AYAAAA les MENACES de TRUMP envers la FRANCE

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torsion testiculaire si ddb, modo ebola si suppression kick ou ban

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Envers la France

Envers le monde

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How a Team of Nobodies Achieved What Superstars Couldn’t

Looking at the UCL history you will rarely see a french club lifting the trophy. That doesn't meant France lacked talents. In fact they have produced some of the best youngsters in the world. But the french league never had the same financial strenght or global spotlight as the other top leagues back then. It was often seen as a selling league where players grew then moved to bigger clubs abroad for better pay and competition. Because of that PSG was often seen like clubs like Leipzig or Ajax, often making it to the UCL but rarely reaching the final stages. In the 2000s, the french league started to look for investors who could buy out clubs and transform them. So in 2011, an investor from Qatar showed interest in buying the capital's biggest club. The main goals from the club and the investors was to raise Ligue 1's popularity. From Zlatan and Thiago Silva to Cavani and Di Maria, Paris Saint Germain went all out signing big names from across Europe. These moves brought them all the attention they were hoping for. But they also wanted to prove to the world that they could beat the best clubs of the continent and a regular UCL contenders. So they pushed even harder and spent 400 millions of euros to sign Neymar and Mbappé, a move that broke all the transfer records and made global headlines. That gamble almost paid off when in 2020 they finally reached the UCL final. The only goal scored in that final was by their academy graduate, against them. But that warning wasn't enough for PSG to wake up as 1 year after that, they went after Lionel Messi. With his arrival, PSG was spending 1,2 billion dollars on just these 3 players : Messi, Mbappé and Neymar. They brought up even bigger names then to stack up their squad with stars. However this would lead PSG to their most difficult period since years. Not only they failed to reach their usual 100 goals, but they also started to concede more than ever.

PSG got a front 3 well established who already proved to the world. Apart from scoring goals and assists, they is very little chance that they will track back consistently or press aggressively. So PSG had 7 outfield players to do all the defensive work. And if you use 2 creative midfielders to feed the big 3, you are left with just 5, which is basically an open way for oppositions to score. So to patch this, PSG had to sacrifice creativity and use more defensive minded players whose only job was to win the ball back and hold the structure. This was why the front 3 had to do all the attacking work : because the team was too busy to survive without the ball. Also when you look at the natural movements of the front 3, all of them tended to drift centrally with the ball. So to maintain the width, the fullbacks were constantly forced to push higher up the pitch to provide width and deliver crosses. This made their defensive flanks wide open for the opposition to counter. Also when you have a team full of egos and personalities, the manager naturally becomes less important and that makes it harder for him to successfully implement his desired system. So this caused a major disconnect between the PSG star players, the supporting cast and the manager. As a result, after suffering back to back 2 early UCL exits in the round of 16 against Real Madrid and Bayern Munich, in May 2023, PSG's ultras gathered outside the club headquarters and even outside Neymar's house, holding banners in their hands and demanding for both Messi and Neymar to be out. That was the turning point. After that protest, PSg's board finally decided to quit the ultimate team policy and play the usual career mode with the focus to not dominate Europe for just 1 or 2 seasons but to build a legacy that last for years to come. For that they needed a squad that was young, grounded and ready to give everything for the badge.

To lead this rebuild, they brought in Luis Campos as the football advisor, a man known for spotting exceptionnal raw talents and building teams from the ground up. Also they needed a manager that could be the face of the club, a true leader that could be feared and respected. And who else than Luis Enrique who already won the treble with MSN in Barcelona, who benched Messi for showing poor discipline at a point and didn't back down even when Messi refused to train for several days after that. French journalist Julien Laurens revealed that for a long time, the club was run by superstars. If they didn't want to do something, they wouldn't do it. They would go straight to the president. It undermined the coach, but not anymore with Luis Enrique. As soon as Luis Enrique arrived, in order to tackle Mbappé's lack of defending, he literally called him and said what hs famously said in the video where he reminded to Mbappé that he was fan of Michael Jordan, that he had to be a true leader like him, to set the example. However 1 month later, the frenchman publicly announced his decision to leave as a free agent. Luis Enrique didn't back down, telling that his philosophy didn't consist of letting Mbappé do anything he wants, that this was the old philosophy, one that didn't win anything special. After Mbappé left, a lot of analysts and medias didn't take the new PSG team seriously, thinking that this would be the weakest PSG squad since the takeover. It turned out that the departure was a blessing in disguise. Within his first 2 seasons, Luis Enrique completly transformed PSG by blending glassroots french talents with some key signings who were known for their high energy and their teamwork. The only thing about these were that each positions had at least 2 quality contenders to bring more competition within the squad, something the club lacked during the superstars era.

The message by Luis Enrique was clear : If you don't give your best, you will get replaced. As Dembélé once said, the coach said that if they didn't press or defend, someone else would take their place. Many times you would see a winger running all the way back into the fullback's territory just to double up and create a 2 v 1 trap on the opposition's winger, something that couldn't be done during the superstars era. As for PSG's kick off strategy, they kept throwing off the ball into the same area. As soon as the ball goes out for a throwing, you would see almost all the PSG players pushing up and staying behind all the possible options for the thrower. Because of the PSG marker stands just behind the receiverss, as the ball comes towards them, they become blind to the pressure so the receiver can either make a back pass, either make a risky side pass under pressure. This increases their chances to win the ball higher up the pitch and creates a counter attacking situations against an unprepared defense. But this PSG not only is excellent at pressing, but they are also one of the few sides capable of escaping high presses just like theirs. Sometimes you see a defender stepping up to try and press a forward like false 9 Dembélé, which opens up a gap in which another PSG player will run into. During build up sometimes you often see PSG's back 3 playing the ball deeper and wider even towards their last option and at the same time, the midfielders also drop deeper to support. This pulls the entire opposition's first 2 lines forward which created a visible space in their original position. And with Dembélé dropping deep to receive the ball, he has now a vulnerable backline ahead with the wingers already in full forward motion. So the goal is clear : if you decide to press us, we will use your press against you. This technique was popularized by Roberto de Zerbi.
Just like Xabi Alonso, Luis Enrique is someone who values both discipline and creativity. That means that he still maintains a clear structure where every player has a role and some defined zones. However, they have creative freedom. With the only condition of this freedom being selfless and it must benefit the team. If you are a player, notice open space in an unexpected area or your teammate is getting outnumbered then you are encouraged to make that free run. But if that's not the case then you stick to your role, hold your zone and rotate within your structure. Just look like at the positionnal map of Kvara. He is supposed to be a left winger but you can see him receiving the ball in almost every zone of the pitch. So rather than playing with a fixed pivot or a classic number 9, almost all Enrique's players have the freedom to run into any random area only if it's beneficial for the team. This blend of individual freedom along with tactical discipline has fulfilled the need of both the players and the manager, and turned PSG into one of the most unpredictable side in world football. While this unpredictability can have its advantages, it can become a weakness by times. When we look at PSG's setup, except for the 2 center backs, almost every other outfield player is able to make creative movements when needed. But even with this positional freedom, Enrique maintains a strict positionnal structure during attacks where he always use a back 3 as a rest defense, who stays back all the time. So to complete that shape, you would often see a fullback, their left fullback Mendes drop deep. Or if both fullbacks pushed high, a midfielder like Vitinha or even Ruiz could fill that role. But there can be moments were both the midfielders and the fullbacks get involved in attacks so much that they fail to recover on time, leaving just 2 players exposed to a counter attack. This is what led to Aston Villa's first goal in the first leg against PSG.

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Some might wonder why didn't Inter Milan capitalize on this during the UCL final especially with their worldclass counterattacks. Luis Enrique often use a counterattack drill before big matches. Luis Enrique stands near the halfway line, sets up a team of a back 3 and a pivot which is up against a front 4 pressers. One more player is there but stays static in a resting position until Luis Enrique calls him into action. So the drill begins with the backline calmly circulating the ball. As soon as Enrique blows the whistle, the pressers immediatly freeze in their position, while the defender with the ball is allowed to advance and take a shot on the goal. But right at that moment, Luis Enrique kicks a second ball toward the resting player who is near the cone. This creates a real time counter attacking situation scenario where the back 2 and the pivot have to defend against 5 players. This drill keeps on repeating in a loop until the coach decides to stop. This constant practise made their backline nearly immune in the final and made it almost impossible for Inter to score. Speaking about the final when we take a step back and look at the players who led PSG to glory, this wasn't close to be the most famous PSG squad but it was the most connected, the most united and arguably the most complete team the club ever had. After years of chasing worldclass players from around the world, PSG realized the most valuable pieces they had been searching for weren't outside but rather inside in their own backyard. So now they have the chance to build a foundation rooted in its own identity. An identity that develops talents, not just buys it. And for Luis Enrique, that Champions League win wasn't just tactical. It was personal.

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The Entire History of Football Tactics
From the chaotic kick and run to the ultra defensive park the bus, from the iconic pyramid to the inspirationnal W M, from revolutionnary total football to a more artistic tiki taka, football has known so many evolutions when it came to tactics. At the XIX century, at a point, any player ahead of the ball carrier was considered as offside and therefore could not receive a pass. So the ball could only be played sideways or backward. As a result, teams adopted a formation like 2 2 6 with a horinzontal line in front. The ball carrier had to dribble as far as possible ans use his strenghts and skills to score. If he got blocked he would simply kick the ball forward for a teammate to chase. At this point passing the ball was not really a thing and football looked more like an individual war with rough tackles coming from all sides. But in 1872 the first international match was played between England and Scotland where England sets up in their normal 1 1 8 formation. which was all about individual brillance. However Scotland took a more defensive approach during that time. And using this, they actually started among themselves and move as a cohesive unit. This surprised everyone including their own fans. For the first time the ball was moved systematically across the pitch rather than simply being booted up and down. This gave rise of the art of passing and teamwork over raw individualism. To complement this, things started to ochange with the introduction of the first offside rule. This new rule allowed players to make and receive forward passes as long as they were in front of 3 opponents, including the goalkepper. With more focusing on passing, more teams began to invent more balanced systems focusing on midfield control. So the old system evolved into a pyramid where the forward dropped into the midfield and acted as a multi skill all rounder, not only making passes, but also scoring goals as a forward and defending when necessary.
Due to flexible midfield, this gave more freedom to the forward on focusing to only score goals while both defenders could concentrate on protecting the goal. In previous systems, every players were required to perform all tasks which drawn their energy out and resulted in goaless games. However with time,d ue to static positionning of defenders and forwards, the pyramid became too predictable. and rigid. So someone had to come up with a more flexible solution. This is where Jimmy Hogan stepped up and came with an idea. Just like midfielders, why not making the forwards flexible? and make them do up and down movements? As a result, the forwards were free to roam around the pitch into the spaces between the opposition's shape. This made the pyramid more flexible and unpredictable, as it forced the defenders to get out of their zonal positions and leave out spaces in behind for others to run into. Taking inspiration from him, many legends such as Austria's Wunder team and Hungrary's golden generation team achieved great success in global stages. As more teams began dominating games through passing and leveraging the attacking overload of the pyramid. Unfortunatly, there was less evolvment happening in the defensive tactics. So rules needed to be made to make the game more balanced and equal. As a result in 1925 a new offside rule allowed the players to be onside as long as only 2 oppositions were in front of him. This rule impacted the game a lot and things started to change a lot. Suddently older systems looked like an open gateway to concede and needed to hurry to adapt with more defensive shape So in England, in order to counter this new rule, Arsenal's coach Herbert Chapman reshaped the old pyramid where he moved his 2 deeper defenders wider and transformed his center midfielder into a third center back who can also join the midfield when needed. Much like how Pep Guardiola recently used John Stones in Man City.

When you connect these deeper players with a line, it forms a M like shape. However with the multi skill all rounder now turned as a defender, there was a lack of creativity in the midfield. So to solve this, Chapman also put his 2 inside forwards deeper into the midfield and turned them into the main playmakers. This introduced the M W shape formation, the early prototype of modern number 10s and double pivots. It provides a perfect balance with 5 attackers and 5 defenders. When you play this against a pyramid, the four midfielders create a box like pattern and easily outnumbers their 3 man midfielders. Pep Guardiola with Man City adopted some aspects of this by using inverted fullbacks or advancing center backs within his 4 3 3, helping to create and utilize the box midfield advantage, turning the whole formation by times into a 3 2 4 1. In the same time he would have ht eiwdth provided by the wingers. As a result from the 1920's to the 1950's, the W M started to gain popularity around as world as a new blueprint to counter the offside rule. Looking at its popularity new variations started to emerge in order to tackle its dominant midfield box So in the 1930's, the italian coach Vittorio Pozzo got the idea of reversing the M and the W, eventually creating a W W shape. When comparing the M W shape, it overloads the midline and can tackles its box midfield. And looking at the shape clearly, it ressembles to our modern day 4 3 3 structure but with older positions. So at this point the W M and W Ws started to widespread throughout the football landscape. And by the 1950's more and more teams started to give equalimportance to the defensive side of the game, which eventually led to one more midfielder joining the defense and giving birth to the back 4.
With a strong defensive shape, it then evolved into a 4 2 4 system. And this system was the highlighting part of Brazil's domination in the World Cups from the 1950s to the 1970s. The presence of a strong back 4 allowed the forwards to turn their full attention to hammering the opposition without worrying about the defense. And the 2 center midfielders were like 2 additionnal supporters who can step up to create a 6 man attack or drop deep to form a 6 man defense. This provided a perfect balance on both of these areas. However in doing so this often left this particular side empty, the ones between the back 4 and the front 4. So to counter this emptiness, taking inspiration from Jimmy Hogan's fluid positionning, Brazil's 4 2 4 was more like an asymetric structure with a lot of positionnal rotations happening. For instance at one moment any player could drop deep to draw a defender out of position while another would make a forward run toward the vacated space. So these random rotations and interchanges made it nearly impossible for the opposition defenses to predict their movements. A a result, this unpredictability made Brazil almost unstoppable during that era, who destroyed every opposition on their way to winning the World Cup.

With professionnal systems becoming standards across many teams, there were still semi profesionnals clubs that lacked the structured training and tactical depth to play against these tactics. And oen club such as Swiss side Servette, which was looking for a more defensive system. So their manager Karl Rappen came up with an interesting idea, where instead of a back traditionnal back 4, he pulled his one center back deeper while one forward dropped deep as a third midfielder, creating an unusual 1 3 3 3 shape. And that last player acted as a so called spared defender for Karl. For example when the ball was played to one side and the center back shifted right to cover the fullback, it may freeze up the central striker as an open receiver. So this spare man would then step up into the vacated position to provide security. This is just ilke applying a safety chain on a door. So with the presence of an extra defender combined with compact free lines could frustrate the attack minded teams to break them down. As a result Karl achieved great results with his club and was later appointed as a national coach of Switzerland where he replicated this success on the international stage. After seeing this success, this style became extremely popular among his southern neighbors Italy where they even named it as Catenaccio, meaning the door chain. That spared man was known as the libero, who not only served to fill the defensive line but also initiated counter attacks with precise passes from deep. However instead of sticking to the 1 3 3 3 shape, the Italians redefined it by adding 1 more midfielder to the back line and eventually creating a 1 4 2 3 or a 1 4 3 2. Now with 5 players at the back, the Italian Catenaccio provided numerical superiority over the widely used 4 2 4.

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Also the deep positionning of the system naturally attracted almost all the opposition's players forward, leaving huge spaces behind them to exploit with long balls. And as a result by the late 1950's and 1960's, Catenaccio became one of the most effective tactical systems. It might not have been the most pleasant style to see with the eyes but it did the job of defeating the top attacking teams of its time. However from the early 1970s the trend suddently shifted back toward attacking football as it was the rise of the style known as total football. Many believe Johan Cruyff to be the creator of this playing style. But it was actually his Ajax coach Reines Michels who brought this style into attention in the 1970s. And when you look at the formation,just like Carl Rappens Catenaccio, it began as a 1 3 3. However instead of a rigid sweeper, Reines allowed his player to step into the midfield during attacks, eventually forming a 3 4 3 shape. Also at this point, positionnal rotations were still limited, with only specific players interchanging to create spaces. But Reines took Jimmy Hogan's principles to a whole new level where he allowed for a complete positionnal rotation within the system. So now any player could move into any position as long as the basic structure was maintained. This made the system almost impossible to predict for the opposition, creating spaces within their structure. And while attacking, they made their shape as big as possible to spread throughout the pitch with the purpose of stretching oppositions shapes as well and force them to defend broader areas, resulting in opening up passing lanes to exploit. And on the other hand, while defending they did the opposite, the shape turned as small as possible until the reached 25 meters line vertically. So this forced the opposition to attack with the ball within this limited space. So from the 1970s until the 1990s, attacking football made a huge comeback.
However even with this, games were surprisingly low scoring and less exciting, just because of the old offside rule, as defensive lines would quickly push their second defender forward to neutralize attacks. So in order to solve the issue in 1990, the new offside rule stated that one player can also remain onside even against one defender as long as he remains level with the second last defender. At that moment the ball is released by their teammate. This was not the case earlier as the attacker required to be entirely behind 2 defenders to stay onside. So this change give a huge advantage to the attacking players who could now trick the opposition's defense by by timing their runs perfectly to stay level with the back line. Also now having a sweeper at the back turned into an opportunity for the attackers to exploit and stay onside. So by the mid 1990s many teams started to play a flat back 4 and brought more attackers into the midfieldn eventually creating a 4 4 2 structure. It provided a good balance at covering both the wide and the central areas, allowing every team to cover every part of the pitch. So in defense it can morph into a 8 man double wall and can covers all the defensive zones by providing at least 2 players in each areas. So it makes it difficult to any opposition to break through this. As a result the 4 4 2 is still used by most of the top sides when out of possession. Another variant of this was developped by Sir Alex Ferguson with Man United. When the double pivot provided defensive support, there was no playmaker to support to forwards and create central creativity. So one of the forwards was put slightly deeper to act as a link between the forward and the midfield. When observing this variation, it was clearly evolving into a 4 2 3 1 structure. So by the 2000s, with the 4 4 2 starting to gian popularity around the world one more variation popped up in Italy's AC Milan.
Carlo Ancelotti saw the major weakness of 4 4 2. Even though it provided good protection in the wider areas, with only 2 players in the center it usually struggles against a narrow midfield 3. Also due to flatness and limited numbers of lines, it became difficult to maintain close proximity and can result in leaving spaces between the lines, with the opposition to exploit it. So Ancelotti tweaked his horizontal pivot into vertical direction with the top one becoming the central playmaker. And instead of having wingerss or wide midfielders he called them to invert centrally. This was the 4 4 2 diamond, which he later used in Real Madrid 2023 / 2024 season. So now with a midfield 4 and a more defined vertical lines, the diamond effectively adressed the major issues of the 4 4 2 system and helped Ancelotti dominate with the 2000s AC Milan, reaching and winning multiple UCL finals. Also the sacred diamond midfield helped him to later secure the 2024 UCl with Real Madrid. However this formation also has weakness like the lack of wide coverage. So Ancelotti changed it into a christmas tree formation where he pulled one of the forwards into a number 10 position and spread the midfield a bit wider to provide better coverage on the flanks. This provided some width with the outer midfielders while strenghtening the midfield even more with 5 players. And with such a strong midfield, the tema not only controlled the central zones, but also created numerous triangular passing options that made it easier to launch counter attacks. However, the reason this formation hasn't been widely adopted in modern times lies in its limitations as the lack of attacking numberss and proper width upfront makes it difficult to stretch the opposition's defense. As a result it places more pressure and the numbers 10 to break through, defensive overloads and deliver goals.
Around the same time, Jose Mourinho would introduce a new tactical system, reminding of old England and Scotland shape but with an upside down angle. Parking the bus is basicallly when all the 11 players are defending like they were defenders. Their main goal is to make area as small as possible and always position themselve zonally. As a result it gives almost no space for the opposition to break through and significantly reduce their scoring opportunity. Also Mourinho instructs to not win the ball back intentionally and instead let the opposition to hold possession. As the reason was if they win the ball and started to counter attack, the opposition would try to counter press them and again regain possession. Now with that compact shape being spread out, oppositions can easily find spaces to score. So the focus was to never lose their positionnal discipline and maintain the defensive structure at all costs. However instead of playing this regularly, Mourinho typically used this tactic when trying to protect a narrow lead or playing a difficult away leg. Thanks to his strict defensive setup, Mourinho led Inter Milan to an incredible treble in 2010 where he defeated the unbeatable Barcelona in the process of winning the UCL. Also in the same time, the 4 4 2 system which was used almost by 50% of the clubs until 2009, declined to only 12% in 2012. This is the rise of 4 3 3 and tiki taka. By the 2010s there was a big surge in wingers who weren't traditionnal crossers but instead instead played as forwards who cut inside to score directly. So this trend transformed the role of wide midfielders into inside forwards or wingers. To bring balance, teams began to add a central mid alongside a single pivot, or applied a 10 in front of 2 pivots. A famous example of a 4 3 3 with a single pivot is Barcelona under Pep Guardiola. A system originally adapted from total football, who evolved from Johan Cruyff to Louis Van Gaal, Frank Ricard and ultimatly Pep Guardiola.

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In the same time the 4 4 2 declined in popularity to be replaced by the 4 3 3. By the 2010s there were a significant surge for wingers who weren't traditional crossers but instead played as forwards who cut inside to score directly. This trend transformed the role of wide midfielders into that of the inside forwards or wingers. In order to provide balance, teams began to favour 2 central midfielders alongside a single pivot. Or they applied a number 10 in front of the double pivots. And the first formation became an integral part of Guardiola's Barcelona system. This system was originally adapted from total football evolving from Cruyff to Van Gaal to Ricardo to Guardiola. First thing coming to mind when hearing tiki taka is constant passes between the players. However it's not only about endless passing but also making constant predefined movements that gave those passes a clear purpose. So Pep divided the pitch in multiple zones and made the rule that only 2 players should occupy the same vertical zone and 3 players could share a horizontal line. He even painted Barcelona's training pitches into zones to make his players practise constantly until their movements and positionnal play became natural. As a result they constantly moved into these zones, creating multiple passing options for the ball carrier to play forwards passes and manipulate the opposition's shape at any given time. However just as all the formations and shapes it can have some weaknesses. One of the reasons Pep Guardiola used tiki taka so widely while most of the teams didn't was the demand for technically skilled and intelligent players who could thrive in this style. It happened that La Masia produced a generation of young world class talents perfectly suited for this system.
Without proper training and experience, tiki taka can quickly become boring and predictable. At the same time It can be vulnerable against high pressing systems and lose possession in dangerous zones. Speaking about high pressing, by the 2010s, advancement of training methods and fitness technologies elevated players physical capabilities. Football became faster, more intense and more physically demanding. In Germany the popularity of heavy metal football was only at its beginning. While at this point, most teams applying pressure did it to regain the ball and maintain possession, heavy metal style was the opposite of tiki taka since it doesn't really care about possession. It's a playing style that is brutal yet exciting. When they lose the ball, they are immediatly applying high press on the opposition's to win the ball back. After winning it, instead of passing around, they immediatly start rapid counter attacks with the only aim to score. The purpose was that when opposition gained the ball from you and wanted to start a counter attack, this is the most vulnerable state for them asthey aren't transitionned their attacking shape so the ball carrier is still looking for passing options. So the sooner a team tends to press and try to win the ball back, the better is the opportunity for them to counter attack with more numbers and score immediatly. However with more players pressing the ball carrier, it leaves large gaps behind the press, making the team vulnerable to counter attacks if the press is broken. So to counter such risk, some teams use a lighter variation of of heavy metal, where only 1 or 2 players press the ball carrier while the rest recover potential passing options. So at this point by the mid 2010s alongside heavy metal there was also a system from Italy that evolved into something far more attacking and entertaining than before. This is the trend of back 3.
When looking at the old Catenaccio system with its spare defender at the back, it was more of a defensive tactic, But that spare man evolved into a ball carrying defender while the fullbacks moved much higher to become a hybrid of both wingers and fullbacks, transforming the Catenaccio into a more balanced 3 5 2 system. It was originally developped by Argentinian's coach Carlos Ballardo in the 1980s. In recent times It was Antonio Conte who achieved great success with the system in both Serie A and Premiere League as unlike previous systems, with 3 proper defenders, the fullbacks have more freedom to advance forward to act like wingers, and due to the width provided by them, the midfielders and strikers could only focus on dominating the central areas by creating overloads. Also when defending it can shift into a compact 5 3 2. So this modern version of Catenaccio not only stablizes the defense but also turns teams into dagenrouso attacking units. Then if we take this, transform it to total football to extreme level, we get what Sheffield United did under Chris Wilder and Inter Milan's Inzaghi. As in their variations, along with the forwards and midfielders rotating with each other, it's not uncomon to see the 3 center backs push forward into the midfield or even into strikers positions. This extra feature made it extremely difficult for the oppositions to play against and confuses their structured markings. However just like the 4 4 2, it has weaknesses, as you observe often the center midfielders functionning as box to box players who has to keep balance between the attack and the defense. As a result, it has a lack of dedicated central playmaker can can connect both sides and who can provide creativity. So this issue tends to generally lead one of the 2 forwards and the midfielder turning tinto 2 narrow playmakers, creating a new variation of 3 5 2 that looks like a 3 4 3.
This change provided the much needed central connections between the midfield and the attack. And allowed the double pivots to focus entirely on defending and to form a solid second wall before the back line. Also due to the flexibility of these 2 playmakers, they can also drop deep and dominate the midfield battle with the form of a 4 man box shape. However when it comes to defend against coutner attacks, there can be moments where the playmalers will struggle to track back quickly enough, leaving the double pivots exposed and easily get outnumbered by the opposition. So these 2 positions + the 2 wingbacks require to have an excellent stamina and work rate constantly move up and down the channels with precision timing. However thanks fo his complexity and his successfull implementations by teams like Tuchel's Chelsea, or Alonso's Leverkusen, the 3 4 3 and its variations have seen a surge of popularity these last years. Looking at tactics ihstory as a whole, we can see it went from full attacking style at the start then turned into defensive in the middle and now has understood the importance of having balance between the 2. Eventually looking at the future, formations and positions may look less important as with the advancement of training and VR technologies, players will likely have the ability to play in any position and adapt during the game. Just like the false 9, new concepts such as the false 10, even the false defenders are emerging. Additionally, with the rise of social medias and video analysis, managers can keep their tactics fully private and they will need to have multiple systems in their bag against oppositions.

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Why The Special One Stopped Being Special

Before Real Madrid when Mourinho create tension it was in the media as he creates a siege mentality for his team. When it's the club tension it's always with the board as he punches up at his superiors to defend his men rather than down at his own players. But in his final season at Madrid the tension was internal with some of the biggest stars of the dressing room turning on him. Mourinho hits back in public ways towards Casillas and Pepe. Even Ronaldo seemed to have turn on him at a point. For Inter Milan in Serie A he ops for a 4 3 3 with Cambiaso shielding the backline while Muntari / Zanetti or Viera provides the box to box dynamism. When playing against more compact sides, Mourinho's influence ensures that players like Quaresma and Balotelli on the wings dutifully track back as much as they can. If Mourinho spots an opportunity to attack through the heart of the opposition, he is happy to switch to a 4 3 2 1 with Stankovic as a 10 in a dual purpose of allowing Inter to defend the center more effectively and having a free floating number 10 and 2 forwards. With an attacking fullback like Maicon providing the width, this task becomes easier. THis flexibility allowed Inter Milan to thrive and win the Seria A in 2009. During the summer, Sneijder, Eto'o, Milito and Motta got transfered to Inter. Zlatan departed to Barca. Sneijder was there for the creativity. Inter could still use the dimand when the situation demanded it but he used more the 4 2 3 1 with Motta Cambiasso double pivot being almost impossible to penetrate, allowing Sneijder to throve in his 10 role. Snijder played his best football. Under Mourino, Sneijder was a creative threat weaving passes into his forwards but he is also a goal threat from the midfield. Mourinho also got Eto's to do a job out wide to sacrifice himself for the team. Mourinho's last match with Inter was the UCL final whch he won.

After 2013, Chelsea welcomed back Mourinho. With the likes of Cech, Terry and Lampard. Mourinho brings Eto'o. Mourinhos sticks with his 4 2 3 1. Matic and Ramires were the double pivot. Ivanovic down the right was a good attacking fullback while Azpilicueta was more conservative as a left back. Eto'o was the forward, Mata was the number 10. Terry and Cahill as center backs, Hazard and William as the wingers and Cech as the goalkepper. About Mata, despite the fact that he was named Chelsea's best player of the year both in 2012 and 2013, Mourinho casted him aside and Oscar moved into a number 10 role while Mata was in the wing. Mata's statistics massively dropped as a result. Mourinho is not using his defense as a foundation for his best attacking players to flourish. Instead every players on the team had to be willing to work Defense was now the priority. Ramires used his engine to harry opponents and Matic's telescopic legs were hard to get. Oscar, Eto's and William were all willing to work. It was about defensive solidity with counter attacking bite. Chelsea was first in the title race in the 2013 / 2014 season at a point before some loses saw them dropping. On April 27th, Cech, Terry, Cahill Eto'o, Hazard were all absent while they had to match their main rival for the title race, Liverpool, an incredible pressing side. So Mourinho sits his side deep in a 4 5 1, demanding more defensive workrate from the wingers while being able to hit hard on transitions. It led one of most memorable moments in the Premiere League history and Chelsea derails the Liverpool title race. The next season, Fabregas and Diego Costa had excellent connection. Fabregas launched long balls for Costa running behind the opposite defense. So the opposition's defensive line dropped even deeper, creating space for Oscar to receive and begin the transitions with the wingers. Chelsea also had the ability to play out with the ball a lot more now with Fabregas.

With Azpilicueta and Matic covering and Oscar doing a lot of running to him, Hazard benefited a lot from that. Just like with Ronaldo, Mourinho created a platform for Hazard to flourish. It was a return to former times. Defense as a mean to attack better and more clinically. CHelsea won the Premiere League in 2015. However the next 2015 / 2016 season was a disaster with poor results and fractures in the dressing room. December 14th 2015 is a turning point. Following a 2 1 loss to Leicester, Mourinho publicly turns on his players a second time. In his first time coming to Chelsea in 2004, Makelele was the cdm patrolling in the deepest regions to shield the defense. Terry and Carvalho doesn't need much cover Ferreira and Bridge overlapped like modern fullbacks and the main theme of the team was balance. Lampard and Tiago were box to box midfielders. situationally providing defensive cover and offensive threat. Chelsea could play through the ball. They could also go long with Droga being a prime target man. Lampard was often well positionned to receive knockdowns Drogba. Out wide, Duff and Robben cause wreckage. And the attacking fullbacks especially Ashley Cole provided threat and width outwide and provide crosses for the target man Drogba or Lampard arriving late into the box. They can also unleash blistering shots In the 2004 / 2005 season they won with 95 points and conceded only 15 goals, a record. In the 2006 / 2007, Mourinho is expected to win the UCL but Abramovic begins to tire of the more pragmatic approach. Ballack and Andreï Chevtchenko are bought. Chevtchenko was supposed to bring more dynamism and more goals while Ballack was here to bring more creativity. However Ballack had similar attacking instincts to Lampard wanting to operate in the same zones as well as making late runs into the box. The pair also often left Makelele more exposed. They tried solving this with a diamond with Chevtchenko pairing but this disappointed.

In 2016 he comes to Manchester United. Big names arrive from left and right. Mourinho sticks with his trusted 4 2 3 1 initially with Pogba as one of the pivots. Rooney or Mata have the ability to play as the floating player behind Zlatan who like Drogba at Chelsea, operated as the main target man. Some of Man United pivots were not the most technically gifted like Fellaini so having Pogba in the center allowed him to be in the center of almost every attack launched. He finds runners in behind more and more often. Antonio Valencia from his right back position often used his running ability to get to dangerous zones allowing the right winger, either Mata or Mkhitaryan to to move into more central zones. However since Pogba is not a natural defensive midfielder he can be caught up high up the pitch leaving the team exposed. As the most expensive player in the world at this time, expectations were sky high. When facing a rival, a second pivot often comes with Fellaini or Carrick, freeing up Pogba and bringing balance. By the end of the season, Manchester United won the Europa League. For even bigger trophies, Mourinho spends big on the transfert market with Matic to operate in a dedicated midfield 3 in a 4 3 3. In the Premiere League results are good even if against low blocks, Man United can struggle with creativity.This season, Man City break the Premiere League record with 100 points. However, Man United are still second with 81 points. However Mourinho ends up having some of his players in his crosshairs for example Luke Shaw constantly criticized by Mourinho in public. Then it was Pogba Next season, the 2017 / 2019 one, would start badly.

In 2002 Mourinho arrives in Porto. They shift between a 4 3 3, 4 5 1 and 4 4 2 diamond. Costa and Carvalho, the cb duo is shielded by Costinha the cdm. both fullbacks can attack but Ferreira can offer more defensive solidity to allow Nuno Valente to flourish down the left. Deco is the floating number 10. This team could sit back or press like dogs depending on what was needed. Mourinho had the ideal dressing room with him, full of experience that it allowed him to focus on coaching. He does more opposition scouting than any manager. Most sides at time had sloppy weight based and running based sessions completly stripped from all the context of a football game. Mourinho introduces tactical periodisation. to work on the fitness and tactical element of football at the same time by mimicking in game situations. Eventually Porto won the UCL in 2004. In 2019 there is still demands for him but he overall has fallen behind the time. At Tottenham he instills the 4 2 3 1 with a more disciplined defensive structure as he tries to solve the defensive issue present under Pochettino. He still uses a double pivot, asymetric fullbacks. Spurs had bright periods but this style was turgid and criticisms were there He went to the League Cup final but was deprived from the opportunity to win the cup when Mourinho was sacked. In 2001 Mourinho took over Leira. In 2021 Mourinho is at his lowest before AS Roma takes him. Just like him AS Roma is a giant for the past but past his prime. But his first season is peppered with high and low. At the end of the day, Mourinho gave them the first european trophy for an italian side since over a decade by winning the Conference League. Next season he drags them to the Europea league league which they don't win. His time at Roma is over.

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The Complete Tactical Evolution Of Lionel Messi

Messi started playing football in the 1990s, a time when football was simpler and wingers stuck to their natural wide side. Their role was to get near the touchline, beat your fullback and get supply into the box. When Messi played on the left he was more conventional way to his side. However his talent was quite confined when he kept hugging the touchline. Despite some physical limits he was the focal point of the attack. As he went to New's Old Boys and to La Masia after this was the enganche role. basically a role of a 10 operating between the midfield and the attack and placing him at the heart of the game. Frank Rijkaard was Barcelona's manager and used a 4 3 3 meaning that there wasn't a number 10 position. Left wing would have been a possibility if Ronaldinho wasn't there already.Ronaldinho was more likely to be the man who drifted more central position near the final third to look to make more difference. So in the 2004 / 2005 season, Messi was put as a right winger. However during his first 2 seasons, Messi mostly had to provide the width for his team, meaning that his main task was to get pass his fullback rather than directly threatening the opposite goal. His decision making still had to improve since he sometimes chose to dribble even if a more direct route was available. He only played 7 matches in the 2004 / 2005 season, scoring 1 goal in 7 games in la liga. But his true career started in the next season, scoring 7 in 17 games in la liga. In the 2006 / 2007 season, he exploded to 14 goals in la liga for 2 assists in 26 matches. He didn't play that much during his first 2 seasons because of growth hormone deficiency which meant that he needed to take treatment for this which resulted into a rapid growth, which in turn resulted into some muscular imbalance as the body adjusts, leading to a few injuries.

Messi already showed that he could take his defender in 1 v 1 but then he also showed that he could manipulate entire defensive structures. As time passed, Messi started to get touches inside, opening up the pitch and giving himself more passing options. The arrival of Dani Alves in 2008 and the departure of Ronaldinho the same year was like adding rocket fuel to his evolution.So there was more responsability on his shoulders to fill the creative buden left by Ronaldinho. With Dani Alves overlapping outside of him and Eto'o stretching defenses ahead of him and creating spaces in the midfield, Messi began to thrive in this inside right channel, cutting in more and more often on his left foot to have more of the pitch opened up to him. He was now beginning to have more of an impact on play, getting more touches on the ball, slowly becoming a reference point in the side and combining with the midfielders Iniesta and Xavi. In the 2007 / 2008 season, his number of assists increased to 14 in la liga only. It was one of the few saasons where Messi assisted more than he scored in the domestic league, with 10 goals. In the 2008 / 2009 in 31 matches Messi scored 23 goals and assisted 13 having for the first time more than 1 goal contribution per liga game with 1,16. With Alves providing the width, Messi only went wide when he saw a weakness to be exploited on the flank. With Eto'o running in behind and even out wide on the left at times, Messi would develop even more into that inside space. However with Eto'o leaving for Inter Milan and Zlatan coming in, this space was crowded now because Zlatan was not making the runs in behind to create space for Messi. In fact he was dropping more in these areas demanding more of the ball, taking away from Messi. Zlatan eventually left the following year.
Then Pep Guardiola initiated a tactical shift by playing Messi as a false 9. Messi was now not drifting from wide to central zones but rather starting central and create the space for himself without forward ahead to make runs in behind to create him space. He started this tactical shift against Real Madrid because Guardiola noticed that their center backs followed with the decision of whether to follow forwards who dropped deep. The space between their midfield and defensive line was a weakness. The experiment came in May 2009. Messi already understood how to combine with Xavi and Iniesta to overload any midfield and even in his yougner days as a 10 he had that natural feel for finding pockets of space between the lines. But what Messi's previous attempts at the role was the combination of skills he brought to it. Previous false 9 like Totti were primarly creators dropping deep to orchestrate play. Messi was that and more. A dribbler who could eliminate multiple defenders, a finisher who could score from any angle and now a playmaker who could split defenses with a single pass. When Barcelona had possession Messi dropped into the midfield, thus creating problems. Following him but creating space for Pedro, Henry or Villa to exploit.But stay in position and you give him time and space between the liens. Double mark him and you leave Xavi and Iniesta extra space to control the game. When opposition teams tried to adapt, they would often see false 9 Messi developping counter strategies. For example having a midfielder to man mark him or dropping their entire defensive block so that the space between the lines almost disappeared.
But this just led to new innovations. When he was man marked, Messi started to make more explosive movements. He dropped deep, dragging his marker with him then suddently accelerated into the space behind. Messi in 2011 and 2012 was probably peak of what is possible on a football pitch. 73 goals just in the 2011 / 2012 season and 91 goals overall just in 2012 in all official matches. This was a player who mastered every aspect of attacking football. The spatial awareness to find pockets between the lines, the close control to operate in tight space, the passing range to release runners, the finishing ability to convert chances, the decision making to know when to do which. Messi was the best in the world at each of these things. Messi continued to tweak the false 9 role for the 2 following seasons. Early on his false 9 days Messi would drop deep only when Barcelona had possession but now he was mixing it up, sometimes staying high and pinning the center backs, other times he would drift into the channels. The predictable patterns were gone, replaced by a fluid interpretation of space and opportunity. The physical demands of the role were immense. He wasn't just moving vertically but covering the entire attack in third. Yet somehow his efficiency still stayed the same. He became a master at conserving his energy, picking his moments to explode into life. Where the young Lionel Messi was all about hassling and harrying the opponents, defensively now he still stood still. In the 2014 / 2015 with Luis Enrique's arrival alongside the signing of Suarez in attack, the question was how to accomodate the best 9 in the world and the best false 9 in the world. The initial solution was clunky with Suarez pushed out on the right wing with Messi staying as false 9. However that didn't maximize Suarez's strenghts and he was neuted out wide. So Luis Enrique moved Messi back to the right wing. At first it looked like a regression.

However the position shift worked because it wasn't really about positions. While on paper Messi started on the right, Messi had complete freedom to drift wherever he saw space, and combinations were beautiful. When Messi dropped deep, Suarez's movements would pin the defenses back, preventing them to step up and press Messi. Meanwhile, Neymar would drift inside from his left wing, creating a direct passing option. If teams committed midfielders to press Messi, they left space for Neymar. If they sat deep to deny space, they would give Messi more time to orchestrate. Their chemistry transcended tactics. For all their tactical ability, the real magic was in the rotations. One moment Suarez was darting wide dragging a center back, the next, Messi would exploded into the space and Neymar would come short pulling his fullback forward, creating space for Messi to release a diagonal in behind. Every moment had a purpose and every run create space for someone else. Under Luis Enrique, Barca became more direct, more vertical and mroe ruthless. The possession was still there but with a different purpsoe : get the ball into the front 3 as quick as possible and let them create chaos. Messi became the first connection, moving into the center of the pitch to play the initial pass. In was his first foray into his role as the primary conductor as his average passes per game and through ball increased from the 2013 / 2014 season to the 2014 / 2015 season. After the Enrique's era and after the MSN, Messi still continued to evolve. Neymar was gone and Suarez aging. But Messi transformed practically into an entire attack by himself. Initially under Valverde there was an attempt to maintain some semblance of the old structure. But Messi was dropping deeper and deeper to get the ball. And this wasn't calculated drops from his false 9 days but rather a necessity because his team needed him to be everywhere.

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By 2018 we see a player who is his team's best goalscorer, best creator and best progressor or the ball. His connectionwith Jordi Alba became Barcelona's main attacking weapon. Messi would drop into the midfield almost to the halfway line, wait for Alba runs and make his trademark diagonical passes behind the defense. It worked for a while with Barcelona winning the 2019 liga title. However, the team has become almost entirely dependent on Messi's individual brillance. If he had an off day, Barcelona didn't really have a plan B. Coutinho was bought to provide some creative support. However he never seemed quite. Griezmann foud himself occupying the same space as Messi and Dembélé was too injury prone and inconsistent. Under Koeman was probably the worst period for Messi and Barca. His deeper positionning became almost permanent. The bursting runs became more selective. Every run, every pass every decision had to matter because the margin of error was much smaller for him. They experimented the 4 2 3 1, the 3 5 2 but they all had the same basic : get the ball to Messi and hope that he can create something. The connection with Alba became more predictable. Messi knew exactly where to position himself to infuence the game while conserving his energy.He drifted into pockets of space, scanned the field and then either released a pass or got passed his defender if the opportunity presented itself. And the arrival of youngsters like Pedri or Fati offered glimpses of what could have been. Fresh legs and minds to share the creative burden. But financial reality caught up with huge wages spent on failed Neymar replacements. Increasingly we were seeing Messi trying to keep afloat a team that was breaking down around him. He went from being the center piece of Guardiola's perfect system to be the system all by himself.

In PSG Messi had to adapt to a system rather than a system adapting to him. Under Pochettino, PSG initially tried to use Messi in 2 distinct ways. In a 4 2 3 1 he would operate as the attacking midfielder while against tougher oppositions they would switch to a 4 3 3 with Messi nominally on the right. But the same player who mastered to art of dropping deep was now being asked to do it even more in Paris because their midfield was functional in trying to make up for the lack of defensive solidity of the front 3. In his first season at PSG, Messi's touches in the midfield third increased compared to his final season at Barcelona. But his progressive passes dropped Rather than the receive he was becoming the progressor, the opposite of what made him so lethal in the final third at his peak at Barca. In ligue 1 during his first season, in 26 appearances he only scored 6 goals. He hit the woodwork 10 times and increased his assists to 14 compared to his last season at Barcelona. Then under Christophe Galtier in the 2022 / 2023 season, PSG switched to a back 3 and occasionally a narrow 4 3 1 2. Now Messi was at closer proximity to his fellow attackers with the width being provided by the wingbacks Hakimi and Mendes. This meant he could focus on finding pockets of space between the lines rather than having to worry about providing the width himself. The new system also solved the build up issues with 4 players in the midfield either by default or Messi and Neymar dropping as the dual 10s. PSG could create a box structure that usually guaranteed a free man in the midfield. When the opponents pressed PSG's pivots, usually Verratti and Vitinha, either Messi or Neymar would be free between the lines In Inter Miami his teammates work hard for him defensively, create space and trust that when the moment comes, the magic will be there for Lionel Messi to make the difference. HIs evolution is basically complete now. The same can be said for his days with Argentina national team.

How Messi's Final Evolution Conquered The World

At WC 2006 Messi was not a superstart yet He was still a teenager. That being said his talent was already obvious to the world. But he was not s starter. Pekerman, Argentina's manager, set to play a 4 4 2 diamond, meaning that Messi's natural position at the right wing was not available. There were only 2 positions that Messi could occupy. The center forward role and the number 10 position. But Saviola and Crespo, players far more experienced and recognized, were the 2 center forwards. Riquielme was playing as the number 10 and at this time, it was impossible to drop him. Messi played 122 minutes out all the 480 minutes Argentina played. Messi was introcued replacing Mexi Rodriguez agianst Serbia while Argentina already was winning 3 0. With Messi's introduction, Riquelme moved deeper on the pitch. Messi's first contribution was receiving from Riquelme and dribbling past his man. Messi and Riquielme, spotted a weakness and played a quick free kick. Messi squared the perfect ball for Crespo to tuck in. Tavez was also playing as a center forward. Crespo, the superstar back then, was partnering him. Tevez was running in behind, dropping deep, pulling out wide. to sniff out every opportunities. These 4 combined perfectly. Messi started the folllowing match upfront with Tevez. But the game ended up 0 0 with much goal chances. And the problem of Argentina's shape started to emerge and for the round of 16, Messi found himself again on the bench. The game being 1 1, Pwkerman pulled out his ace and bring on Messi. it almost worked. With almost the last kick of the game, Messi had scored a goal.

But the goal was called offside. Against lesser opponents, Messi could play in the 10 role as Riquelme playing deeper could still drift around without worrying too much about being exploited defensivly. Better teams could take advantage of this so against Netherlands and Mexico, Riquelme played the 10 role. So when they played both at the same time, Messi had to play more as a traditionnal center forward. But Messi wasn't yet at his fully best on top especially if opponents opted to get more physical. So Messi dropped in 10 role but Riquelme alraedy playing this role, they got into each other at times, reducing the effectivness of both. So on extra time Argentina had to rely on an absolute stunner to get them to the next round. Against Germany in quarter final Messi dropped back on the bench because of the tactical problems from the prevoous match. Pekerman didn't want to bring Messi on it would affect the balance of its side. Argentina would loose to penalties against Germany after 0 0 score. Pekerman said to Messi that he knew that he could become the best player in the world but that wasn't his world cup yet. He told that Messi's world cup would be the one held in South Africa. The world cup was held in 2010, with Messi wearing the iconic Argentina's number 10 shirt. Argentina's manager was the legend Maradona himself. Maradona had a few management experience but went on to retire before being dragged out of his retirement for thie world cup. During the qualifications for World Cup, Maradona used one hundred of diferent players. But there was not a correlation between the amout a time a player would play with the odd of this player making it to the world cup. At the end of the day, it was a matter of if Maradona was a fan or got along with the player. The biggest victim of that was Riquelme who went on missing the world cup.

The inconsistency of Maradona's argentina was seen during the qualifications with Argentina only finishing fourth. Maradona was accused of having bad or no tactics at all in this world cup. In 8 matches under Maradona, Messi scored only 1 goal in 8 appearances. Maradona also opeted for a 4 4 2 diamond with Heinze and Gutierrez as the fullbacks. Rodriguez and initially Di Maria would flank Mascherano in that miedfield. Messi would be the 10 behind Higuain and Tevez. Mascherano established himself as an elite miedfielder so he was started in central position The 2 guys flanking him, Rodriguez and Di Maria was in fact 2 miedfielders being forced to tuck in as cental miedfielders. Heinze despite his best efforts was not an up and down fullback. Gutizrrez could as a natural miedfielder, push up but generally thse fullbacks were not that great at providing width. It was because Maradona had crammed all his talented players throught the spine. So with the ball Di Maria would immediatly attack the wing Rodriguez and Mascherano could then shift into a double pivot. It left the right side vacated so Higuain would often pop from center forward position Not the ideal situation so Rodriguez would often drift to the right wing. Messi has transitionned between 2006 and 2010 from an inverted winger to a false 9 meaning that the 10 position was one step deeper than he was used to play. But Messi being Messi at times he could make it work. Plus with Messsi receiving between the lines, Higuain and Tevez were mobile enough to move out wide, dropping deep or at time interchanging with Messi. The third goal in the 4 1 match against South Korea was the best example of this. Argentina would then emerge victorious 3 1 against Mexico against in the round of 16.

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But the tactical problems they had experienced were emphasized Superior talent was no longer enough. The problem with Di Maria and Rodriguez wide roles meant that Mascherano would be often isolated. Opposite teams would often look to man mark him or commit 2 mens when the double pivot Rodriguez joined him. Argentina had 2 solutions against this. Either the one they choose against Mexico with all their talents being upfront and Mascherano being the only miedfield and get the ball from back to front as quickly as possible. They sacrified the control of the miedfield, resulting in a basketball style end to end encounter. Even Maradona had to accept that this all out attack strategy was untenable. Second solution to support Mascherano and Rodriguez was having Messi to drop deeper and deeper until he popped up as a traditionnal miedfielder.This was not the 2022 version of Messi who was used to this but the 2010 one who went from inverted winger to false 9, with blistering pace, amazing dribbling ability and incredible eye for goal. But at times he played so deep that he could barely see the goal. Before the tournament Maradona had considered playing a 4 4 2 with Veron instead of Rodriguez and Messi as the forward floating around. But Tevez was playing to well to be dropped so to accomodate tevez and the talented forwards, Messi had to play deeper. People said that if Messi was here vs Germany in 2006 he would have make the difference and now Messi had the chance to proof it in 2010 as Argentina would face Germany again in the quarter finals. But Germany had Khedira, Ozil, Muller, Kross, Neuer, talented youngsters who would become superstars later, mixed with established world class players like Schweinsteiger , Klose and Lahm.
When defending the Germans sat in 4 2 3 1 formation with Ozil glued to Mascherano. The wingers would tuck narrow to cover the passing lanes higher up the pitch. With Rodriguez and Di Maria attacking the flanks whenever Messi dropped deeper to receive the ball the Germans immediatly flooded him, suffocating him. Argentina could not get the ball to their talented forwards in good zones. Messi dropped deeper and deeper but the Germans tailed him and to make matters worse, Germany were looking to exploit another Argentina's weakness, the fullbacks. When the fullbacks looked to push up to provide width, this would create huge gaps in the defense during transitions from opponents. Also, injuries meant that a youg Nicola Otamendi had to play out of position as a right back. WHatever Germany won the ball in the crowded center of the pitch, Podolski and Muller would attack the flanks with ferocity. It led up to the first goal. Second goal saw Di Maria being drawn out of meidfield to fall back for attack. Khedira walks past Messi Otamendi was 2 v 1 situation. Otamendi over committed, allowing Podolski to make the run on the outside to assist Klose. The third and fourth goal were pretty much similar, while the first one was Germany exploiting Mascherano being the solde central meidfielder and switching to Podolski in the left wing, where Otamendi over commited and fouled him, leading to the free kick and allowing Germany to score their first goal. Back in the home, the theory that Messi only over performed with his club was beginning to take some credence. He would have to wait another 4 more years to have another shot.

This 2014 world cup wwould be hoested by Argentina's rivals, Brazil. The pressure was bigger than never. In the 2011 copa america, Messi's side disappointed squeaking past the group stage before immediatly being knocked out by Uruguay in quarter finals on penalties. Argentina's manager in 2014 was Alejandro Sabella. Sabella was more thinking about safety. he started the tournament with a back 3. Despite having Zabaleta as a great right back and a solid Rojo on the left handside, neither of them were traditionnal wingbacks. So even when they were very hgih on 1 v 1 situations they weren't diferent speakers. The extra man on defense was a manner to maintain more defensive solidity. However the miedfield against Bosnia was still the same that the Maradona's one in the WC 2010. With Di Maria and Rodriguez splitting to support the wingbacks, Mascherano would be once against isolated. Rodriguez even when dropping deeper alongside him, was not a natural dee miedfielder so ball progression was not his speciality. It evolved into familiar situation with Messi having to drop deep leaving Aguero isolated. Argentina ended up winnign 2 1 barely. But more important than the win were the half times substitutions. Gago came instead of Rodriguez and Higuain played as the second forward alongside Aguero. Now Messi was trully a 10 in this diamond formation. Messi ended up an inonic goal after combining with Higuain. Sabella then stuck with the diamond shape. But next match against Iran was 0 0 until the extra time where a Messi's magic moment gave them the win. Messi scored then twice against Nigeria. But they conceded 2 goals showing that the diamong miedfield was still vulnerable and for the same reasons than Maradona did.
4 years earlier Maradona adapted his side to fit Tevez but now Sabella adapted his side to make Messi to get the best out of Messi. Argentina switched to a 4 2 3 1 with Aguero being dropped on the bench. This had a double several benefits. Firstly doubel pivot meant MAscherano would not be overloaded anymore and also quality players like Lavezzi and Di Maria in the wings allowed Messi to thrive in the 10 rule. This shape helped Argentina winning the match against Switzerland in the extra time. Building with the double pivot the attackers could stay higher on the pitch Messi was supported in this 10 role by Higuain on the side That freed Di Maria on the right side to finish from Messi's assist. This shape carried Argentina past way until the final, passing Belgium in the quarter finals, and Netherlands in the semi finals. Argentina had the chance to take their revenge against the nation who broke their dreams on 2 several occasions : Germany. But Germany was similar from previou tournament except with even more experience. They were high on confidence after demolishing 7 1 on the semi final and all the youngsters from WC 2010 were now world class. Di Maria couldn't play due to an ijury but Perez took his place. Di Maria was crucial in Argentina's path. Argentina wanted to lean on their defensive capability and their ability on the counter. When Germany had the ball, Argentina sat in 4 4 2 looking to keep Messi and Higuain behind the ball withthe narrow wingers helping to compact the space. But when Argentina was on the ball, Germany swarmed them like bees. It was priem German football when Klopp and Guardiola were training Bundesliga's team, Bayern Munich and Dortmund, setting up complexe pressing systems that would win the ball back in mere seconds.

That translated into the national team. Germany's miedfield 3 ended with superior pass accurary compared to Argentina's miedfield. Argentina wanted to capitalize the counter attacks with Messi starting them, looking to hit Germany hard and fast. Higuain infamously had a poor finishing this final just like Palatio. But Messi himself wasn't perfect. In early second half Germany over committed, allowing Argentina to pick up the ball. Messi made the run between the center backs and was foud with a perfect pass. It took a great first touch. Messi now needed to beat the best goalkepper in the world, Manuel Neuer. His shoot went wide and it would be the biggest chance he would have the entire game. In extra time after a great run from Andre Schurle, Mario Gotez received from his chest and finished perfectly to win Germany to world cup. Messi wnning the best player award of tournament would be a scanned consolation. It was Messi's best chance. Many view 2018 as Messi's best chance. Sampaoli was the new manager and he had done well with Sevilla and won the copa america with Chile. But things weren't looking good in the qualifying stages. Argentina needed a hat trick from Messi vs Ecuador to allow them to participate in the world cup. People were already wondering if Sampaoli's complex high pressing football could be translated into international football and if he had necessary CV and aura to command a dresssing room like this. He had new starting 11 and formation in every single match. Messi was tested as second stricker with Aguero but also in 3 4 3 with Messi being on the right side vs Croatia and on the right in 4 3 3 vs Nigeria, finally finishing as a false 9 flanked by Di Maria and Pavon. In every matches Argentina struggled badly almost like if every team had figured out a way to counter them as soon as the match started.

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First match was a draw vs Iceland who would press high Argentina's center backs and picking up Mascherano which would force long balls to Messi and Aguero against the gigantic Iceland's centre backs. Not the ideal opition. In deeper situations Iceland would defend into a 4 5 1 formation, extremly deep, narrow and compact. Mascherano was struggled for ball progression but he couldn't pass this compact block and Messi struggled to make any impact on the game, even missing a penalty during this match. Argentina's only goal came from Rojo taking a speculative shoot from a terrible angle, scuffing his way so bad that he actually somehow found Aguero who controlled it and finished. Iceland's shape meant Messi had to drop very deep to dribble and create chances almost all by himself. But against Croatia, everything went crashing down. Sampaoli used a 3 4 3 formation with MEssi on the right side with Acuna and Salvio as the wingbacks. It was not their ideal positions. Sampaoli wanted them very wide and to push high to have their forwards more centrally and having Messi to drop in a 10 role. Croatia fof the ball were happy just as Iceland to drop deep and very compact Sometimes Perisic and Rebic, the wingers would drop so deep that they would look like a back 6. It allowed the back 4 to remain compact.The narrow 3 in front of them made it almost impossible to find the forwards in dangerous situations. Messi was only limited to one shoot in this match. To make things worse the wingbacks were given so many attacking responsabilities that they rarely tracked back. It left the back 3 exposed during transitions. And this back 3 was simply not good enough to handle it.

It was shown in Croatia's second goal. The wingbacks were so high that MAscerano had to cover Rebic, leaving a big hole in the miedfield for Modric to exploit. Argentina needed to win against Nigeria to go in the roud of 16 and even if they won, they didn't look like promising at all. Only notable things were a moment of asolute magic from Messi and then Rojo giving them the lead at the end of the match. In the roud of 16 Argentina were knocked out by France 4 3. It showed that when the talents level were more than equal, they struggled tactically. As a throw back to his earlier carrer, Messi was moved in a false 9 position. But idfference is that Messi had the pace waiting for a center back coming at him, only to spin in behing to get away from him. But this time the defenders were more confident in following him deep. Secondly Barcelona had David Villa and Pedro who attacked the space he left vacated. But DI Maria hugging the touchline in the left wing and Pavon doing the same thing meant that the central zones were not occupied outside Messi. Also France were a counter attacking team giving the possesion to Argentina They used their pace on the transitions to dominate. Argentina scored because of some lucky goals like Messi's shot being deflected by Mercado but also individual absolute brillance like Di Maria's equalizer in the first half time. Messi also had to drop below France's team to make an outstanding assist. With Scaloni however, things started to get diferent. Messi led Argentina to copa america's win in 2021 defeating their rival Brazil 1 0. It was followed with a 3 0 win against Italy in the finalissima. Suddently Messi won 2 trophies with Argentina and Messi came back to his balon d'or form at during the 2022 - 2023 season. The 2 first matches saw Argentina using 4 4 2 formation with a double pivot being Paredes and De Paul.
Saudi Arabia front 2 were willing to press the center backs. Or the front 2 coudl sit deeper on the double pivot to prevent any pass to them. So De Paul often dropped in center back position to allow an extra player chooice and the fullbacks to push higher. But the miedfield being vacated meant that Messi had to drop deep again. Against Mexico Enzo Fernandez came to replace Paredes and Julian Alvarez replaced Lautaro Martinez in front. This would change the entire Argentina's course during the world cup. The miedfield was now diferent with one of the pivots dropping into defense with Mc Allistair tucking into the half spaces as the fullback would push up. the ufllback being Tagliafico or Acuna on the left. This meant that Argentina always had at lest a miedfield 3. But with Messi dropping, it could also form a magical miedfield 4. Argentina having an extra man in the miedfield meant that they could work to get Messi as the free men. With Paredes and Fernandez Argentina had not 1 but 2 elite ball progressive talents. So Messi didn't need to drop as much as usual. Alvarez in front also seemed to run on battery as he would never stop pressing the opponent. Also the threat of Alvarez making runs behind was so huge that defenders had to drop deeper to prevent this creating more spaces for Messi.
But if opposition stayed high, Messi had a runner like Alvarez to play into the tiniest of gaps. This was seen against Croatia with Messi drawing a man to allow Alvarez to receive the ball to get the penalty. Against Netherlands in the quarter finals, Messi drawed Ake out of position to make a magical pass to Molina who was the right fullback. In this match Argentina used a 5 3 2 formation. With Alvarez drawing Van DIjk away Messi foud the tiniest space to make his passs allowing Molina to score. And there was also the moment Messi dribbled past Gvardiol in the semi final vs Croatia before passing for Alvarez to finish.Messi did almost 0 pressing since Alvarez's engine meant he could cover half of the region with De Paul taking care of the other side of the pitch. Argentina found itself very balanced.