CHAÎNE de RIRE pour Marseille qui PERD à 11 contre 10

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From Olympique de Marseille to Ordure Ménagère

@Sneaky tu peux modifier le titre ? et mettre à 11 contre 10 cimer chef

après c'est le réal c'est pas l'ogc nice en face

C'est good

Cimer chef

From man oriented pressing high up the pitch to fluid build up patterns that left the opponent outnumbered, both Enrique and Flick are at the forefront of this subtle tactical evolution. One of the most recent changes in football is how teams look to press. Specifically this man oriented aggressive press we see from some of the best teams in world football. High pressing was already done in the past but usually with 1 or 2 man disadvantage to keep an advantage in the defensive line and not be exposed at the back. But this resulted into the team in possession to play out from the back and move to an offensive position more easy. So by covering every single player further up the pitch, it means build up is no longer straightforward. The trick here is how teams deal with the goalkeeper who will always be the extra player. If we take a look at PSG, as soon as a pass is made into one of the center backs, the player on the opposite side would instantly close off a back pass to the keeper and it would force Barcelona into tricky positions like Koundé being trapped on the flank with every single option picked up. The hidden move for PSG is also to shift the whole balance of the team over to this side of the pitch. So we can see for example that Barcelona do have a free player on the opposite side but there is no way they can play it into him in this position and PSG have now effectively dealt with the extra player.

They now have a clear advantage but Barcelona do the same thing. The team switch from zonal to man marking as soon as the pass to the goalkeeper is triggered.

Barcelona are now in 4 2 3 1 and zonal. The pivots are necessarly locked and PSG's defender Zabarnyi has time on the ball.

PSG circulates around the back and when Pacho plays it back to the keeper, the press is triggered. Torres closes off a pass back to Pacho. Rashford holds his run to first block a pass out wide but is ready to close down the center back Zabarnyi if needed and the Barcelona's 3 midfielderss lock on the 3 PSG's midfielders.

But the msot crucial rotations are also happening at the back. Martin breaks off the defensive line to pick up the fullback and Cubarsi shifts over to pick up PSG's right winger. This leaves the back line in a 3 v 3 but it will be difficult from PSG to create from this position as there are no players in support.

Modern football is essentially this. In not even 10 seconds you need to be able to go from zonal to man marking and know what player you need to pick up. Once Barcelona were able to force one PSG player into the flank then the winger and the fullback of the opposite flank are no longer needed and can move over to help give a numerical advantage. The high line is also needed for this system to work. If PSG or Barcelona didn't start defending right on the halfway line then the spaces between the lines would be too much and even through you are locked into a man marking system, the player on the ball would have more time and space to pick out the right pass and everything would unravel. As the team in possession moves further up the pitch, the defensive team will shift to a zonal marking system with very few managers relying on man marking all across the pitch. As the team in possession moves further up the pitch, the defensive team will shift to a zonal marking system Here for example PSG is shifting to a zonal system.

There is a man disadavantage when it comes to pressing the center backs. But they have a man advantage at the back, defending 2 v 1. This is still an aggressive shape from PSG are there are 5 players actively pressing and 5 who are protecting the defense. The defensive line is high. So the team in possession essentially has 2 options to progress. Either attack the space in behind like they did with Yamal finding Olmo in the half space, or they can play between the lines which they also did. If PSG's center back stepping up to close down any player is not timed correctly, there is space from the ball to break forward.

Barcelona's first goal came from a similar idea with 5 Barcelona players pressing further up the pitch trying to win the ball back early.

This time with Yamal intercepting a pass from Vitinha. pushign forward and Barcelona moved the ball to Rashford who perfectly times his pass into Torres who finished the move.

These defensive principles that we see both from Luis Enrique and from Hansi Flick generally reflect the majority of what the best teams in Europe are trying to do. What is interesting is how this way of defending is subsequently shaping every single attack. These defensive charges are forcing managers to find creative ways of attacking from the back. Because there are so few options during build up, it does mean that football is becoming slightly more direct withe goalkeepers going long directly into the attackers and looking to win the second ball. But in the moments where they do look to play out from the back, But in the moments they do look to play out from the back, there is a lot of interesting ideas and it's all down to the positionning of the fullbacks.

In recent years we have become so used to the idea of inverted fullbacks that it became the norm to see them in more central positions or already on the defensive line. But currently there is a big shift taking place in this role and it seems to be reverting to how they were mostly used 20 years ago. Because teams press more aggressively by keeping the fullbacks as wide as possible and connected to the center backs, it help stretch and create gaps further up the pitch. This is visible straight from build up. When a team successfully forces the opposition into one flank, they will shift over and leave the player on the opposite flank completly free. It became a common idea that this player was not useful staying this disconnected from the ball. But because teams are now tilting heavily when pressing, having a player completly opposite from the attack can be extremely beneficial.

We see it here with this long switch into Hakimi.

Even though the ball isn't perfect, Barcelona have no player in this position ready to press Hakimi.

It means PSG can move into midfield and force Barcelona back into a zonal marking system. Having the fullbacks stay wide helps circulate possession around the back and opens these pockets of space in the center for the 2 pivots to get on the ball. Something we see consistently both at Barcelona and PSG. And if the opposition gets to aggressive clowing down the fullbacks, then it opens up these 2 gaps mentionned earlier : in front of othe defense, or in behind.

This is why modern football is becoming more entertaining once again. And because every single position is becoming an individual battle, it's giving space to more creative players to beat their opponent and finding huge advantages. Compare this to the positional ideology that dominated football over the past decade especially with Pep Guardiola's Man City. It wasn't necessarily the individual player that found the advantage but the system exploiting a specific space. And after a few years of teams figuring out how to defend against this style, it's no longer as effective as it used to be. Offensively speaking, all it takes now is for one player to beat their opponent and there are huge advantages. For example here Gérard Martin is beating Hakimi which makes PSG exposed.

And by going to the opposite flank which we know is a weak point of these man marking systems, Barcelona can quickly create a 2 v 1 and attack in behind.

But PSG are doing the exact same thing. And we can see that in their equalizer. The advantage here for PSG actually came before they even played a pass. as a miscommunication in the center meant that Yamal was late to close down Pacho and there was a free pass into Mendes.

With a perfectly timed one-two, the man marking system is exposed as Mendes has now beaten his direct opponent Koundé and there is a lot of space for him to run into. This forces the center backs to shift over and opens up a central gap for Mayulu who slots his shot past Szczęsny

These modern systems mean that the majority of chances aren't necessarly coming after a prolonged periods of possession but rather are being create from much deeper positions when there is still a lot of space to attack in behind the defense. However not every single successful team in the modern game plays this way. But these principles are becoming more popular across managers and leagues.

Pendant ce temps, le PSG bat Atalanta.


Pas la première fois d'ailleurs : Analyse tactique : PSG 2-1 Atalanta | Comment le PSG a réussi son retour | Tactiques Tuchel contre Gasperini |

How Chelsea Stopped The Champions

When Chelsea built from deep, Liverpool defended in a lopsided 4 4 2 with Gakpo dropping deep and the midfield going man to man. Liverpool stopped Chelsea from playing through the center most of the time but they walked into Chelsea's trap especially down the left handside. Because in the 4 4 2, Salah had to join Isak in the press to apply man to man pressure to the center backs to force a pass backwards or a long ball where Van Dijk and Konaté would win most of the aerial duels. Salah had to cut the pass through Cucurella by putting him in his cover shadow. But if he got his angle slightly wrong, Cucurella could receive freely forcing Gravenberch to cover the wide region. Even if Salah got his angle perfectly, Enzo could drop deep knowing Gravenberch would follow him, then make a 1 touch pass into Cucurella with Salah not tracking back for most of the part. If Gravenberch came across, Liverpool would be 1 man less in the midfield. Even for the first goal if Caicedo didn't produce such a finish, Garnacho was completly free. But if Cucurella committed high, Salah was perfectly positioned to make the run into the space during transitions. Slot changed things by putting Szoboszlai pressing alongside Isak while keeping Caicedo in his cover shadow. But if Caicedo created the perfect angle for the pass he had time to turn and try to take advantage of the 3 v 2 in the midfield. Or Van Dijk could be drawn out of position to try to even up the numbers in the midfield. Even when Salah was used more wide, there was still a potential 2 v 1 against Bradley because he wasn't a defensive monster. So Slot reverted again to having Salah pressing the center back to have absolute solidity in the center. And the left side overload ended up being essential to the winner.
Just like Liverpool, Chelsea stopped most of their opponent's play through the center. And just like Liverpool were dependent on a wide man to look to apply the pressure in Garnacho. But Garnacho did a much better job consistently cutting out the line to Bradley. Even if he didn't succeed, he was backed up by Cucurella who would push up as Chelsea shifted to a 3 with Neto on the far right side dropping deeper. So where Liverpool looked to gain the advantage was through the center. If Chelsea's midfield were all occupied by going man to man, it presented the opportunity for a fourth man to make the difference. At first it was Isak dropping deep. It could have been successfull had the center back not be so aggressive in dropping with his man. Liverpool even looked to tweak this with Isak moving left and Gakpo being the fourth man. But again the center back did a good job at initially tracking the dropping forward and then passing him on as he drifted wide, allowing him to still be aggressive on the actual fourth man. When Wirte came and dropped a lot, Caicedo was hesitant to follow because of that ability from the forward and the wide man to drop into the space created. While at the same time the opposing movement from the dropping forward and the running midfielder could lead to situations where Liverpool almost took advantage.


The SCARY Truth About Arsenal Everyone's Afraid To Admit

These last years Arsenal have been solid and consistent. Midfield and defense got better. But the main missing piece the last seasons was a dominant striker with great finishing. In 2024 / 2025 Arsenal scored 69 PL goals and conceded 34 so a + 35 goal difference. They overperformed their expected goal. Most of these goals vastly came from wingers and midfielders. It's where Gyokeres might change things. Arsenal doesn't just need more goals but the right kind of goals, the one coming when the plan breaks down, when you are chasing a result or in a situation where you cannot rely on your wingers and midfielders only to win it all. Gyokeres also suit Arsenal because Saka, Trossard, Martinelli, Havertz, all can play alongside him. In 2022 / 2023 season, Arsenal conceded more goals than expected. Ramsdale had a decent save percentage of 70,6%. However by the 2023 / 2024 season, Ramsdale's save percentage would drop to 64% with Arsenal conceding more goals than expected. David Raya in the 2024 / 2025 season had a save percentage of 74%. And Arsenal conceded less goals than expected. David Raya has the sweeper keepers instincts, si very good in passing, especially long passing. He also had one of the most clean sheet in the PL in 2024 / 2025 season. So far this season, Raya's form is very good. In defense Saliba ranks among the top defenders in recoveries, interceptions and duel success. Timber also had a great 2024 / 2025 season and so far the 2025 / 2025 season is starting well for him. Calafiori is also in incredible form. Last season Odegaard had second highest number of assists in 2024 / 2025 season while leading the charge in term of progressive passes. Declan Rice ranked top 5 Premiere League midfielders for recoveries and interceptions in 2024 / 2025 season. Zubimendi was also top 2 midfielders who won possession the most in la liga in 2024 / 2025 season. His tackle success percentage is also higher than any other Arsenal's midfielders.
Zubimendi also ranked among the top players in term of line breaking passes in that same season. Another reason why Zubimendi is a big addition is that it allows Declan Rice higher up the pitch. Merino is also an underrated midfielder who also carried Arsenal even when he was playing out of position as a forward. With the addition of Eze, Arsenal can also be more dangerous on the flanks. For years, Saka was the only consistent threat on the wings. Now they have Eze who can play as an inverted winger and a sort of interior playmaker. Saka might have less pressure on his shoulders now with better teammates around him. And Gyokeres isn't just a great finisher, he has great movements and positionning. he can drag center backs out of position and consistently make runs to open lanes for Saka and Eze to run in.

Xabi Alonso’s Terrifying Formula: Mbappé + Arda Güler

Mbappé went from being a wide forward to a kind of 9 that Real Madrid has been missing since Benzema. Instead of hugging the touchline then looking to cut inside, Mbappé now starts more centrally. He is attacking spaces between defenders, timing his runs better and finishing with excellent composure. Every movement has a purpose an every move stretches the back line. Alonso is trying to build a system to maximize Mbappé's strenghts. A high press to win the ball quickly, midfielders who can find him instantly and wingers dragging defenders wide so Mbappé gets more space in the middle. Another change is how Mbappé is handling the transitions. He isn't drifting out of games anymore. When Madrid is defending deep, he stays central, ready to break the moment the ball turns over so Madrid always has a threat ready to explode behind defenses.In build up he drops just enough to link play but never too deep to lose his impact near the goal. Xabi made him work on decision making, when to run, when to stay, when to press. Alonso's structure gives him freedom without chaos. But Alonso is also transforming Guler. Close control, quick turns, vision. Xabi Alonso made him the link between the midfield and the attack. Xabi recognized that Guler isn't just a playmaker but a controller. So instead of using him as a winger like Ancelotti sometimes did, Alonso moved him deeper into the midfield. So Guler drops beside the pivot during the build up Once they progress he drifts higher between midfield and attack where he can turn and thread passes into Mbappé's runs. Mbappé and Guler's connection is dynamic rather than rigid.
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How Liverpool Spent £400m & Got Worse.

In 2024 / 2025 season, back 4 was initially quite flat allowing options in first phase of play. Trent was very comfortable on the deep in these deep zones. Compared to Frimpong who has more touches in the final third and less in deeper zones. Robertson also often received deep. Now in 2025 / 2026 first part of the season, Kerkez is asked to stay deeper and rarely touches any ball in the final third which is surprising considering he was more attacking when he played for Bournemouth. 2024 / 2025 season Luis Diaz was making associative runs depending on positionning of his teammates. Ekitike came and his role had some similar aspects, peeling to the left but he is frenquently in the middle too. The problem now is how do Liverpool fit all these players into a starting 11. Liverpool's defence so far are looking worse than last season. The first goal they conceded this season against Bournemouth should have been a warning sign. Double pivot in this match was McAllister and Szoboszlai. Szoboszlai played a more attacking role in the 2024 / 2025 season meaning he naturally took more risks. But here he was doing it in a deeper position with 4 Liverpool players ahead of him. So many technical first players on the pitch takes away from that natural defensive nouse of a team. But even when Gravenberch returned it was still a structural issue. And the problems are that not only Wirtz but also Isak and Ekitike's arrival impacted Salah's role. The reason why Wirtz was so good at Bayr Leverkusen is that some ingredients are not there at Liverpool. Wirtz was spending a lot of his time in half spaces and touching the ball wide in the final third. Although Grimaldo on the left was also very wide, he was extremely wide and stayed out of the way in the final third. Their striker Boniface wasn't very demanding of the ball. This structure led to Wirtz getting the ball in this kind of half space area where nobody was getting in his way.
Even against low blocks where space is tighther, his teammates still left this space vacant for him so he could still create chances, allowing for interchanges and shots at goal. For Liverpool, Wirtz's touch are more diverse and it's a problem. Wirtz initially does well winning the ball high up the pitch. But his usual left side is taken by Kerkez and Gakpo, leaving Wirtz more central At Leverkusen, Wirtz was allowed to start wide then combine with teammates in central areas allowing him to end up in these spaces, not start in them. During build up, Crystal Palace had many players to occupy the left side, creating congestion, forcing Van Dijk to play down the right. Salah's touches in the box have drastically fallen. Firstly, Szoboszlai played a great role in Salah's success but now he is moved a lot out of position as a right back. Last season they had Trent finding him with passes in behind, letting him attack space with speed. This season he is reiceiving to his feet much more with less teammates around him so he is opened to being doubled teamed on far more frequently. Isak's role also plays a role in how he affects things around him. When Isak drops to drag a center back, then plays into Salah, instead of supporting Salah, Szoboszlai has to make that forward run because Liverpool wants a player attacking the near post so Isak can wait on the back post but this means the opposite team can double up on Salah and forcing him to make a backward pass.
For the line up I would have Conor Bradley as a right back, Konaté and Van Dijk as center backs, Kerkez as left back. Then Gravenberch and McAllister as double pivot not only for their abilities to cover huge spaces but also their abilities to receive the ball from the defense and link the forwards into play. As a right winger, Frimpong or Ngumoha. Without Szobozlai you ain't getting the best out of Salah. But with one of these 2 you got 2 explosive players who can receive the ball on their own, beat their player 1 v 1 and drive to the by line and pull back crosses. Now on the left winger, Wirtz with Kerkez overlapping. Then forward I would have both Ekitike and Isak. Ekitiké is comfortable with his back to gla in these spaces whilst getting that ability to spin in behind and that would allow passes with Wirtz in his desired areas while also having Kerkez overlapping like he used to do. If Isak goes short, Ekitiké can easily attack the space in behind. Plus it allows them to target the near and back posts when crossing the ball. Finally, it would allow Liverpool to have a better pressing structure with 2 forwards there and ready to drop in a 4 4 2 mid block or go 4 2 4 in a more aggressive position. Currently Salah is half moving over to that side as part of that 2 but it kind of looks like a 3. It's been either Wirtz or Szoboszlai.


This NEW Liverpool Formation will Fix ALL of Slot's Problems!

Alisson in goal. Van Dijk and Konaté as center backs with Gomez to replace in case. Frimpong as a right back and Kerkez as a left back. Gravenberch as the lone defensive midfielder instead of the double pivot system from last season. He would still have both McAllistair an Szoboszlai to support ahead of him serving as 2 box to box midfielders. With these 3 it allows Liverpool to compress their midfield while defending. And it gives them more control. Szobozslai can help Frimpong in defense just like McAllistair can help Kerkez in defense. When Frimpong and Kerkez make those overlapping runs, McAllistair and Szoboszlai can drop in, slot in and beat that counter if possession is lost. Then Florian Wirtz as the attacking midfielder to distribute to the front 2 made of Ekitiké and Isak. He can drop back, receive the ball, be the one tracking back to receive from Wirtz or from either McAllister or Szobozslai. He could be that kind of Firminho false 9 type of player. Isak finally would complete the front 2 and make those runs in behind. Basically a 4 3 1 2 formation or a 4 4 2 diamond shape midfield formation.

How Man Utd Can Beat Liverpool

Pourquoi Liverpool contre Arsenal n'était pas seulement une question de coup franc de Szoboszlai

Arteta's decision to leave Odegaard on the bench made Arsenal's most dangerous weapon ( corners ) useless. Odegaard has a shoulder injury against Leeds although deemed to be fit against Liverpool. With Merino as a right midfielder, Declan Rice had a deeper role when Arsenal were building from the back often dropping between the center backs and dictating the tempo from a deeper position. The majority of the time, Rice is used in the left inside channel pushing further up the pitch and adding tupposrt to Martinelli on the flank. But in this setup it was the left back Calafiori who had a more attacking role and picked up these positions in the half space. This shape meant that they had a lot players involved in the build up. Zubimendi would rotate as the pivot in the center. And with Timber holding his position at the back on the right side, Arsenal often ended up with 4 or 5 players behind the line of the ball. The objective was to drag Liverpool high up the pitch, circulating the ball around the back and creating bigger and bigger gaps in the midfield. Then when the moment arrives, find the player between the lines and attack Liverpool's back 4 with the front 3 of Martinelli, Gyokeres and Madueke stretching the pitch as much as possible. This hapepned by times during the first half. However there was an instance of Van Dijk intercepting a pass into the midfield. Losing the possession in this area and you can be completly exposed.
When Arsenal broke through the press and found the front 3 they were kinda toothless. Gyokeres only had 17 touches and didn't have a single shot on target. Madueke showed a bit more especially with long balls from Raya. However, Kerkez was brillant with great tackles and recoveries. Usually in corners Arsenal swings delivery towards the goal and Arsenal rush forwards, crowding the defenders and the keeper. These swingings are often delivered by Rice on the left and Odegaard on the right. But without Odegaard, Rice took the corners form the right as well and his deliveries were out swinging away from the keeper. It made it easier for Liverpool to defend as the team can push up with the ball. And the majority of the corners of this game were from the right flank. As for Liverpool, Slot used Szoboszlai as the right back since Frimpong is injured instead of playing someone like Connor Bradley who is an actual right back. With this slow rotation towards the center, Liverpool can outnumber the opposition's midfield. This rotation took a long time to be effective in this match because for the first half a the first part of the second half, Szoboszlai was locked into his position out wide, used as a circulating possession outlet but sstruggling to get forward and help the attack. It was mostly down to a good Arsenal's press with Gyokeres and Merino covering the 2 center backs. And Rice would push forward onto Grevenberch. Because there weren't many options in the midfield, Liverpool needed to stay out wide. This meant Salah was often isolated on the right and he also struggled to get past Calafiori. Even when Liverpool tried to play directly to the wingers, Arsenal's central block forced Liverpool to circulate possession around the back again. Mosquera as a center back was also good at replacing an injured Saliba. Slot mainly relies on finding players between the lines. The idea was to get Arsenal's midfielders to push forward on McAllister and Kerkez to free this gap.

Il est multi millionnaire

ça intéresse qui mis à part les bougnoules ?

perdre contre des albanais sous-entrainé

Marseille cette ville perdue pourquoi il joue pas dans le championnat dz

Marseille aurait pu prendre 3 buts en 10 minutes

Marseille depuis que les PSG a gagné la ldc ils sont

Je vais bruler mon maillot de l'OM et plus jamais supporter ce club et me barrer loin de ce shithole

Ils ont gaché ma jeunesse ces fils de pute

Rulli noté 9.7/10