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Le classement en direct

Les admins svp, vous branlez pas sur du prn 12k 360° VR, ça fait lagguer onche
il y a 19 heures
LE 7 2 BUT VITINHA
Les admins svp, vous branlez pas sur du prn 12k 360° VR, ça fait lagguer onche
il y a 19 heures
Jon
21h
il y a 19 heures
Les allemands sont bons joueurs, ça applaudit à la fin du match
Les admins svp, vous branlez pas sur du prn 12k 360° VR, ça fait lagguer onche
il y a 19 heures
Tu viens quand même poster c'est que tu n'en as pas totalement rien a foutre
il y a 19 heures
Trop facile.
Le Bayern de Kompany joue… comme le PSG de Luis Enrique ? 😳
Même permutations de poste, mêmes latéraux qui montent, Kane qui décroche pour mener le jeu comme Dembélé. Son équipe presse haut, construit depuis l'arrière avec des milieux qui descendent entre les défenseurs et Kane devient le lien entre la défense et l'attaque. Philosophie de Luis Enrique mais plus verticale, directe et aggressive. On voit souvent Kimmich descendre pour former une ligne de 3 défenseurs avec Upamecano et Tah. Les latéraux motnent pour rejoindre la ligne des milieux. Cela donne à l'équipe une supériorité numérique à la relance et surtout oblige le pressing de l'adversaire à reculer. Au PSG c'est pareil : quand Vitinha ou Ruiz descendent, ils permettent à Hakimi et Mendes de monter en attaque. Derrière, Kimmich peut soit combiner avec les défenseurs, soit jouer long pour mettre un ailier en situation de 1 v 1. Et ce n'est pas le seul milieu de terrain qui peut organiser le jeu de derrière vu qu'il est souvenu par Goretzka avec les 2 qui font des permutations : quand Kimmich monte, Goretzka descend pour soutenir la défense et faire sortir le ballon. Le but est d'amener le ballon sur une aile pour ensuite réaliser des permutations et des combinaisons entre les joueurs pour déstabiliser l'adversaire. Mais ce qui permet vraiment à la défense de Munich de pouvoir organiser le jeu à partir de derrière sans subir la pression de l'adversaire ce sont les mouvements + déplacements de Kane. Par exemple Gnabry en tant que milieu offensif peut aller sur l'aile droite et pendant ce temps le latéral Boey monte pour rejoindre l'attaque et Kimmich commence à aller dans l'axe alors que pendant ce temps Pavlovic descend et soutient sa défense, ce qui brouille le pressing de l'adversaire. Mais quand Kane descend dans le dos des attaquants adverses c'est encore plus le cas. Il veut proposer des solutions dans l'axe.
Et ensuite souvent le bloc adverse va reculer et le Bayern peut tranquillement faire circuler le ballon d'une aile à l'autre. Si une équipe presse la ligne des 3 défenseurs du Bayern et que le pressing est battu, ils se retrouveront avec une ligne de 5 joueurs dont Kane qui descend, 2 milieux de terrain, et 2 latéraux qui seront montés. Et encore plus haut, les ailiers qui font peser le danger. Kompany utilise Kane comme un faux 9 pour contrer le pressing en passant par l'axe qui est toujours pris par un autre joueur que Kane. Même si un défenseur central suit Kane très bas sur le terrain, les latéraux du Bayern vont monter pour profiter de l'espace laissé ce qui oblige l'opposition à reculer et le pressing adverse finit par être annulé. Si une équipe presse haut le Bayern, Kane redescend proposer des solutions au milieu de terrain tout en attirant un milieu adverse dans son dos ce qui à son tour libère de l'espace au milieu. Et en fin de compte on a une situation où souvent un latéral du Bayern reçoit le ballon seul vers l'axe ou le demi espace. Stanisic sur le côté gauche du Bayern peut aussi souvent se retrouver seul. Et en plus de cela, c'est dur de presser le duo Kane et Gnabry quand ceux ci permutent au milieu de terrain. Une fois dans la moitié de terrain adverse le plan est d'attirer, fixer, sortir proprement et exploser en attaque. Un autre point fort du Bayern de Kompany est de mettre leurs ailiers en 1 v 1 pour lancer les latéraux qui montent en profondeur. Tout comme avec le PSG. Et touc comme le PSG, le Bayern a des ailiers plus que capables de gagner leur 1 v 1, percuter et ramener du danger dans la surface adverse. Sur les ailes le jeu est bien rôdé : le latéral monte, le milieu le couvre et l'ailier rentre à l'intérieur. Sans ballon c'est Gnabry qui va aller presser le plus le défenseur central. Kane va enfermer le latéral droit sur l'aile ce qui oblige l'adversaire à dégager le ballon.
A la récupération le ballon est souvent remis à Kimmich dans l'axe et le contre est rapide. Kompany veut économiser Kane en lui évitant de faire des courses intensives à répétition. Parfois ça peut être Gnabry, parfois ça peut être Pavlovic qui presse les défenseurs centraux haut sur le terrain. On voit parfois Olise presser le gardien et l'empêcher de jouer sur l'autre côté. Diaz comme Olise se montrent souvent très menaçants sur l'aile. Kane peut aussi descendre et défendre comme un numéro 6 pour bloquer des passes.
Même permutations de poste, mêmes latéraux qui montent, Kane qui décroche pour mener le jeu comme Dembélé. Son équipe presse haut, construit depuis l'arrière avec des milieux qui descendent entre les défenseurs et Kane devient le lien entre la défense et l'attaque. Philosophie de Luis Enrique mais plus verticale, directe et aggressive. On voit souvent Kimmich descendre pour former une ligne de 3 défenseurs avec Upamecano et Tah. Les latéraux motnent pour rejoindre la ligne des milieux. Cela donne à l'équipe une supériorité numérique à la relance et surtout oblige le pressing de l'adversaire à reculer. Au PSG c'est pareil : quand Vitinha ou Ruiz descendent, ils permettent à Hakimi et Mendes de monter en attaque. Derrière, Kimmich peut soit combiner avec les défenseurs, soit jouer long pour mettre un ailier en situation de 1 v 1. Et ce n'est pas le seul milieu de terrain qui peut organiser le jeu de derrière vu qu'il est souvenu par Goretzka avec les 2 qui font des permutations : quand Kimmich monte, Goretzka descend pour soutenir la défense et faire sortir le ballon. Le but est d'amener le ballon sur une aile pour ensuite réaliser des permutations et des combinaisons entre les joueurs pour déstabiliser l'adversaire. Mais ce qui permet vraiment à la défense de Munich de pouvoir organiser le jeu à partir de derrière sans subir la pression de l'adversaire ce sont les mouvements + déplacements de Kane. Par exemple Gnabry en tant que milieu offensif peut aller sur l'aile droite et pendant ce temps le latéral Boey monte pour rejoindre l'attaque et Kimmich commence à aller dans l'axe alors que pendant ce temps Pavlovic descend et soutient sa défense, ce qui brouille le pressing de l'adversaire. Mais quand Kane descend dans le dos des attaquants adverses c'est encore plus le cas. Il veut proposer des solutions dans l'axe.
Et ensuite souvent le bloc adverse va reculer et le Bayern peut tranquillement faire circuler le ballon d'une aile à l'autre. Si une équipe presse la ligne des 3 défenseurs du Bayern et que le pressing est battu, ils se retrouveront avec une ligne de 5 joueurs dont Kane qui descend, 2 milieux de terrain, et 2 latéraux qui seront montés. Et encore plus haut, les ailiers qui font peser le danger. Kompany utilise Kane comme un faux 9 pour contrer le pressing en passant par l'axe qui est toujours pris par un autre joueur que Kane. Même si un défenseur central suit Kane très bas sur le terrain, les latéraux du Bayern vont monter pour profiter de l'espace laissé ce qui oblige l'opposition à reculer et le pressing adverse finit par être annulé. Si une équipe presse haut le Bayern, Kane redescend proposer des solutions au milieu de terrain tout en attirant un milieu adverse dans son dos ce qui à son tour libère de l'espace au milieu. Et en fin de compte on a une situation où souvent un latéral du Bayern reçoit le ballon seul vers l'axe ou le demi espace. Stanisic sur le côté gauche du Bayern peut aussi souvent se retrouver seul. Et en plus de cela, c'est dur de presser le duo Kane et Gnabry quand ceux ci permutent au milieu de terrain. Une fois dans la moitié de terrain adverse le plan est d'attirer, fixer, sortir proprement et exploser en attaque. Un autre point fort du Bayern de Kompany est de mettre leurs ailiers en 1 v 1 pour lancer les latéraux qui montent en profondeur. Tout comme avec le PSG. Et touc comme le PSG, le Bayern a des ailiers plus que capables de gagner leur 1 v 1, percuter et ramener du danger dans la surface adverse. Sur les ailes le jeu est bien rôdé : le latéral monte, le milieu le couvre et l'ailier rentre à l'intérieur. Sans ballon c'est Gnabry qui va aller presser le plus le défenseur central. Kane va enfermer le latéral droit sur l'aile ce qui oblige l'adversaire à dégager le ballon.
A la récupération le ballon est souvent remis à Kimmich dans l'axe et le contre est rapide. Kompany veut économiser Kane en lui évitant de faire des courses intensives à répétition. Parfois ça peut être Gnabry, parfois ça peut être Pavlovic qui presse les défenseurs centraux haut sur le terrain. On voit parfois Olise presser le gardien et l'empêcher de jouer sur l'autre côté. Diaz comme Olise se montrent souvent très menaçants sur l'aile. Kane peut aussi descendre et défendre comme un numéro 6 pour bloquer des passes.
il y a 19 heures
Arsenal vient d'exploser l'Atlético 4 - 0.
How Kompany Built Europe's Most Dangerous Attack
Kompany is using aggressive tactics often with 2 players providing cover, 2 players circulating possession and 6 players overloading the defensive line. From the build up it's often Kimmich dropping deep with the right back Laimer already being on the defensive line and creating a 2 v 1 with Olise. These rotations out wide from the holding midfielder creates a lot of pressing issues for the opponents. Do you sit back and allow Kimmich to slowly gain ground or do you press him and risk exposing the center where players like Kane and Gnabry will have more time on the ball.If the opponents get too aggressive then these direct passes over the top are the next solution. With so many forward rotations their build up often looks like a situation where everyone pinning the defenders back and with space to push forward Vincent Kompany is a manager who loves trapping the opponent in their own half. Almost 2 thirds of all Bayern's possession takes place into the opponent's final third.This is where the 2 2 6 shape comes into play. There is so many rotations in this team that they rarely actually resemble this shape. There are 3 key zones where Bayern want to progress the ball. First there is the control zone deeper where there is generally 4 players, the 2 center backs and the 2 holding midfielders. Their duty is to circulate possession and find passes into the front 6. To make it possible there are coutless of different shapes they can adopt. The pivots might be in the midfield to form a box with the center backs, they might form a diamond or might even vacate the center entirely. Anyone can rotate in and out of his zone. Kane might drop deep to collect the ball with Goretzka pushing forward or Olise likes to come in more central position. At times it can even be 5 or 6 players moving the ball around in this area. The next area is the space out wide. which is where the majority of their attacking moves originate from.
This area is mostly occupied by the fullback and the winger. The only instructions are one in the half space and one out wide. It's irrevelant which player it is and it's mostly down to the presence of that player. Olise is more comfortable starting out wide but on the other hand, Luis Diaz is often more inverted. Obviously other players are allowed into this zone like Gnabry or even Kane can end up in any of these spaces and it can even lead to a quick overload with a lot of players shifting to one side of the pitch. For example Bayern can put almost all their players on one side of the pitch except 2, often the fullback and the winger who stay on the opposite side ready to attack forward and ready for a switch. Or exploit the defense over committing to one flank and play it directly in behind through the middle. The 2 players out wide are not on the same line. The player out wide will look to stay on the defensive line while the one in the half space will stay a bit deeper. This means Bayern can look to go directly in behind or they can go into the winger with a run into the half space. And these opposite movements create a lot of disruption in the opposition's defensive shape. Finally the last space we see in attack is this central space in front of the defensive line. Maybe the trickiest for the opponent to stop because a lot of time there is no one there. Kane and Gnabry will rotate all over and as Bayern pushes forward, anyone can end up in these positions. The main idea of Kompany is that during attacking phases this space is not that important during the build up. And if you can overload the midfield with as many players as possible, then you will essentially hold on to the ball as much as you want.
The opposition's center backs can't be too aggressive because there is still the threat of this direct ball in behind into the wingers. So they need to stay in line with the fullbacks to ensure that if Bayern play a ball over the top, then it's as wide as possible.This leaves essentially the center backs with nothing to do when Bayern are building their attack. But it's when Bayern enters the final third that we see this zone being flooded with players, runners in behind. Majority of goals of them this season so far are coming from these balls into pockets of space either side of the center backs. Either finishing the shot directly or then looking for cutbacks back arcoss the balls. Because of all these rotations that took place during build up, any player can end up finishing off the move. With 18 goals and 3 assists in 10 matches, Kane has been obviously the main talking point. But all of Bayern's frontline has been on fire with Diaz, Olise and Gnabry all off to great starts as well. Diaz has been a phenomenal addition and is comfortable in this dynamic front 6 This aggressive shape should in theory make them vulnerable at the back but it's not the case and so far they have one of the best defensive records as well. So far they have the lowest xG from counters conceded in the Bundesliga and by far the best defensive record in general. It's all down to the incredible off the ball work rate.
The first priority as soon as possession is lost is to chase down the opponent with a relentless gegenpress. Because they are able to get so many players forward it also means the defenders are in close proximity so are quick to close everyone down. When Bayern counter press there are 3 zones that spread out from where the ball is of varying intensity. First zone has an all out press, chasing the ball and quickly rushing the pass. Then a second larger zone sees players step off their men slightly encouraging the pass into feet so they can then close them down. But also ready to run backwards if the press is broken. In this area it's not uncommon for them to have an extra player as well. Finally in the last zone players are more in a zonal position. The attackers are positioned in a way to instnatly be a threat if possession is won whilst also being quick to close down their man if needed. And the defenders will ensure they are covering any dangerous space in behind. But they also carry this aggression into their normal defensive phase as well. And Bayern just like the majority of elite teams in Europe right now are pressing with a man oriented system. Straight from goal kicks they are right on the edge of the opponent's box, following every movement and not keeping to any specific defensive shape. So many times this has led the opponents looking to play the ball over the top and Bayern simply regaining the ball and starting their attack. In the moments where they do need to drop a bit deeper, then one interesting element is that their most advanced player isn't Harry Kane but Gnabry. This has some extremely benefical consequences when counterattacking, as it means they have a quick player ready to attack the space in behind and Kane's passing range can be used to instantly pick out this run.
Kompany is using aggressive tactics often with 2 players providing cover, 2 players circulating possession and 6 players overloading the defensive line. From the build up it's often Kimmich dropping deep with the right back Laimer already being on the defensive line and creating a 2 v 1 with Olise. These rotations out wide from the holding midfielder creates a lot of pressing issues for the opponents. Do you sit back and allow Kimmich to slowly gain ground or do you press him and risk exposing the center where players like Kane and Gnabry will have more time on the ball.If the opponents get too aggressive then these direct passes over the top are the next solution. With so many forward rotations their build up often looks like a situation where everyone pinning the defenders back and with space to push forward Vincent Kompany is a manager who loves trapping the opponent in their own half. Almost 2 thirds of all Bayern's possession takes place into the opponent's final third.This is where the 2 2 6 shape comes into play. There is so many rotations in this team that they rarely actually resemble this shape. There are 3 key zones where Bayern want to progress the ball. First there is the control zone deeper where there is generally 4 players, the 2 center backs and the 2 holding midfielders. Their duty is to circulate possession and find passes into the front 6. To make it possible there are coutless of different shapes they can adopt. The pivots might be in the midfield to form a box with the center backs, they might form a diamond or might even vacate the center entirely. Anyone can rotate in and out of his zone. Kane might drop deep to collect the ball with Goretzka pushing forward or Olise likes to come in more central position. At times it can even be 5 or 6 players moving the ball around in this area. The next area is the space out wide. which is where the majority of their attacking moves originate from.
This area is mostly occupied by the fullback and the winger. The only instructions are one in the half space and one out wide. It's irrevelant which player it is and it's mostly down to the presence of that player. Olise is more comfortable starting out wide but on the other hand, Luis Diaz is often more inverted. Obviously other players are allowed into this zone like Gnabry or even Kane can end up in any of these spaces and it can even lead to a quick overload with a lot of players shifting to one side of the pitch. For example Bayern can put almost all their players on one side of the pitch except 2, often the fullback and the winger who stay on the opposite side ready to attack forward and ready for a switch. Or exploit the defense over committing to one flank and play it directly in behind through the middle. The 2 players out wide are not on the same line. The player out wide will look to stay on the defensive line while the one in the half space will stay a bit deeper. This means Bayern can look to go directly in behind or they can go into the winger with a run into the half space. And these opposite movements create a lot of disruption in the opposition's defensive shape. Finally the last space we see in attack is this central space in front of the defensive line. Maybe the trickiest for the opponent to stop because a lot of time there is no one there. Kane and Gnabry will rotate all over and as Bayern pushes forward, anyone can end up in these positions. The main idea of Kompany is that during attacking phases this space is not that important during the build up. And if you can overload the midfield with as many players as possible, then you will essentially hold on to the ball as much as you want.
The opposition's center backs can't be too aggressive because there is still the threat of this direct ball in behind into the wingers. So they need to stay in line with the fullbacks to ensure that if Bayern play a ball over the top, then it's as wide as possible.This leaves essentially the center backs with nothing to do when Bayern are building their attack. But it's when Bayern enters the final third that we see this zone being flooded with players, runners in behind. Majority of goals of them this season so far are coming from these balls into pockets of space either side of the center backs. Either finishing the shot directly or then looking for cutbacks back arcoss the balls. Because of all these rotations that took place during build up, any player can end up finishing off the move. With 18 goals and 3 assists in 10 matches, Kane has been obviously the main talking point. But all of Bayern's frontline has been on fire with Diaz, Olise and Gnabry all off to great starts as well. Diaz has been a phenomenal addition and is comfortable in this dynamic front 6 This aggressive shape should in theory make them vulnerable at the back but it's not the case and so far they have one of the best defensive records as well. So far they have the lowest xG from counters conceded in the Bundesliga and by far the best defensive record in general. It's all down to the incredible off the ball work rate.
The first priority as soon as possession is lost is to chase down the opponent with a relentless gegenpress. Because they are able to get so many players forward it also means the defenders are in close proximity so are quick to close everyone down. When Bayern counter press there are 3 zones that spread out from where the ball is of varying intensity. First zone has an all out press, chasing the ball and quickly rushing the pass. Then a second larger zone sees players step off their men slightly encouraging the pass into feet so they can then close them down. But also ready to run backwards if the press is broken. In this area it's not uncommon for them to have an extra player as well. Finally in the last zone players are more in a zonal position. The attackers are positioned in a way to instnatly be a threat if possession is won whilst also being quick to close down their man if needed. And the defenders will ensure they are covering any dangerous space in behind. But they also carry this aggression into their normal defensive phase as well. And Bayern just like the majority of elite teams in Europe right now are pressing with a man oriented system. Straight from goal kicks they are right on the edge of the opponent's box, following every movement and not keeping to any specific defensive shape. So many times this has led the opponents looking to play the ball over the top and Bayern simply regaining the ball and starting their attack. In the moments where they do need to drop a bit deeper, then one interesting element is that their most advanced player isn't Harry Kane but Gnabry. This has some extremely benefical consequences when counterattacking, as it means they have a quick player ready to attack the space in behind and Kane's passing range can be used to instantly pick out this run.
il y a 19 heures
6 - 2 pour le PSV face à Naples. Enorme surprise.
The Best Tactical Match Of The Season So Far
Chelsea's tactics were pretty solid but this was a day where Bayern's risks paid off. Early Bayern would shift in a back 3 during build up with Kimmich looking for spaces outside the center backsand between the center backs. But Chelsea was comfortable pressing man to man. Because of how Chelsea set up in defense, the weakness was in Chelsea's right flank. When Chelsea defended they were in a vey lopsided 4 5 1 with Palmer at times looking like atucked in winger. Especially if Neuer was the third man, allowing the left center back wider or if Tah was more aggressive in pushing high with the ball, Palmer could be drawn into a center forward position making it a lopsided 4 4 2. But when Palmer came centrally, no one in the midfield was shifitng across leading to situations when Stanisic as left back received with no one pressuring him. In the midfield when possible, Chelsea looked to be aggressive in their man to man press of Bayern's midfield. Bayern looked to break this through constant rotations. But it's not just a forward dropping and a midfield running in beyond. Botht he forward and the attacking midfielder would drop very deep forcing Chelsea into a decision and often, Chelsea looked ton continue to be aggressive with their man to man press meaning that a defensive midfielder and a center back were drawn out of position leaving gaping holes in the most important parts of the pitch. In the first half if Neuer was the third man with Stanisic ready to receive on the outside left of the pitch and Olise holding the width down the right, it was often Laimer from his right back position who had the freedom to operate as a free man finding space wherever appropriate. Chelsea were quickly forced into trade offs beacuse we could at time see the remaining pivot, often Caicedo dropping off. But that would mean that the aggressive man to man press in the midfield had all of a sudden disappeared.
So Chelsea could isntead shift to a hybrid system that combined both zonal and man to man principles where when the forwards initially began to drop deep, the center back and the pivot would be man to man whilst their men were in their zones. Once they dropped too deep, they would look to pass that man on to one of their teammates higher up the pitch. That sounds great in theory and it did work at times but this system requires immaculate communication. So switching to it mid match when your opponent is consistently rotating isn't the easiest thing to do. It led to sequences where James is initially picking up Gnabry. Gnabry then rotates with Pavlovitch and James is unsure whether he should pick him up or Kane. Chalobah then picks Kane up and now James and Palmer are on who should pick up the drop in Pavlovitch and who should pick up the left back instead. Run into it and it culminates in a scenario where 4 Chelsea players are picking up 2 Bayern players. It shows that Bayern's rotations were able to unsettle Chelsea. When Stanisic had the ball, Gusto would look to press and prevent easy possession butthat distance would often leave time for Stanisic to get his head up and assess the situation before Gusto got to him. All of this was combined by Kane and Gnabry dropping deep often leaving big gaps in the defense And the center back who moved out to cover Gusto would now be isolated on the flank. But we also saw a Bayern's midfielder often coming wide for a potential 2 v 1 against Chalobah. One better example of Bayern's danger was when Laimer received outside Palmer and drew Gusto high up the pitch. Gnabry and Diaz have rotated but the principle is the same : 1 Chelsea's center back is drawn wide and the other is drawn high onto the dropping Kane and Diaz begins to draw Caicedo much like Gnabry had been doing. So Laimer plays into Diaz and makes the supporting run and because Bayer had forced this odd positioning, Laimer had acres of space to run into.
He then draws Tosin which creates space for Harry Kane who has a huge chance. From the goal kick, Chelsea's game plan was to maintain a traditional back 4. Just like out of possession phases, Palmer wasn't operating like a traditional winger, moving infield early instead. In these phases, Kane and Gnabry were the front 2 for Bayern. With these 3 men looking to be narrow on the 2 pivots. No matter which flank Chelsea built down, Bayern could get immediate pressure on the back line and once the fullback got the ball, the ball side winger could then apply pressure on that fullback while the ball far winger picked up the far side pivot, ensuring that there were no easy outlet. In that deeper open play build up, Bayern were in a 4 4 2 with Chelsea reverting to their 3 2 5 with Gusto pushing on while Cucurella tucked in which is interesting because recently we saw more of a single pivot in Chelsea's system to allow 3 men between the lines before the front 3. But this more secure double pivot system might be their approach against higher caliber opponents this season. And if Chelsea took defensive risks by giving the Bayern's left back space, Bayern took the word risk to the next level. The issue for Bayern when they were in their 4 4 2 is that they were 4 v 2 down in the midfield and their double pivot was committed to trying to stop Chelsea playing high up the pitch by pushing up which left the 2 Chelsea number 10s free. Bayern took risk by being aggressive with the man to man press, having a defender push up onto Enzo and Upamecano was often tasked with being hyperaggressive with the remaining 10, meaning that Tah was often 1 v 1 against Joao Pedro. And we saw them ducking out in the first half, leading to a Tah booking and a half time substitution.
Chelsea were also having success with their front 5 as their 5 v 4 advantage allowed them to manipulate Bayern's back line. Down the left, Neto would draw Laimer and if Fernandez moved across, 2 of Chelsea's back line had been drawn wide, creating room here for a forward to run into, creatinga 1 v 1 again. Or even simple switch situations that saw Gusto consistently get into dangerous positions as Palmer's infield runs would draw in the fullback, leaving Gusto with space to make the run. This was one of the most fascinating tactical matches this season so far.
Chelsea's tactics were pretty solid but this was a day where Bayern's risks paid off. Early Bayern would shift in a back 3 during build up with Kimmich looking for spaces outside the center backsand between the center backs. But Chelsea was comfortable pressing man to man. Because of how Chelsea set up in defense, the weakness was in Chelsea's right flank. When Chelsea defended they were in a vey lopsided 4 5 1 with Palmer at times looking like atucked in winger. Especially if Neuer was the third man, allowing the left center back wider or if Tah was more aggressive in pushing high with the ball, Palmer could be drawn into a center forward position making it a lopsided 4 4 2. But when Palmer came centrally, no one in the midfield was shifitng across leading to situations when Stanisic as left back received with no one pressuring him. In the midfield when possible, Chelsea looked to be aggressive in their man to man press of Bayern's midfield. Bayern looked to break this through constant rotations. But it's not just a forward dropping and a midfield running in beyond. Botht he forward and the attacking midfielder would drop very deep forcing Chelsea into a decision and often, Chelsea looked ton continue to be aggressive with their man to man press meaning that a defensive midfielder and a center back were drawn out of position leaving gaping holes in the most important parts of the pitch. In the first half if Neuer was the third man with Stanisic ready to receive on the outside left of the pitch and Olise holding the width down the right, it was often Laimer from his right back position who had the freedom to operate as a free man finding space wherever appropriate. Chelsea were quickly forced into trade offs beacuse we could at time see the remaining pivot, often Caicedo dropping off. But that would mean that the aggressive man to man press in the midfield had all of a sudden disappeared.
So Chelsea could isntead shift to a hybrid system that combined both zonal and man to man principles where when the forwards initially began to drop deep, the center back and the pivot would be man to man whilst their men were in their zones. Once they dropped too deep, they would look to pass that man on to one of their teammates higher up the pitch. That sounds great in theory and it did work at times but this system requires immaculate communication. So switching to it mid match when your opponent is consistently rotating isn't the easiest thing to do. It led to sequences where James is initially picking up Gnabry. Gnabry then rotates with Pavlovitch and James is unsure whether he should pick him up or Kane. Chalobah then picks Kane up and now James and Palmer are on who should pick up the drop in Pavlovitch and who should pick up the left back instead. Run into it and it culminates in a scenario where 4 Chelsea players are picking up 2 Bayern players. It shows that Bayern's rotations were able to unsettle Chelsea. When Stanisic had the ball, Gusto would look to press and prevent easy possession butthat distance would often leave time for Stanisic to get his head up and assess the situation before Gusto got to him. All of this was combined by Kane and Gnabry dropping deep often leaving big gaps in the defense And the center back who moved out to cover Gusto would now be isolated on the flank. But we also saw a Bayern's midfielder often coming wide for a potential 2 v 1 against Chalobah. One better example of Bayern's danger was when Laimer received outside Palmer and drew Gusto high up the pitch. Gnabry and Diaz have rotated but the principle is the same : 1 Chelsea's center back is drawn wide and the other is drawn high onto the dropping Kane and Diaz begins to draw Caicedo much like Gnabry had been doing. So Laimer plays into Diaz and makes the supporting run and because Bayer had forced this odd positioning, Laimer had acres of space to run into.
He then draws Tosin which creates space for Harry Kane who has a huge chance. From the goal kick, Chelsea's game plan was to maintain a traditional back 4. Just like out of possession phases, Palmer wasn't operating like a traditional winger, moving infield early instead. In these phases, Kane and Gnabry were the front 2 for Bayern. With these 3 men looking to be narrow on the 2 pivots. No matter which flank Chelsea built down, Bayern could get immediate pressure on the back line and once the fullback got the ball, the ball side winger could then apply pressure on that fullback while the ball far winger picked up the far side pivot, ensuring that there were no easy outlet. In that deeper open play build up, Bayern were in a 4 4 2 with Chelsea reverting to their 3 2 5 with Gusto pushing on while Cucurella tucked in which is interesting because recently we saw more of a single pivot in Chelsea's system to allow 3 men between the lines before the front 3. But this more secure double pivot system might be their approach against higher caliber opponents this season. And if Chelsea took defensive risks by giving the Bayern's left back space, Bayern took the word risk to the next level. The issue for Bayern when they were in their 4 4 2 is that they were 4 v 2 down in the midfield and their double pivot was committed to trying to stop Chelsea playing high up the pitch by pushing up which left the 2 Chelsea number 10s free. Bayern took risk by being aggressive with the man to man press, having a defender push up onto Enzo and Upamecano was often tasked with being hyperaggressive with the remaining 10, meaning that Tah was often 1 v 1 against Joao Pedro. And we saw them ducking out in the first half, leading to a Tah booking and a half time substitution.
Chelsea were also having success with their front 5 as their 5 v 4 advantage allowed them to manipulate Bayern's back line. Down the left, Neto would draw Laimer and if Fernandez moved across, 2 of Chelsea's back line had been drawn wide, creating room here for a forward to run into, creatinga 1 v 1 again. Or even simple switch situations that saw Gusto consistently get into dangerous positions as Palmer's infield runs would draw in the fullback, leaving Gusto with space to make the run. This was one of the most fascinating tactical matches this season so far.
il y a 19 heures
4 - 2 pour Dortmund face à Copenhague.
2 - 0 pour Man City face à Villareal.
4 - 0 pour l'Inter Milan face à l'Union Saint Gilloise.
3 - 0 pour Newcastle face au Benfica.
2 - 0 pour Man City face à Villareal.
4 - 0 pour l'Inter Milan face à l'Union Saint Gilloise.
3 - 0 pour Newcastle face au Benfica.
il y a 19 heures
Sans oublier avant cela le 6 - 1 pour le Barca face à l'Olympiakos et le 0 - 0 apathique entre Kairat et Paphos.
il y a 19 heures
On se revoir demain pour les prochains matchs de LDC.
Dont OM vs Sporting et Real Madrid vs Juventus.
Dont OM vs Sporting et Real Madrid vs Juventus.
il y a 19 heures