positions. In their attacking phase, Kross usually moves up in cdm position as the other pivot, causing huge troubesl for oppositions. With opposition's deep midfielders having to lave their positions to pressurize them, it creates spaces, forcing opposition's fullbacks to be narrow, leaving the German's fullbacks wide open. Then when the fullback can cross, the Germans creates an overload into the box with their central players. So a quick cross give a few time only to the opposition to track all the incoming movements. If the opposition plays with a back 3, the wingbacks can track more easily the fullback's movements. In this case Nageslsmann manipualte opponente with tense rotationnal plays
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