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Pourquoi la reconstruction de Liverpool est plus dangereuse qu'on ne le pense

We will likely see Kerkez as the left back, Frimpong or Bradley as the right back, Szoboszlai and Gravenberch in the midfield double pivot, and Wirtz and Ekitike linking up in the attack along with Salah on the right and Gakpo being used on th e left during pre season. This first big difference compared with last season can be seen when playing out from the back. Last season, Slot liked to use his fullbacks in a relatively hybrid position, not too narrow but also not too wide. But now his approach looks like Postecoglou's, with the fullbacks starting higher up the pitch and in the half spaces. Specifically, while the left back Kerkez is used a little bit more defensively, Bradley or Frompong appears to have the license to roam more freely and are very frequently seen on the defensive line and ready to give support to Salah out wide. This build up shape is very narrow. If the center backs are pressed, it's Grevenberch or Szoboszlai that give support out wide or in the center. But beacuse of this aggressive shape out wide, teams will likely not commit too many players forward. If they do then it means Liverpool are comfortable quickly getting the ball forward into wingers, something we saw a lot early in the season last year. Interestingly, one of the big differences between Bradley and Frimpong is that Frimpong is more likely to be the player hugging the touchline with Salah drifting more centrally. As they move up the pitch, the team essentially splits in 2 groups of 5 with behind, 2 center backs, the left back and the double pivot. The front 5 will be more fluid and rotate their positions and not give the defense anything to latch onto. The links between the 2 groups is usually down to the 3 midfielders, with Szoboszlai and Wirtz rotating frequently, with Wirtz often dropping far from his starting position to receive the ball, and his position being occupied by any other player up top.
Sometimes Ekitike dropping off the defensive line or even players like Bradley moving into a more central position. Seeing Wirtz's stats from FotMob last season, we see how important he was both offensively and defensively for Bayer Leverkusen. In the league he ranked as one of the best players both for expected goals and expected assists, along with the most amoutn of successful dribbles. Even more crucial for a manager like Arne Slot are his defensive numbers and his interceptions, recoveries, and high regains were some of the best numbers in the Bundesliga for players in his position. However, Wirtz will probably rarely move out wide since his crossing accuracy and success rate was one of the lowest for players in his position. So he will naturally be more of a threat down the middle with late runs into the box to finish off moves. This more possession oriented system allows Liverpool to control possession more easily whilst also having a lot of players in attack. When in the opposition's third it can often just be Van Dijk and Konaté at the back with Gravenberch ready in the center with both fullbacks being used high up the pitch and big clusters of players being created with these rotations forward. It means that a lot of players can end up in the box and with players like Szoboszlai, Wirtz and Bradley, there are countless of players ready to crash into the box. Even a player up top like Ekitike is not fixed in his position. Liverpool will likely give defenses few reference points that they can latch onto. We system seems like a natural progression from last season but in the same time we can see why it might be too risky in certain situations.


Comment le nouveau système d'Amorim a exposé Arsenal… et malgré tout perdu

Man United cause a lot of issues to Arsenal's defense with their direct play. But they also struggled to pack the box with players. Statistically Man United dominated Arsenal. From the back Man United would have De Ligt pushing alongside Casemiro, Fernandez pushing slightly further up the pitch and this formed a sort of diamond uptop with Mount on the top and the 2 inside forwards Mbeumo and Cunha. Yoro and Shaw started closer to Bayindir. The wingbacks gave options outwide outside of Arsenal's central block. Odegaard and Gyokeres in the front 2 didn't close down the center backs aggressively. Arsenal adopted a passive 4 4 2 defensive hspae. It was to shadow mark the pivots in the center and force Man United out wide before applying pressure and make sure the ball wouldn't go through the center. But as Man United rotated back to the gk, this press wasn't aggressive and there was time to pick a pass further up the pitch. Man United looked to play over Arsenal's midfield, win the aerial duels and pounce on the second balls, starting their attack from a more advanced position. Cecause their offensive shape caused a slight overload on Arsenal's defensive line, Zubimendi would pick Fernandes and the fullbacks had to keep an eye on the wingbacks. So then winning the ball in the air, Man United consistently found a player between the lines and then look to move player outwide and start the attack. Even when they didn't win the ball, the close proximity of these players meant that they were ready to counterpress quickly and suffocate any Arsenal's player on the ball. They were able to create opportunities from quick transitions and counter attacks. From more structured position when Man United had possession around midfield, the wingbacks would push forward onto the defensive line. The key to play these balls in behind was down to the clever rotations in the center. Mount, Mbeumo and Cunha were consistently swapping positions.
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Comment la formation 3-1-3-3 de Maresca révolutionne Chelsea

This time there is a well drilled system to build on for Chelsea.Last year, Maresca experimented different shapes and patterns. Generally speaking, the most used set up was a 3 2 5 with one of the fullbacks inverting as a double pivot or even as an inside forward. After a period where Chelsea struggled to string good results together, this setup worked better towards the end of the season mostly thank to Cucurella adopting a more fluid role and Caicedo being able to work as a single holding midfielder allowing Chelsea to get more players forward in attack. But one of the most subtle changes came down to where Chelsea wanted to keep possession.During a rough spell of a the season, Chelsea could not break down low blocks in any way they tried. They would push further and further up the pitch and suffocate the opponent deep in their half. But this constant circulation of possession meant there was little space for their dangerous players to create meaningful chances. And players like Cole Palmer were dropping deeper and deeper to get on the ball and were struggling to have a substancial impact. The big chances in performance happened gradually. First the shape morphed into more of what we see now which is a 3 1 3 3 shape with a more fluid use of Cucurella on the left and Palmer adopting a more central role or in the right half space. But the second major change was where Chelsea would circulate possession and were not now reliant on holding the ball in these areas but were more patient circulating the ball from a deeper position. This meant the opposition has their defensive line higher up the pitch. There was more space in the midfield for players to get on the ballAnd when they did break forward, chances were created quickly before the opposition's defense could set up. This system wasn't always perfect and Chelsea got caught out by times trying to play out from the back.
But the impact it had overall in their attacking output was worth the risk. This is the foundation of the next season for Chelsea. In the 3 1 3 3 you will see the back 3 and the single pivot Caicedo who hold everything together so the attack can flow. When playing out from the back, the center backs split wide and Cucurella will invert next to Caicedo, forming a double pivot. Up top, the wingers pin the fullbacks and in the center, 2 players, likely Palmer and Pedro or Delap will start in close proximity. This direct pass through the middle is something Sanchez looks for quite frequently. We saw it in the World Cup club final against PSG and in their pre season friendlies. It quickly allows Chelsea to push forward. This shape allows the goalkepper to pass centrally. If they are pressed, it frees the player further up the pitch. Because of this specific danger, most of the time the opposition will concede some space and Chelsea can move into their 3 1 3 3 shape. Cucurella forms the second line of 3 with Palmer and Enzo Fernandezwhile the front 3 are on the defensive line and as wide as possible. From here Chelsea are still very patient on possession. Play rotates from side to side and the 2 wide midfielders move into these spaces to receive the ball. If not pressed they can pass out wide and attack the half space. Or if they are pressed then this create even more danger for the opponent. This constant circulation around the back ensures that Chelsea can progress in lots of different ways. Once the player receives the ball between the lines, the front 3 are in the perfect position to attack forward. Sometimes Palmer might drop deep to receive the ball or swap places with Cucurella. It keeps the opponent having to chance who they need to mark. It means these central passes can come at any moment, either directly through the middle or going around the press. But at one point, or another, Chelsea will look to cut right through the hear of the opponent.
The final third is where the true danger of this system can be seen. As the play shifts out wide, 3 players are ready to attack the box. The winger has space to cut inside because of this run into the half space that drags away a defender, and the rest of the players can quickly the backpost to meet any crosses into the box. We saw that in the 2 - 0 goal against AC Milan. As Neto cuts onto with his left foot, there are 5 players attacking the box, with James overlapping on the right flank. While all these players are attacking, Chelsea create constant overloads in dangerous areas, making it very difficult for opponents to defend against their fluid and quick movement. However, this system also requires excellent tactical discipline and a high work rate especially in transitional movements. Defensively, the back 3 and the pivot need to be alert to counterpress quickly when possession is lost to avoid being exposed.

Comment Thomas Frank a fait taire Guardiola


When you are this possession oriented you cannot have any weak point in the build up especially in the first phases. When Man City splitted their center backs and having Gonzalez and Reijnders looking to provide options, they were often picked by Palhinha and Betancur while Sarr or Johnson would push high to support Richarlison. This led to the game changing goal when Trafford chose to pass to the central man under pressure instead of passing to the center back out wide. Trafford also often played long into Haaland. Generally in open pay, Man City played in a 3 4 3 box shape. But the players in the midfield had more freedom but most often ended up as a diamond. In ressponse, Spurs looked to defend in a 4 4 2. This meant that space were mostly on the sides. That meant that if Johnson was dranwn out of possition to a center back especially, there were space behind. But more often Lewis moved infield which dragged Johnson. This had the same effect of opening room on City's right flank where Cherki would often look to receive. But Tottenham was prepared and Van De Van, the center back, would drop on Cherki all the way to this zone. But with City having so many dangerous runners in behind like Marmoush and Haaland, having a center back that out of position wasn't ideal. So Frank adapted and whenever Lewis or Cherki received on these zones, Spence was pressing the receiver with the back 3 shifting across. Ait Nouré as a left back is more dynamic than Aké, often pushing up the flank, occasionally inverting into the midfield, leaving a back 2 in the build up. Once Ake was in, it was more often a back 3, leaving the midfield to deal with the progression. Tottenham's front 2 were willing to energetically press the back 2 or 3. Spurs center backs were willing to be aggressive to prevent the free man in the midfield to turn in the first place. Even when City bypassed it, Spurs quickly dropped compact vertically taking away the space between the lines.

This had disadvantage as Spurs struggled in first half to get out and any clearance tended to fall to a City's defender with their back 3 sspread horizontally. When Spurs had possession, City looked to press high up but they struggled to press effectively. City initially sat in a 4 1 4 1 mid block which allowed a man to man setup in the midfield. However unless Haaland could cut the pass out between the center backs which he rarely did, Spurs could change the point of attack down both sides of the pitch, making them more difficult to defend against. So City shifted into a 4 4 2, trying to apply pressure on both center backs and force then to one side of the pitch. Sometimes Cherki was pushing. Problem was that neigher Haaland or Cherki was as aggressive pressers as Spurs' front 2. So Van de Van and Romero still could get their heads up at times, potentially playing into the midfield where Spurs would now have na advantage. So Bobb from the right joined Haaland for the press, allowing Cherki to stay deeper. But again the issue was the intensity of the City's press and the coordination. For this to be effective, Lewis had to be instantly on Spence to force him backwards or into an error. But often he gave him the time to turn and pick out a man higher up the pitch. To take advantage of City's high line, we saw at times Sarr pushing right up alongside Richarlison so Spurs had 4 runners to attack the space in behind. These constant runs forced Trafford to be more and more aggressive with his positionning as the game progressed as he tried to reduce the space in behind as the match went on, leading to some hairy situations.

The Tactical Failure Of Every Manchester United Manager

At Everton, Moyes wasn't a possession oriented manager. His philosophy was built on directness and physicality. Get the ball forward quickly, press high when out of possession and rely on set pieces or second balls to create chances. Fellaini was injured so in man United we saw Cleverly, Fletcher and even Phil Jones as pivot. Some rare times it was an aging Ryan Giggs. Van Persie's injury saw Rooney pushed back as a center forward role. Rooney sometimes actually dropped as a number 10 to help the pivots but this time the 10 replacing him would be a true 10 who would stay between the lines rather than drop in and help defenders. Kagawa barely had minutes. So Man United started more direct and long plays bypassing the midfield. But when it didn't work, Man United was caught in a situation of either sterile possession where they struggled to play through the center. Or they pumped it long leading to rapid turnovers. Januzaj drifted from the left earlier and earlier to become a pseudo number 10. Juan Mata was bought in.As number 10 he genuily provided an outlet, getting on the ball and threading through dangerous passes to Rooney and ther wingers ahead of him. But now the club had Rooney, Mata and Van Persie, all 3 for 2 spots. Moyes leaned heavily on Rooney so Mata took the hit and was moved out to the right where he struggled. Before mata came, the wingers tended to begin wide. Moyes encouraged the fullbacks to overlap outside of them to create 2 v 1 and have as many crosses in the box as possible. They had 2 targets with Rooney and Van Persie. With only Rooney they barely had presence as Rooney would often drop deep for the cut back. Crosses lacked movement, variety and elite delivery. And it became predictable. Absence of a midfield run into the box was a consequence of the static double pivot. In 2014 vs Fulham Man United had 81 crosses and yet the match ended 2 - 2.

Moyes spent most of the time trying to nullify the opponent rather than exploiting the opponent's weaknesses. Man United was trying to fall back into defensive shape rather than quickly trying to win the ball back. With both fullbacks were high and the static double pivot, Man United became vulnerable on the flanks so they had to drop quickly to compensate. The deeper defensive line also neutered United's counter attacking threat. Under Ferguson Man United won the ball back often in advanced positions and had the pace to exploit disorganized defenses. Moyes' tactical failure at Man United is a lesson about understanding a team's tactical identity. Man United imposed its will on his opponents, played with courage and ambition. Moyes replaced it with caution and pragmatism. Worse part is that Moyes tactics weren't fundamentally wrong, like crossing, defensive solidity, pragmatism. But tactic without context is meaningless. Moyes didn't understand that at Man United.

Louis Van Gaal was called in 2014. He came with his unshakable belief in his possesssion based system. He had success with Ajax, Barcelona, Bayern and Netherlands. He bought Ander Herrera to increase ball playing ability in the midfield. Di Maria and Daley Blind were also coming. Rojo and Shaw came as well. Falcao was supposed to bring attacking threat. Man United played with a back 3. But against Swansea, it didn't work as Swandea dropped into a compact 4 2 4 and invited Man United's center backs Smalling, Jones and Blackett to play with the ball. The defenders didn't have the technical ability or the vision to hurt the opposition from deep. Burnley and Sunderland would copy Swansea. The squad was not ready for the transition and it was too early. The shift to a 4 4 2 diamond represented a tacid admission and it transformed United's central area from a weakness to a stranght. With 4 midfielders in close proximity they could execute more of the short intricate passing and combinations that Van Gaal craved. Shaw was bringing the width down the left. In the diamond Di Maria was used off the left to inject chaos. The other midfielders were instructed to maintain possession at all costs while Di Maria had the licence to drive forward with the ball. This mix of structure and spontaneity looked promising. But Van Gaal worked into moving into a more and more structured, positional system. Football became increasingly rigid and mechanical. Every pass had to be optimized and had to serve the system. Every movement had to prioritize possession, retention over penetration. Di Maria who thrived on instinct and improvisation, foud himself suffocated by the structure. The slow and methodological build up was also the result of the frontline with Rooney as 10 dropping and assisting the build up. But Man United didn't have runners breaking beyond the lines to add the threat of the pass over the top. The fullbacks or wingbacks looked to provide the width.
But as they started so deep they still had to keep an eye on defense. So their running wasn't consistent enough to provide genuine depth to stretch the opposition. 2 things were consistent during Van Gaal's first season at Man United : injuries and formula changes. That season had 39 injuries in total. Blind helped about the progression of the ball but provided little width. The midfield didn't have enough creativity. With Van Persie's injuries, Rooney was forced back as a center forward and Mata was sstill only drifting from the right. It was a structured slow positional side with no creativity. When they had no idea they would just go long for Fellaini. Against Mourinho's Chelsea they lost 1 0 despite having 70% of possession. Chelsea was sitting deep daring Man United's midfield to conjure up anything that resembled the creativity needed to break a deep block. The one positive change with Man United playing 4 3 3 was the press. Schneiderlin and Schweinsteiger were bought in next season. First season, Man United finished 4th which was good but the pressure was still there. Depay and Martial came here to add more dynamism. Second season, Man United often played in a 4 2 3 1. The front 3 just behind Rooney had a lot of flexibility. But Rooney was aging and struggling to hold down the frontline when it came to run in behind. Martial constantly cutting in, Shaw missing most of the season because of leg injury. Blind was struggling to provide the deep run from the left. Van Gaal doubling down on the calculated patterns of play meant that they attacked very slowly. They had the second highest possession in the league behind Arsenal. But they the wingers drifted centrally, they were narrow and predictable. Man United were 15th in term of shoots per game. 3 of the 5 behind Man United got relegated. Thingss only got better when injuries forced Van Gaal to use Lingard and Rashford. At least Man United only conceded 35 goals in the 2015 / 2016 season.



But Van Gaal ended being too convinced about his methods despite overwhelming evidences of his failure. Even when Man United won the FA Cup, it was more because of their defensive solidity and the opponent's errors rather than the flowing and attacking football that the club supporters craved. He was stubborn. Under Jose Mourinho, Eric Bailly came for 38 millions of euros, to add steel and mobility to the backline. The creativity concerns were adress by bringing in Mkhitaryan for 42 millions. Then they broke a transfert record at this time with Paul Pogba's arrival from Juventus for 105 millions of euros, pairing him with Zlatan coming as a free transfer. But Schneiderlin and Schweinsteiger departed. Carrick played this role at times he was 35 years old and never was the most mobile pivot anyway. It left Mourinho with other midfielders to play this single pivot role like Pogba, Fellaini... but he didn't trust them at it. So he often compensated by switching to a 4 2 3 1 with Herrera and Pogba as the double pivot. But this altered Man United's structure. While Man United was top 5 of the league in term of possession, it was more the product of the squad's quality rather than philosophical intent. Pogba was the hub, consisstently registering the most touches and serving as the primary progressive force from deep with exceptionnal passing range. Since he was the heartbeat of the team, smaller teams tried to cut passing lanes to him which forced to play to the other pivot where progression issues reppeared. But Rooney was declining. Lingard as a 10 in the other hand was a young talent struggling to show his ability. The right wingers, Mkhitaryan or Mata, would drift centrally to alleviate this and provide some creative threat. But other teams could allow themselves to be passive as long as they didn't allow Pogba higher up into the creative positions. Against deeper sides, Pogba had to push higher up to become the creator. This left the other pivot isolated.

So if Manchester United lost the ball, the threat of a counter was ever present. To prevent this as the season went on, especially for the biggest matches, Carrick was reintroduced alongside Herrera to allow Pogba as a number 10. Unlike Van Gaal, Mourinho had a plan B. He would move Fellaini as a 10 on some occasions, allowing Man United to skip all the progression. This aerial presence was also helped by Zlatan. Down from the right wing it was more about creating with Mata or Mkhitaryan. But down the left it was more about goalscoring through Rashford or Martial who both preferred to play as a inside forwards. When the space was there this was effective in increasing both the creativity and the goal threat. But when the opponent sat narrow there was no room to maneuver. So the fullbacks had to provide almost all the width.However, Valencia as a right back was a woeful crosser often blasting it low and hard and hoping for the best. The left back was either Blind or Darmian. Blind was more of a pass oriented fullback so he wasn't really tearing up his flank to get crosses in. Darmain wasn't renowned for whipping crosses in either. So despite the fact that Man United had players like Pogba, Zlatan, Fellaini, all good in the air, Man United didn't have the crosses quality that matched their talent. For the next season, Mourinho bought Lukaku, Lindelof, Matic, Sanchez. Injuries and a suspension of Pogba caused issues early on. But when he was available the starting 11 often had Lukaka as the center forward and Matic as a pivot alongside Pogba. Last season at Chelsea, Matic was excellent at protecting his defense, to the point that he helped Kanté developing a new element in his game with Kanté having the freedom to be more a box to box midfielder. At Man United Matic wad doing the same with Pogba.It worked for the most part. However they were just a better version of the same team last season, meaning that problems were still present.
Pogba's attacking instincts vs Mourinho's defense first philosophy created a constant battle. Herrera was put as an extra midfielder alongside Matic to compensate for Pogba's attacking instincts. But this left a gaping hole in the number 10 position. So plays became again more long and direct with Lukaku being misprofiled. A tall player playing as a center forward can lead to assumptions about their ability to hold up the ball like a target man. But Lukaka was better at running in behind. So Mourinho by times turned to Fellaini to come late in the game and save the day. But the problem of having a definitive secondary goalscorer was never solved. First season it was Zlatan leading in goalscoring, in second season it was Lukaku. But the second best goalscorer was in both cases far behind. They tried to solve it with Alexis Sanchez but despite his success at Arsenal, his goalscoring dropped massively at Man United. At the end of the day there was still a lack of central creativity and a lack of wide threat. Combined with the fact that the didn't really trust his pairing of center backs, meaning that he kept his fullbacks too conservative rather than bombing on. Man United managed to finish second of the Premiere League behind Man City. However they overperformed their xG by almosts 9 goals while De Gea carried a mid defense during the whole season. Man United conceded almost 16 goals less than the xG suggested. Expected points had them finishing in 6th rather than 2nd. Despite a FA Cup and a Europa League trophy, Mourinho couldn't keep his job at Man United for that long.


Solskjaer. He came as an interim in 2018. But him staying for 3 years and a half shows that Man United lacked a defined managerial strategy. Each Man United managers since Ferguson came with their own philosophy, signed some players to fit their system, get fired when the board lost patience leaving fragments of incompatible strategies. There was no tactical cohesion. Solskjaer brought more positivity. He was more willing to adapt to the opponent splitting between a 4 2 3 1, a 4 3 3 and a 4 4 2 diamond. Each formation unlocked 2 key players : Pogba and Rashford. Rashford went from left wing to center forward and the focal point of Man United's counter attacking system. Pogba was consistently paired with Matic and another midfielder, freeing Pogba to orchestrate attacks and launching his diagonal passes. It was simple tactics but well executed. Solskjaer often got both fullbacks pushing high simultaneously to provide the width. The wingers could tuck in and more importantly the wider midfielders didn't like to drift too wide. In possession the diamond moved into a 4 3 3 with the false 9 being Lingard or Mata. But one of the biggest adaptation was having Lukaku to move into the right wing. So it allowed him to beat his fullback in the air when needed but most importantly attack the center at pace facing the goal rather than with his back to goal. It led to more goals. With more men higher up to attack, Solskjaer got his side to counter press more. There was more speed in attack and more intensity in defense. This was backed by the diamond shape when they had to defend for longer spells, with the front 2 pressing the wide side of the center backs to force central play and walking the opposition straight into their pressing traps. However when he arrived Man United was first in the Premiere League. Once his spell was permanent, towards the end of the season, they plummeted to 16th for that time period.
Even in their winning spell, they had some holes. There was a reason why Mourinho hesitated to commit his fullbacks in attack or to a high press. Ole's side conceded too much. For the 2019 / 2020 season, Maguire, Fernandes, Wan Bissaka and Daniel James were signed. De Gea's shot stopping was perfect for a team sitting deep like under Mourinho. But his inhability to get involved as a third center back against an opposition's press began to hamstring the build up. The right side of the defense, Wan Bissaka and Lindelof weren't that good on the ball either. Shaw was injured again also. So Maguire and Young had more responsabilities as a result. In the midfield, Perreira wasn't really a creative threat as an attacking midfielder. Matic often had to drop into the backline to assist the build up when Maguire was being pressed. He was better than most of the center backs at ball progression. But he wasn't Pogba level either. Matic dropping that deep also meant that the number 10, either Lingard or Perreira, had to drop in to assist the remaining pivot, reducing the threat in those key creative zones. So Man United struggled coming near the final third with a true number 10 orchestrating high quality opportunities.

How Jurgen Klopp Transformed Liverpool | Liverpool Champions League 2018/19 | Klopp Tactics

In the 2014 / 2015 season, Liverpool under Rodgers usually played a 4 3 3. Sterling would often drop deep allowing Sturridge and Suarez central. Rodgers played a fluid attacking style led by a front 3 who led them to score over 100 goals. They lost out by 2 points to Man City in the end. They conceded 50 goals, which was 2nd most in the top 8. They had a great attack but were let down by the defence. These problems would continue for the 2014 / 2015 season. Rodgers was unsure on how to play to make up for the loss of Suarez so he sporadically changed formations between the 3 4 3, the 4 2 3 1, the 4 3 3 and other which created uncertainty in the squad. In this season they only scored 51 goals while conceding 48 goals. They scored 101 goals during their lasst season. Their possession went from 55% to 52%. They also conceded more goals than expected goals, meaning that they had deficiencies both in gk and defense. When Klopp came, he had an instant impact with an Europa League final which Liverpool lost 3 - 1 to Sevilla. During the 2016 / 2017 season we truly started to see the club's philosophy taking place. He gave the team a system so each player knew exactly their role. They used the 4 3 3 in 35 of their 38 matches. They finished fourth but there was a clear progression. They had more possession, more goals for, less goals against, more shots for, less shots against, more cross for and lesscross against. Then next season came Salah, Solanki, Robertson and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain. Now accustomed to the 4 3 3 they could introduce more tactical elements. They maintained a high press, primarly with a back 4 The front 6 could change shapes from 4 3 3 to stretch defenses to a 4 2 3 1 to keep possession or even the 4 4 2 to isolate the center backs. He converted Salah this seasson from an out and out winger to an inside forward and even a striker. The team made again progression from their previous season.

The biggest factor was Salah who outperformed his xG by 7 points, and Van Dijk coming in winter. The finished fourth again but the expected points had them finishing second. The drop off occurred in the second half of the season probably because they knew that City was winning the league, which they did with 100 points. So they focused on the UCL. And they reached the final. Guys like Trent, Alisson, Shakiri and Firminho were brought in. Klopp knew that his team would need more dynamic flexibility with their tactics for the 2018 / 2019 season. He still primarly used a 4 3 3 but with Firminho as a false 9 to form a 4 4 2 diamond. So the wingers were only wingers on paper. Mané was now more confortable in central areas. The front 3 were fluid and they had more midfielders running into the box which made it harder for the opposition's defneders. Trent and Robertson were the main cross providers. They finished with 97 points, barely second 1 point behind Man City. They outperformed their expected goals conceded thanks to Alisson and Van Dijk mostly. With their clinical forwards, Liverpool also scored 10 more goals than expected. It was their best season on paper. They had 59% in Premiere League overall. Only real drop was the shots for. To maintain fitness, gegenpressing was renewed. The team had now the intelligence to know when to press and when to drop back. He also improved the psychological element by getting them to function as a team rather than individuals, making them greater than the sum of their parts. As Klopp said, the tactics are important but the emotions make the difference. And at the end of the day, they won the Champions League in 2019.




Klopp's Tactics Behind The Greatest Season | Liverpool's 2019/20 Tactics | How Klopp Improved LFC |

Liverpool scored 66 goals or 2,28 goals per game on average just behind Man City. Where they made the difference against City was that they conceded less goals than them, conceding on average less than 1 goal per game. Liverpool almost exclusively lined up in a 4 3 3 with only a few times being in a 4 2 3 1. Alisson was good on the ball, and often made short passes to the center backs. When opponents looked to push up high on the center backs when the keeper has the ball, Fabinho can drop deeperto give them the number advantage. It was a highly vertical team looking to attack quickly. Long diagonals were one of the major weapons. With the fullbacks staying deep initially to support the build up, the midfield shifts to one side, often the left, to drag the opposition across the pitch. Trent in this situation would often stay deeper and wider to make himself an option for the switch or tuck in to the midfield. Either way the opposition' winger stayed close to him which opened a gap in the right handside with either Henderson or Firminho dropping into the right half space with Salah hugging the touchline. So the opposition's fullback had to track 2 men, giving Salah more room. Van Dijk as the left center back was instructed to attempt this switch often with almost 10 long balls per game on average, the second in his team, and completing over 5 of them. This meant that Salah could be 1 v 1 against the fullback with the rest of the team clustered on the left. From deep, the fullbacks completed the most passes from deep. But they are also often involved in attack. Switches are big elements of Klopp's Liverpool. And Trent often made these long switches for Robertson so he could attack the left flank and look for a cross. The fullbacks and the wingers also had a strong relationship. The winger often looked to make a deep run in behind to draw the fullback deeper. Liverpool's wide midfielders Wijnaldum and Henderwon were comfortable moving into this space created.
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Quand Pep jouait contre l'anti-Pep



On one side Guardiola, the meticulous composer who hawritten every note in advance, conducting his plalyers through a symphony perfected over the years. Every movement is planned, every pass premeditated and every position calculated to create a perfect math equation on the grass. On the other hand, Fernando Diniz the jazz conductor giving his musicians the freedom to improvise collectively in real time. While Guardiola writes his sheet music Diniz gives his players the freedom to create jazz in real time. Where Guardiola demands precision, Diniz embraces beautiful chaos. It was Man City vs Fluminense, the match between positionism and relationism. With this Fluminense, no need for structure passing lanes, no systematic progression through the thirds and no need for optimal spacing between the players. During City's build up in the other hand, it was often the same, with Ederson stepping wider as a center back to allow Stones pushing alongside Rodri into the midfield. Aké provides the width on the left and the box midfield beginss to form. Positionism is about the manager dictating as many moves as possible. In the other hand, relationism isn't just about letting players on the pitch do everything they want. It's a misconception leading to see relationism as a tactical anarchy. Positional teams create overloads around the ball, typically seeking a + 1 advantage. Matching the opposition's numbers and adding one extra player the free man can then exploit the numerical superiority and begin to progress the attack. Fluminense didn't just want an extra man around the ball. More players providing additional options even when they already have the advantage. They are seeking overwhelming local superiority. Most of coordinated and measured out vertical structures of positionalism allow a minimum of players to be committed deep to allow a many players as possible to remain higher up to receive.

Against a team like Man City, taking risks in possession and looking vulnerable can quickly become your biggest strenghts. The deep clustering of Fluminnese acts as a magnet drawing more and more men forward. You would often see Fluminense taking big risks on the ball. That's because strangely the more danger from Man City is when they have possession, the more danger the opponent is in. Because the more men they committ to the press, the more gaps are there to be exploited. They also look to cluster horizontally to then allow the switch. Sometimes when in possession, Man City prioritized theri defensive structure rather than over committing. Fluminense's principles were taking risks to get men around the ball, create space elsewhere on the pitch, While City also get numbers around the ball to support, they primarily do it within the confines of their structure. Fluminense uses the physical spaces occupied by their actual players to move their opponents whereas Manchester City used the ball and their structure to maneuver opponents around the pitch. Both can work but they demand different relationship between the players, the ball and the very concept of a position. Relationism wasn't spread that much around elite teams because positional play does have some advantages. First by having a player in roughly predefined positions in specific game situations, it allows automatisms to begin to form. Also telephatic understandingss between teammates that make complex moves look effortless. In relationism, the support players are different, the shape change and the options available to ball carriers are constantly changing, placing an enormous cognitive load on the player. They must read the situation, identify their teammates and where they are this time. As a result they always have to process multiple options and execute the right pass under pressure. So a player with the ball will have to put his head up to scan.

Meanwhile a Man City player even under pressure will be in familiar territory and know where his teammates are positionned relative to his location so his decision making process isn't about choosing from infinite possibilities. It's about selecting the optimal options from a limited predictable set. This allows the player to focuss entirely on the execution rather than decision making. The difference becomes crucial when margins are tight and the pressure is intense. And here's another massive advantage of positional play. When they play against a team whose defensive structure plays into their hands, they become devastating. Fluminense had a 4 4 2 defensive structure with ther 2 forwards not sitting on the double pivot but rather pushing up onto the center backs. This created a potential 3 v 2 in the build up for City, a potential 4 v 2 in the midfield as well as a potential 5 v 4 against the backline when the midfielders moved into the half spaces. City often pushed their wide center backs as wide as a fullback would, forcing Fluminense's wingers to engage, making the midfield entry much easier. And more easy to find a man between the lines. As a result City would approach Fluminense's final third without taking the risks that Fluminense's style would demand. In the attacking third, systematic positioning truly separated both teams. City shaped into their signature 3 2 5. With this shape, the fullback had 2 players to pick simultaneously. The the midfielder's run into the half space is tracked typically by the fullback or a midfielder dropping back, it created a room for the winger to drive infield. If the half space run is not attacked, the winger can find the midfielder who then drive into the cutback zone, drawing the center back out of position and creating high value scoring opportunities.

Even Fluminense typically defended in 4 4 2 but it's hard for them to go from a highly unstructured in possession to a highly structured defensive play when out of possession. When attacking, positional teams tend to maintain relatively even spacing and roughly speaking will maintain their positions with support for the man in possession, only coming from nearby teammates, meaning that it's much rarer to get into those situations where half the team is clumped in one zone of the pitch. So this combination of overall structure but support around the ball means that when a positional team loses the ball, they have the immediate numbers to immediatly counterpress and try to win it back early. But the key is that the overall structure means that their rest defense is well taken care of so even if the immediate press is escaped there is a second layer of defense to protect them. But Fluminense's committment to swarming the ball creates a completly different problem.

Kompany nous montre-t-il la prochaine évolution du football ?

In possession most of the elites team play in a 3 2 5 or a 2 3 5 typically trying to overload the midfield. Typically teams tend to defend in a 4 4 2. Leipzig out of possession shifted from a 4 3 3 to a 4 4 2. If the front 2 are on the double pivot, the center backs have more responsability on the ball. It can slow down a possession side greatly. To counter this, Kompany had Kimmich move to either side of the center backs sometimes to a left center back position but more commonly to a right center back position. Meanwhile, Laimer would move into the right half space with Stanisic temporarily moving into a pivot position. The space outside the opposition's front 2 often emerge as the free zones and that's why we see more and more of the influencial game dictators moving into this zone to get space to create. The issue when Bayern had the possession higher up the pitch is that Kimmich drifted back into his normal midfield position with Stanisic now moving higher up the pitch. which wasn't a problem. But it meant that Bayern had 2 center backs protecting against the transitions. This meant there were acres of space behind the inverted fullbacks. But a key factor in Bayern's possession is fluidity. Not just in term of positional rotation but also in term of formation fluidity. When Kimmich operated in the backline, Gnabry and Kane operated as more of a front 2. Both are good at dropping deep and running in behidn which caused problems to Leipzig's defense. Once the ball was higher up, Bayern used a 2 2 in the build up allowing Stanisicto move higher up to either be wideor in the half space depending on Diaz's movements while at the same time it gave the Bavarians the potential to overload zone 14.
The effect was having one of the front line, either Kane or Gnabry, dropping in. But because they had a front 5 ahead of them, who were not only pinning the backline deep but were also willing to run in behind there was the danger that Bayern would be able to find this man who could then find the runner. Kane in particular when dropping deep is threatening. Defending in a back 4, there was the danger of letting a wide man with too much room. We saw both Laimer and Olise taking advantage of this. On paper both teams lined up with a 3 man midfield. However initially the goal for Bayern was also to defend but in a 4 4 2. But unlike passive teams who have their front 2 on the midfield, Gnabry and Kane were high on the center backs. But this made them be down 3 v 2 in the midfield. Kompany adapted by dropping Gnabeyr deeper in the press with Olise coming in from the right handside to join Kane. So Bayern were able to keep the pressure on the center backs while having a man to man situation in the midfield. But that didn't solve all the problems because now Laimer and Diaz had to pick up the fullbacks, leaving just 3 at the back. And Leipzig looked to spread their front 3 as wide as possible to isolate Bayern Munich's backline as much as possible.

Pourquoi Liverpool contre Arsenal n'était pas seulement une question de coup franc de Szoboszlai

Arteta's decision to leave Odegaard on the bench made Arsenal's most dangerous weapon ( corners ) useless. Odegaard has a shoulder injury against Leeds although deemed to be fit against Liverpool. With Merino as a right midfielder, Declan Rice had a deeper role when Arsenal were building from the back often dropping between the center backs and dictating the tempo from a deeper position. The majority of the time, Rice is used in the left inside channel pushing further up the pitch and adding tupposrt to Martinelli on the flank. But in this setup it was the left back Calafiori who had a more attacking role and picked up these positions in the half space. This shape meant that they had a lot players involved in the build up. Zubimendi would rotate as the pivot in the center. And with Timber holding his position at the back on the right side, Arsenal often ended up with 4 or 5 players behind the line of the ball. The objective was to drag Liverpool high up the pitch, circulating the ball around the back and creating bigger and bigger gaps in the midfield. Then when the moment arrives, find the player between the lines and attack Liverpool's back 4 with the front 3 of Martinelli, Gyokeres and Madueke stretching the pitch as much as possible. This hapepned by times during the first half. However there was an instance of Van Dijk intercepting a pass into the midfield. Losing the possession in this area and you can be completly exposed.

When Arsenal broke through the press and found the front 3 they were kinda toothless. Gyokeres only had 17 touches and didn't have a single shot on target. Madueke showed a bit more especially with long balls from Raya. However, Kerkez was brillant with great tackles and recoveries. Usually in corners Arsenal swings delivery towards the goal and Arsenal rush forwards, crowding the defenders and the keeper. These swingings are often delivered by Rice on the left and Odegaard on the right. But without Odegaard, Rice took the corners form the right as well and his deliveries were out swinging away from the keeper. It made it easier for Liverpool to defend as the team can push up with the ball. And the majority of the corners of this game were from the right flank. As for Liverpool, Slot used Szoboszlai as the right back since Frimpong is injured instead of playing someone like Connor Bradley who is an actual right back. With this slow rotation towards the center, Liverpool can outnumber the opposition's midfield. This rotation took a long time to be effective in this match because for the first half a the first part of the second half, Szoboszlai was locked into his position out wide, used as a circulating possession outlet but sstruggling to get forward and help the attack. It was mostly down to a good Arsenal's press with Gyokeres and Merino covering the 2 center backs. And Rice would push forward onto Grevenberch. Because there weren't many options in the midfield, Liverpool needed to stay out wide. This meant Salah was often isolated on the right and he also struggled to get past Calafiori. Even when Liverpool tried to play directly to the wingers, Arsenal's central block forced Liverpool to circulate possession around the back again. Mosquera as a center back was also good at replacing an injured Saliba. Slot mainly relies on finding players between the lines. The idea was to get Arsenal's midfielders to push forward on McAllistair and Kerkez to free this gap.



Nous a-t-on menti sur la relance courte ?

Building from the back went from just an idea to an untouchable philosophy. Coaches built their whole team aroud this idea. But almost every week we see goals conceded from avoidable ways all in the name of having a clear tactical identity and following the manager's philosophy at all costs. But does the amout of chances or goals it leads to justify the risk? Some pundits, ex players, fans, are not trully convinced. When it works, it's beautiful free flowing football but when it doesn't, it often results in an important goal scoring opportunity for the opposition. For example when Onana came in Man United, he was supposed to transform United into a more possession oriented side, into a more modern looking football team since the departure of David De Gea who was an unbelievable shot stopper but not really as good at building from the back. But Man United kept being plagued by issues during build up and by bad goalkepping. But a lot of teams are facing similar problems. Build up play emerged as a simple tactical idea : control the ball in all areas of the pitch and you can control the game. It started as a way to have possession and as a way to counter high pressing teams, dropping deeper in order to stretch the press and find spaces between the lines for your more offensive players to attack from. This was down to the fact that by using your goalkepper as an outfield player you will naturally have a man advantage and by circulating possession, you could more easily free up a player further up the pitch. As a result the prize for ball playing center backs and goalkeppers sky rocketed. These previously defensive minded players now completed more passes than the midfielders for the first time in history. This idea of building up from the back slowly gained popularity. A game rule changed the tactical landscape in 2019.
Now players could receive the ball inside the penalty area from goal kicks. Center backs would start closer to the keeper. Managers started to experiment different shapes in attack. More and more automated passing sequences were used to gain an advantage by manipulating the space with calculated passes. Some managers based their whole ideology on the build up play. Defensive teams adapted. Initially teams were experimenting with zonal principles, not committing too many players forward fearing that the man's disadvantage would be too much to handle. Then teams started to be more aggressive, latching onto all midfielders, trying to force play in specific areas of the pitch. Most of the teams looking to press higher up tend to adopt a man oriented press. You rarely see a specific defensive shape from opposition's goal kicks. As a result build up started to look increasingly similar with teams waiting for the goalkepper to be closed down and a third man pass into the free player allow them to gain ground. Or they lure the press forward then play it over the top for the forwards. Defensive teams are aware of this approach so even if there is a free player, then limiting any option further up the pitch. it's not long before the defensive team can once again reform their shape and the pattern begins again. There are teams still excellent at breaking the first line but managers are finding out that just buying goalkeepers and defenders beacuse of their passing range might be a bit short sighted. Man City in 2024 / 2025 season had one of their worst season under Guardiola but still were the most efficient from the build up, creating an xG of 5,03 and a positive goal difference of 8. It's an evidence that with the right players, this system can work. City are still a more direct team and will go logn more frequently especially to Haaland up front.

With Hansi Flick's Barcelona they build up from the back from 95% of goal kicks. Players start in the center before movign out wide, mostly on the left flank. From these goal kicks? Barcelona have created an xG of 3,33 during the 2024 / 2025 season and had an expected goal against of 1,92. But looking at their actual difference from their goal kick, it's 1. Barcelona who are one of the best team at playing out from the back in la Liga have conceded more goals than they have scored from their goal kicks. Their xG from opposition's build up is higher than the xG from their own build up. So it begs the question : why not go long more oftenn not risking losing possession in your own half and try and regain the ball higher up the pitch where you are statistically more likely to create a chance. These are 2 teams where build up can still be somewhat interpreted as a positive choice. But there are other teams that make us wonder if they were not suited for better tactics. Postecoglou's Tottenham for example. Injuries didn't help but his choice to build up at all costs didn't help in the Premiere League. 97,8% of the goal kicks were taken short While this led to relatively high xG created, it also led to one of the worst xG conceded in the league. For all this hard work and efford to build from the back, the result is a goal difference of 0. They have scored the same amount of goals as they have conceded from their own goal kicks. It's an even worse story if we look at Chelsea with a negative xG from goal kicks leading towards a lot of frustration towards the manager for his incessant ideology even though there are clearly some difficulties from the players in adapting to his system. With Man United their issues during the 2024 / 2025 season were more related to build up from a more advanced position, struggling to create chances whilst also suffering quite a high xG conceded, highlighting that the goalkeeper certainly not the only issue within the team.

It's important to note that the objective of build up is not solely to create goalscoring opportunities but also to help the team to control the game and create more dangerous shapes further up the pitch. For example while the team might b uild their attack in a 2 4 4, playing out from the back allows the team to keep possession and then move into a more dangerous offensive shape in the opposition's half in a way that can be easily coached and implemented. The fact that it's a goal kick easily replicated in training and players can learn the patterns in a more structured way. But given what we saw how it might be actually more dangerous than productive, surely there is a better way to get the ball into this position in the first place. Some managers proof that there are indeed other approaches. In the PL, Nottingham Forest and Nuno Espirito Santo. They essentially never build from the back. Nearly all goal kicks have been taken long and they play forward into the opposition's half. It keeps the opponent far away from their goal whilst also creating quick attacks, resulting in a positive goal difference of 4 from their own goal kicks. Better than most of the teams with a core focus on build up. It may not be as consistent and even result in less possession but it can easily lead to more free kicks, throw ins or structured attacks already in the opposition's half. It prooves that even if you don't want immediatly the ball, by applying pressure further up the pitch, the advantages can be more prolific and direct than even a well structured build up.
This doesn't mean you should go long all the time. It does require an effective coaching to create a supporting structure in order to be dangerous from these long balls. For example Chelsea conceded their first goal against Ipswich because they weren't correctly positioned to deal with the long ball from Sanchez. So the solution would seem to be some sort of middle ground with a team capable of adapting to both scenarios. For example a team like Newcastle. This allows them to use the advantage of build up if there is space to do so, but are also ready for any long ball if the opponents are closing them down effectively, resulting in the second best difference from goal kicks in the league during the 2024 / 2025 season as well. But because of their high energy attack and midfield they have realized that they will end up scoring more goals by pressing the opponent high up the pitch rather than trying to outmaneuver them everytime. So a long ball and a high press might be more effective than their own structured build up. All of this doesn't tell us that build up is inherently broken because with the right players it can be dangerous and create goal scoring opportunities. But the blind commitment to build up regardless of context, players or opponent is starting to look less like a tactical choice and more like managers not willing to adapt to the changing tactical landscape. The stats show us that even the top teams are struggling to consistently find value from a deep build up position and some of the best performing teams are the ones mixing it up or going long altogether. It's a reminder that in football no idea regardless of how successfull, should go unchallenged. Because at the end of the day the best tactics aren't the look the most modern, they are the ones that work.


How PSG became INCREDIBLE after losing their BIGGEST stars (Champions)

There was already a solid base to work on with that first season of Enrique's PSG. But a lot of people said that everything would be over for PSG after Mbappé left But this was the end of the bling bling era which was maybe a necessary evil to elevate their brand and get global recognition, sponsors and interests. But now they could fully focus on a genuine sporting project rather than PR signings mixed in there for brand exposure. In the 2024 / 2025 season, PSG lost 3 of their 5 first league phase matches and 1 draw. After that however they went on a magnificent run.

Same Formation, Opposite Results: Tuchel vs Amorim's 3-4-3

It's not like the 3 4 3 formation is inherently wrong. Alonso with Gasperini, Alonso with Bayer Leverkusen knew success with it. Even in the Premiere League, Conte did well with that. Speaking of Premiere League, Tuchel literally won the UCL in 2021 with Chelsea using a 3 4 3 formation. One of Tuchel's back 2 strenght was how proactive it was. When they were in possession they were rarely static. It began from the left center back Rudiger who was consistently aggressive with the ball at his feet. Building with a back 3 is great because against sides who press with 2 forwards, the opposition is never able to get completly man to man because the third center back is always the escape valve. Rudiger was often that escape and when he received he pushed up into the midfield. Against sides pressing with 1 forward or sides who didn't press at all, this movement became even more important. Having one spare man in the build up is great but having 2 spare men becomes wasteful as those extra men could be better used high up the pitch as passing options, goalscoring threats or just general disruptive entities. That's what Rudiger's movement alllowed as he pushed higher up the pitch to join and disrupt the midfield. He wasn't alone because when the opposition gave Azpilicueta room, he could push up higher as well. If we compare to Amorim's Man United, Amorim was at his tenure less adventurous with his backline even when opponents invited them forward by giving them room in the wider regions, the center backs stayed in their flatter 3 leading to potential wasted men in possession. As time has gone especially this season we see more and more of the wider center backs pushing up. Luke Shaw at left center back as well as Mazraoui or Yoro as the right center back have been more willing to do this, making the build up play more dynamic. But the back 3 isn't only about the wide center backs.

At the heart of the system, there is the central center back. For Thomas Tuchel at Chelsea it was Thiago Silva. Having more mobile center backs aisde of him meant that in sustained possession, Silva could be relatively stable positionally. Silva was also renowed for his intelligence about defending without the ball. Another key aspect of his game was his excellent ball playing ability. He could break the line with a pass to the double pivots or even a longer ball over the top into a forward or a wingback making a run in behind. This meant the back 3 alone was a cohesive structure. If the opponent was overly concerned with stopping Thiago Silva, the outboard to the progressors was always on the cards. But if they were too passive trying to stop the ball into the midfield or overindeed on stopping the wide center backs, Thiago Silva had time and space on the ball and could begin to dictate the play. For Amorim the role of the primary ball progressor has mainly fallen to De Ligt at Manchester United. However his progressive passes per match places him in the bottom 24th percentile for center backs, which pales when comparing to Thiago Silva who had far greater quality and quantity of progressive passes and balls into the final third. Both also were used differently. Amorim often asked De Ligt to move into a pivot option early in the build up play. So he was often requested to play with his back to goal rather than getting his head up. Receiving with your back to goal is tricky even for good pivots. No wonder why De Ligt tend to pass safer going backwards, usually an automatism to Lenny Yoro at right center back. Silva by contrast as a more traditional central center back spent most of his time looking ahead at the pitch. Even when Man United moved higher up and De Ligt was in a more natural position, De Ligt and Silva were looking at different images. De Ligt looked at 2 fairly stationary pivots waiting to receive the ball.

It gets worse becacuse on some occasions the opposition doesn't even actively press the center backs and opt instead to keep United's double pivots on their cover shadow. Higher up the pitch you have the attacking midfielders or the wingers depending on your interpretations. Those are the floaters. At Chelsea they consisted mostly of Havertz, Werner or Mount. Regardless, the front 3 was fluid being in constant rotation making it bordeline impossible for the center backs to know who to pick. Most importantly almost all of those men were not only comfortable dropping deep but were under instructions consistently to move deep whenever the pivots were under pressure and needed a third option. While Chelsea looked vulnerable in the middle due to having only 2 men here, they were often 3 v 2, 4 v 3 or even 5 v 3 up, meaning that the backline always had available options. As for Man United the players taking these positions tended to be genuine wingers or inside forwards whose forte was not dropping into the midfield but instead looking to make the runs in behind. Werner drifted to the left for Chelsea and was primarily the runner in behind but he was paired with forwards who could drop in. So if the center backs followed the droppers too closely, Werner could be foud over the top. But his runs could also force opposite's defenses to drop deep earlier than usual, opening up more space for Mout and Havertz to operate between the lines. At Man United Hojlund was often backed by Garnacho, Amad. It resulted into a front 3 that was primarily focused on running in behind, meaning that even if space did open up, there was rarely someone in the correct position with the correct skill set to take advantage. Amorim was aware of that which is why he filtered with the idea of putting Fernandez as one of the forward floaters but he was also needed elsewhere as a pivot. Mount being injured also meant that he couldn't perform his dropping role for Man United like he did with Chelsea.


With his return and Cunha arriving, we will see how Amorim adapts. But that doesn't solve the problems in the center. The midfield for Tuchel's Chelsea was always Jorginho alongside either Kanté or Kovacic. For Man United it was 2 of these 3 ( Fernandez, Ugarte or Casemiro ). One of the midfielders who has most often played as a pivot would not pick the pivot position as his first choice position. In comparision to Jorginho and Kovacic there was essentially no no ball progression from those pivot positions for Man United. Even Kanté who is not the highest volume passer at least brought progression in the form of his ability to carry the ball at his feet. Again, none of Ugarte or Casemiro were particulary great at that. Fernandez was almost forced to play as a pivot as the only one remotely capable of progression the ball for the side. But he is still an attacking midfielder at heart which means that risk is just part of his game. So it's not the safe metronomic passing expected of a pivot but rather the expensive passes of an attacking maverick. that look great when they pay off but also lead to much lower completion rate as well as unecessary turnovers. Add to that the fact that Chelsea's pivots were highly technical and happy to receive on the half turn whereas United are not and instead tend to play safe. And the progression for Man United becomes glaringly obvious. The wingback area also has key issues. First is consistency. Injuries aside Tuchel had a preferred wingback pairing in Reece James and Chilwell with guys like Alonzo being more than capable back up. Amorim on the other hand had a rotating cast of wingbacks. We saw wingbacks playing on their non dominant side such as Dalot as a left wingback and Amad Diallo as a right wingback. So when the wingbacks get into crossing positions they are either delivering from their weaker side or more likely to be forced to cut back onto their stronger foot to allow a better delivery. So the attack is slowed down.

Compare this to Chelsea's wingbacks who when they got into position had no reason for hesitation. All of this is layered with the defensive element of the game. Most of theches, Man United dropped their wingbacks deeper as they shifted to a deep 5 2 3. This can work if the team defends as a unit either dropping deep or pushing higher up in unison. But the issue is that the front 3 launch into a somewhat half hearted press. If these 3 are bypassed the midfield is overloaded. This isn't helped by Fernandez not being a pivot by trade, meaning that he can easily be lured into bad pressing situations, leaving his partner even more isolated. Chelsea on the other hand would almost instantly adapt as soon as they lost the ball. From a 5 2 3 in most cases to now having Mason Mount drop in behind the 2 forwards, the shape being now more of a 5 2 1 2. Unless the opponent was operating in a diamond, Chelsea were rarely overloaded through the center. Even if the opponent were able to get an extra man into the midfield, this is where the hyper aggressive wide center back came into play. Their mobility wasn't just of use to Chelsea in possession. When out of possession if the opponent's forwards tried to drop in to create overloads there was either Rudiger or Azpilicueta harrying their men and following them as deep on the pitch as possible with the rest of the defense seamlessly covering the vacated space. Man United tried to implement this at times but with less success.

Where they had more success is when they sat deeper in a compact shape. As a narrow 5 2 3 had at times been effective at preventing the opponent building through the middle. But when the opponent attacks the wide space rather than being front foot and having the wingbacks press the advancing man, they tend to be late or not push up at all, perhaps expecting a wider forward to cover. As a result this allows the opposition to easily move to their half and set up camp. Compare this to Chelsea who knew that they had a narrow 2 in the defensive phase. They would committ their ballside wingback to press the opposition's fullback whilst the mobile wide center back would be happy to temporarily move into a fullback position to cover. But all of these granular tactical issues are surface level. The real problem is deeper. Tuchel had been a manager heavily favouring a back 4 during his career but he adapted at Chelsea. He found a system and a foundation that suited his players. Amorim on the other hand used a 3 4 3 in almost every single match at Sporting and attempted to export his system over to Manchester United. It was a premeditated decision withotu concern for assessing his squad first. This led to personnal issue such as forcing his world class player Bruno Fernandez to play in a position where he is good but not world class like in his usual position. Amorim is someone who believes in a specific system.

Comment Thomas Frank fait revivre une tactique oubliée chez les Spurs

The concept of double width boils down to keeping 2 players ready on the opposite flank and in the same vertical channel. That way when your team switches play, you isntantly have support to push forward and you could overload the oppositio'ns fullback with a simple overlapping run from your own fullback It was how the majority of the teams used their fullbacks around 10 - 15 years ago before the idea of inverted fullbacks became popular. Look at how Cucurella plays for Chelsea, Calafiori for Arsenal or even Porro for Tottenham under Postecoglou, all used further up the pitch and in an inverted position. This way of using fullbacks is still quite widespread and dangerous if done correctly. The main reason why the use of fullbackss out wide lost its popularity wa because it was seen as a waste of a channel. By having 2 players in this vertical space it meant that it was difficult to get more players involved in the attack and compared to systems like 3 2 5, it usually ends up with one less player on the defensive line. But because the majority of the teams now adopt a man oriented press, having 2 players far away from the ball can create big gaps through the middle for other players to move into. Furthermore, another advantage of this shape is that it doesn't require any complex timings and rotations and the players will already start in the correct position. With Vicario in possession, the fullbacks are as wide as possible hugging the touchline while the center backs also split wide. In the center whilst they initially start with a double pivot, as they push slightly further up the pitch, they only keep one player in that central position, with Betancur usually stepping slightly further up the pitch. This wide shape right from the start of the move makes it it difficult for the opponent to close off every pass.

If they man mark the opposition which is the most common approach, Spurs will move out wide and go down the line where Richarlison and Sarr can also move over to help out. This idea is visible in the goal that made it 1 - 0 against Man City.Spurs played out from the back and Man City locked into a man marking system. Marmoush has to delay his run out wide into Porro because if he goes too soon it opens up a central channel which can be more dangerous, so Romero has the option out wide available. If the opposition doesn't effectively cover this pass through the middle, then you can end up with a similar scenario to the Burnley phase with Romero playing a ball through the middle into Richarlison who has support from Sarr breaking forward and finding Brennan Johnson in behind the defense. Against City once Spurs move out wide, from there, Richarlison and Sarr are pulled over to this flank and an excellent flick forward into Richarlison who beats the offside trap, leaves him in acres of space to push forward anf find Johnson in the center. As Spurs gained control, the center backs were even wider and the fullbacks maintained their position out wide. They don't push forward onto the defensive line but are essentially moving in the same vertical channel as the winger. Because this shape is so expensive with the front 3 stretched out and the fullbacks in support, there are these central channels that can be attacked from a deeper position. On the left we have usually Betancur running into this channel while on the right, Sarr will often attack forward, meaning Spurs can end up with 4 players on the backline consistently and at times when the moment is right, nothing is stopping the fullbacks from underlaping into the half space attacking forward with the wingers moving inside. Basically the 4 players attacking the opposition's backline can change. Since Spurs are spread out they will often develop on the flanks, patiently rotating from side to side.

When switching play it means they often end up with the overlapping run from the fullback being played in behind and crossing into the box which is reflected in their statistics. Looking at FotMob, we can see they are currently ranked second for the most of crosses per match with a cross success of 31,6%. Even if this system is good at exploiting the space far away from the ball, Thomas Frank wants his players to keep the ball on the ground with Spurs ranking low for long balls and accuracy of these long balls. When Spurs enter in the final third they still want their shape to be as wide as possible. When it comes to the defensive shape, Spurs have an aggressive man oriented system and is one of the main reasons why they have been successful in their opening games. In their 2 - 0 win against Man City, their press was mostly done with the left winger Brennan Johnson and the striker Richarlison picking up the center backs. This meant the left back Spence would push forward onto City's right back and the left back was picked up by Kudus. With the other players latching on in midfield and the defensive line, this gave Manchester City little time to build from the back. As they attempted to circulate possession, even Spurs center back Van De Ven pushed all the way up the pitch to close down any vacant City player, Cherki in this case. THat means that Spurs can have one of their center back, their holding midfielder basically almost as high as their wingers and their forward. Other players then fill in the gaps defensively.

When adopting a man marking systme, the opposition almost always has a man advantage because of the goalkeeper. Some will give the gk time on the ball but ensure he has no one to pass to, while others will look to close him down quickly and force a rushed pass. If done correctly this is the trickiest situation to deal with. The striker will press at an angle ensuring that there is no easy pass to a free player. And the easy options in the center are quickly closed down as well. This is how Spurs made it 2 - 0 against Man City. In situations where the opponents are able to hold onto possession and drag Spurs further and further up the pitch, it can create these big gaps in front of the defensive line. The defenders can't push forward as they have to cover the strikers, and if just one player loses track of their man, it can quickly create a chain reaction of free players and lead to an opportunity.

Why Alexander Isak Changes Everything at Liverpool

From perfectly timed runs in behind the defense, the great link up play and movement into pockets of space, Isak is the definition of a world class modern attacker.With so many talented signingss that gives Slot a lot of options but it' also hard to have a system that gets the best out of everyone. Generally speaking Isak is not the most involved player during build up. He won't drop too far to get the ball. But he ha an excellent timing to break from the ball line to give the team an option between the lines often catching defenders off guard and dragging them out of position to open up space for his teammates There are already countless players in the midfield that will rotate to give support to the defense. So his main task at Liverpool will probably to keep the center backss pinned back to separate the 2 lines, potentially ready for a last break forward when he will ook to run in behind the defense as he often does. But generally speaking where he becomes more involved is once the team move into a more active build up phase, hovering from side to side to find space between the lines link up play. While mobile, he is mostly seen in the left inside channel looking to connect with teammates and create overloads. This position on the left may be down to the way Eddie Howe wanted to play last season. But this position could be benefical for Liverpool as well. Slot loves to create fluid shapes and clusters of players on either flank. So with Isak they can lean into this idea more heavily. He can be either the outlet to break in behind the defense or can pin back the defenders and continue to play with his back to goal. When he moves over to one side, expect other players in midfield to rush into this space ahead of him. As something Liverpool love to do is dragging defenders on one side then quickly exploit the space on the opposite flank.
At Newcastle when Alexander Isak collected the ball in these pockets, he often drifted wider, vacating the central lane for teammates to advance into. Then from here he likes to cut inside and combine with his teammates around the edge of the box. Last season Isak often drifted from the left mostly, to the inside, looking for the one two on the edge of the box before taking the shot. Or because he dragged so many defenders towards the center, opening up space out wide for the winger to be involved However as he drifts out wide, players run ahead of him, he can occasionally get forced out onto the flank where he can see one small small downside to his game which is is crossing accuracy being slightly below average. So it's rare to see him drive all the way to the touchline when looking to make an impact. This run from out wide towards the center that Isak loves to do might not be so straightforward at Liverpool as there is already countless players that pick up this position so I am curious to see if this is something that Slot leads into.
But the true danger of Isak is in the final third obviously. Of his 19 goals from open play in the 2024 / 2025 season with Newcastle, 12 were one touch finishes and 4 were 2 touches inside the box. There is 2 sides that make him dangerous in that position. The first is his ab ility to beat the offside trap and run in behind the defense. Something we saw countless of times when Newcastle were able to break forward quickly, peeling off the defender before finishing neatly past the keeper. But the more common approach is against a more set up defensive unit where again he either links up play or slowly moves onto the back post and always plays on the shoulder of the defender. While he did get his share of assists, he isn't known for that side of the game particularly, either because he is completing the pass before the pass or he is simply moving the fenders out of a space that he then wants to attack himself. And he does that excellently. His movement is nearly always between the 2 center backs and playing on the shoulder of the center back in front, making it extremely difficult to track his movement. It's one of the reasons why he seems to nearly always find that extra yard of space to finish off the move. So many of his goals may seem like simple tap ins but it's all down to the subtle movements in the box that make him hard to keep track off. However, even though he is 1m92, his heading ability isn't even that outstanding and he is more comfortbale with low driven balls rather than arching crosses. So I would expect Liverpool to look to go further down the line before delivering back across the box rather than looking for deeper deliveries from this position. So it could work well with a player like Frimpong on the right who loves to attack in behind. Maybe these curved crosses from Salah on the right will benefit Isak's playstyle.
Say Slot wants to keep the same 4 2 3 1 formation from 2024 / 2025 season. You could keep the same back line, a similar midfield but with Szoboszlai in the inverted fullback role and the 2 same holding midfielders of Gravenberch and Mc Allister. Then it would most likely be a choice of either Ekitike or Isak up top, keeping the wingers role for Salah and Gakpo with Wirtz playing in the number 10 role. This gives plenty of options in the midfield to rotate, essentially creating a box midfield with the front 3 stretching out wide. But maybe Arne Slot wants to play with both Ekitike and Isak. Then you could potentially shift to a 4 3 3 with one or the other picking up positions as the left winger and drifting into the center to form overloads. This could free the flank for the left back Kerkez to push forward but also mean you would likely need a more defensive role on the right who is ready to tuck inside to help provide cover. Someone like Bradley might work in the system but maybe not the most suited to players like Frimpong as he loves to bomb forward. In this system it would mean Gakpo is the odd one out in the front line and would also mean that one of these 4 midfielders would also not be included in the starting 11. Alternatively, maybe Slot wants to adopt an extremely narrow formation and play essentially with a back 3.
Say Slot wants to keep the same 4 2 3 1 formation from 2024 / 2025 season. You could keep the same back line, a similar midfield but with Szoboszlai in the inverted fullback role and the 2 same holding midfielders of Gravenberch and Mc Allister. Then it would most likely be a choice of either Ekitike or Isak up top, keeping the wingers role for Salah and Gakpo with Wirtz playing in the number 10 role. This gives plenty of options in the midfield to rotate, essentially creating a box midfield with the front 3 stretching out wide. But maybe Arne Slot wants to play with both Ekitike and Isak. Then you could potentially shift to a 4 3 3 with one or the other picking up positions as the left winger and drifting into the center to form overloads. This could free the flank for the left back Kerkez to push forward but also mean you would likely need a more defensive role on the right who is ready to tuck inside to help provide cover. Someone like Bradley might work in the system but maybe not the most suited to players like Frimpong as he loves to bomb forward. In this system it would mean Gakpo is the odd one out in the front line and would also mean that one of these 4 midfielders would also not be included in the starting 11. Alternatively, maybe Slot wants to adopt an extremely narrow formation and play essentially with a back 3. We know that Frimpong loves to hug the touchline and rush forward on the right, meaning Salah could be in an inverted position.

So you could use the 4 3 2 1 christmas tree formation with a narrow front 3 of Salah, Ekitike and Isak down the middle, ultimatly, also sacrificing between McAllister, Szoboszlai, Gravenberch and Wirtz. But in this system it makes sense to leave Wirtz out of the team and exploit the trio that was so successfull last season. Salah is cleary Liverpool's best attacking player but with a slow start to this season along with the fact that he will be absent from some matches because of the AFCON, Slot needs to find a way to play without their star player. This would likely mean adopting a 4 4 2 diamond formation. Gakpo and Salah would be the ones left out. But you have players in their natural positions. It would make sense for Isak to be on the left as he drifted to this side more often with Newcastle while Ekitike was used on the right when paired with Marmoush at Frankfurt. But the 4 4 2 diamond is a tricky formation to get right. You need fullbacks to provide the majority of the width and it can leave the back line exposed. So far Slot doesn't seem to stick to one specific way of playing.

From Galácticos to CLOWNS : Real Madrid

In the first weeks we could already see glimpses of what Xabi ball could look like. Seeing some Real Madrid's training footage, you could see that they were applying the exact same pattern of play that they had worked on in training. You can see Xabi Alonso shouting instructions at players, telling them what to do, where to move, where to be as they work on different passing patterns in a possession drill. There is a clear tactical identity. Ancelotti was a manger who encouraged his players to play free and he let them figure out how to solve problems on the fly. When you are winning, that strategy looks fantastic, it's free flowing football. However when it stops working it looks ugly because you have no foundation to fall back on. Alonso is not like Ancelotti in that regard. There are certain shapes and positions that he wants to see. Alonso took a bit of inspiration from Ancelotti but also mixed it up with all the things he learned from other managers he played under like Mourinho, Guardiola, Luis Aragon, Del Bosque. As a result they played better at the beginning of the club world cup. It wasn't just the fact that they were winning but the fact that they were playing actual fluid football. One of the main thing is also flexibility. Against Juventus, Real Madrid adapted and went from a back 3 to a back 4 so Trent and Garcia could be pushed wider meaning they could exploit space in behind before Juventus could shift their 5 3 2 block He wants his side to be able to adjust to win games. Huijsen looked like Toni Kroos in a center back position being very good on the ball and at breaking the lines with his passes. Alonso's build up doesn't work without him. We saw that against PSG. Trent was also good at providing that creative outlet on that right side. Gonzalo Garcia as a forward also ended up being one of the best performers of the tournament. He gave Real Madrid an outlet in the opposite box, something they hadn't have since Joselu.

Gonzalo Garcia was always finding space in the 6 yards area, finding pockets of space then punishing teams. Alonso even compared him to Raul. But beyond the goals what made him such an asset is that he runs without the ball. He fought for every duel, pressed like his life depended on it. He has no ego and is willing to do the dirty work without the ball. His progressed kinda halted when Mbappé came back. Things worked well for Real Madrid before the PSG game. Maybe Alonso wanted only big names players but Alonso pretty much got rid of all the little adjustments that he made earlier in the tournament. On paper it looked like Mbappé started on the left, Vini on the right and Gonzalo Garcia up top. But as the match went on it became clear that Gonzalo Garcia was just shoehorn into the right side with Mbappé back in the middle. As a result Gardia had been wasted. Then Mbappé was doing all the same mistakes that he did during the previous season. He wasn't pressing, he wasn't working hard off the ball and even worse, he was loosing the ball too easily. The clip of him loosing the ball to Kvara, a winger, then walking back, it summed up PSG's transfer strategy.But even if PSG's first 2 goals were due to bad mistakes from the center backs, PSG overall simply exploited and punished Real Madrid's mid system. A 4 3 3 shape with Mbappé and Vini both up front doesn't work against a team like PSG.We already saw Barcelona picking it apart time and time in the 2024 / 2025 season. And PSG took their foot of the gas in the second half time. Even Inter Miami had more shots and created more possession against PSG than Real Madrid. 38 years old Messi also played better against PSG than prime Mbappé and Vini. Overall Real Madrid conceded 84 goals in the 2024 / 2025 season, equalling their worst record in their history ( from the 1998 / 1999 season ). That's not only about the defense but about the entire team structure.

The weird thing is that Vini looked fine without Mbappé like against Salzburg, punishing the opposition with his speed, dancing past players and making runs in behind. In 2024, Vini would carry that left flank because Mendy wasn't often going forward. But when playing with Mbappé against elite teams, he can't even make a 5 yards pass and it seems to only happen when he plays with Mbappé. It's almost as if because Mbappé is not pressing, Vinicius isn't pressing either and if Mbappé doesn't pass when other are open, Vini imitates him. When these 2 are playing it's almost as if Vini forget how to play and keep trying to shoot from impossible angles and is looking more to score individually than to help the team. This is a problem that Alonso will have to fix because the Vini that played alongside Gonzalo Garcia was clearly better. The positive thing is that we saw that Xabi ball has potential. Second thing is that players that were not or rarely given the opportunity under Carlo Ancelotti in the 2024 / 2025 season like Guler or Gonzalo Garcia have now the opportunity to shine. Another thing looking great is that Fran Garcia Arda Guler connection. Fran Garcia as a wingback in the back 3 system was very effective, allowing him to push forward more and he is better on the ball and in possession than a player like Mendy. Then Arda Guler provided the team with the control that they had been missing. Finally they have a starter who can dictate the tempo of the game and Huijsen who can do the same from a deeper position. Against Salzburg, Guler was even trusted in a deeper double pivot role alongside Valverde.



The Real Reason Why Barcelona Can't Register Players

From one of the most powerful financial empire in football, Barcelona ended up with 1,35 billion debtn not being able to keep Messi or being able to register free signings like Olmo. It's about reckless spendings, secret contracts and boardroom battles. In 2003, Laporta has been elected Barcelona's president. The club was broken, financially struggling and no major trophies while Real Madrid was dominating Spanish football. Laporta believed that Barcelona should be different. While other big clubs were chasing quick money and big name signings Laporta focused into identity, pouring money into La Masia and focusing so on academy players. For 100 years, the Barca shirt had been sacred, with sponsor, corporate logo. In 2006, Barcelona start paying UNICEF every year 1,5 million per year exactly, to help childrens around the world. Pep Guardiola takes over in 2008 with a squad ful of La Masia players + Messi added. They develop their own players, stay loyal to their principles. But success attract wolves and one of them was Sandro Rosell who won Barcelona presidency with over 60% of the votes, promising to bring economic stability to the club. Since he was Laporta's right hand man once, some thought he truly undersstood what Barcelona stand for. But he wasn't really liking this Barcelona. Man United was cashing in on global marketing, Real Madrid had big sponsor In December 2010 Barcelona signs the biggest shirt deal in football history.

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